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Introduction
Emmanuel Berger1 
Antoine Renglet
The papers in this volume were presented during an international conference at the UC-
Louvain on 30 and 31 May 2018. The aim of the meeting was to continue a discussion 
which had started in 2012 in Trento about ways in which populations can be involved 
in delivering justice, commonly termed popular justice. The earlier meetings, first in 
Trento2 and then in 2015 in Regensburg3 allowed us to expand our understanding not 
only of the wide range of fields related to the concept but also of the historical proces-
ses which influenced how various forms of popular justice emerged, were transformed 
or even became obsolete between the end of the eighteenth century and the present day. 
This seems to have been a key period for the increasing importance of the State and thus 
also for the State’s monopoly on acts of legitimised violence. This process, previously ex-
plored in works by authors such as Max Weber, Norbert Elias or even Michel Foucault, 
reflected an affirmation of the status of the Nation-State, resulting in the legitimisation 
and institutionalisation of justice as administered by the ‘people’, under the strict con-
trol of governments. Nonetheless, the means of establishing ‘institutional’ popular justice 
were far from straightforward. On the one hand, the legitimacy of the involvement of 
the people in matters of justice was repeatedly contested throughout the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries in Europe, both by conservative governments as well as legal profes-
sionals. The most obvious example of this is doubtless the popular jury in Spain which 
was subject to no less than nine reforms (adoption or subsequent suppression) between 
1809 and 1888.4 On the other hand, the rise of institutional popular justice did not at 
once replace all other modes of popular justice (be they violent, spontaneous, ritualised 
or traditional). There was a particular resurgence of these latter methods during periods 
of political transition or conflicts, or in the face of the breakdown or collapse of the State.
Following the two conferences, it became clear that, in order to better understand the 
multiple facets and nature of these movements in the context of the shifting political, 
economic and social climates of society in Europe, we would have to go beyond a strictly 
judicial approach to popular justice, and integrate this into a broader consideration of all 
the various forms of policing. Whether it was through the creation of ‘surveillance com-
1  Emmnuel Berger’s ORCID iD: 0000-0003-2797-7199
2  Popular Justice, ed. by Delivré, Berger and Löhnig.
3  Popular justice, ed. by Delivré and Berger.
4  Pérez Juan, ‘Popular Justice in Times of Revolution’, p. 45-67.
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mittees’ or ‘popular commissions’ in times of revolution,5 appeals for public denunciati-
ons during enemy occupation, the negotiation of acceptable norms for consensual po-
lice control, or even the establishment of bourgeois or citizens’ guards in order to combat 
bandits, at different times the people have been asked to participate in the process of po-
licing. This raises a number of questions: how were the public integrated into State-con-
trolled tools for policing? Which forms did these ‘popular police’ assume? What kind of 
relations did they have with professional bodies? And what means did the people use to 
exert influence on policies relating to public order?
The various answers to these questions seem all the more important given that, for a 
long time, the study of different aspects of popular police was limited by a rather dicho-
tomous vision of policing. This point of view encompassed either the traditional forms 
of policing from the Ancien Régime6 or those of the Modern State.7 For a long time, re-
search into popular policing under the Ancien Régime focused on the role played by 
neighbourhood groups, the ‘gardes bourgeoises’, or priests, or other organisations which 
were important for social control.8 Evolutions such as the decline of the bourgeois militia 
in the eighteenth century, the establishment of the gendarmerie in 1791/1796, the spread 
of ‘commissaires de police’ throughout Europe under Napoleon, and the establishment of 
the Metropolitan Police in England in 1829 are all regarded as signs of the triumph of the 
modern state and its bureaucracy over more traditional and popular methods of policing. 
Nonetheless, in recent years, scholars have begun to move beyond overly linear interpre-
tations of the state as a body with a monopoly on law enforcement.9
In Great Britain, France or even in Germany, research has shed light on the fact that 
during the course of the nineteenth century, members of the population were called upon 
to carry out certain police tasks.10 This popular participation also occurred repeatedly du-
ring periods of unrest or during war. As with popular justice, research into popular poli-
cing therefore requires a precise analysis of how the phenomenon evolved over time and 
throughout Europe as well as how it interacted – or did not interact – with state bodies. 
The texts collected in this volume study these dynamics in order to offer insight into both 
specificities and general trends of different forms of popular participation in policing du-
ring the period from the end of the Ancien Régime until the 1930s.
5  Les comités de surveillance, ed. by Pingué and Rothiot.
6  In terms of recent studies on the modernisation of the police from the eighteenth to nineteenth centuries, 
see the following, non-exhaustive, list: Williams, Police control systems; Organiser, innover, agir, ed. by 
Campion.
7  Churchill, ‘Rethinking The State Monopolisation’, p. 131-152.
8  Milliot, ‘Mais que font les historiens’; Social control in Europe, ed. by Roodenburg and Spierenburg.
9  Roodenburg, ‘Social Control Viewed from Below’, in Social control, ed. by Roodenburg and Spierenburg, 
p. 146-147.
10  Houte, ‘Citoyens policiers ?’, p. 100; Churchill, Crime control and Everyday Life; Johansen, ‘Police-Public 
Relations’, p. 499-501; Sälter, ‘Locale Ordnung und Soziale Kontrolle’; Lucrezio Monticelli, ‘Pratiques de 
police’.
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I. Popular policing during the Old Regime 
While the eighteenth century is generally seen as the time at which bourgeois police were 
being phased out, there are two papers in this volume, one by Brigitte Marin and the 
other by Livio Antonielli, which give some nuance to this affirmation. Their work shows 
above all that popular participation in policing was not in any way limited to the forma-
tion of militia. Brigitte Marin reminds us of the extent to which neighbourhood orga-
nisations which were originally established for the purpose of social control, in fact still 
existed until the end of the Ancien Régime in numerous towns throughout France. Fur-
thermore, these popular institutions which had been given police powers did not all ori-
ginate in the Middle Ages or towards the beginning of the early modern era. In addition 
we see that the idea of electing local police officers was not an innovation of the French 
Revolution.11 The cities of Naples and Madrid are perfect examples of this. In Naples, the 
people remained attached to the practice of electing capitani until the end of the eigh-
teenth century, and the people firmly defended their right to choose these local agents. 
Despite the election process, the inhabitants of the ottine – the districts of Naples – made 
sure that they chose capitani with impeccable reputations who had the skills required to 
carry out the role, assigning people such as property owners and craftsmen. With just 
a few exceptions, the capitani were in fact members of the communities which elected 
them, and were therefore very familiar with the neighbourhoods under their control. In 
her second case study, Marin demonstrates how the alcaldes de barrio of Madrid was an 
institution widespread throughout the whole of the Spanish empire. They too were a sign 
that popular participation in policing during the eighteenth century was not simply a 
leftover from the pre-existing medieval system. Rather, the creation of this institution in 
1768 was a response to a move to bureaucratise police work towards the start of the revo-
lutionary era, and, more generally, was part of a movement towards the professionalisati-
on of the police. The alcaldes were in favour of voting rights being reserved for the local 
elite in order to ensure that officials would be re-elected year on year. Even if the Ma-
drid government often expressed opposition to elections which were unfairly influenced, 
or even rigged, until 1801 they were still opposed to reducing the voter base, insisting 
that this function had originally been created in order to ensure that the poorest peop-
le would be represented within the legal bodies. In the end, numerous alcaldes de barrio 
were easily able to get themselves re-elected, suggesting that candidates were selected less 
for their technical abilities than for their reputations.
Like the alcaldes de barrio in Madrid, the examples of the Capitani di strada in Naples 
also show that the involvement of the people in policing was not necessarily incompatib-
le with the development of state institutions. The general aim of the institutional reforms 
at the end of the eighteenth century was to integrate these auxiliary popular groups in 
charge of social control into the royal justice or bodies of urban administration. A more 
specific example of this overlap of State authority with popular consent in police activi-
ty can be found in the esecutori of the Magistrato di Sanità, explored in Livio Antonielli’s 
11  Denis, ‘Les commissaires de police’.
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research on Milan in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Antonielli shows that the 
deputati di Sanità played auxiliary roles in justice, at the very bottom of the chain of hier-
archy of the administration of the Italian Duchy. They were chosen from the members of 
the community, and also appointed and paid for by the community. However, the legiti-
macy of the people selected relied on the Magistrato di Sanità. That is to say, it was deri-
ved from central power, whose only requirement was that these offices should be held by 
individuals who were deemed competent and of good reputation. 
Although there were different electoral systems in the different localities of the Duchy, 
the deputati di Sanità were generally all members of the local elite. They had to be able 
to write, and had to collaborate with doctors and surgeons in order to fulfil their obliga-
tions. In the event of a health crisis such as an epidemic, the Magistrato de Sanità would 
hand over responsibility for the sanitary police to another category of officials, the com-
missari forsensi, who, unlike the deputati di Sanità, were high-level public servants ap-
pointed by central government. Some were required to offer their services in case of 
significant health catastrophe, whereas others were chiefly in charge of the roads and 
borders of the Duchy. While performing their duties, the commissari forsensi were faced 
with the need to collaborate with the population. They could, for example, revive the ol-
der customary practices of defence in rural communities in order to exercise surveil-
lance over regions which were less firmly under the control of the officers of the state of 
Lombardy. The last and final category of esecutori of the Magistrato della Sanità were the 
anziani di parrocchia. These civil and licenced officers were elected by the heads of fami-
lies of the parishes of Milan. They held numerous competences in terms of police duties: 
seeing that streets were clean, controlling beggars, recruitment for the militia etc. 
The example of the esecutori of the Magistrato della Sanità offers a slight counterpoint 
to the received view that the English police force was unique in relying on the commu-
nity for the task of law enforcement. There were in fact numerous similar examples on 
the continent, and not only in the north of Italy. In their texts, Brigitte Marin and Livio 
Antonielli thus invite the reader to reconsider the view put forward by Michael Braddick 
that state institutions gradually appropriated police functions throughout the course of 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.12 
II. Popular policing during the French and Polish 
Revolutions
As the question of public law enforcement arose in France at the end of the Ancien Ré-
gime, it became the object of intense conflict between the different established autho-
rities at the start of the French Revolution. The contribution to this volume by Maria 
Betlem Castellà i Pujols offers insight into the role played by the Committee of Reports 
(Comité des Rapports) of the National Constituent Assembly in relation to the incre-
asing control over policing by legislators. The Constituents’ initial plan had been qui-
12  Braddick, State Formation. 
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te different. In fact, on 6 August 1789, the Constituent Assembly decided to entrust law 
enforcement to the municipal authorities. However, given the tumultuous events of the 
Revolution, it quickly became apparent that the local authorities were not systematical-
ly applying the decrees for which the legislators had voted. This reluctance to adopt the 
decrees was particularly evident when it came to enforcing martial laws. Therefore in or-
der to better enforce its decrees, the Constituent Assembly tasked one of its committees 
– the Committee of Reports – with preparing the measures necessary to re-establish pu-
blic order and implement laws. Between August 1789 and August 1791, this committee 
handled 20% of the correspondence addressed to the Constituent Assembly and produ-
ced 190 reports. This activity reflects its growing influence over the relevant prerogatives 
which in theory came from the government. The king repeatedly expressed his concern 
regarding the growing violence and demanded the reinforcement of the powers of public 
order. However his requests were refused every time by the Constituents who feared that 
this would lead to the reinstatement of a system of royal despotism. Distrust of the king, 
however, did not prevent the Committee of Reports from working jointly with the diffe-
rent ministries in order to take numerous appropriate measures. These included: com-
munication of decrees, approval or refusal of decisions by local authorities, suspension of 
responsible authorities, summoning the responsible authorities to appear in front of the 
Court of Orleans in case of crimes of lèse-nation. The Committee’s activity was gradually 
reduced over the course of the summer of 1790 following the elections of the representa-
tives of the districts and departments. From then on, a large proportion of matters of pu-
blic order would initially be dealt with by the elected district and department authorities, 
and the Committee would only be informed afterwards. However in case of conflict bet-
ween the local authorities, or during major eruptions of violence, the Committee would 
intervene directly by sending civil commissioners. Officially these commissioners were 
appointed by the king, but in actual fact they reported back on their missions only to the 
members of the Committee of Reports. After the fall of the monarchy, the National Con-
vention extended and enlarged this new method of law enforcement by deploying well-
known représentants en mission.
Michał Gałędek’s contribution shows at the same time as the situation in France 
around 1790 was generating discussion over different policing models, a similar deba-
te was also emerging in Poland. Starting from the second half of the eighteenth centu-
ry there were numerous reforms in the Republic of Two Nations which aimed to moder-
nise political institutions in Poland and Lithuania. The first moves towards reform were 
undertaken in the reign of Stanislas Auguste Poniatowski resulting in the adoption of the 
republican constitution by the Four Years’ Parliament on 3 May 1791. Over the course 
of these developments, parliament decided to abolish the convoluted system of tribu-
nals, which hereafter were to be in session permanently, and it also decided to require 
that judges should have previous experience of public office. This partial professionalisa-
tion was, however, tempered by the republican tradition which transformed the position 
of judge into an elected position which was performed with no pay. After Prussian an-
nexation in 1795, the debates over the choice between a ‘professional’ or ‘lay’ justice sy-
stem continued, and became even more animated following the creation of the Duchy of 
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Warsaw. From 1808 onwards, the Polish justice system was reorganised using the Napo-
leonic model. In civil matters, this reform was characterised by the adoption of the Code 
for civil procedures, as well as the Napoleonic Code and the justice of the peace. The Po-
lish justice of the peace was elected for a fixed term, and fulfilled the role without a sala-
ry. This model fitted the traditional “republican” approach to judiciary functions. Howe-
ver, in line with the reforms which were started during the ‘Four Years Diet’, some more 
professional aspects had been introduced. Contentious civil affairs and petty crimes were 
dealt with by the podsędek, a professional magistrate with a salary who was appointed 
for life. After the fall of the Empire and the integration of Poland into the Russian Em-
pire, a committee for civil reform was established with a view to reorganising the Polish 
judicial system. The work of the committee was reflected the general reaction against 
the French model which was considered foreign to the existing national legal and politi-
cal traditions. Specific suggestions of the members of the committee included abolishing 
the code of civil procedure, drastically reducing the justice budget, abolishing the positi-
on of podsędek, etc. The central suggestion for reform was to bring back a traditional sy-
stem of law enforcement based on a ‘citizens’’ magistrature, which was an unpaid positi-
on, elected for a fixed term by nobles and urban elites. At the same time, the members of 
the Committee agreed on partially adopting French law, promoting the function of the 
justice of the peace and the use of a popular jury. While the French legal model was even-
tually rejected by almost all of the European territories which had been liberated from 
the Napoleonic Empire, Poland thus stood out thanks to its continued attachment to the 
republican tradition of a non-professional justice system following principles similar to 
those the French revolutionaries fought for.
III. National Guards in the Nineteenth Century
The French influence can also be seen in another institution which became an emblem 
of the Revolution: the Garde nationale. This model was both exported into the annexed 
European territories of the Grande Nation, and was also reactivated during the revolu-
tions of the nineteenth century. This domestic force13 relied on popular adherence to the 
task of law enforcement and sought to assure the right of every citizen to arm themselves 
in order to guarantee their own security as well as that of their community. This volume 
contains three texts which consider the extent to which the national guard was a state or 
popular institution, although the short answer is that it was both.
The research of Francesco Dendena demonstrates that the national guard in the Ci-
salpine republic was organised by the minister of the Police, Gaetano Porro, as a means 
of controlling the rural territory and its villages. The initial reason why the minister put 
mobile columns (colonnes mobiles) into place was in order to fight the bandits who were 
ravaging the countryside of Lombardy. Matthias Pareyre’s research demonstrates that the 
decision to establish a national guard was not unequivocal. The guards never arose ex-
clusively as the result either of a central government decision or out of some ‘sponta-
13  Guibert, De la force publique.
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neous’ popular desire. In the eyes of the authorities, the national guard had the advantage 
of constituting a reserve force which could conduct policing duties but was also a way of 
maintaining discipline amongst the bourgeois youth. This latter function of the militia is 
indicated by the fact that they had to wear uniform, and that there were rules containing 
numerous provisions to ensure the discipline of the guards. Indeed, a few months after 
the 1830 revolution, the July monarchy reinstated the institution of the guard in order 
to project the image that the population was in support of Louis-Philippe. Nonetheless, 
as seen in the third contribution on this topic, Axel Dröber’s research has demonstrated 
how the government rapidly sought to contain this armed force, and in 1831 they passed 
a law regarding the organisation of the national guards. This law enforcement body was 
thus activated in times of trouble, in moments when the State was weak or even threate-
ned. Bandits and popular insurrections were also reasons to mobilise citizens. To start 
with, authorities invoked the revolutionary aspect in order to mobilise individuals, but 
this was gradually replaced by a role that was more police-like, and this role too even-
tually diminished. The development of these functions was accompanied by a reduction 
in engagement and weakening of discipline. In Rennes, for example, in the months after 
the National Guard was first established it gradually lost its prestige amongst the popula-
tion. The guards had ever less power to impose their authority and eventually even beca-
me the victims of aggressions.
These three contributions on the national guard also remind us that the memory of 
the revolutionary experience of 1789 remained extremely important throughout the ni-
neteenth century when the need arose for the fast and efficient reactivation of national 
guards. The memory of popular participation in policing is even more prominent gi-
ven that the episodes of insurrection in 1830, 1848 and 1871 were all reminiscent of the 
events of 1789. For the members of the national guard in Rennes, the task of law enforce-
ment was above all about defending the revolutionary institutions which protected po-
litical freedom. The capacity and opportunity for citizens to organise themselves into 
guards was regarded as the manifestation of a community’s sovereignty in the face of 
the state’s power. The texts in this volume relating to the National Guard also consider 
the question of how companies were recruited. Apart from the case of the Cisalpine, the 
companies of the guards consisted of young bourgeois men from the cities, thus provi-
ding a certain reminder of the bourgeois guards of the Ancien Régime. Until the midd-
le of the nineteenth century, it was expensive to join the National Guard and the role was 
thus reserved for members of the bourgeoisie. Starting in 1848, as Matthias Pareyre ex-
plains, the National Guard gradually opened up and became accessible to members of 
the proletariat. By 1870 it had become a reserve force on a national level with the aim of 
protecting France from Prussian invasion. 
From 1789 onwards, the national guard was both a body of politicisation and also a 
tool for law enforcement. In urban areas, the guard became a reinforcement for the po-
lice similar to that offered by the bourgeois militia during the Ancien Régime. On the 
borders of the Cisalpine Republic, the mobile columns of the national guard, which were 
first used only in exceptional circumstances, later came to be deployed for nightly pa-
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trols. In the course of their mission, the mobile columns would stop young men who 
were alone or small groups consisting of maximum four individuals. However, contra-
ry to the authorities’ claims, these columns were less involved in tackling larger groups 
of bandits, and more focused on catching petty thieves. In reality, the reason that the na-
tional guard carried out these patrols was to occupy public space and increase visibility 
of a force which was large in number and organised by citizens, thereby preventing dis-
ruptions to public order.
IV. Armed mobs and popular militia
However, reliance on the National Guard as a tool for law enforcement was not at all 
universally accepted in the nineteenth century, even in times of revolution. During the 
years following the fall of the Napoleonic empire, there were a multitude of insurrections 
in the southern regions of the Italian peninsula which were suppressed by the Bourbon 
kings. In this context, the year 1848 proved particularly dangerous for the crown since 
a revolution broke out in Sicily in January and managed to render the island indepen-
dent from the continent for a period of several months. On 15 May of that year, Ferdin-
and II violently suppressed an attempted revolt in Naples. In his contribution to this vo-
lume, Pierre-Marie Delpu analyses what repercussions the massacres of May 1848 had 
in the peripheral areas of Reggio-Calabria. In these regions, the revolutionaries conside-
red the events of May 1848 as a breach of the pact between the king and his people. The 
monarch’s legitimacy was supplanted by a new revolutionary legitimacy based on popu-
lar participation. The local elites (priests, land owners, mayors) established committees 
in the municipalities and appropriated the powers over police, justice and taxation which 
were previously in the hands of the king. For the defence of the different insurgent mo-
vements, their leaders decided to mobilise the people, arming them and cultivating their 
participation in law enforcement. Numerous debates arose between moderates and radi-
cals over the question of whether this popular participation should take the form of na-
tional guards. There was still a good deal of mistrust towards this institution which was 
associated with the old order, and the revolutionary elites were therefore in favour of mo-
bilising the population in another way, through the destruction of royal emblems, by rea-
ding anti-royalist sermons or even by performing rituals of popular justice against the ty-
rant. However, when faced with the weak level of politicisation among the population, 
the most efficient method of popular mobilisation seemed to be to offer financial rewards 
to the people through family and social networks.
Another example of popular participation in policing during a period of revoluti-
on can be found in Emilio Scaramuzza’s research into Sicilian squads. After Garibaldi’s 
army landed in Sicily in 1860, the Brigades of the Redshirts were so weak that the army 
had to enlist the help of popular squads in order to help defeat the troops loyal to King 
Francis II. However, these armed groups consisting mainly of poor farmers were invol-
ved not only in military action but also in policing Palermo and the surrounding coun-
tryside. One of Garibaldi’s priorities was, in fact, to avoid all anarchy in the town. The 
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squads were placed at strategic locations in order to keep watch over the land (ports, ba-
stions), and defend the new revolutionary order (city hall, university, police). In Palermo 
the squads patrolled the streets, often with the Redshirts, and intervened wherever they 
were needed. In the surrounding countryside, the squads played a particularly essenti-
al role in suppressing bandits. The new authorities gradually re-established the different 
urban police forces and were also able to rely on support from the army and the natio-
nal guard. Over time, the relationship between the squads and these different forces pro-
ved rather problematic, and this provoked numerous clashes between individuals, and 
conflicts in matters of jurisdiction. The violence and brutality perpetrated by the squads 
then became a threat to public order. In addition, as the threat from the Bourbons rece-
ded, there was increasing criticism of the lack of discipline amongst these groups leading 
to their gradual disbandment. This disbandment proved essential for Garibaldi to pro-
ject an image of order and stability to other European governments and to continue his 
advance beyond the Strait of Messina. Public law enforcement could no longer be in the 
hands of the divided popular police forces but instead would need to rely on a professio-
nal police force similar to those in the Kingdom of Sardinia. It was clear to the general 
that standardising the policing organisations in Sicily would contribute to the political 
and institutional unification of Italy.
Different forms of popular police, centred around what the American political scien-
tist Kowalewski termed ‘vigilantism’, tend to surface as soon as authorities begin to give 
the impression that they are not able to cope with social deviance. The authorities thus 
support different forms of popular participation in policing, yet like the rest of society, 
they will not stand for these groups themselves becoming a source of trouble. There were 
similarities between the situation in Sicily in 1860 as described above and the ‘vigilante 
groups’ established in Barcelona at the start of the twentieth century, researched by Flori-
an Grafl. From the start of the First World War until the Spanish Civil War, the violence 
which erupted in Barcelona in effect repeatedly led the authorities to establish auxiliary 
forces to keep public order, in addition to the ordinary police force. These included in-
formants who famously were recruited from the criminal underworld. However this was 
not always an efficient move as those very informants were often behind the violence 
which was widespread at that time in Barcelona, the capital of Catalonia. Ordinary po-
lice forces had difficulties keeping peace and order in the city and in this context, starting 
in 1918, the Federación Patronal of Catalonia established a parallel police force called 
the Banda Negra. Its members served as police-informants in a very organised way, and 
infiltrated the proletariat communities of Barcelona as agents provocateurs. Alongside 
other examples of popular participation in policing, Florian Grafl cites the case of the 
Sometent militia which was probably the most successful group. Initially active in the 
Middle Ages, there was renewed interest in the group during the second half of the ni-
neteenth century as part of a revival of Catalonian traditions. By 1919, 8000 members of 
this militia were patrolling the streets of Barcelona. As with the National Guards in Fran-
ce, in order to join the militia one needed a good reputation amongst the citizens of the 
city. The members of the Sometent had to be either professionals or property-owners. 
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Their mission was no different from that of the official police force, and the collaborati-
on between the different police forces suggests that the Sometent constituted a truly po-
werful force of auxiliary police. Both the Sometent and the Banda Negra were eventually 
dissolved, as they contributed to the escalation of violence in Barcelona, and also becau-
se it proved impossible for the authorities to control them.
V. Popular policing and crime
Popular participation in policing not only took the form of auxiliary police forces but 
also took the form of collaboration by consent of individual citizens. In her contribution 
to this volume, Maria João Vaz examines the situation in Lisbon in the nineteenth cen-
tury. The civil police force in Portugal’s capital city was originally inspired by the Metro-
politan Police in London. The influence of the English policing model was particularly 
noticeable through the force’s means of assisting the local population, a task to be con-
ducted by civil police guards in a consensual, even paternalistic way. The aim of the au-
thorities was to establish a civil, uniformed and non-armed police force. The main func-
tion of civil police officers was to patrol the streets of the city both day and night in order 
to safeguard the safety of people and property, as well as defending the other ‘rights of 
the citizens’. The working classes were likewise calling for the creation of a police force 
that could prevent and reduce criminality. Over the course of the nineteenth century, the 
labouring classes gradually came to accept that the police were acting in the interest of 
the people, and not only to the advantage of the ruling elites. From then on, police acti-
vity garnered increasing support from the people, at times even resulting in concrete ac-
tions like help from the public in arresting an individual.
By analysing the management of large crowds, Laurent Lopez’s research on France at 
the turn of the century demonstrates how people’s involvement in police actions influ-
enced the public order policy which was determined by the authorities. Under the Third 
Republic, public opinion became a factor which could influence the means and methods 
for maintaining public order. Certain sections of the population even put pressure on 
police authorities by voicing their opposition to the budget allocated for police salaries 
when this came before the municipal council. Groups of the population also resorted 
to petitions in huge numbers in order to argue for increased measures for security, and 
for the right to play an active role in police activities. In addition, unlike petitions which 
were becoming an out-dated means of communication between rulers and the peop-
le, the written press enjoyed a veritable explosion in printing numbers during the Bel-
le Époque. The press came to be considered as the legitimate mouthpiece of a populati-
on which was calling for greater efficiency from its police forces. In conclusion, the forces 
which the state provided to maintain public order could not work efficiently in a society 
which was lacking in social cohesion, nor could they function without the involvement 
of the public.
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VI. Popular Denunciations
One of the most symbolic demonstrations of public involvement in police activities du-
ring contemporary history can be seen in the act of denunciation. The activities of the 
Haute Police during the era of the Consulate and the Napoleonic Empire were often 
compared to the government who made use of thousands of spies to monitor and de-
nounce enemies. In her research, Jeanne-Laure Le Quang analyses the role played by 
the fanciful stories perpetuated by the Haute Police. While it is always risky to precisely 
quantify such matters, it seems that the police and Ministry of the Interior actually made 
use of a far smaller number of informants than legends would have us believe. On the 
other hand, the tasks of the Haute Police included surveillance and prevention not only 
of political crimes but also regular crimes. To this end, informants from a range of social 
backgrounds would spy on gambling houses, cafes, salons or even theatres. This led to 
rather fluid boundaries between the world of crime and that of the informants. Some in-
formants, such as Pierre-Hugues Veyrat or Jean-André François, managed to exploit this 
fluidity to aid of their own social climbing. As well as surveillance, the informants were 
also tasked with influencing public opinion by spreading rumours, in particular stories 
in support of the Consulate and later the Empire. Thanks to their double role of surveil-
lance and influencing the public, the informants played a key role in ‘establishing con-
sent’ to Napoleonic rule. In addition to these ‘professional’ informants, the government 
also relied on the help of lay citizens. The police ministers of the Consulate and the Em-
pire were building on the heritage of the revolutionary culture of popular denunciati-
ons, using public proclamations to encourage people to denounce the enemies of pu-
blic order. The penal code of 1810 helped institutionalise this process and encouraged 
popular denunciation by offering remissions of sentences or sanctions in exchange. The 
records of letters of denunciation show that accusations were mostly made against indi-
viduals who had expressed anti-government opinions, against those who were deemed 
insufficiently patriotic, or those who were not from the local area. It seems also that the 
authors of the letters made fluent use of the official rhetoric of the regime in relation to 
policing, and also followed the development of repressive politics. The fact that the au-
thors were able to use the official rhetoric in fact allowed them to manipulate denuncia-
tions and use them to personal advantage: requesting compensation for costs incurred 
from surveillance activities; requesting work, titles, awards; taking the opportunity to get 
rid of a political or personal enemy etc. Although often tied up with personal aims, the-
se denunciations were the main way in which the police could place an individual under 
surveillance. This overlap between individuals and government interests points to an al-
ternative view of a population who otherwise might could be seen solely as ‘victims’ of 
the police regime. Yet in reality, it was very clear to the governments of the Consulate and 
of the Empire that they had much to gain from popular participation in the work of the 
haute police and they therefore continued to encourage this participation in order to re-
inforce the legitimacy of the Napoleonic order.
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The research of Ronan Richard also analyses the issue of popular denunciations, not in 
relation to the Consulate or the Napoleonic Empire but during the First World War. In 
that context of whole-scale mobilisation, the press and French publications incited fear 
of ‘the enemy from within’ and of spies connected to the Germans. Those members of the 
population who had stayed on the home front actively participated in the search for spies 
across the whole of France. This activity was seen as a public contribution to the war ef-
fort. A particularly large number of denunciations came from the coastal regions where 
refugee camps were situated along with work camps and also holiday homes frequented 
by Germans before the war. The enemies of the state who were denounced were not only 
Germans but also people from groups mistaken for Germans in the popular imaginati-
on such as people from Alsace, Lorraine, the Swiss, Russians and other foreign refugees. 
Anyone foreign to the native population came to be seen as suspect. There was such a le-
vel of mistrust that even just being a tall, blond man, or an overly-hairy woman (seen as 
a sign of a male spy disguised as a woman) became targets for suspicion. The same was 
true for any individuals who had a name that was German, or German-sounding. This 
fear was compounded by the recent arrival of large numbers of refugees along with the 
construction of internment camps for prisoners of war and the people of the German 
and Austro-Hungarian Empires. As shown by Jeanne-Laure Le Quang’s research on the 
period of the French Consulate and the Empire, patriotic denunciations were often dri-
ven by a personal motivation. This was particularly true of the work camps, as people 
complained that the products being manufactured there provided unfair competition for 
domestic producers. The denunciations were generally taken seriously by the authorities 
and were investigated in order to avoid any new wave of popular violence similar to the 
events of the first months of 1914.
People were not only encouraged to make popular denunciations in order to re-
inforce authoritarian regimes, or during wars. In the chapter by Laurence Montel, we 
learn about the case of Claude Malméjac, an 18 month year old child who was kidnap-
ped from 29 November to 2 December 1935, which is an exceptional example of acti-
ve collaboration between the police and the population of Marseille. The unusual thing 
here was the fact that the police and justice authorities encouraged the collaboration. 
Faced with a stalling official investigation, the authorities launched an appeal for wit-
nesses via telegraph and newspapers. In the space of five days, they received dozens of 
letters and denunciations. Analysing this correspondence we uncover a great social di-
versity amongst the authors of the letters. Postmen, teachers, unemployed people, me-
chanics, judges and even ex-convicts responded. They were not satisfied merely with de-
nouncing suspects, or suggesting lines of enquiry; they themselves became involved in 
the inquiry by interrogating and even shadowing their neighbours. Mediums and occul-
tists also became involved, drawing on their expertise and new ‘sciences’ in order to find 
the Malméjac child. This democratisation of inquiry methods also had a direct impact 
on the professional police forces and judicial authorities. The judge in charge of the in-
vestigation was able to rely on the support of hundreds of inspectors from different po-
lice forces. In view of the case’s importance, the judge gave the police a great deal of auto-
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nomy, contributing to a dilution of professional hierarchies and less delineation between 
traditional areas of specialisation. For a period of several days, judges, police and mem-
bers of the public together became a vast community of investigators. This mobilisation 
of the population can be explained by the fact that this event called to mind previous dis-
appearances (Nicole Marescot in 1935, Charles Lindbergh in 1932), and led to a fear of 
the spread of American ‘gangsterism’. The public enthusiasm can also be explained by the 
level of media and press attention which the case garnered. Journalists were not satisfied 
simply with reporting on the efforts of the police but also acted like inspectors themsel-
ves, promising rewards in order to get the public to assist them. Indeed the press gained 
such importance that the police and magistrates planned their actions according to the 
leads which the journalists were following. France in the thirties was marked by a series 
of crises, yet this exercise in popular, collective policing seemed to have managed, at least 
for duration of this case, to re-establish a moral, political and social unity.
Having given an overview of the work in this collection, it only remains for us to ex-
press our thanks to the people and institutions who have helped make possible the or-
ganisation of this conference on ‘Popular Policing in Europe (18th-19th Centuries)’. The 
FNRS and the Institut des Civilisations, Arts et Lettres (INCAL) of the Université catho-
lique de Louvain whose financial and logistical support enabled the conference to take 
place in the best possible conditions. We would also like to thank the members of the sci-
entific committee14 of the conference as well as the editorial board15 of the Rechtskultur 
– Zeitschrift für Europäische Rechtsgeschichte, which agreed to publish the present vo-
lume. 
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Elective popular offices and urban law 
enforcement in the 18th century
Brigitte Marin
During the 18th century, and even more so afterwards, the development of police ser-
vices in Ancien Regime towns is marked by the decline of civilian police forces made up 
of local inhabitants giving way to an increased professionalization of this workforce and 
to a wider centralisation of its command chain. At the time, local populations agreed to 
the partial transfer of their supervisory powers, previously embodied by middle-class 
watches for example, to law enforcement professionals specifically paid to ensure public 
peace. There has been a multiplication of studies on very diverse European towns in the 
last few years, with a particular focus on daily surveillance practices, on the police pro-
fession, and on the relationships between power-holding agents and local populations, 
which have allowed for a better comprehension of the evolution of police forces at the 
end of the modern period. They have revealed that far from being a linear process lea-
ding to community police forces and a centralised state police, this evolution is characte-
rized by many local variations in public order improvements, sometimes even by reverse 
movements tending to revitalize neighbourly organisations deeply rooted in local spaces 
dating sometimes back to the Middle Ages.1
Middle-class watches (or militias) who mainly guaranteed the safety of French towns at 
night were generally criticised, especially in the second half of the 18th century, for their 
inadequacies when faced with urban growth and the ‘rise of perils’. Popular upper clas-
ses were however becoming more and more reluctant to provide this service for the com-
munity and attempted to free themselves from this chore by paying out substitutes who 
were more interested in the meagre earnings than in any civic participation. The suc-
cess of these professional, specialised and paid lookouts in replacing middle-class wat-
ches in many large towns, must not overshadow resistance movements against this trend 
in places such as Nantes2 or Marseille3 where traditional law enforcement  continues un-
1  Denys, ‘The Development of Police’.
2  Stéphane Perréon showed that despite both the 1786 royal decree and the Intendant’s and Brittany’s Chief 
Commander’s commitments for the establishment of a professional watch, the reform did not succeed 
when faced with the municipality’s opposition who defended a preventive deterrent neighbourhood po-
lice force well-established in the urban fabric and with proven intelligence methods (Perréon, ‘Guet pro-
fessionnel’, pp. 151-167).
3 In Marseille, magistrates promoted successive improvements in the bourgeois militia. The latter was un-
der the command of four neighbourhood captains generally designated every year by the City Council 
and originating from honourable city families. Strengthening the workforce with extra guards and esta-
blishing new watches were preferred to the introduction of a ‘royal’ watch in order to retain control over 
the town watch and to prevent the expenses of paid troupes (Rosania, ‘La configuration de la police’, 
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til the Revolution. Their military role having become marginal, these middle-class mi-
litias managed to retain essential policing functions in their role as mediators between 
the authorities and local populations in urban space management and public peacekee-
ping. They maintained the vivacity of interpersonal relationships and collective vigilance 
within the neighbourhood and contributed to the integration of the working class within 
the life of the municipality.4 In Toulouse, the decline of middle-classes’ military func-
tions did not affect the dizeniers police activities. These local agents inherited from the 
Middle Ages (roughly 450 in the middle of the 18th century) pursued voluntary missi-
ons of surveillance, peacekeeping, mentoring and information around the blocks they li-
ved on, in exchange for the dignity and small privileges these functions bestowed upon 
them.5 On the contrary, they acquired new policing duties in the second half of the cen-
tury (ticketing, conducting searches, public lightning) and became commissaires de quar-
tiers (‘neighbourhood superintendents’) in 1783 identified through their uniforms. The-
re are corresponding dizeniers figures in Bordeaux or in Lille, or under different names in 
other places like for instance the connétables des rues in Valenciennes whose functions at 
the ruage level (understood here as a little civilian constituency) were modernised by the 
municipality from 1768 onwards.6 
Numerous towns therefore retained more or less institutionalised neighbourhood or-
ganisations until the end of the Ancien Regime, coordinated by small-scale dignitaries 
from the local community, whose role in the arbitration of small conflicts, in social me-
diation and conciliation, as a relay for local authority, and in assisting in the identification 
and arrest of delinquents, was accepted by both local inhabitants and high-level authori-
ties. They preserved a sense of neighbourly sociability and solidarity as well as a collecti-
ve control over local behaviour patterns. These duties were not financially rewarded and 
those who performed them received simple honorary retributions. Devoid of any coer-
cive power, they did have a certain authority whilst remaining close to their constituents 
on behalf whom they could also speak out when needed. These institutions and practices 
carried on throughout the 18th century and were sometimes even renewed and impro-
ved – financial considerations did play a role in the authorities’ decision to uphold them 
as middle-class duties were exercised without payment – yet they were also criticised as 
they placed law enforcement powers in the hands of people of an inferior rank, often ac-
cused of ignorance and corruption, ill-prepared to the recording and writing duties that 
were increasingly demanded by the administration. 
These subordinate roles often remain rather unknown as they have left few and dis-
continuous traces in the archives. It is therefore difficult to make out precisely how one 
would gain access to these duties or to measure the attractiveness of the position, and 
even less so to assess the agents’ motivation. Their modes of designation varied between 
towns. They seemed to be mostly chosen and nominated directly by officials, sometimes 
pp. 141-156) .
4 Saupin, ‘La milice bourgeoise?’
5 Laffont, ‘La police de voisinage’.
6 Denys, Police et sécurité, pp. 328-332. Denys, ‘The Development of Police’, pp. 338-339.
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for long times periods – as long as they were able to exercise their duties – like the di-
zeniers in Toulouse,7 sometimes via an annual rotation system, like the neighbourhood 
captains in Marseille. They were close to the population as they carried out their mo-
nitoring, registration and reconciliation missions thanks to their long-established resi-
dence within the neighbourhood8 and their social profiles – mostly craftsmen and small 
merchants. In other cases the population was required to take part in an elective process 
to make sure these duties went to those most likely to be heard and respected by the lo-
cals. It is precisely on these forms of popular expressions and on the local participatory 
processes in the designation of local law enforcement agents that I would like to focus, in 
order to better comprehend these forms of popular policing during the Ancien Regime. I 
will look more specifically at two case studies located in Southern European capital cities 
where policing powers were shared between royal tribunals and local authority and whe-
re the reinforcement of royal police forces, in the last third of the 18th century, was used 
for the expansion of monarchical government intervention in city management. On the 
one hand, there are Naples’ capitani di strada (‘street captains’), a long-established part of 
the local authority’s organisation who remained active until the end of the century. One 
the other hand, I will examine Madrid’s alcaldes de barrio, new types of auxiliary police 
officers introduced in the late 1760s as part of the larger reform movement for the im-
provement of public order in the city, a creation that quickly spread over to other Iberi-
an towns and cities. 
In order to help outline popular participation in law enforcement and the socio- spatial 
roots of police subordinates, one needs to examine the rules of eligibility and the mo-
des of designation by local populations, as well as territorial jurisdictions, the extent of 
validation and acknowledgement by competent authorities and procedures’ evolution 
throughout the 18th century. Despite the lack of documentary evidence, it is possible to 
gather some data on these actors’ social profile and to illustrate how their legitimacy was 
either accepted or challenged when exercising their policing duties and small judicial po-
wers; originating from popular urban backgrounds, they evolve between a locally built 
authority based on their daily relationships with the inhabitants, and a gradual integrati-
on in central law enforcement services.
I will draw conclusions from comparing these two case studies as regards the discourse 
and attitude of governmental elite towards these popular public order figures, especially 
within the context of reforms aimed at setting up new professional police forces placed 
directly under central governmental control, thus leading to progressive changes in the-
se popular duties.
7 Laffont highlights that dizeniers however used to suggest their own replacements, which made it de fac-
to a charge passed from father to son (Laffont, ‘La police de voisinage’, p. 24).
8 However, in the case of Marseille, in the 18th century, captains no longer came from the districts for 
which they were responsible.
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I. Capitani di strada: a traditional duty between 
popular election and service to the prince
As Naples’ city clerk between 1607 and 1613, Giulio Cesare Capaccio is well informed 
of urban institutions when he depicts a foreigner and a citizen in his dialogue called Il 
 Forastiero (1634). When asked what are capitani’s functions the citizen replies that alt-
hough he is not aware of the word’s origins they are the ‘chiefs of their ottine or regions, 
as are the caporioni in Rome’. He indicates that this is a ‘highly reputable’ function as ca-
pitani must look after their complateari,9 and all ottine’s inhabitants, cittadini (citizens) as 
much as forestieri (foreigners)’, making sure they would be neither ‘offended or offensi-
ve’. They also looked after the poor, organising charity and the endowments set up by the 
 Piazza del Popolo10 to wed destitute women. They provided certificates and testimonials 
required by the inhabitants. And most importantly, they were the guarantor of ‘the po-
pular reputation’ regarding the orders of the prince and the Eletto del Popolo whom they 
obey and to whom they lend ‘their eyes, and make sure they fulfil such necessary duties 
with thorough care’. Finally, he highlights their importance as the ‘chiefs of such a great 
people, as is that of Naples’. They were generally appointed for six months ‘so that every-
body got a chance to take part in such honours’ although some remained in office for al-
most ten consecutive years.
This testimony shows that these duties were highly regarded in the early 17th century. 
Yet they have stayed rather unexplored, as they have left few traces in the archives espe-
cially since those of the piazza popolare have been lost. Elected by family chiefs’ assem-
blies in each of the 29 ottine that divided the urban space, the capitani did play an im-
portant role in the ruling of the capital’s population, not only because of their policing 
and support duties but also because they were one of the backbones of the municipal in-
stitutional structure formalised between the Middle Ages and the early modern period. 
From 1498 onwards it was the Prince who nominated captains, thus conveying the func-
tion with the dignity and the authority conferred to royal officers, even though this was 
done on the basis of three names voted by ottine’s (neighbourhoods) people assemblies. 
Capitani summoned Popolo’s family chiefs to elect two procuratori for each ottina, who 
would then designate ten consultori della piazza popolare and draw up the list of names 
from which the monarch would chose the Eletto del Popolo. Capitani also took part in the 
9 Literally those who live on the same platea or street. It relates families of citizens entrenched in the otti-
na who take part in the election of the capitani.
10 In Naples, as in other Southern Italian cities, local government rested on a marked distinction between 
nobles and popolani. In 1498 the sovereign Federico d’Aragona had stipulated that an Eletto del Popo-
lo would sit alongside nobles’ representatives to administer the city: an act of recognition that definite-
ly contributed to the constitution of popolani’s political capital. Municipal functions were split between 
these two groups both with their own organisation and elected body. The city council (Tribunale di San 
Lorenzo) was made up of six representatives of noble seggi and of one office from the ‘popular’ side, the 
Eletto del Popolo. His competences covered mainly four areas: the city’s political representation, the ad-
ministration of the city’s heritage, the management of public supplies, urban police (retail, roads, hygie-
ne, building work etc.). See: Faraglia, ‘Le ottine e il reggimento’; Muto, ‘Gestione politica e controllo’; Ma-
rin, Ventura, ‘Les offices populaires’.
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Piazza del Popolo’s decisions: they gathered with the ten consultori and the Eletto del Po-
polo in San Agostino convent’s cloister thus representing the whole of the popolani. Con-
sent from the majority of captains (that’s 15 out of 29) was needed to endorse any measu-
re, with no involvement from the consultori who were only summoned to attend. 
Their military functions such as raising citizens’ militias when the city was faced with 
barbaric incursions still held a significant place in the 16th century. But they gradually 
gave way to more general public order duties, in which various capodieci supported the 
capitani delle ottine (also called capitani di strada). We don’t know anything about how 
these capodieci were appointed, but we can realistically assume they were chosen direct-
ly by the capitano under the supervision of the Eletto del Popolo.
The lawyer Gaspare Di Blasio’s plea, Ragionamento intorno all’Ufficio de’ Capitani del-
le Ottine della Fedelissima Città di Napoli (August 1739), written to defend the Piaz-
za popolare’s dignity and legitimacy following a conflict with Vacaria’s tribunal shows 
their authority was truly acknowledged by the local population who regarded them as 
the their ‘Padri, e Protettori (fathers and protectors)’, and by their co-citizens who held 
them in ‘grandissima stima, e venerazione (very high esteem and veneration)’: this au-
thority rested on the respect they had earned in the neighbourhood through the support 
they gave and the wise advice they shared within this close community. Hence they were 
able to intervene in the most sensitive family affairs with discretion, thus avoiding ma-
jor scandals and other disturbances thanks to the confidence ordinary people entrusted 
them with. The capitano was the guardian of families’ honour and secrets. Common folks 
therefore readily complied with his decisions and conciliatory arbitrations whereas they 
would have feared social disgrace had their domestic affairs been dealt with in front of a 
magistrate in a court of law. 
The magistrates from the Camera di Santa Chiara, the kingdom’s supreme court, were 
asked to adjudicate on the capitani’s policing powers in 1741 following the conflict bet-
ween the piazza popolare and Vicaria’s tribunal, an ordinary civilian and criminal court.11 
Following an incident between two shopkeepers in June 1739 the strada degli Orefici’s 
capitano had ‘de viva forza (forcibly)’ incarcerated one of the troublemakers and had 
sought the support of Vicaria tribunal’s sbirri, the court’s armed forces, to do so. As soon 
as the court judges found out they liberated the imprisoned troublemaker and went to 
trial for usurpata giurisdizione (usurpation of jurisdiction), claiming the capitani were 
not authorised to exercise any judicial function as they had done when incarcerating 
their ottine’s popolani. In so doing, they disputed their competences in terms of public 
safety and denied them any legal endorsement for coercive interventions on individu-
als, like temporary imprisonment whilst awaiting trial. Camera di Santa Chiara’s ma-
gistrates gave a clear answer on the judicial level: Vicaria’s tribunal was the only com-
petent authority on ‘ordinary jurisdiction’, that is the power to incarcerate and punish 
delinquents. However, they did not dismiss capitani’s regular requests to the tribunal’s ar-
med forces to incarcerate violent individuals within their neighbourhoods. Besides, the-
11 Archivio di stato di Napoli (thereafter ASN), Camera di Santa Chiara, Bozze di consulta, vol. 47, inc. 15, 
‘Piazza del Popolo chiede se i capitani di strada possono esercitare atti di giurisdizione col carcerare i po-
polari delle loro ottine’.
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re were numerous testimonies on the subject. In their eyes, it was an ‘abuse’ tolerated by 
past governments. Therefore, if the judicial issue was firmly settled, denying the capita-
ni any judicial powers, even the so-called bassa ones that Gaspare di Blasio defined in his 
pro-capitani discourse as ‘those only used to pacify small conflicts, like the ones occur-
ring within a specific neighbourhood’ (p. 24), magistrates were however of the opinion 
to keep the same modus operandi for practical reasons, as long as Vicaria’s tribunal was 
immediately informed in order to ensure appropriate follow-up action was taken, and 
as long as this formal point of law was kept from the general populace. Indeed, without 
the threat of incarceration capitani’s powers would have been undermined and disorder-
ly behaviour would have been dangerously increased. The Camera di Santa Chiara thus 
acknowledged the captains’ power to temporarily incarcerate local folk from their neigh-
bourhoods on law enforcement grounds before handing them over to the judicial system 
as an effective means of lower classes’ social control, but not any truly delegated judicial 
authority (the captains did not have their own army, prison, court or tribunals, nor could 
they issue a warrant or pass any sentence).
The senior judges also emphasised capitani’s preventive roles, whereas court officials 
only intervened once the disturbance had occurred. They knew their neighbourhood’s 
inhabitants very well as they came from the same background and were therefore well re-
spected. They were thus in a better position to uphold public peace and avoid social un-
rest than the tribunal’s subordinates. Gaspare di Blasio highlighted that such men ‘were 
necessary for Republics’, and, even ‘more importantly for some of the local people’ (p. 
41). There were two essential requirements in his eyes for the capitani to be able to pro-
perly fulfil their policing duties: to come from the local populace and neighbourhood 
where they were to exercise their functions whilst also serving as the ‘loyal vassals’ of the 
prince.
We can assume that the elective process would secure popular confidence even though 
we know nothing of its origins or of its specific modalities. As well as imparting the char-
ge with increased prestige and authority, their eventual nomination by the prince from 
the voted list of names integrated the capitani into the monarchical system. Gaspare di 
Blasio notes that when Charles de Bourbon acceded to the throne in 1734 he had asked 
the Eletto del Popolo to recall and replace the capitani as their loyalty was no longer as-
sured.
Throughout the 18th century, the traditional election of capitani by ottina’s family 
chiefs – the complateari – doesn’t seem to be in decline or challenged. On the contra-
ry, two affairs related to these elections and brought up to the kingdom’s supreme court, 
the Camera di Santa Chiara, show how attached local populations were to this expressi-
on of popular choice, and their substantive participation in these procedures. In both ca-
ses, a number of inhabitants disputed the designation of the capitano and therefore his 
legitimacy. The government consulted Camera di Santa Chiara’s magistrates about an ap-
peal brought forward by the Eletto del Popolo dating 14th April 1760 attempting to remo-
ve the capitano of the S. Pietro Martire ottina called Pennarola from office. Thirty-seven 
complateari had requested the election of a new capitano, partly because of Pennarola’s 
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disability and partly because of his recurring absences from the ottina. These arguments 
were supported by the priest of S. Arcangelo dell’Armieri and by a number of arte de ti-
ratori d’oro’s master craftsmen who testified that Pennarola would travel daily to Lavinaro 
road to melt gold for the purpose of his trade. Sixty-two other complateari however sup-
ported Pennarola: ‘for many years, he has carried out [his duties] with diligence, charity, 
vigilance and concerns for the common good […] even though he had to be away from 
his ottina for a few months to nurse a broken leg’.12 But no longer had he recovered that 
he had moved back to the ottina in his son Andrea Pennarola’s house.
In 1778 the complateari from S. Giovanni Maggiore ottina challenged the election of a 
capitano called Raffaele Spasiano on the grounds it went against traditions: captains in-
deed always had to be well-educated and wealthy family chiefs from the ottina. Raffae-
le Spasiano did not meet these criteria. Rather than electing someone of a similar back-
ground to the deceased, Biagio Pastena, who came from a well-off family with a good 
upbringing, a young and single shopkeeper had been promoted with the help of his brot-
her. Worse, he did not even live in the ottina, when there were plenty of doctors of law or 
affluent merchants amongst the complateari who would have been worthier of this char-
ge. However, the Eletto del Popolo supported the new captain claiming the disgruntled 
arguments were inconsistent, as he was ‘of a good birth with honest and healthy man-
ners, of many talents and with useful abilities’. He also owned a house inherited from his 
father at the heart of the ottina and he lived only a couple of steps away from its bounds. 
He even tacitly invited the sovereign to stand firm on these issues, which, in his opini-
on, were prompted by private interests, as was the case with Giulio Carrano, the capita-
no from Sellaria’s ottina who had been contested because he was not born in Naples.13
These documents inform us on the entity formed by an ottina’s complateari, and on the 
popular participation involved in the choice of a capitano. In 1760 for instance no less 
than 99 family chiefs decided to come forward to take side for or against their capitano. 
Furthermore, we can observe that although elections should theoretically take place eve-
ry six months, as is underlined by G. C. Capaccio at the beginning of the 17th century, 
some actually remained in office for years, which tends to show the respect and notability 
they had earned amongst the local inhabitants. The charge also seemed to be de facto ea-
sily passed on from one member of a family to the next. In the second case the deceased 
capitano’s fratello called Stefano appeared, in some people’s eyes, to be the best candida-
te as he was a ‘wealthy and well-educated family chief with solid experience’. This reveals 
the ideal profile according to popular values: a man born in the city, who had raised a fa-
mily, who lived in the ottina, or better still, who owned property in the ottina, who be-
longed to the ceto civile, who was master craftsman from a prestigious guild, or a mer-
chant, perhaps even from a law-related background or from a liberal profession. Criteria 
of residency, stability, deep-rootedness and reputation thus formed the cornerstones of 
this territorial social control internal to the common folk.
12 ASN, Camera di Santa Chiara, Bozze di consulta, vol. 239, inc. 18.
13 ASN, Camera di Santa Chiara, Bozze di consulta, vol. 136, fol. 50.
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These documents show that the popolani organisation did not seem to be declining in 
the last third of the 18th century and ‘popular’ charges still held much social dignity and 
appreciation. We know a lot less still of capitani’s subordinates, the capodieci. We find 
them in very few archive documents, taking care of certifications to be signed by the ca-
pitano for his inhabitants (certificate of poverty, passports to get out of the kingdom etc.), 
or operating on the spot. Based on archives destroyed in 1943, Benedetto Croce for ex-
ample recounts how from 1778 onwards capodieci decano, Mariano Ceriello, a cobbler 
by trade, supported the architect in charge of realising the new promenade on the town’s 
western shore, the Passegio Reale (Riviera di Chiaia), and how he repeatedly managed to 
settle popular discontent triggered by the works and the changes incurred to the uses of 
various parts of the area.14
If in Naples these popular charges were inscribed in an almost immemorial tradition, 
or at least recorded from the end of the Middle Ages by the authors of the time, other 
elected policing functions were created ex-novo in the 18th century particularly in Ibe-
rian territories.
II. L’ alcadía de barrio: an elective office at the heart 
of the reform movement
Social tensions in 1760 Spain took the form of worrying popular uprisings for the go-
vernment, in particular with the Motín d’Esquilache in Madrid between the 23rd and 
26th March 1766.15 This episode had important consequences on the reform movement; 
as a result, people’s representatives were introduced within local government through 
the 1766 local authority reforms, and through those of the urban police in 1768-69. They 
were elected on a territorial basis corresponding to neighbourhood communities with 
a view of easing social tensions and improving the administration, the justice system 
and the police.16 Both reforms are mostly owed to the propositions of one of Castille’s 
Council’s fiscales, Pedro Rodríguez de Campomanes, who was convinced bridges nee-
ded to be built between government instances and the poorest members of society. To 
do so, popular figures needed to be associated with law enforcement. On the one hand, 
they materialised in the form of diputados del común who were elected through a two-le-
vel voting procedure to counterbalance to weight of local oligarchies within local autho-
rities.17 On the other, alcaldes de barrio were new types of police auxiliaries introduced in 
Madrid and distributed across the city according to new territorial boundaries between 
cuarteles dividing the city into 64 barrios. The capital’s policing services were thus rein-
forced through the assistance given by alcaldes de barrio to the Sala de Alcaldes de Casa 
y Corte judges, who were in charge of the city’s public order alongside the municipali-
14 Croce, ‘La villa di Chiaia’, p. 35.
15 López García, El Motín contra. 
16 Guillamón Álvarez, Las reformas de la administración. Cuesta Pascual, ‘Los Alcades de Barrio’. Martínez 
Ruiz, La seguridad pública. Pablo Gafas, La sala de alcades.
17 Hernández, ‘La democracia ilustrada’.
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ty. On the 6 October 1768, the Cédula profoundly transformed the organisation of the 
Madrid police through the introduction of these new agents whose modes of designati-
ons and specific charges were defined more precisely in the Instrucción published on the 
21 October of the same year.18 This text remained in effect until 1801 when the alcalde de 
barrio’s designation modes were quite importantly revised. Just one year after their crea-
tion in Madrid, they were introduced in other Spanish cities and all the way to imperi-
al territories, through the law of 13 August 1769, starting with towns comprising audien-
cias and chancillerías (courts of second instance).19
Alcaldes de barrio’s functions were similar to those of Naples’ capitani di strada: arbi-
tration of small conflicts, information, ensuring compliance with police decrees, moni-
toring the poor, the foreigners, wanderers, abandoned children, as well as road mainte-
nance and street lighting. Differences were mostly threefold.
To begin with, a larger role was given to paperwork within policing practices. Whereas 
capitani di strada were not bound to any regular record, alcaldes de barrio were instruc-
ted to regularly update the registration of all inhabitants under their jurisdiction (ma-
trícula). This task was considered to be their most important duty. It was their responsi-
bility to visit each house and family to indicate each vecino’s name, status or profession, 
as well as registering his children and servants. Instrucción’s article 9 stipulated how the-
se registers should be kept: one sheet per house ‘leaving as much space as possible to re-
cord transfers throughout the year’. Of course, this monitoring applied to foreigners too 
which the government insisted upon especially after 1789. Alongside general populati-
on registers, alcaldes de barrio indeed kept other registers like the one for hostels (posa-
das), which were regularly inspected. Owners had the obligation to provide a written re-
cord of their clients’ entries and outings. Furthermore, alcaldes were bound to make a 
daily log of what had happened in their barrio and of the nature of their interventions in 
books called Libros de hechos.
Moreover, whereas we have seen how there were sometimes uncertainties lingering 
over capitani di strada’s jurisdiction, that of alcaldes de barrio was clearly specified: small 
judicial powers (called pedanea) enabled them to arrest people on the spot and to incar-
cerate them until a local judge could take action. This power was represented on their 
badges, which showed a vara de justicia (rod of justice) with an ivory knob, to ensure 
they would be accepted and respected.
Lastly, the judicial apparatus rigorously regulated these new alcaldes de barrio. Admit-
tedly they were sworn in and registered at the town hall after their election but they were 
placed under the direct authority of the alcalde de la Sala, their neighbourhood’s judge, 
who gave them the detail of the streets under their jurisdiction, their barrios. Compa-
18 Instruccion que deben observar los Alcaldes de Barrio, que para el más expedito, y mejor gobierno se 
han de nombrar, ò elegir en cada uno de los ocho Quarteles en que se divide la Población de Madrid, en 
cumplimiento de lo mandado en la Real cedula de seis de este mes, expedida à Consulta el Consejo de 
diez y nueve de Setiembre de mil setecientos sesenta y ocho, y lo que han de egecutar los Jueces Ordina-
rios en las causas de Familias (Archivo Histórico Nacional [thereafter AHN], Consejos, leg. 504). 
19 Marin, Exbalin, Polices urbaines recomposées.
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red to capitani di strada who were only accountable to popular municipal organisations 
and could not be assimilated to Vicaria’s tribunal subordinates, even tough they relied on 
this tribunal’s armed force when needed for law enforcement purposes, the alcaldes de 
barrio clearly appeared as Sala’s new subordinate police and judicial corps as they were 
answerable to their neighbourhood’s judge for their actions and obeyed his orders. But 
whereas other police and judicial subordinates directly attached to the tribunals such 
as the alguazils were law graduates and held a commercial office, there were no educa-
tion prerequisites for the alcaldes de barrio. The office was open to all vecinos honrados 
(‘honourable citizens’). Social recognition, reputation within the neighbourhood, and 
an acknowledged role as a small popular dignitary took precedence over technical com-
petences or administrative experience. The duties involved brought no financial reward, 
but expenses were covered through the impoundment of a third of the fines. However, 
they represented a heavy workload that was hardly compatible with the daily exercise of 
another trade. Thus needing a certain level of affluence, as well as enough education to 
fulfil the requirements of written procedures, these charges were mostly occupied by for-
mer militaries, minor administration officers, lawyers, sometimes hidalgos, but also by a 
few shopkeepers and craftsmen.20
The advantages and disadvantages of electing those holding this office through popu-
lar vote were soon debated, first in Madrid, and then in the other cities where these char-
ges had developed. Besides, there was some wavering at the time of the establishment of 
this new provision. Were there to be financial conditions placed on the right to vote (as 
was the case for the diputados del común)? The Sala had announced its preference for a 
two-level voting procedure, proposing the comisarios electores should vote to designa-
te the alcaldes de barrio at the same time they voted for the diputados del común, or that 
they should at least propose a list of names validated by the alcalde del cuartel for a final 
nomination by the Council. It is Campomanes’ choice that eventually prevailed: a direct 
vote with procedures overseen directly by the alcalde de cuartel who presided over voting 
assemblies in the parish.
On numerous occasions and especially in 1781 and 1782, the Sala observed that ‘citi-
zens failed to take part’.21 Historians have sometimes interpreted this poor attendance as 
citizens’ disinterest in these elections and therefore as the explicit failure of the reform 
movement in its wish to increase citizen participation. Yet we mustn’t overlook the prior 
informal arrangements that could precede alcalde de cuartel’s regular assembly, especial-
ly since administrators precisely deplored agreements and transactions conducted about 
the votes outside of the public arena.22
Elections were normally held yearly in December. They were challenged on numerous 
occasions, not only by the Sala magistrates who did not support them to begin with, but 
also by some alcaldes de barrio themselves. The case they made shed light on why this 
20 Cuesta Pasqual, ‘Los Alcades de Barrio’. Marin, ‘L’alcade de barrio à Madrid’.
21 AHN, Consejos, Libro de gobierno 1371, fol. 147v.
22 Hernández, ‘La democracia ilustrada’.
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elective process was abandoned on the 26 January 1801 in favour of a nomination pro-
cedure by the Sala from a list of three chosen by Charitable Delegations23 for their ‘better 
aptitudes and conduct’.
From 1773 onwards eight alcaldes de barrio, all lawyers by trade came forward in the 
name of the entire corps to ask the government to change the system.24 Basing their legi-
timacy on ‘the practical experience acquired through the exercise of their functions’, they 
asked to be able to carry out their duties for at least two to three years rather than one, 
and for their charge to bear higher prestige and dignity in order to constitute a properly 
recognised rank within an administrative career. Moreover, they demanded that only the 
neighbourhood’s dignitaries (los de mayor distinction) had the right to vote and that do-
mestics and other small trades they regularly inspected should be excluded. The higher 
authority opposed their proposal to limit popular voting. Excluding all inhabitants un-
der inspection by alcaldes de barrio indeed would have meant leaving out ‘todas las clas-
ses del Pueblo (all popular classes)’, including shopkeepers and craftsmen, in favour of 
the more affluent and educated members of the neighbourhood. However, this charge 
had been created precisely to ensure people’s interests would be represented within the 
police and judicial institutions thanks to popular choice and acknowledgment. Castil-
le Council’s fiscal insisted that ‘honour’ was not just attached to nobility. He argued that 
there was honour attached to each social condition residing in socially approved conduct 
and in collective esteem and consideration: ‘an intelligent, enthusiastic and good work-
man is just as much an honourable citizen as a Great from Castille or a Graduate from 
Salamanca’.25
The charge was normally held for one year but re-elections were frequent which shows 
that some of these subordinates managed to build and to keep the legitimacy and con-
sensus needed to continue exercising their authority. Sacramento’s alcalde de barrio Eu-
genio Ahumada Guillen del Castillo for example was first elected in 1776 in Palacio’s 
cuartel and later re-elected for five consecutive years between 1781 and 1786. In 1786, 
the cuartel‘s alcalde Manuel Sisternes y Felin specified in writing that the charge had been 
granted ‘through a unanimous vote from all citizens who took part in the elections’.26
Sala’s judges made an issue of the popular vote on different occasions in the 1780s and 
1790s as they denounced the plotting and manoeuvres fomented at the time of elections. 
They offered to take control of the subordinates’ designation in order to counteract the-
se disturbances. They suggested the cuartel‘s alcalde selected three persons who were the 
most qualified to exercise the duty and who could be trusted. The barrio would vote from 
that list. Charity delegations on the other hand recommended the charge should be held 
23 64 Charitable Delegations (one in each barrio) were created following the Auto Acordado of 13 May 
1778. They were made up of the alcalde de barrio, of a clerk designated by the parish priest and three of 
the barrio inhabitants. 
24 AHN, Consejos, leg. 833, exp. 15, quoted in Guillamón Álvarez, 1980.
25 Ibid., fol. 852v-853r., 6 December 1773.
26 AHN, Consejos, Libro de gobierno 1375, fol. 861 sq.
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for longer, two or three years, to be able to count on more experienced alcaldes de barrio 
who would be better trained to efficiently police the poor.27
In 1791 Juan Antonio González de Velasco, the alcalde de barrio from las Descalz-
as Reales and accounting officer for Monte Pio Militar, put a new reform plan forward. 
Once again the elections were at the heart of the highlighted dysfunctions: ‘they gene-
rally benefit worthless individuals or people busy [with their trade], and usually at the 
request of these same elected officers’.28 The alcaldes de barrio therefore tended to come 
from the ‘Republic’s lowest ranks’ whilst letrados or administrative officers were rarely 
designated when, according to author, they were the only ones to properly exercise these 
functions even though they often turned them down.29
We witness similar challenges to electoral systems in other Spanish cities. In Grenada 
for instance the alcalde de barrio Lorenzo Alarcón (Magdalena’s parish) disclosed regula-
tion breaches, bribes and intrigues during the election process on two occasions (178230 
and 1784). He wrote that candidates bought the votes, gathered voters in taverns and 
paid for food and drinks as the poor outnumbered the wealthy. That is how alcaldes de 
barrio who could not read or write would be elected whereas other types of citizens, like 
lawyers for instance, were much better suited to take on this charge.
Enlightened Spanish reformers therefore thought introducing non-professional sub-
ordinates within urban police forces through popular vote was a good way of upholding 
public order within a people who had demonstrated its capacity for rebellion in 1766, as 
their authority was acknowledged and accepted by the working classes. As the middle-
man between the judicial administration and the urban common folk, and as the direct 
emanation of neighbourhood communities who had designated individuals with whom 
they could identify, the alcalde de barrio was an invaluable source of information about 
the local population and its most marginal elements thanks to his deep local rooting. Yet 
the lack of financial reward and the exposure to popular discontent meant the charge was 
not attractive to ‘honourable people’. On the 16 November 1787 the Secretary of State 
Floridablanca suggested that as cuartel‘s alcalde, Sala’s judges should make sure trustwor-
thy persons, ‘honest and educated men’, held these functions. But they should be care-
ful not to seem to be depriving the people of the freedom of choice they had been gran-
ted through the 1768 legislation.31 At the same time, some of the elected alcaldes de barrio 
who came from the judiciary or the administration saw this professionalisation as a way 
of keeping the duty for themselves in order to climb the social ladder within the ranks of 
the state apparatus.
27 AHN, Consejos, Libro de gobierno 1371, fol. 147v.-148r.
28 AHN, Consejos, Libro de gobierno 1382, fol. 1489r.: ‘[…] se hacen aquellas por lo común en personas o 
míseras, o ocupadas y no pocas veces a solicitud de los mismos elegidos’.
29 The law stipulated someone elected to be alcalde de barrio could turn down the charge for professional or 
health reasons. These refusals caused delays in the taking of the office, which seemed like another draw-
back of the system.
30 AHN, Consejos, leg. 833, exp. 15, quoted in Guillamón Álvarez, 1980.
31 AHN, Consejos, Libro de gobierno 1377, fol. 1341-1342.
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The new low-level policing function created in 1768 initially meant to embody the ‘no-
tability of the neighbourhood’ which enjoyed a certain level of trust within the commu-
nities it directly represented, following a rather widespread model of Ancien Regime 
municipal police. But it became a social resource for letrados looking for government 
employment. Despite the resistance from certain enlightened administrators such as 
Campomanes, this social demand lead to these agents’ full integration within the capital’s 
police services at the beginning of the 19th century. Their nomination now took into ac-
count candidates’ training and experience in other administrative branches (judicial, mi-
litary, tax etc.) and replaced the elective process.
III. Consolidation of the administrative framework 
and progressive professionalization of elective po-
lice charges
The electoral system introduced in Madrid in 1768 was definitely overridden after 30 
years ‘for not achieving the goals that were set due to the abuses and frauds it generated’.32 
The government had wavered between two approaches for a long time. On the one hand, 
voting seemed the best way to keep the office’s popular acknowledgement and represen-
tation, and to guarantee the efficiency of these social mediators, trusted as they were by 
the lowest classes of urban society. On the other, making sure these popular choices cor-
responded to governmental views would prevent these duties from falling into unlawful 
hands or from being hijacked by criminals. There is no doubt the alcalde de barrio could 
take good advantage of his position in the neighbourhood to consolidate his authori-
ty, extend his influence and enlarge his client base, as a trade-off for the time spent sett-
ling cases and disputes which bore a financial cost and sometimes led to strenuous con-
flicts with local inhabitants. Pressures and manoeuvres to obtain votes were therefore 
relentless. They preoccupied the authorities who wanted these duties to be carried out by 
men well aware of the judicial administration’s procedures and perfectly obedient to the 
judges’ authority (alcaldes de cuartel), essential as they were for social control. If the Spa-
nish authority eventually gave up any electoral procedure to reinforce their control over 
these subordinates, what was it like elsewhere at the end of the century?
The dizeniers’s case in Toulouse studied by Jean-Luc Laffont shows a similar tendency: 
in the second half of the 18th century the municipal authority attempted to regain con-
trol over this ‘petite magistrature populaire’ (small popular judiciary) for social regula-
tion purposes.33 Originally merchants or craftsmen, these municipal agents acquired the 
status of commissaires des quartiers in 1783. Endowed with new powers such as being 
able to fine or to carry out search warrants and identified by a uniform, they were now 
32 Decreto de los Señores de la Sala plena mandando que los Señores Alcaldes de Quartel pasen oficio a las 
Diputaciones de Caridad de sus respectivas personas capaces de desempeñarle y de este modo recaigan 
le elección en las mas idóneas conforme a lo resuelto por el Consejo (AHN, Consejos, Libro de gobierno 
1391 (1801), fol. 802).
33 Laffont, ‘La police de voisinage’, in particular pp. 28-29.
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better regulated by the administration. Admittedly they were not elected but nominated 
for life by the municipality, yet in the first half of the century they still possessed a cer-
tain amount of autonomy, sometimes even forgoing magistrates’ provision letters. As a 
‘somewhat educated middle-aged man who exercised a sedentary activity with an alrea-
dy well-established family and profession and therefore deeply rooted in his dizaine’,34 
the dizenier’s typical profile rightly corresponded to the traditional values expressed for 
 example by S. Giovanni Maggiore’s ottina’s complateari cited above to define the type 
of individual eligible to become capitani di strada through popular vote. This centrality 
tends to disappear as their professionalization starts to develop.
Other Italian situations show the continuation of electoral procedures in the last part 
of the 18th century for offices of social control at the neighbourhood scale. In Lombardy 
towns for instance anziani di parrocchia were directly elected by family chiefs in each pa-
rish to carry out these duties for life or until their resignation. Livio Antonielli has shown 
how this office was gradually integrated into stately bureaucracy in Milan even though 
it started out as the expression of local society.35 Anziani di parrocchia were indeed part 
of a local judicial authority to begin with, before being placed under the central judicial 
authority of the Magistrato di Sanità, to which they were bound until it was finally sup-
pressed in 1786. They maintained their elective dimension but it was the authorities’ re-
mit to summon the inhabitants to the elections, to ensure they were conducted accor-
ding to the current regulations, to gather the necessary information about the candidates 
to check their eligibility – they had to be older than 20 or 25 after 1757, born in or resi-
dent of Milan’s Duchy for over ten years, and with no judicial record. The election was 
followed by a nomination with the attribution of the corresponding patente, which con-
ferred the anziano his legitimacy. Participation in elections was not insignificant overall: 
Livio Antonielli estimates it represented between 5 and 33 per cent of all family chiefs. 
The authorities generally respected the neighbourhood’s choice. At first it was mostly 
craftsmen who tended to seek out this office, prestigious as it was within urban socie-
ty. As the duties increasingly fell within the remit of the central authority, the nature of 
the functions shifted toward that of tribunals’ subordinates. An institutional redefinition 
procedure was launched in 1775 but did not succeed. It aimed at steering the anzianio di 
parrocchia towards more professional policing functions through the granting of a small 
allowance. This ever more stringent administrative framework probably made the char-
ge less prestigious amongst the working classes than in Naples where this type of elected 
function had preserved its political dimension: the 29 strong capitani corps was more re-
presentative of people’s interests than the Eletto del Popolo himself, and asserted the ho-
nour traditionally attached to these functions as they were the direct and autonomous 
expression of the local population.
In 1779 however a new law was passed aimed at reorganising the functions of Vicaria’s 
tribunal police force through the redeployment of judges and their staff across new po-
34 Ibid., p. 25.
35 Antonielli, ‘Tra polizia sanitaria’; see also his contribution to this volume.
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lice headquarters created for that purpose.36 The government also used this law to increa-
se their control over capitani di strada and to connect them more tightly to the judicial 
police and the commanding judges of the capital’s main justice and police royal tribu-
nal. The law indeed specifically summoned capitano di strada and capodieci to obey the 
orders of neighbourhood judges for all matters relating to public peace and summoned 
them to provide all necessary information about their ottine’s population, as no one knew 
them better. The idea was not to dispute the city’s privileges and remove capitani from 
the traditional municipal organisation, but to reposition their office under the royal au-
thority that could then guide the actions of all individuals with policing powers and ma-
nage the entire surveillance apparatus.
In a report dated February 1798 captain general Francesco Pignatelli, an urban police 
superintendent, highlighted capitani’s lack of accountability to neighbourhood judges 
and their reluctance to collaborate. Scrivani (court clerks) and other tribunal subordi-
nates on the other hand could not find any suitable alternatives to such invaluable sour-
ces of information for the police about the local population.37 The police superintendent’s 
tone is strikingly different to that of Piazza Popolare’s documents and reflects the many 
grievances from police commissioners that fill up 1790 police archives. By then capodieci 
are described as the ‘worst in their profession and more ignorant that one can imagine’38 
which shows both the gap between neighbourhood judges and these municipal subordi-
nates and the difficult relationships between Vicaria’s police authority and the traditional 
framework of social control. The police superintendent specifically targeted capodieci, 
who held the lowest popular charge, as they escaped all royal control and were just nomi-
nated by the Eletto del Popolo. Yet ‘Capodieci have much legal influence since the delin-
quents in the ottina are, or are known to the Capodieci’. The superintendent did not hide 
his outrage at seeing these individuals having risen from the lowest layers of society to 
the rank of guardians who could even issue their ottine’s inhabitants with passports. He 
therefore invited the sovereign to ‘resolve this matter so that […] the choice of capodieci 
fell entirely within the remit of the Gran Corte and neighbourhood judges, to ensure the-
se duties were held by honest shopkeepers and provided neighbourhood judges with ad-
ditional resources in identifying the bad citizens’.39 1799 revolutionary events interrupted 
this reform movement aimed at transforming these popular charges into police auxilia-
ries for giudici commissari.
Cases studied here show electoral procedures were still very much operative in sup-
plying popular charges of social control and urban neighbourhood management in the 
18th century, whether these were long-term traditions as was the case in Naples or re-
cent creations as in Madrid. We witness a certain amount of appetence from the working 
class for these social regulatory functions, embedded as they were in local forms of com-
munity organisations. They contributed to the recognition of popular honour and, even 
36 Alessi, Giustizia e polizia; Marin, ‘Découpages de l’espace’.
37 ASN, Archivio di Polizia, Consulte, 26, fol. 25.
38 ASN, Archivio di Polizia, Consulte, 23, fol. 735.
39 ASN, Archivio di Polizia, Consulte, 26, fol. 25.
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though they brought no financial reward, they provided the individuals who held these 
offices with some advantages, like boosting their public reputation, building up their so-
cial networks for the benefit of their families and lineage, and sometimes like in Madrid 
for instance, they led to social promotion through a career in the administration. Fur-
thermore, governments wished to centralise police forces’ command all over and to dis-
pose of a well-supervised professional corps that could be easily controlled by a firm-
ly established hierarchy. At the same time, we witness the authorities’ increasing distrust 
or even disregard for these functions when exercised by figures issued from the lowest 
strata of society. However they did acknowledge the absolute necessity for social me-
diation and the gathering of information within big cities’ working classes, which were 
hardly accessible to those coming from the outside. Some of the envisaged solutions pro-
posed to redefine these charges within a stronger institutional framework embedded in 
a  hierarchical chain of command and subjected to a series of professional controls. This 
movement for the professionalization of subordinates favoured by the authorities intert-
wines with other trends developing across the people of the cities. The latter is of course 
far from socially homogenous. Many social struggles find a stage within the police re-
forms of the second half of the 18th century as can be witnessed in Spanish cities, whe-
re some of the upper social classes attempted to keep the alcaldes de barrio functions for 
themselves, and to exclude individuals from lower classes in order to hold on to these 
new resources. These complex evolutions therefore cannot be attributed to the sole ac-
tions of the central authorities and beckon for larger comparisons with other local situa-
tions whilst remaining attentive to the singularity of each urban culture within which 
these movements take place, in order to broaden this panorama.40
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Community involvement in the 
administration of public health in the State 
of Milan in the 18th century
Livio Antonielli
The history of the police force and territorial control has significantly moved forward 
over recent decades, both quantitatively and qualitatively. The result has been a remar-
kable surge in the understanding of the topic and, above all, a general sharing of themes 
and issues among scholars from different parts of the world. Although this osmotic pro-
cess has enabled us to reflect on individual regional situations while preserving a solid 
thematic unity, there still exists an entrenched, long-established, ongoing interpretive re-
sistance that still pervades some of the basic premises, despite an historiographical out-
put which, in many cases, has challenged it.
Even today there remains a polarity, albeit somewhat blurred, between the images of 
the police forces of Britain and France. In a by now dated work, David Bayley states: ‘The 
British police are generally perceived as being honest, approachable, trustworthy, and 
helpful. They are viewed with respect and an admixture of affection. Generally they work 
as individuals, not in groups. They carry no firearms, and are commonly non-authorita-
tive and non-punitive’. Compare this to Bayley’s description of their counterparts across 
the Channel: ‘The French police have a reputation for being efficient, indefatigable, and 
omniscient. They are considered individually to be brusque and rather unapproachable. 
They are armed, feared, and disliked, though they are not considered especially corrupt’.1
The above descriptions focus primarily on the different behaviour of the respective po-
lice officers: the British are viewed as friendly, helpful and unarmed; the French, on the 
other hand, as harsh, feared, unapproachable and armed. According to Bayley, the ge-
nesis of this perception can be traced back to the traditional opposition between Fran-
ce as the cradle of absolutist institutions, and England as the champion of decentralizati-
on and respect for local autonomy. The stereotypical picture of the ‘good bobby’ has long 
been popular in Europe, and vestiges of this belief can still be found today. The bobby is a 
bit gruff but protective and reliable, constantly on the citizen’s side, and capable of ensu-
ring respect for the rules without ever seeming to be threatening. This depiction of the 
British police has long found fertile ground in Italy where the people once had to cope 
with a very different police force; a force that Bayley describes as follows, in rather cru-
de terms that are certainly far from true today: ‘Italian police are considered corrupt, pu-
1  Bayley, ‘The Police an Political Development’, pp. 53-56.
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nitive, and unscrupulous. They are feared and disliked. One would not consider going to 
them for assistance except in time of great stress. They are armed’.2 
This portrayal of the British police officer has been adequately updated by modern hi-
storians, most of whom have revised its more mythical aspects.3 Other more traditional 
historians, however, have focused on the organisation of the police force, and more gene-
rally on the bureaucracy of the Ancien Régime, with one eye on the burgeoning of these 
institutions from the grassroots up, and the other on the detection of a central authority 
represented by them. The outcome has been the continued existence of what I would call 
an enduring distorted vision. In other words, rather than seeking similarities and analo-
gies within diverse policing authorities across countries, the general preference has been 
to highlight their differences and divergences. Hence, there has been a tendency to treat 
the British and French examples as two somewhat antithetical, and therefore not easily 
equitable, entities. On the same wavelength, research conducted into other European ex-
amples has often emphasised the contrast between one or other extreme case. Thus an in-
terpretation of any specific case is approached from a preconceived viewpoint and, in a 
certain sense, converted to an ideology.
The sketch that I have attempted to create here is in many aspects far-fetched, but pur-
posely so in order to more clearly define the contrasts. In point of fact, many recent stu-
dies have opened the way to diverse and much better balanced perspectives. In particular, 
if we consider French historiography in relation to the history of the police force, we see 
the emergence in recent years of a tendency to challenge the view from the centre in an 
analysis of these institutions. An example can be found in the interpretation of Vincent 
Milliot, in his work on an authority that primarily represents the strengthening in Fran-
ce of an embryonic police system, created and managed by the state, i.e. the Lieutenance 
générale de police in Paris.4 Milliot deals with this issue by focusing initially on the prac-
tice rather than on the rules, and in so doing he recedes from a strong national model as 
an unavoidable point of reference. The activity of the police force can then be viewed as a 
practice which is continuously adapting to a societal context, and is therefore only clum-
sily relatable to formal conceptualizations. Hence contributions such as Milliot’s lead to 
research options which substantially alter traditional interpretations, both in relation to 
the Parisian Lieutenance5, and more generally to the police forces in the Ancien Régime, 
or, were we to use a term perhaps more appropriate for the period, to territorial control.
That said, it remains true that the most methodical historiography on the development 
of controlling institutions from the grassroots up comes signally from Britain and Nor-
th America. This gives rise to the perception, still strong today, of the singular nature of 
2 Ibid., pp. 58-59.
3 See a comprehensive treatment of the topic in Storch ‘The Plague of Blue Locusts’.
4 Milliot, Un policier des Lumières.
5 In addition to Milliot’s aforementioned work and other contributions on the same theme, Piasenza (Po-
lizia e città) and Vidoni (La police des Lumières) have made, and continue to make, substantial inroads 
into this topic. Regarding the difficulty of describing police work from a formal perspective, see: Napoli, 
Naissance de la police.
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the British position. A notable example in this respect is undoubtedly a work by Michael 
Braddick, State Formation in Early Modern England,6 which revolves around the theme 
of the strengthening of State power in modern-day England. Taking inspiration from ca-
tegories generated within anthropological studies, Braddick identifies a ‘typology of rule, 
which places the state at one end of a spectrum, distinct from such other means of regu-
lating social life as the tribe, lineage or warrior band’.7 This allows him to raise a question. 
Although the central authority of the state between the sixteenth and seventeenth centu-
ries was still able to exert only relatively slight territorial and societal control, nonetheless 
its territory was studded with numerous offices of various kinds, which were endowed 
with extensive coercive powers. These offices, irrespective of whether or not they were 
state-run, represented a political power that was extensive and authoritative. The author 
can thus claim that: ‘collectively, these offices constituted a ‘state’ in the sense that they 
were part of a territorially bounded and coordinated network, which was exclusive of the 
authority of rival political organizations within those limits’.8 Starting from these premi-
ses, the creation of an effective state power therefore constitutes a progressive acquisiti-
on, on the part of the state, of powers generated in its territory.
British historiography is rich with studies dealing with this reality in its concrete orga-
nisation and development. In particular, I would like to refer to the works of Joan Kent9 
who, taking her cue from the lowest agencies of territorial administration, deals with 
the complex world of petty officials initially employed by such agencies. Starting with 
the parish vestries, Kent examines a wide variety of officials: constables, petty constab-
les, churchwardens, overseers of the poor and night watchmen; all of them officials who 
combined their lowly appointments derived from the parish vestries with a formal au-
thority conferred from on high to perform a number of tasks, including coercive ones, of 
consequence to the citizenry.
Kent frequently emphasises a basic ambiguity that characterised these offices: they 
were filled by individuals who had to comply with orders from higher authorities while 
simultaneously responding to the needs of their own community, which often remune-
rated their work. Thus they were called upon to serve the state, while at the same time 
attempting to look after local interests. A significant share of tasks relating to truly typi-
cal social problems of the modern age, namely poverty and vagrancy, fell to the lot of the 
parish vestries. Following the passing of the Elizabethan Poor Laws or the 1699 Vagran-
cy Act, these administrative structures were compelled to take on ever more complex re-
sponsibilities, involving tasks unable to be implemented without the work of these low-
ranking officials.
In more recent times, the strengthening of these peripheral administrative structures 
has therefore been considered as a crucial step towards a heavier presence of public au-
thority over the territory. Although the growth of state power between the 17th and 18th 
6 Braddick, State Formation in Early Modern England.
7 Ibid., p. 15.
8 Ibid., p. 18.
9 J.R. Kent, ‘The Centre and the Localities’; ‘The English Village Constable’; The English Village Constable.
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centuries was indisputably due to the creation of new institutions, it was mainly connec-
ted to a ‘willingness on the part of parish elites to implement the state’s policies’.10 This 
willingness to cooperate with government agencies through the appointment and sup-
port of a network of low-ranking officials can be seen, therefore, as a fundamental condi-
tion for the growth of the control and efficiency of state action.
Again according to Braddick, ‘in this view, state power is not something ‘central’, but 
rather something that is extensive’.11 At the same time, the fact that this power has its ori-
gins in the grassroots does not signify that it cannot grow. It is necessary simply to consi-
der the development of state presence over a territory, but not as a process brought about 
solely, or predominantly, by institutions created from above almost as if it were a type of 
obligatory perspective. Rather one should focus on the ways in which state power, irre-
spective of its origin, underwent changes and became more direct. Therefore, state po-
wer in the British situation seemingly had no connection with the increasingly intrusive 
presence of state institutions, as has often been claimed by historians in relation to other 
scenarios.
One further detail needs to be mentioned in relation to these low-ranking officials. 
Their authority was conferred upon them, as stated above, from on high, directly by 
the sovereign, through his magistrates. It was in fact they who would deliver the writs 
(authenticated by the appropriate warrants) which enabled these lower-ranking officials 
who had been appointed or elected locally to exercise the necessary powers, including 
that of law enforcement. 
In light of these reflections, the specific nature of the British situation could easily be 
the subject of debate. As it happens, these low-ranking officials do not appear dissimilar 
to the law enforcement agents known as esecutori, who are to be found everywhere, in 
large numbers, in the Europe of the Ancien Régime. The collection of essays Entre justice 
et justiciables, edited by Claire Dolan,12 provides a multifaceted picture of such individu-
als. In one of the essays, Robert Jacob writes that ‘behind the office of each juge magistrat 
stands a whole army of tipstaffs, police constables, gendarmes, a prison network, a huge 
coercive web on which the authority of justice can rest’.13 These officials could be qui-
te different from each other, both in regard to the tasks they performed and to appoint-
ment procedures, as well as in regard to their respective social standing. Some could be 
considered authentic precursors of the modern police, as for instance the multifarious 
world of sergents or archers in a French context, or the notorious sbirri or birri in Italy, as 
well as the alguaciles of Spain. Others could appear to be far removed from tasks invol-
ving control and coercion, but a methodical analysis will reveal, even if less prominent-
ly, their law enforcement powers.14 The whole class of esecutori was in any case licensed 
to perform a number of tasks, granted by a higher authority through a formal procedure.
10 J.R. Kent, ‘The Centre and the Localities’, p. 365.
11 Braddick, State Formation in Early Modern England, p. 14. 
12 Dolan, Entre justice et justiciables. 
13 Jacob, ‘Licteurs, sergents et gendarmes’, p. 38.
14 Let us quote the campari camerali, who in the Po Plain had to regulate the diversion of canals to faci-
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An Italian case study provides insight into the extent to which esecutori could differ 
from one another, even within the same department. It also examines how a specific ca-
tegory of functionaries, appointed at a local level and forced to divide their loyalty bet-
ween a higher authority and the local community, was not confined to an English con-
text. This case will be studied by taking as a reference an important government agency 
of the state of Milan, the Magistrato di Sanità (Department of Health) between the 17th 
and 18th centuries.
This Magistracy, also known as the Tribunale di Sanità, was one of those typical go-
vernment departments that characterized the Ancien Régime, and its modus operandi 
was tied to a strictly judicial procedure. As the executive responsibilities of functionaries 
and those of the judiciary had not at that time been separated, a judicial procedure was 
the only way for a Magistrato to deal with issues falling within its remit. Therefore the ad-
ministrative functions, as a fundamental part of the activities of magistracies, were struc-
tured as a kind of extension of the primary judicial function. Any determination issuing 
from these institutions possessed the characteristics of a judicial sentence. For its execu-
tion it was therefore necessary to delegate authority to officials so that they could imple-
ment coercive measures against those on the receiving end of the sentence.15 In this capa-
city, the Magistrato di Sanità employed a large number of esecutori, both for the purpose 
of law enforcement and to carry out administrative functions.
The Magistrato di Sanità was a long-established department. Founded in 1534 (in kee-
ping with Italy’s early development in this area)16 it lasted until 1786. The responsibili-
ties of the Magistrato were both wide-ranging and of great import, and consequently it 
wielded substantial power. Its primary function was to exercise authority over all mat-
ters that concerned the protection of the State of Milan from contagious diseases. At that 
time bubonic plague was the greatest threat, but considerable attention was also paid to 
the spreading of animal epidemics. Responsibility in this area entailed ongoing written 
communication with its counterparts in neighbouring states, in order to keep abreast of 
any new epidemics. The Magistrato also had the authority to stop or limit the traffic of 
humans, animals and goods inside the state, and when necessary to totally close the bor-
ders, at times for lengthy periods. In the struggle against contagion, it was the role of the 
Magistrato to ensure that a specific procedure be followed in all cases of death, by way 
of a medical report certifying that the demise was not ‘suspicious’, as the phrase went.17 
litate irrigation in the countryside. They also had to watch over navigation in the canals, and in both ca-
ses their task was to monitor all infringements committed by users, and where necessary to impose fines 
(Antonielli, ‘Gli ambigui confine della polizia’). 
15 The clearest description of the functioning of the administrative system under an Ancien Régime can be 
found in Mannori, Sordi, Storia del diritto amministrativo.
16 On the early development of these institutions in Italy see: Cipolla ‘Origine e sviluppo degli uffici di sa-
nità’.
17 All so-called sudden deaths were regarded as suspicious. Deaths were considered to be sudden when 
they occurred within four days subsequent to a state of health. In all such cases a medical certificate had 
to be exhibited, stating the cause of death and ruling out any possibility that the illness may have been 
contagious. See, as an example, the Archivio di Stato, Milan (thereafter ASM), Sanità, p.a., c. 12, the de-
cree of the Magistrato di Sanità of 26 August 1693.
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Other responsibilities of the Magistrato related to environmental hygiene, i.e. the main-
tenance of the city’s sewerage network, the cleaning of public areas, pollution control, hy-
giene and quality control of food, and finally, a major issue: pauperism.
The office of the Magistrato di Sanità in Milan had jurisdiction over the whole of the 
state territory. It operated directly through its own structures and personnel only in the 
territory of Milan Province, whereas in the other state provinces it operated through 
health departments under its control. These provincial health offices exercised uniform 
control over the areas within their respective jurisdictions, while complying with the or-
dinances issued by the central magistracy.
Permanent positions that guaranteed security of tenure and a departmental salary 
were held by only a limited number of functionaries within the Milan magistracy. Basi-
cally we are talking about eight people: three city commissioners (commissari urbani), 
two apparitori (city commissioners of a lower rank), one porter, one commissioner for 
beggars and one lazaret caretaker. To these we should add some rural commissioners 
(commissari forensi), so called because they operated outside the city walls. On average 
there were ten of them, although this number varied seasonally. The total number of ese-
cutori would however grow out of all proportion when including the network of local 
functionaries who enabled the Magistrato to operate on the city’s outskirts. The Magi-
strato would direct each community to appoint one or more health deputies according to 
the number of residents.
These lower-ranking officials fully meet the requirements we are seeking. They were 
selected and appointed by their communities from among their members, they were re-
munerated by those same communities (when they were paid at all) and were empowe-
red by a magistracy (in this specific case by the Magistrato di Sanità) to carry out a se-
ries of tasks.
The only directive the Milan Magistracy would issue to the communities was that 
they select ‘capable, and suitable’18 candidates. All other details were left to their discreti-
on. Choices were therefore entirely up to the communities who were free to operate as 
they saw fit, depending on the circumstances. Some appointments were decided by the 
local notables, others through formal meetings of the local council, and yet others ac-
cording to a strict adherence to the principles of direct democracy, i.e. through a mee-
ting of heads of families, summoned by the pealing of bells, known as convocato. Small 
neighboring villages too would occasionally elect a deputy as an area deputy (deputato di 
pieve).19 The chosen officials were generally of varying social status according to the size 
of the community that elected them, but nevertheless they were all reasonably well edu-
cated, and always literate. In larger towns (such as Abbiategrasso might have been) four 
health deputies were appointed in 1751. Among their number there undoubtedly would 
18 ASM, Sanità, p.a., c. 42, Editto a stampa, 18 July 1730.
19 This term traditionally signified an administrative division within a diocese, which later came to define 
just an area of territory.
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have been one person of noble status and another who bore the title of doctor:20 in other 
words, they would have belonged to the local élite. In the performance of their duties, 
deputies had to be able to read and understand the messages forwarded to them by the 
central magistracy, to network with physicians and surgeons, and to convey to that same 
Magistracy reports relating to pathologies etc.
As previously mentioned, these officials were granted the authority to perform their 
duties directly by the relevant magistracy, at times either by the central Milan Magistracy 
or by other provincial health offices in its jurisdiction. This authority was granted by way 
of a document called a patente. Deputies were thus conferred with ‘sufficient authority 
to sanction anyone at all, and people in regard to health... and to impose fines of up to 25 
scudi’.21 In other words, they possessed coercive powers in relation to third parties, and 
were able to use such powers in actions that were far from insignificant. During a health 
emergency, as testified by the patenti, they were authorized to erect roadblocks on transit 
routes without prior notice. These were manned by armed personnel in order to cut off 
at the source the transit of people or animals likely to spread the disease within the Sta-
te. Similar and immediate measures could be adopted vis-à-vis suspicious cases of disea-
se among farm animals, by isolating the diseased animals and quarantining whole herds. 
Other than in emergency situations, which required prompt intervention, deputies were 
charged with the monitoring of public compliance with all directives issued by the Magi-
strato di Sanità; in other words, with all aspects of public health for which the Magistrato 
was responsible. Naturally, the patente mandated that deputies report without delay on 
any restrictive measures to the Magistrato, whose responsibility it was to ratify or annul 
any decisions, as well as to carry out any further assessments.
There were numerous active health deputies in the state, a few hundred at the very 
least, despite reports that, in contravention of orders, some communities had made no 
appointments or had neglected to renew their patente, which had a validity of three 
years. These functionaries then, appointed locally and not professionally qualified, were 
charged with the implementation of an important share of the monitoring of public 
health by the state of Milan.
In times of real crises in the public health sector, viz during serious epidemics affec-
ting humans or animals within the territory of the state, or whenever state borders nee-
ded to be closed due to reports of an epidemic outbreak in the proximity, then not even 
the thick network of health deputies was sufficient. In such circumstances, the Magistra-
to would resort to another cohort of law enforcers. I am referring to the network of com-
missari forensi I mentioned above.
These officials fell into the category of higher-level functionaries. They were no longer 
selected by the local communities at grass-roots level, but appointed directly by the Ma-
gistrato di Sanità, who remunerated them adequately. They could be divided into two ca-
20 This is an official notice of appointment, dated 21 April 1751, submitted by the Chancellor of the Abbi-
ategrasso Community to the Magistrato di Sanità (ASM, Sanità, p.a., c.12).
21 See two almost identical patenti di delegato, one from 1745 and the other from 1753, in ASM, Sanità, 
p.a., c.12.
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tegories, the first consisting of permanent staff based in the office of the Magistrato. Their 
number varied from time to time but in the first half of the 18th century it remained con-
stant at around ten. Their offices were strategically placed in townships close to obligato-
ry routes that had to be traversed by people and goods entering the State of Milan from 
abroad. In the first instance the officials were charged with the extremely delicate task 
of checking the mandatory documents, known as bollette di sanità, that accompanied 
all people, goods and animals and contained details of their route and previous health 
checks. In order to cover expenses incurred by the Magistrato they were also responsible 
for the collection of health levies payable on all merchandise crossing the border. Final-
ly, it was their duty to prepare and ensure that the required periods of quarantine be ob-
served for people, goods and animals during public health emergencies. In addition, they 
carried out a cleansing procedure, known as a spurgo, that involved the sterilization and 
elimination of ‘malignant corpuscles’ (as bacteria causing contagions were often descri-
bed) in accordance with the techniques available to medicine at that time.
The second category comprised the commissari forensi who were recalled at times of 
greatest need; that is, whenever contagions at the border were confirmed and effective 
protection had to be provided for long periods of time. The main function of these of-
ficials was organizational, insofar as they were responsible for the creation of complex 
control networks at the borders, designed to prevent entry into the state of those trying 
to evade checks along the regular routes. They were therefore granted the necessary au-
thority to recruit on the spot armed guards, and when necessary to mobilize the local ci-
tizenry for tasks involving active vigilance. The choice of individuals selected in this se-
cond category of commissari forensi was also made by the Magistrato, who remunerated 
them from its own budget. It is obvious that these positions were limited to the duration 
of an epidemic, hence when the crisis ended the commissari were promptly discharged. 
Their number varied according to the gravity of the situation, however it never exceeded 
that of the permanent commissari forensi.
The office of the commissari forensi was not, therefore, modelled on that of the of-
ficials selected directly by their local communities, as in the case of the health deputies. 
Nonetheless, an examination of their modus operandi in relation to the powers granted 
them by the Magistrato reveals that in this case too the local communities were involved. 
As indicated above, when access to the State had to be barred for health and safety rea-
sons, the priority was to intercept anyone attempting to use minor roads in order to by-
pass the roadblocks set up along the main routes.
This called for extreme care and attention. Admittedly a quota of illicit border cros-
sings could be tolerated in the fight against smugglers and their goods, but it was not ac-
ceptable in the context of public health: just one infected person would be sufficient to 
spread the contagion. Hence the utmost effort was expended to block even the most re-
mote routes. The task of the commissari therefore was to direct all those with detailed 
knowledge of certain areas, such as mountain communities, to prepare themselves for 
the setting-up of surveillance networks. In 1681 Giovanni Paolo Cambiago, an official 
delegated by the Magistrato to the protection of borders, wrote: ‘my only concern was 
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to block off those mountain passes in Helvetia, Rethia and Vallese, which enabled peop-
le travelling down from Germany to bypass those guarding the straight route and stealt-
hily enter the aforesaid areas. It was also to make sure that our state borders would be 
most diligently protected not by foreigners, but by our subjects, so that neither persons 
nor goods originating from infected or suspect countries could be imported into our Sta-
te. These were the two main tasks allocated to me by the most honourable Tribunal.’22
In other words it was the ‘subjects’ who received from the Magistrato, through an in-
termediary, the authority to use force and weapons against third parties to prevent them 
from entering the State. The communities obeyed these orders by resorting to ancient 
customary practices of self-defense. This was possible as the regulations for bearing 
arms allowed residents in border areas to keep weapons at home, thus enabling them at 
a moment’s notice to deal with any emergency.23 Moreover, the law stipulated that on be-
half of the general public the communities must compulsorily defray, at their own expen-
se, the cost of a number of defensive measures.24
Finally, there was a further category of functionaries, qualified to serve through a pa-
tente issued by the Magistrato di Sanità, which will be worth examining within the con-
text of the present paper. I am referring to the anziani di parrocchia (parish elders), who 
had existed in the city of Milan since the Middle Ages. They could still be found, under 
various titles but with similar roles, in all Lombardy townships as well as in other centres 
in Italy and elsewhere.25
The title anziani di parrocchia has no religious connotations. A parish should be view-
ed as a territorial entity or district, or more precisely as a community of residents, after 
the style of an English parish. In the case of Milan the title was undoubtedly derived from 
the procedures followed for the election of these officials. Indeed, an elder was chosen by 
means of a ballot to which all heads of families belonging to his individual parish were 
summoned. The anziani spread out to occupy many areas around the city. In the period 
to which we are referring here (between the second half of the 17th century and the first 
half of the 18th century), approximately 75 parishes fell within the remit of an anziano.26
The parish elders thus represented an ancient form of self-management on the part of 
a social body, designed to ensure the delivery of a number of services in the common in-
terest of parishioners. Among the diverse tasks entrusted to them was, in particular, that 
of reporting all deaths occurring within their jurisdiction, in order to detect suspicious 
22 ASM, Sanità, p.a., c.4, undated report (probably from 1681).
23 Antonielli, ‘La licenze di porto d’armi’.
24 From among many, see: ASM, Giustizia punitiva, p.a., c. 15, edict of 7 July 1724.
25 For Milan: Antonielli, ‘Tra polizia sanitaria’. There are reliable reports on the presence of anziani also for 
Mantua: Pagano, ‘“Questa turba infame”’, p. 48 and p. 68. As for the identification of similar institutional 
figures in remote areas, see: Buono, ‘Anziano, calpixqui, shaykyh, nanushi’.
26 This number was subject to minor variations during the period, at which time we notice some mild at-
tempts at rationalisation. In some cases the areas covered by the more important parishes could be sub-
divided into two territorial units known as anzianerie, and conversely two parishes covering a smaller 
area with only one anzianeria could be merged. In some cases, one anziano was in charge of two anzia-
nerie for specified periods.
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cases of contagious diseases in the shortest possible time. It was, in fact, the central role 
taken on by the elders in this specific context that resulted in their progressive absorp-
tion into the newly created Magistrato della Sanità.27 Their dependency was formalized 
through the issue of specific patenti di anziano.
The patenti authorized the anziani to administer all tasks pertaining to the Magistra-
to in their allocated territory: monitoring public cleaning services and reporting in-
fractions; monitoring the observance of legislation concerning beggars and checks on 
any unauthorized presence (i.e. of those coming from areas outside the city) in some 
households; the compilation and safekeeping of lists of residents suitable for recruitment 
into the city militia. Above all, as mentioned above, they were given total responsibili-
ty for administering all health-related procedures linked to deaths, from time of death to 
burial. This involved forwarding all documentation (including the death certificate sta-
ting cause of death) to the registrar for deaths, namely a notary on the Magistrato’s staff. 
There was no limit on the duration of an anziano’s tenure but neither was there provision 
in the budget of the Magistrato for any salary to be paid to him.
Thus we find also in the case of parish elders an office arising from the local communi-
ty, in this case even through direct election by heads of families. The functions of the an-
ziani were based on patenti issued by a state magistracy. If we look at the total network 
of officers who made it possible for the Magistrato della Sanità to carry out its tasks,28 in 
most cases we discover functionaries known as esecutori, elected, as stated above, by the 
local community. They were not remunerated by their superiors and derived their autho-
rity from a delegation of power granted to them by the magistracy. All of this parallels 
the English model discussed in the present paper.
As an example, we can look into the procedure for granting a specific authorization to 
proceed to some English lower-ranking officials (such as churchwardens and overseers 
of the poor).
They were elected by their local community at the parish level, and we find documents 
that set out the same series of delegated powers, specifically though the granting of war-
rants. As we can read in a Form of the precept from the high constable to the church-
wardens, &c. for returning lists of jurors [...]: ‘By virtue of a warrant from the clerk of the 
peace of the said county […] unto me directed, you are hereby required to make out, be-
fore the first day of September next, the true list in writing in the form hereunto annex-
ed, containing the names of all men.’29
We return at this point to revisit our initial assumption, i.e. a search for compatibili-
ty between the forms of territorial control characteristic of England and the Continent. 
27 Before the creation in 1534 of a Magistrato della Sanità with jurisdiction over the entire State of Milan, 
there was already an Ufficio di Sanità for the City of Milan, to which the elders reported even then (Vagli-
enti ‘“Noluit ire ad visum”’).
28 For the sake of completeness, reference should also have been made to the commissario dei poveri (com-
missioner for the poor) and his staff. These functionaries were totally equivalent to the law enforcement 
officers.
29 Willcock, The Office of Constable, p. 30 and p. 108.
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We have analysed this in regard to the State of Milan, but it can also be detected in Fran-
ce and other States within the Italian peninsula. This has led to a serious re-evaluation 
of the theory of the individuality of the English model (we are obviously referring here 
to the centuries of the so-called Ancien Régime). While this may be plausible, compli-
cations arise when we return to the example of the State of Milan, especially when at-
tempting to describe a trajectory such as the one suggested by Braddick for England; 
i.e., the State›s progressive acquisition of powers which had evolved from the ground up. 
It would perhaps be more accurate to say that such a process is identifiable in part, but 
through a series of significant distinctions.
The first factor to be considered is that the State of Milan, though endowed with ex-
tensive autonomy in the running of home affairs, was nonetheless dependent on external 
powers: initially the Spanish monarchy and then, from 1706 onwards, the Austrian mon-
archy. Precisely as a result of the encouragement and political decisions of the Austrian 
monarchy (especially after 1748), a number of institutional measures allegedly undermi-
ned a power structure built on the primacy of metropolitan aristocracies, the so-called 
patriciates, and in particular on the primacy of the Milanese patriciate. This aristocracy, 
through trade-based and professional bodies (above all, the Collegio dei Giureconsulti 
in Milan) occupied the highest positions and controlled most of the state magistracies, 
which obviously included the Magistrato di Sanità. Starting from the activation of the 
Land Registry (catasto censuario), known as catasto teresiano, the mid 18th century saw 
the introduction of a series of reforms that, within half a century, were destined to alter 
both governmental institutions and their relationship with local communities.
On one hand, the creation of a land registry made it possible to determine a level of 
taxation based on the capital value assessed for each individual property. On the other 
hand, it served to officially ascertain the identity of the wealthiest landowners, area 
by area. This facilitated the establishment in 1755 of a uniform administrative model, 
known as the convocato, based on the rights and duties of representation relating to the 
highest assessments. Meanwhile, the task of taking a census, set and monitored by the 
Census Bureau, had led to the appointment of a network of officials to perform this role. 
From 1751 onwards, a number of functionaries known as cancellieri delegati were re-
cruited. They were selected, appointed and removed by the same Bureau, whose task it 
was to keep and conserve the records of each census.30 These officials, selected and mo-
nitored by the central authority, were gradually allocated other responsibilities, one of 
which was the selection of the deputati di sanità (who nevertheless were still chosen 
from within the local community).
A short time afterwards the system of government through magistracies also began to 
be affected. Suffice to recall the creation in 1765 of the Supremo Consiglio d’Economia 
and its conversion in 1771 to the Magistrato Camerale, an institution entirely different 
from its homonymous predecessor, which ceased to exist. The new institution no longer 
had the characteristics of a semi-autonomous magistracy under patrician control that 
30 Ostinelli, ‘I cancellieri del censo’, pp. 461-462.
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the old Magistrato Camerale had possessed for over two centuries. In 1786, the Magistra-
to di Sanità ceased to exist, within the framework of institutional reforms dictated by Jo-
seph II.
The Magistrato di Sanità, in the period between mid-century and its abolition, had 
perceived clear signs of its own gradual restructuring. Observe, for example, the decisi-
on in early 1774 to close down the group of deputati di sanità, i.e. the network of officials 
that had enabled extensive measures of control within the State. They were replaced by 
mayors and consuls, i.e. officials who were elected from within the local community, who 
however had no direct relationship with the Magistrato di Sanità.31 Or further, we may 
quote an order that had earlier on in 1772 been issued by the Prince of Kaunitz, to the ef-
fect that commissari forensi were not to be replaced when they died or ceased their em-
ployment.32
These brief examples have been chosen from among many possible ones. They are in-
strumental in showing how the far-reaching reforms of the institutional structures, im-
posed by the Vienna regime with the sole support of the enlightened élites within Lom-
bardy, were followed by changes also at the level of minor and peripheral offices. For the 
sake of completeness, we should also dwell on other government decisions that, during 
those years, would fundamentally revolutionise the network of offices within the state 
of Milan. There was, for example, the creation of the Court of Accounts in 1770, which 
withdrew the ability of the single magistracies to govern their own financial affairs, and 
consequently their ability to manage policy in regard to public offices. There was also the 
1749 reform of public offices, which was followed by a ban on the right of succession in 
public offices, and finally by the suppression of venalità (hereditary transmission of of-
fices), which had had a significant impact on the State of Milan in the 17th and first half 
of the 18th century.
This comprehensive reform package has always been positively assessed by historians, 
who have credited it with the rationalisation of overall government structures. They hold 
that this diminished the harmful effects of a system biased in favour of a patrician éli-
te with a propensity to exploit government offices for its own corporate advantage.33 It is 
not my intention to challenge here this kind of interpretation. I simply wish to highlight 
the fact that the system of government in the State of Milan, at least until the middle of 
the 18th century, was showing significant parallels with the English experience, through 
a huge reliance on the involvement of local communities. Hence, the diversities between 
different scenarios are not so much traceable to the alleged originality of the English mo-
del, as to the political and institutional conditions that permitted on the one hand its sur-
vival, and on the other an evolution that was to preserve substantial legacies.
31 ASM, Sanità, p.a., c. 66, circular of 1 October 1774 addressed to the commissari forensic.
32 ASM, Sanità, p.a., c. 46, letter from the Government of 31 October 1772, read out in the congregazione 
of 27 April 1776.
33 See a comprehensive treatment of the topic in Capra, ‘Il Settencento’.
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Our analysis could also be carried out within the vast class of functionaries, which pre-
sented significant variations. We can repeat a rhetorical question posed by Catherine De-
nys: ‘What do the following have in common? A judicial law enforcer paid for the pursuit 
of criminals, a resident obliged to keep vigil over his district by night, a notable or ju-
rist who uses the police as a stepping stone to an administrative career, a returned soldier 
who becomes a village policeman?’34 Indeed, apart from the notables and jurists, the in-
dividuals described here belong to the class of law enforcers, insofar as they were all au-
thorized to perform various activities, including law enforcement, on the grounds of the 
specific powers granted to them by a magistracy.
The world of law enforcement agents in the State of Milan, then, presented structures 
of some complexity. At its core, it should be pointed out, the body of judicial enforcers 
on Italian territory was undoubtedly more numerous than its English counterpart. The-
se sbirri or birri, as they were known, were not an expression of the local community, but 
rather an example of a bureaucracy. Due to their low-level policing role they were social-
ly marginalized and tended to transmit their jobs down the line from father to son. Gi-
ven their meagre wages, their conduct was motivated by the fact that they needed to seek 
remuneration for their work. They did this to a large extent by demanding payment from 
those they were pursuing in the course of their judicial duties.
These factors, which operated within the body of law enforcers, contributed to a de-
crease in the willingness of the community to implement certain tasks, thus giving rise 
to unequivocal differences in respect to the English situation. This, however, does not de-
tract from the fact that in the State of Milan, at least until the first half of the 18th centu-
ry, there was a solid presence of officials who carried out executive and law enforcement 
tasks. Their appointments were the responsibility of local communities, and the authori-
ty to perform those tasks emanated from the State government.
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Under the Eyes of the Committee of 
Reports: Local and popular involvement in 
the maintenance of public order under the 
National Constituent Assembly (France, 
1789-1791)
Maria Betlem Castellà i Pujols
When the National Constituent Assembly learned of the royal flight to Varennes on 21 
June 1791, it resolved to bring together the Committee of Reports and the Committee of 
Research with a view to ensuring the maintenance of law and order.1 The Constituent As-
sembly decided that the two committees, which Louis XVI had denounced in the mani-
festo-letter he left before attempting to flee, should now work together.2 
The Assembly, by means of its committees, at all times exceeds the limits 
which it has been assigned; it is involved with affairs which are the sole re-
mit of the administration of the kingdom and of justice, and in this way it 
is accumulating all the powers; through its Committee of Research, it even 
displays a true despotism which is more barbarous and insufferable than 
anything ever before seen in history.3 
Louis XVI railed against these committees because they had been responsible for over-
seeing the maintenance of public order and good order since 28 July 1789. The Com-
mittee of Reports was in charge of devising the most appropriate means of preventing 
outbreaks of disorder and of pacifying those that occurred, while the Committee of Re-
search was responsible for locating the persons who had occasioned the disorder. The 
fact was that within a short time of the establishment of the National Constituent Assem-
bly, the deputies had begun to receive hundreds of letters, reports, petitions and addres-
ses requesting guidance on how to respond to the breaches of order that were taking 
place all over the country, and the creation of these two committees was its solution to 
this situation.4 
However, just a week after the setting up of the Committee of Reports and the Com-
mittee of Research, which were to intervene in one of the most important competences 
1 This research has been carried out within the framework of the Study Group on Institutions and Political 
Cultures (XVI-XXI centuries) – (2017 SGR 1041) at Pompeu Fabra University (Barcelona). I should like 
to take this opportunity to thank Graham Thomson, the translator of this article. 
2 Archives parlementaires, vol. 27, p. 373. 
3 Ibid., vol. 27, p. 381; note: all quotations have been translated by the editor from French into English
4 Castellà, Revolució, poder i informació, vol. 1, pp. 10-54.
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of the executive power, namely the maintenance of civic order and peace, the Constitu-
ent Assembly decided, on 5 August 1789, that the municipal authorities and the bour-
geois militias should be responsible for establishing good order, and that the government 
should provide military assistance to municipal authorities where necessary.5 Five days 
after taking this decision, on 10 August 1789, the Constituent Assembly adopted the first 
decree on the restoration of public order:6 the first martial law, and the first of the five de-
crees on the restoration of public order that would be adopted under this first Constitu-
ent Assembly.7 What was its goal?
The aim of this draft decree, or first martial law, was to ensure that the maintenance of 
law and order did not rest entirely in the hands of the King. It sought to assign this task 
to the municipal authorities and to make the mobilizing of the national militias, the ma-
réchaussées and the troops a municipal responsibility.8 It was also designed to direct all 
the information that might be produced as a result of such disorder as occurred into the 
hands of the Constituent Assembly, so that it should know the source of the disruptions 
of good order incidents and the causes that occasioned these incidents and be able to im-
pose exemplary punishments on those who took part in them. This information would 
largely be channelled to the Committee of Reports, and to a lesser extent to the Com-
mittee of Research. Within a few weeks of the start of the revolutionary process, and in 
less than fifteen days, the National Constituent Assembly had transferred to two legisla-
tive committees and to the municipal authorities a part of the management of the main-
tenance of public order.
I. Identifying the problems
From the summer of 1789 on, the municipal authorities and the bourgeois militias and 
the National Guards played an important role in the maintenance of law and order, and 
as a result of this the Committee of Reports of the National Constituent Assembly was 
assigned a considerable amount of work. Not only was it charged with determining the 
causes of the breaches of order that were taking place and with proposing the most ap-
propriate means of pacifying them – above all, when those who should have quashed the 
disturbance failed to do so – but also with resolving all such conflicts as might arise bet-
ween the various instruments of law and order at local and/or regional level: the Com-
mittee of Reports had to intervene in breaches of the peace caused by those entrusted 
5 Archives parlementaires, vol. 8, p. 351.
6 Ibid., pp. 378-379.
7 Under the National Constituent Assembly five projects were adopted to restore public tranquillity: 10 
August 1789, 21 October 1789, 9 February 1790, 23 February 1790 and 27 July 1791. However, Riho Ha-
yakawa and Florence Gauthier consider that the Le Chapelier law (14 June and 20 July 1791) was a com-
plement to martial law, in contrast to Michel Pertué, who does not so consider it (Hayakawa, ‘La loi mar-
tiale’, pp. 69-79; Gauthier, Triomphe et mort du droit naturel, p. 61 and p. 102; and Pertué, ‘Loi martiale, 
état de siège et législation révolutionnaire’’, pp. 71-113). 
8 Carrot, Révolution et maintien de l’ordre, pp. 82-83. 
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with the maintenance of order. In the words of Charles-Louis-Victor, prince de Broglie, a 
member of the Committee of Reports: 
It is a matter of gaining revenge for the laws which have been violated, and 
of doing so against the very people who were supposed to protect and defend 
those laws.9
In this regard, the Committee of Reports was very soon engaged in mediating in con-
flicts between the old and the new municipal authorities; between the bourgeois militias 
and the future National Guards; between the municipal authorities on the one hand, and 
the national militias and guards on the other; between municipal authorities and their 
inhabitants; or between the municipal authorities and the districts and departments once 
these had been organized.10 The Committee of Reports had to ensure the maintenance 
of good order (political, economic and social) as defined by the decrees of the Natio-
nal Constituent Assembly, and in consequence it was permanently working to avoid any 
possible repudiation of the Constituent Assembly’s decrees and to constrain all those 
whose obligation was to prevent or put down breaches of order at the local or regional le-
vel to act in accordance with the law. The Committee of Reports, in the manner of a con-
certmaster, was charged with fine-tuning the various necessary instruments to ensure 
that the order defined in the framework of the Constituent Assembly would be imposed 
everywhere and without opposition.
However, fine-tuning these instruments was not an easy task, as is indicated by the 190 
reports submitted by the Committee of Reports to the National Constituent Assembly, or 
the 6,554 letters registered by the Committee.11 Analysis of the reports presented by the 
Committee of Reports to the Constituent Assembly and the correspondence records of 
the Committee itself has shown that it confronted six main types of problem.
The first problem the Committee of Reports faced was that those who had to mana-
ge the maintenance of law and order in the local setting did not, for the most part, know 
how to proceed. They were uncertain as to what measures they should take, and as a re-
sult they wrote to the Constituent Assembly or directly to the Committee of Reports to 
request instructions.12 In some cases these petitioners addressed their requests directly to 
the Committee of Reports, or sent a delegation to the Committee to jointly discuss what 
9 Archives parlementaires, vol. 19, p. 514.
10 We have also been able to find a conflict in Strasbourg between the directory of the department on the 
one hand, and the district and the municipality on the other. Archives parlementaires, vol. 26, p. 675-
676. This conflict would provisionally give Gaïd Andro the following arguments in quotation marks: ‘In 
effect, the administration of the district is rarely mentioned in the sources as being the cause of a conflict 
with the other layers of administration. Ultimately, between 1790 and 1792, the administration of the ca-
pital district almost always worked in close collabortion with the departement. In case of tensions, the 
district administration is automatically associated with the departmental administration against the mu-
nicipality’ (Andro, ‘Le procureur général syndic en son chef-lieu’, p. 34).
11 The records that contain the indications on the correspondence received by the Committee of Reports 
are: AF/I*/5-8 of the sous-série AF I Régime constitutionnel (1789-1792) and D*XL 58-61 of the sous-sé-
rie D XL Comité des pétitions, dépêches et correspondances of Archives Nationales (CARAN) in Paris. 
12 On these difficulties, see: Biard, Les lilliputiens de la centralisation, p. 174.
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decisions should be adopted to resolve the conflicts that were taking place.13 By April 
1791, the civil commissioners sent on mission to the Lot department were aware of this 
problem, and noted that the science of public administration was as yet so new that ad-
ministrators ought not be blamed for a lack of experience that would be acquired over ti-
me.14 
It should also be acknowledged that the doubts and uncertainties of the municipal au-
thorities were on occasion entirely justified, given that the Constituent Assembly was 
not or could not always be perfectly clear in its indications. For example: Where should 
the limits of zeal or patriotism that the Constituent Assembly demanded of the muni-
cipal authorities be set? Could private correspondence be opened, given that a draft de-
cree adopted on 10 August 1790, established the privacy of correspondence as an invio-
lable right that could on no account be infringed?15 Confusingly, the opening of private 
correspondence by municipal authorities striving for act with the requisite zeal was not 
always reproved in any consistent fashion by the Constituent Assembly. Some municipal 
authorities were cautioned against opening private correspondence,16 others were appro-
ved in doing so,17 and others again, such as the Municipality of Saint-Aubin, were open-
ly admonished.18 
The second problem to be resolved by the Committee of Reports was that those re-
sponsible for the maintenance of law and order at the local or regional level often pos-
sessed neither the means nor the necessary instructions with which to do so. On more 
than a few occasions the municipal authorities or the militias that were required to take 
action communicated to the Committee of Reports that they found themselves abando-
ned by the executive power. They complained that they did not receive the necessary as-
sistance, and were provided with neither troops nor weapons, or did not receive satisfac-
tory instruction as to how to put into effect the decrees approved by the King.19
The third problem to emerge is that those who were charged with the upkeep of law 
and order in a given area were at times the actual perpetrators of the acts of disorder that 
were taking place. Everywhere in France there were breaches of order as a result of con-
frontations between old and new municipal authorities, as the former refused to stand 
down, or between the municipal authorities and the King’s procurators and bailiffs, who 
annulled the decisions of the municipalities; of confrontations over the elections to ap-
point the new administration, mainly with regard to procedures and results; of confron-
13 Archives parlementaires, vol. 27, pp. 146-147 and vol. 22, p. 291.
14 Ibid., vol. 25, p. 301. 
15 Ibid., vol. 17, p. 696. On the 25 July 1789, there was a debate on the inviolability of correspondence 
within the framework of the Constituent Assembly, which did not conclude with any decision on the 
part of the Constituent Assembly. Archives parlementaires, vol. 8, pp. 274-275. On the inviolability of 
correspondence under the Constituent Constituent Assembly, see also: Pierre Caillet, Les Français, p. 
183. 
16 Archives parlementaires, vol. 28, pp. 111-112.
17 Ibid., vol. 28, p. 550 and vol. 29, p. 762. 
18 Ibid., vol. 17, p. 696. 
19 Ibid., vol. 20, p. 295. 
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tations between different municipal authorities, usually in relation to grain supplies; of 
confrontations between the municipal authorities and the bourgeois militias and / or the 
future National Guards, with the armed corps refusing to submit to the municipal body; 
of confrontations between the old bourgeois militias and the new National Guards, and 
between the National Guards and the regiments, or between the National Guards and the 
volunteer bodies.
The fourth problem that presented itself has to do with the accusations of inaction, ne-
glect, connivance and weakness levelled at the municipal authorities. For what reason? 
Faced with the breaches of order that occurred within their jurisdiction they often re-
fused to adopt rigorous measures and were more inclined to conciliate, preferring not 
to send in troops, to proclaim martial law or to impose, as some departmental authori-
ties demanded, a healthy terror.20 However, as a result of their disinclination to mobilize 
the troops and in particular to proclaim martial law, they risked being regarded as com-
plicit in the disturbances and accomplices of counterrevolution, intrigue and corrupti-
on. In light of all this, they were accused of weakness, of being incapable of doing what 
they had to do, and of being negligent. They were seen to be very close to their fellow ci-
tizens, and the same criticism was also levelled at the courts, which were suspected of not 
to holding their friends and relatives accountable to the law.21 Indeed, municipal authori-
ties were also accused of being the insurrectionary instigators of rebellions that numbe-
red up to 15,000 insurgents.22 
The fifth of the six main types of problem is the fact that in some cases the munici-
pal authorities responsible for ensuring the maintenance of law and order were denoun-
ced, ‘kidnapped’, driven into exile or forced to act in a certain way by a section of the lo-
cal population. The authorities might be reported for failing to prevent disturbances and 
for not suppressing excesses and persecutions; for taking decisions such as restricting the 
free movement of grain or setting its market price or supply; and for supposedly com-
mitting irregularities in the electoral process.23 It was apparent to the Committee of Re-
ports that on some occasions the inhabitants of villages and countryside compelled the 
municipal authorities to second their deliberations and adopt their decisions, and even 
proceeded to dismiss them and hold new elections to appoint officials willing to do their 
bidding, or to force them to take the lead in acts of insurrection.24 As a result, some mu-
nicipal authorities that had refused to submit to the will of the local population had been 
persecuted, while others had chosen to go into exile.25 
The sixth and last type of problem that the Committee of Reports had to address was 
the tendency, on the part of the municipal authorities and others responsible for ensu-
ring the maintenance of public order, to disregard the decrees of the National Consti-
20 Ibid., vol. 15, p. 549; vol. 21, p. 152; vol. 23, p. 176, p. 308 and pp. 545-546; vol. 25, p. 291; and Collection 
générale des décrets, vol. 12, pp. 208-210. 
21 Archives parlementaires, vol. 26, pp. 672-676 and vol. 27, pp. 317-318. 
22 Ibid., vol. 28, p. 550.
23 Ibid., vol. 8, p. 444; vol. 13, p. 96; vol. 15, p. 337 and vol. 16, pp. 148-149.
24 Ibid., vol. 17, p. 165; vol. 18, p. 647; vol. 21, pp. 150-155; vol. 25, p. 281 and vol. 28, p. 548. 
25 Ibid., vol. 25, p. 278. 
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tuent Assembly and the measures it advocated for pacifying conflicts and to ignore the 
warnings and advice of the Committee of Reports.26 The latter omission prompted an im-
mediate response from the Committee of Reports, which threatened to inform the Con-
stituent Assembly of the reprehensible conduct of those municipalities that persisted in 
rejecting its counsels and the measures it recommended.27 
II. Managing the information
The Committee of Reports acquired its extensive knowledge of the problems affecting 
the local management of the maintenance of public order from the huge volume of cor-
respondence it received. The Bureau des renvois of the National Constituent Assembly 
passed on to the Committee 7,796 of the 40,282 letters it registered between August 1789 
and 31 August 1791,28 amounting to 19.35% of the correspondence received by the Con-
stituent Assembly. Its ledgers list 6,554 letters registered, of which 2,215—34% of the to-
tal—were not attended to. What, then, was done with the remaining 66%? Were their 
contents communicated to the rest of the deputies? Did the Committee manage them on 
its own without consulting the Constituent Assembly, or did it receive assistance from 
other agencies?29
The Committee of Reports was informed of the majority of disturbances that took 
place throughout France, and was assisted by other committees and commissions of 
the Constituent Assembly in managing the content of the letters it received, and a total 
of 1,209 registered entries—letters with their annexes—were processed with such assi-
stance, especially from the Constitution Committee, the Finance Committee, the Com-
mittee of Research and the Ecclesiastical Committee. However, most of the matters dealt 
with by the Committee of Reports were managed not with the help of other agencies of 
the legislative power but with the assistance of the executive power: central (King and 
ministers), regional (provinces, departments and districts) and local. 1,973 registered 
items were managed with the help of the executive power without the involvement of 
the Constituent Assembly—45.47% of the matters the Committee decided to address. 
Almost half of the total. It is understandable, therefore, that the deputy François-Pier-
re Blin, who was a member of the Committee of Reports, should have sought to prevent 
the committees from referring to the executive power the matters they received without 
a prior pronouncement by the Constituent Assembly.30 
26 Ibid., vol. 20, p. 423 and Archives Nationales, record D*XL45, pp. 187-188. 
27 Ibid., vol. 24, p. 732.
28 Castellà, Revolució, poder i informació, vol. 3, pp. 763-963.
29 All these questions are analyzed in greater depth in, Maria Betlem CASTELLÀ I PUJOLS, “Pouvoir et In-
formation dans les mains du Comité des rapports: un comité-pendule entre les pouvoirs législatif et exé-
cutif sous l’Assemblée nationale constituante (1789-1791)”, Parliaments, Estates & Representation (pu-
blié online le 31 mai 2019).
30 Archives parlementaires, vol. 11, p. 24.
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Of this great volume of information that the Committee of Reports received, how 
much did it consider should be communicated to the Constituent Assembly? The stu-
dy of the six ledgers in which the Committee of Reports registered the correspondence 
it received indicates that of the 6,554 letters entered, it considered only 190 deserving of 
this treatment, a mere 2.89% of the total number of items registered. It thus appears that 
the Committee of Reports forwarded to the deputies whose task it was to legislate and to 
draft a Constitution for France less than 3% of the information at its disposal, a state of 
affairs that would go some way to explaining the refusal of the Left deputies of the sub-
sequent Legislative Assembly to establish committees and their determination to read all 
the correspondence received.31 
The deputies of the National Constituent Assembly thus had to deal with a committee 
that shared with them only a tiny percentage of all the correspondence it received, and 
in addition shared in more or less detail only the information it deemed more or less op-
portune: of the disturbances that were taking place and the tensions between the peop-
le responsible for managing the maintenance of law and order at the local level, it made 
known what it thought it most advisable or prudent to make known.
By way of example, this was the case with an incident in the Mâconnais. On 7 Sep-
tember 1789, the Committee of Reports registered receipt of a letter from Mâcon, writ-
ten by members of the committee that had been set up there. The letter was entered in 
the ledger as No. 572 and then passed, in all likelihood, to the deputy Jean-Pierre Pe-
zous for examination.32 The deputies of the Committee of Reports decided to communi-
cate its content to the Constituent Assembly after meeting with the deputies from Mâcon 
to draw up the report. The findings of the Committee of Reports, entered in its register, 
were that the proceedings and deliberations of the Mâcon Committee were irregular, and 
that the members of this committee should confine themselves in future to detaining the 
criminals and placing them at the disposal of the courts of justice. What had happened?
The Parliamentary Archives indicate that following an intervention in the National 
Constituent Assembly by the deputy Louis-Jean-Henri-Darnaudat, member of the Com-
mittee of Reports, on 18 September 1789, the municipal officers of Mâcon and the com-
mittee in that city had set themselves up as a tribunal, and had pronounced and carried 
out death sentences against certain persons accused of looting and arson. The decision 
of the Constituent Assembly with regard to this was to forward the case to the executive 
power in order for it to be dealt with as soon as possible.33 This decision was followed by 
a silence about what had occurred in the Mâconnais that continued until 22 March 1791, 
when François-Felix-Hyacinthe Muguet de Nanthou, another deputy and member of the 
Committee of Reports, presented a new report on the events in Mâcon to the Constitu-
ent Assembly.34 
31 Castellà, ‘Monsieur André Aubusson’.
32 Archives Nationales, record AF/I*/5, pp. 57-58.
33 Ibid., vol. 9, p. 41.
34 Ibid., vol. 24, pp. 287-288. 
Under the Eyes of the Committee of Reports
56
What did Muguet de Nanthou make known to the deputies with this new report? Mu-
guet de Nanthou represented to the entire Assembly chamber that a number of gentle-
men of property in the Mâconnais, finding themselves threatened and assaulted by a 
gang of bandits, had come together to obtain redress for the aggressions they had suffe-
red, and that as a result more than 200 people had been killed, leaving some hamlets un-
inhabited, and all without any combat having taken place or any of the avengers having 
sustained any injury. However, the gentlemen’s vengeance did not end here. According to 
the account offered by Muguet de Nanthou, the triumphant property owners, not satis-
fied with the revenge they had exercised, had decided to arrest some thirty people, who 
were imprisoned and then tried by the same gentlemen, who converted the permanent 
committees of their towns into sovereign courts with the authority to judge, sentence 
and execute – as they duly did – 32 persons.
Why did the Committee of Reports, by way of Muguet de Nanthou, make a second re-
port on these events, and in greater detail than on the first occasion, as was the practice 
when the victims were not poor citizens assaulted by gentlemen of property but proper-
ty owners assaulted by common people categorized as bandits? For a very simple rea-
son. The victims of the property owners’ reprisals appealed to the National Constituent 
Assembly for justice when the vengeful gentlemen decided to take action against them 
again within the framework of the recently established courts for the aggressions they 
had suffered. How did Muguet de Nanthou justify the silence with which these events 
had been received? By pointing out that the Constituent Assembly had sought to avoid 
civil war by turning a blind eye on what had occurred and consigning the matter to the 
executive power.
The Assembly, which at that time was received news every day of these 
very disasters which were afflicting all parts of the kingdom, believed that the 
best way to stop this suffering and prevent a civil war from erupting was to 
make people forget about it; the Assembly therefore referred the affair back 
to the executive power, who attempted to calm things down. Peace ought to 
follow from this measure of prudence that you have indicated. The respecti-
ve injustices of the two parties ought to have ended the quarrels; but those 
whose properties had been destroyed were waiting for the organization of the 
courts so they could register a complaint against the residents of the coun-
tryside.35 
From 28 July 1789 until 30 September 1791, the Committee of Reports had the final 
say on the information at its disposal, deciding at all times what was to be communica-
ted and how, and determining what was worthy of being remembered and what was to 
be forgotten. And, as Muguet de Nanthou would once again argue to the Constituent As-
sembly on 22 March 1791, the affair in the Mâconnais was best forgotten, no doubt be-
cause the murders were committed by citizens anxious to defend their property, who had 
35 Ibid., vol. 24, p. 287.
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murdered with the complicity and collaboration of those specifically entrusted with the 
maintenance of law and order. 36
III. Resolving the problems 
The problems emerging in relation to the local popular management of the maintenance 
of law and order obliged the Committee of Reports to decide how it should respond to 
them. The reading of its reports and the study of the decisions in its records concerning 
the 6,554 registered items of correspondence referred to above make it possible to clas-
sify the Committee’s responses into eight types.
First: To communicate the decrees of the National Constituent Assembly to where the-
se could urgently be put into effect. Given that the Committee of Reports considered that 
the people were often mistaken and ignorant of the law and of the nature, extent and li-
mits of liberty, it chose, especially during the first months, to send out some of the de-
crees of the Constituent Assembly. By way of example, the decree of the 10 August 1789, 
on the restoration of public order, the first martial law; the decree of the 4 August 1789, 
on the payment of taxes and charges, the supposed abolition of the Ancien Régime; the 
decrees on the free movement of grain, of the 29 August and 18 September 1789; and the 
decree of Fontainebleau of the 15 October 1789, on the election of the civil and police 
committees, which prior to the organization of municipal authorities and national militi-
as would adopt only those decisions necessary to ensure the putting into practice of the 
decrees of the Constituent Assembly and the maintaining of order. Of all these decrees, 
by far the most widely disseminated was that of the 10 August 1789, which has been lar-
gely ignored and very rarely cited by a historiography that tends to regard the first mar-
tial law as corresponding to the decree of the 21 October 1789,37 thus eclipsing the poli-
tical-economic programme imposed in August 1789: martial law on the one hand, free 
movement of grain on the other. In other words, the liberal economic terror.38 
Second: To make contact with the ministers to ensure that they took heed of the mat-
ters the Committee sent to them and to supply it more information than it possessed or 
could have access to, and to urge the ministers to adopt a certain course of action in or-
der to resolve the conflicts in question. The Committee of Reports called on the mini-
sters to enact the Constituent Assembly’s decrees, to facilitate the free movement of grain 
by eliminating any obstacles, to put down breaches of order, to mobilize the troops, to 
provide weapons and to put pressure on the justice system to process certain cases more 
swiftly. The Committee of Reports was in almost constant contact with the Garde des 
Sceaux, subsequently the Minister of Justice, during the whole period of the National 
36 Ibid., vol. 24, p. 288. 
37 Michel Pertué, ‘Loi martiale’, pp. 682-683; Gauthier, Triomphe et mort du droit naturel, pp. 56-66; Haya-
kawa, ‘L’assassinat du boulanger Denis François’, pp. 1-19; Lemarchand, ‘À propos des révoltes et révolu-
tions’ p. 159; Neusy, ‘Opinions et réflexions sur la loi martiale’, pp. 27-48 and Hayakawa, ‘La loi martiale’, 
pp. 69-79.
38 On the liberal economic terror, see: Gauthier, Triomphe et mort du droit naturel, p. 57 and ‘De Mably à 
Robespierre’, p. 122. 
Under the Eyes of the Committee of Reports
58
Constituent Assembly, and the contact with the ministers of War and the Interior was far 
from negligible. 1,106 items were managed with the aid of the ministers.
Third: To examine the measures and behaviours of those responsible for maintaining 
law and order in the local and / or regional context in the event that those measures and 
behaviours had generated a breach of the peace, and make its opinion and advice availab-
le to all those who needed it. However, in order to do this the Committee of Reports had 
to request the permission of the National Constituent Assembly, and, the Committee’s 
president, the Abbé Baptiste-Henri Grégoire, did not obtain the necessary authorization 
until 5 February 1790.39 A few weeks previously, on 28 December 1789, it had been deci-
ded that no committee could make its opinion public.40 Not all deputies were in favour of 
the committees being allowed to make public statements without first consulting the le-
gislative body.
Fourth: To approve or censure the measures and behaviours of those responsible for 
maintaining law and order in the local and / or regional context in the event, once again, 
that those measures and behaviours had generated a breach of the peace. The Commit-
tee of Reports could do this in two different ways, either by submitting a report to the 
Constituent Assembly, in the hope that the deputies would endorse their opinion, or in-
dependently, bypassing the Constituent Assembly and dispensing with the approval or 
consent of the deputies. In effect, public approval or censure was intended to set an ex-
ample, with public endorsement constituting a mark of honour and public disapproval 
constituting the opposite. The Committee of Reports did not hesitate to censure all tho-
se who did not adjust their behaviours and measures to the will of the National Consti-
tuent Assembly.41
Fifth: To propose to the National Constituent Assembly the annulment of the decisi-
ons, measures and acts that were at the origin of many of the disturbances that had oc-
curred. In its communications with the Constituent Assembly the Committee of Reports 
proposed that the legislative body declare null and void certain decisions taken by mu-
nicipal authorities, their municipal officers or their permanent committees, or by the 
district and / or department directories; that it declare null and void certain verdicts is-
sued by the courts; and that it declare null and vexatious certain prison sentences and 
null and unconstitutional certain elections made.42 With the adoption of these proposals, 
the National Constituent Assembly ended up intervening in administrative and judicial 
functions of the executive power.
Sixth: To propose the suspension from office of persons responsible for maintaining 
law and order in the local and / or regional context. In the event of their refusing to pro-
claim martial law, engaging in inappropriate conduct or adopting provisions contrary to 
the decrees of the National Constituent Assembly a mayor, a group of municipal officers, 
39 Archives parlementaires, vol. 11, p. 436.
40 Ibid., vol. 11, p. 24. 
41 Ibid., vol. 18, p. 386
42 Castellà, Revolució, poder i informació, vol. 1, pp. 154-164. 
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an entire municipality and even a directory could thus be suspended,43 and indeed it 
could be possible not only to suspend the existing municipality and convene a new elec-
tion to replace it,44 but also to intervene in this replacement municipality. In other words, 
the Constituent Assembly, the departmental authorities or the civil commissioners sent 
on mission could appoint a certain number of provisional commissioners to take tem-
porary charge of municipal and / or departmental functions if a directory was suspen-
ded.45 A result of this was that citizens came to be governed by persons whom they had 
not freely elected. 
Seventh: To propose to bring before the Court of Orleans, entrusted with judging cri-
mes of lèse-nation, persons suspected of committing this offence. The Committee of Re-
ports considered that refusing to proclaim or apply martial law, deliberating against a de-
cree of the Constituent Assembly and disseminating this deliberation, or failing to obey 
the decrees of the Constituent Assembly could constitute a crime of lèse-nation, and in 
light of this that the mayor, the municipal officials and the procurator of the commune of 
Douai should face such a charge for having refused to apply martial law;46 that the presi-
dent and the commissioners of the Assembly of Catholics of Nîmes could be so charged 
for their deliberations and by the communication of these deliberations to a large num-
ber of municipalities and corporations of craftsmen,47 and that the Chambre de vacations 
of the Parlement of Toulouse could also be charged with rebellion against its decrees.48 
All of this was proposed in defence of the endangered Motherland.49 
Eighth: To inspire fear in all those who sought to defy or to thwart the decrees of the 
Constituent Assembly. As Noël-Joseph Madier de Montjau said on 15 August 1790, it 
was necessary to intimidate those municipal authorities that might be tempted to pre-
varicate.50 Thus, with a view to ensuring public order and peace throughout France the 
Committee of Reports did not hesitate to use its speeches to the Constituent Assembly, 
its draft decrees and its proposals to direct the law in all its severity against those who 
attempted to disobedience. According to the Committee of Reports it was necessary to 
prevent new crimes on the part of enemies and new errors on the part of citizens, and 
to protect the Constitution from new agitations. It was necessary to preserve the general 
will from being insulted and to require all persons to respect for or at least to keep silent 
about the Constitution. There was no place for false mercy or ill-conceived clemency for 
those who rebelled against the decrees adopted by the National Constituent Assembly.51 
43 Archives parlementaires, vol. 21, p. 154 and p. 703; vol. 23, p. 135 and vol. 26, pp. 676-677.
44 Ibid., vol. 20, p. 202 and vol. 23, pp. 545-546.
45 Ibid., vol. 17, p. 373; vol. 21, p. 622; vol. 23, p. 179 and Collection générale des décrets, vol. XII, pp. 208-
210.
46 Collection générale des décrets, vol. XII, pp. 208-210.
47 Archives parlementaires, vol. 24, p. 524.
48 Ibid., vol. 19, pp. 513-515.
49 Ibid., vol. 19, p. 515. 
50 Archives parlementaires, vol. 18, p. 81.
51 Archives parlementaires, vol. 20, p. 138-139 and vol. 21, pp. 620-622.
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However, the Committee of Reports was not solely dedicated to disseminating a dis-
course that sought to inspire fear and terror; it also, on certain occasions, pursued the 
opposite course, calling for clemency and the balm of forgetting. As we have already 
seen, the Committee of Reports, with its reports, its draft decrees and its proposals, in-
dicated what was to be remembered and what should be overlooked, what should be pu-
nished and what should not. By way of example, the murder of M. Latierce by a group of 
misguided citizens called for severe punishment,52 while the murder of 232 people in the 
Mâconnais by a group of property owners was to be conveniently forgotten.53 In the first 
case, leniency would be a crime, in the second, a necessity. In the first case, punishment 
was needed to enforce respect for property and guarantee personal safety; in the second 
case, clemency was necessary to stifle hatred and ensure peace. Which measuring rod or 
set of standards did the Committee of Reports work with? With double standards and a 
variable measuring rod?
IV. Defending municipal authorities
Following the adoption of the draft decrees on 10 August and 21 October 1789, the mu-
nicipal authorities had a key role in maintaining law and order. They were empowered to 
call out the national militias, the maréchaussées and the troops to put down disturbances, 
and the significance of this competence of the first order was lost on no one,54 neither the 
legislative power nor the executive power, which in February 1790 attempted to regain 
control of the management of the maintenance of public order.55 On 4 February 1790, 
Louis XVI intervened in the National Constituent Assembly to demand a strengthening 
of the executive power, to announce that new breaches of order were taking place, to in-
vite the Constituent Assembly to join with him in order to pacify these disturbances, and 
to explain how much he was troubled by these reports of attacks on property and wealth 
and acts of violence against persons. 
By what fatality, just as calm was starting to emerge again, has this new 
unrest spread through the provinces! By what fatality will we be spared from 
this new excess! All of you, join me to help stop them, so that all our efforts 
may prevent criminal violence from sullying these days in which the nation’s 
joy is being prepared. You who by so many means can influence public con-
fidence, shed light on the true interests of the people which have been decei-
ved, the good people who are so dear to me, and - as I am assured when I 
am being consoled in my pain - who love me. Ah! If he knew how unhap-
py I am on hearing the news of an attack against the goods, or of an act of 
52 Archives parlementaires, vol. 21, p. 152.
53 Archives parlementaires, vol. 24, p. 287.
54 Pertué, ‘Le maintien de l’ordre’.
55 Petitfils, Louis XVI, p. 742-745 and Félix, Louis XVI et Marie Antoinette, p. 515.
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violence against the people, perhaps they would spare me from this painful 
bitterness!56
The Right sector of the National Constituent Assembly supported the intervention of 
Louis XVI and was prepared to strengthen the executive power in the king’s hands be-
cause it seemed that the municipal authorities did not dare to deploy armed force;57 but 
the Left sector of the Constituent Assembly, with the Abbé Grégoire, president of the 
Committee of Reports, at its head, continued to trust in the municipal authorities to 
quell the disturbances that were taking place, and succeeded in passing a draft decree on 
9 February 1790, that insisted on the putting into effect of the decree of the 10 August 
1789, while warning the municipal authorities that if the disorders did not cease, the exe-
cutive power would be obliged to deploy its strength.58 
This new draft decree on the restoration of law and order effectively neutralized the 
draft decree presented by the Abbé Jean-Sifferin Maury, of the Right sector, which sought 
to enable the mobilization of troops without a prior request to that effect by the munici-
pal authorities.59 However, the offensive in this sector was by no means over, and on 16 
February 1790, it was renewed with the reading of a report that Louis XVI had wanted 
to bring before the Constituent Assembly. What was the content of this report? The same 
discourse as always: the monarch was suffering as a result of the disturbances that were 
taking place, but trusted that the municipal authorities would bring to bear, with coura-
ge and success, all possible means in pacifying the breaches of order.60 
Within a week of adopting the draft decree of the 9 February, which left the decision 
to call out of the national militias, maréchaussées and troops to the municipal authori-
ties, their exercise of their responsibilities was once again being questioned. They were 
considered incapable of deploying public force – and at times of being unwilling to do 
so. What solution was to be adopted now? To convene the Constitution Committee and 
the Committee of Reports, and to make them submit a draft decree preventing the mu-
nicipal authorities from refusing to employ all the means at their disposal to quash any 
breach of public order.61 What solutions did these two committees present on 18 Febru-
ary 1790? 1) That municipal officers should be suspended from their functions and de-
clared ineligible for public office if they failed to proclaim martial law when the lives and 
the property of citizens and the collection of direct or indirect taxes were endangered; 2) 
that any municipal officer implicated in a disturbance would be declared guilty of preva-
rication and punished accordingly; and 3) that if the municipal officers were unwilling 
to call out the national militias, the regular troops or the maréchaussées, four notables 
of the Council of the Commune or eight eligible citizens could give the order.62 Was the 
56 Archives parlementaires, vol. 11, p. 431.
57 Ibid., vol. 11, p. 537
58 Ibid., vol. 11, p. 538.
59 Ibid., vol. 11, p. 537.
60 Ibid., vol. 11, p. 613.
61 Ibid., vol. 11, p. 615.
62 Ibid., vol. 11, p. 641-642.
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plenary session of the Constituent Assembly happy with these proposals? Not especial-
ly, and on 20 February 1790, discussions were resumed with a new proposal by the depu-
ty Isaac-René-Guy Le Chapelier, member of the Constitution Committee. What did this 
new proposal say? That in the event of their not mobilizing the forces of order, munici-
pal officers would be removed from office and disqualified from the exercise of any pu-
blic function, and would be required to pay compensation for any losses resulting from 
the disorder. The desire of many deputies to ensure that the maintenance of law and or-
der was not left exclusively in the hands of the king led them to put pressure on the mu-
nicipal authorities, with the imposition of severe punishments should they refuse to in-
tervene.
Art. 2. If out of negligence or weakness, the municipal officers did not re-
quest the help of the armed forces, and if any damage were done, they would 
be responsible for it; they would be deprived of their offices, declared inca-
pable of assuming any public function in future, condemned to third par-
ties, and to give reparations as judged fair to those who have suffered dama-
ge to their person or property, and for the restitution of the sums which the 
public treasury may have lost through the pillage of its coffers or the default 
of the receipt of taxes. Art. 3. If it could be proven that the municipal officers 
excited or favoured the seditious mob, they could, exceptionally, be followed, 
condemned as corrupt, and punished as such.63
The Right sector of the Constituent Assembly was not satisfied by this new proposal. 
Its deputies continued to believe that the executive power was separate from the mon-
arch, that the king had no role to play and that the municipal authorities had no need of 
him, and that the fears of these authorities were an obstacle to the application of mar-
tial law. When Cazalès, Jean-Jacques Duval d’Eprémesnil and Pierre-Victor Malouet, 
among others, called for the executive power to be reinforced and for the king to be gi-
ven absolute responsibility for the management of breaches of order,64 these interventi-
ons provoked the reaction of Honoré-Gabriel-Riqueti, count of Mirabeau: If they wished 
to establish a dictatorship in France, then they must submit a motion to that effect for 
discussion.65 
Two days later, Maximilien-Marie-Isidore Robespierre intervened in the discussions to 
declare that the draft decree of the 9 February had already been adopted, and that ano-
ther proposal for the restoration of public order was now being discussed, because the 
ministers – in the report that had been read to the Constituent Assembly on 16 Febru-
ary – considered that the draft decree of the 9 February was insufficient.66 Robespierre 
was of the opinion that there was no need to adopt any new martial law, especially when 
the present disturbances were being put down and elections to districts and departments 
63 Ibid., vol. 11, p. 653.
64 Ibid., vol. 11, p. 654-658.
65 Ibid., vol. 11, p. 655.
66 Ibid., vol. 11, p. 665.
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were about to take place.67 The Left sector of the Constituent Assembly considered that 
the outbreaks of disorder were exaggerated and that what was needed was conciliation 
rather than repression, the communication the decrees of the Constituent Assembly to 
the municipal authorities and the involvement of ecclesiastics in their dissemination.68 
This was so for the simple reason that breaches of order were due to ignorance of the law, 
or due – as the Abbé Grégoire, president of the Committee of Reports, was to say, on the 
basis of the opinion of the municipal authorities – to ignorance of the language, to a fear 
that the decrees of the 4 August were not being implemented, to a misunderstanding of 
the decrees, or because malicious persons were leading the peasants into mischief and 
false decrees were being circulated throughout the country.69
On the following day, the 23 February, the deputy Pierre Boussion presented his own 
draft, as Maury or Malouet had previously done, in which he brought together a num-
ber of the interventions that had been made since Louis XVI’s address to the Constituent 
Assembly on 4 February 1790, such as that the municipal authorities should compensate 
any losses occasioned by their negligence, that the king should address all decrees to the 
municipal authorities as soon as they were passed, or that the clergy should read out the 
adopted decrees in their churches.70 The National Constituent Assembly duly discussed 
Boussion’s motion and concluded that the municipal authorities should apply martial 
law when the collection of taxes and the security of persons and property should so re-
quire, and that the Commune – not the municipal officials – should be responsible for 
paying compensation if the disorder could have been avoided. However, the Commu-
ne could seek to reclaim these sums by taking legal action against the perpetrators of the 
disorder in the courts.71 
In February 1790 the municipal authorities elected by their citizens came within a 
hair’s breadth of being obliged to cede to a monarch who since July 1789 had seen this 
competence denied him the exercise of the maintenance of law and order, thus making 
it possible for the National Guards, the maréchaussées or the troops to be called out wi-
thout municipal mobilization,72 and requiring the municipal authorities to compensate 
losses suffered as a result of a breach of order by considering them guilty of negligence 
or incompetence in failing to quell the disorder.73 The municipal authorities were spared 
this cession, but were required to adopt martial law, they were required to take action, 
67 Ibid., vol. 11, p. 673-674.
68 Ibid., vol. 11, p. 537 and p. 670. 
69 Ibid., vol. 11, p. 537.
70 Ibid., vol. 11, p. 677.
71 Ibid., vol. 11, p. 682.
72 This situation was to be modified by the decree of the 16 January 1791, which led to the founding of the 
national gendarmerie. In this decree it was established that the gendarmerie could act without a particu-
lar mobilization. This situation was also modified as a result of the draft decree of the 27 July 1791, which 
established that the guards on salary were in the same situation as the national gendarmerie. However, 
in accordance with this draft decree, the National Guard and troops of the line had to act at the orders of 
the city procurator, or, failing that, of the municipal authority. 
73 This debate has also been taken up by Carrot, Révolution et maintien de l’ordre, pp. 117-120. 
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and when some months later their role in the maintenance of order (political, economic 
and social) was once again interdicted on account of their proximity to their citizens, 
the sovereign people that had elected them, the National Constituent Assembly and its 
Committee of Reports chose to oblige them to obey the decrees of the legislative body. 
How? By sending civil commissioners to the departments.
V. Restricting communication
By the time that breaches of public order were once again taking place throughout Fran-
ce, in the summer of 1790, the administration had been renewed. The municipal elec-
tions were held during the months of January, February and March, and the elections 
to the districts and departments took place in the months of May and June.74 The Natio-
nal Constituent Assembly had already defined the channels of communication between 
the different tiers of administration of the realm and had also established an administra-
tive hierarchy with responsibility for overseeing the legality of administrative acts.75 On 
12 August 1790, the functions of the administrative assemblies were defined by means 
of an instruction76 and on 16 August 1790, the judicial reorganization took place.77 The 
summer of 1790 therefore saw a reorganized and renewed executive and judicial admini-
stration. At that time, the situation had changed so much that even the amount of corre-
spondence received by the Committee of Reports and the National Constituent Assem-
bly was considerably affected. The number of items registered by the Bureau des renvois 
of the Constituent Assembly and the Committee of Reports began to decline markedly in 
comparison with previous periods. What was happening? Why had the volume of corre-
spondence decreased? 
74 Glénard, L’exécutif et la Constitution de 1791, p. 385. 
75 Ibid., pp. 388-389.
76 ‘Instruction de l’Assemblée Nationale sur les fonctions des Assemblées administratives’, Collection géné-
rale des décrets, vol. 5, pp. 77-143. 
77 ‘Articles sur l’organisation judiciaire’, Collection générale des décrets, vol. 5, pp. 170-194. I would like to 
take this opportunity to thank the young researcher Valentin Noisette for his very pertinent observations 
on the impact of the reorganization of the judicial power in the reduced volume of correspondence regi-
stered by the Committee of Reports.
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By the middle of the summer of 1790, taking into account the administrative and ju-
dicial reorganization and the fact that the instruction of the 12 August 1790, established 
that the departmental administrations constituted the link between the king and the 
district administrations, and that these last named were the bond between the depart-
mental administrations and the municipal authorities,78 it seems likely that both the citi-
zens and their municipal authorities had begun to apply to their most immediate admi-
nistrative authorities to resolve their doubts and their problems. This would explain not 
only the reduction in the volume of correspondence received by the National Constitu-
ent Assembly and by the Committee of Reports, but also a reduction in the frequency of 
this committee’s contact with the local powers and its more frequent and more intense 
contact with the departmental powers. 
78 ‘Instruction de l’Assemblée Nationale sur les fonctions des Assemblées administratives’, Collection géné-
rale des décrets, vol. 5, p. 82.
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In fact, on 6 October 1790, the Committee of Reports assigned a separate register to 
recording the correspondence with the departmental directories,79 and on 7 January 
1791, the Constituent Assembly ruled that only the deputation of the administrative bo-
dies or directories of the departments and those of the Municipality of Paris would be 
admitted at la barre.80 Direct communication between the local authorities and the Con-
stituent Assembly was being restricted in favour of communication between the depart-
mental authorities and the Constituent Assembly. And in fact it was not only the local 
power’s direct communication with central power that was restricted but also the right to 
petition – which could not be exercised on behalf of the collective – and the capacity of 
the municipal authorities to deliberate on any matter that had a bearing on the nation or 
the revolutionary process. In the wake of the adoption of the draft decree of the 10 May 
1791, the assemblies of the communes could be convened and authorized only to discuss 
strictly municipal matters. Any deliberation that strayed beyond the purely local ambit 
would be considered null and unconstitutional.81
In this context, then, of the diverting of local affairs to the new reorganized admini-
strative and judicial authorities, the role of the municipal authorities in the maintenance 
of law and order was once more interdicted, above all when conflicts arose between the 
municipal authorities and the district and departmental authorities. The municipal au-
thorities accused the departmental authorities in particular of seeking to impose them-
selves, whereas the National Constituent Assembly was of the opinion that the municipal 
79  Archives Nationales, record D*XL 60. 
80 Collection générale des décrets rendus par l’Assemblée nationale, vol. 10, pp. 28-29. 
81 Archives parlementaires, vol. 25, pp. 693-694. 
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authorities were unwilling to subordinate themselves to their more immediate authori-
ties.82 It would appear that by the summer of 1790, the normative texts organizing the va-
rious structures of administration still presented omissions, and the limits of their prero-
gatives were not yet clearly defined.83 
In fact, the municipal authorities entered into conflict with the departmental authori-
ties because they acted in a similar fashion to the Committee of Reports. They annulled 
decisions taken by municipal authorities, examined and validated elections at the muni-
cipal level, made decisions as to how the breaches of order within the department were 
to be managed, and suspended the municipal authorities at they saw fit.84 Above all, ho-
wever, the municipal authorities came into conflict with the department authorities over 
their repeated refusal to proclaim martial law,85 and it was on this question that the de-
puties Étienne-Vincent Moreau and Louis-Simon Martineau intervened in the Natio-
nal Constituent Assembly, on 16 July 1790, to request yet again that municipal officers 
should be held responsible for all such disturbances as they had failed to prevent.86
However, when the municipal authorities came into conflict with the districts and de-
partments, with these intermediate tiers, which were also concerned with the application 
of the law within their jurisdictions,87 the National Constituent Assembly and especially 
the Committee of Reports opted to send civil commissioners to pacify breaches of order. 
This was intended to set in motion the administrative machinery put in place by the le-
gislative power to fine-tune the various instruments whose purpose was on the one hand 
to enforce the law and on the other to maintain public order. From September 1790 to 
July 1791, 11 missions were mounted by the National Constituent Assembly with a view 
to ensuring the maintenance of law and order. Of these 11 missions, seven were pro-
posed by the Committee of Reports. 
Date Mission Person(s) proposing the mission
31-08 / 03-09-1790 
(AP, t. 18, p. 434 and p.530)
Mission to Nancy Barnave on behalf of the Military Com-
mittee / Mirabeau
13-12-1790
(AP, t. 21, p. 458)
Mission to the Lot department Lucas / the Committee of Reports
20-12-1790
(AP, t. 21, p. 598)
Mission to Aix Proposed by the president and the ad-
ministrative bodies of the department 
of Bouches-du-Rhône and presented by 
Mirabeau
82 Ibid., vol. 20, pp. 547-548 and vol. 21, p. 292. On subordination of municipal authorities: Glénard, ‘Les 
rapports entre les pouvoirs administratifs locaux’, pp. 13-15 and p. 21. 
83 Andro, ‘Le procureur général syndic en son chef-lieu’, p. 33. 
84 Archives parlementaires, vol. 21, p. 151 and vol. 27, pp. 146-147.
85 Archives parlementaires, vol. 15, p. 549; vol. 21, p. 153; vol. 23, p. 176, p. 308 and pp. 545-546; vol. 25, p. 
291 and p. 296; and Collection générale des décrets, vol. 12, pp. 208-210.
86  Archives parlementaires, vol. 17, p. 166.
87 Andro, ‘Introduction à la deuxième partie’, p. 129. 
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20-01-1791
(AP, t. 22, p. 353)
Mission to the Haut-Rhin and 
Bas-Rhin departments 
Broglie on behalf of the Committee of 
Reports
14-02-1791
(AP, t. 23, p. 179)
Mission to the Morbihan de-
partment 
Broglie on behalf of the Committee of 
Reports
23-02-1791
(AP, t. 23, p. 452)
Mission to the Gard department Muguet de Nanthou on behalf of the 
Committee of Reports
02-04-1791
(AP, t. 24, p. 504)
Mission to the Var department 
(Extension of the 20-12-1790 
mission) 
Proposed by Voidel on behalf of the 
Committee of Research and the Com-
mittee of Reports
18-06-1791
(AP, t. 27, p. 312)
Mission to the Island of Corsica Muguet de Nanthou on behalf of the 
Committee of Reports
22-06-1791
(AP, t. 27, p. 409)
Mission in certain border de-
partments 
Emmery on behalf of the Military Com-
mittee
22-06-1791
(AP, t. 27, p. 428)
Mission to go in search of the 
king
Emmery on behalf of the Military Com-
mittee and the Constitution Committee
16-07-1791
(AP, t. 28, p. 379)
Mission to the department of 
the Vendée
Goupillau on behalf of the Committee 
of Reports and the Committee of Re-
search
VI. Sending out civil commissioners
For the purpose of maintaining law and order, the Committee of Reports and the Natio-
nal Constituent Assembly opted to send civil commissioners to those areas where brea-
ches of order occurred. The civil commissioners were tasked with restoring law and or-
der and obtaining the necessary information to assess the situation, identify the causes of 
the disturbances and come up with the most appropriate means of ensuring peace. If the 
bodies empowered to restore law and order were failing to do so, had entered into con-
flict or were at the root of the problem, the civil commissioners had to make them ope-
rational again, restoring the hierarchy, implementing the decrees passed by the Consti-
tuent Assembly, removing from office all those who stood in the way of good order or 
initiating judicial action against the perpetrators of the disorder. The civil commissioners 
also had to instruct the people as to their true interests and lead them away from wrong 
or false ideas spread by malicious persons or enemies of the revolutionary process. In or-
der to achieve peace, they could issue proclamations or call out the National Guards and 
the troops of the department to which they were delegated and those of the neighbou-
ring departments.88 If the administrative authorities of the area had neither been inter-
dicted nor were at the root of the disorder, the civil commissioners could work with them 
to restore the peace, and could similarly work with the clergy to have their proclamati-
ons read out from the pulpit.89
88 Castellà, Revolució, poder i informació, vol. 1, pp. 194-208. 
89 Archives parlementaires, vol. 25, p. 276. 
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For the Committee of Reports, which proposed the majority of missions that took 
place under the National Constituent Assembly, the civil commissioners were an effici-
ent resource for maintaining law and order: 1) they were more effective and less dilato-
ry than leaving the administrative bodies to deliberate and make decisions; and 2) they 
had no links to the local populace.90 In addition, the civil commissioners could provide 
the Committee of Reports with supplementary information in addition to that supplied 
by the local deputies and administrative authorities – and perhaps more neutral infor-
mation. Indeed, some civil commissioners on mission acted as instruments of a two-way 
flow of information: on the one hand they communicated their proclamations, and on 
the other they received the petitions of the people.91 The discourse of the legislative po-
wer was brought to the people, and the voice of the people was brought to the legislati-
ve power, or rather, to the Committee of Reports. For although the majority of civil com-
missioners sent on mission were appointed by the king – deputies of the Constituent 
Assembly only began to be recruited as civil commissioners after the flight of the king – 
the information they collected very often went to the Committee of Reports, which then 
made the corresponding report to the legislative body.92 In fact, the involvement of the 
Committee of Reports in the missions of the National Constituent Assembly was so im-
portant that on 22 June 1791, the day after the king’s flight, a large number of the depu-
ties chosen to go out on mission to implement the necessary measures to guarantee the 
security of the State and maintain public order were present or former members of the 
Committee of Reports.93 
However, the use of civil commissioners to maintain law and order was not equally to 
the liking of all. Some departments displayed their displeasure at the imposition of these 
outsiders who made contact directly with the district authorities or the municipal autho-
rities and received them with cries of “Les commissaires à la lanterne”;94 and in the frame-
work of the National Constituent Assembly, not all the deputies applauded the proposals 
of the Committee of Reports when these entailed sending out a new mission.95 In Februa-
ry 1790, there was no intention of strengthening executive power or of granting the king 
full powers to maintain law and order, but by the autumn of that year it had been decided 
that the civil commissioners should adopt whatever measures they considered opportu-
ne, employ all requisite means of prudence and persuasion necessary, and take such steps 
as they judged appropriate or useful.96 The civil commissioners had been invested with so 
wide an arc of powers as to lead Muguet de Nanthou to remark on 11 February 1791 that 
they exercised a form of dictatorship under its aegis.97 
90 Ibid., vol. 23, p. 452 and p. 639.
91 Ibid., vol. 25, p. 276. 
92 Ibid., vol. 23, pp. 133-136 and pp. 639-641; vol. 26, p. 288 and pp. 672-676.
93 Castellà, ‘Les Comités des rapports et des recherches’, p. 188. 
94 Archives parlementaires, vol. 23, pp. 133-134. 
95 Ibid., vol. 23, p. 452.
96 Ibid., vol. 18, p. 530; vol. 22, p. 353 and vol. 23, p. 179.
97 Ibid., vol. 23, p. 134. 
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Despite the fact that the historiography of the French Revolution has inexplicably tip-
toed around the missions of the National Constituent Assembly,98 considering them to be 
essentially military – when this manifestly was not so – and instruments of the executi-
ve power, because the civil commissioners were appointed by the king,99 they were bey-
ond all doubt a resource of the Committee of Reports, of the forerunner of the Commit-
tee of Public Safety under the National Constituent Assembly, with which to ensure the 
maintenance of public order.100 Contrary to what has been said, at no time did the Natio-
nal Convention table any original motion for the purpose of safeguarding the political, 
economic and social order it defined through its decrees. The only original measure, if it 
may so be called, adopted by the National Convention was the appointment of its own 
deputies to go out on mission, but viewed in the light of the missions sent out after the 
king’s escape, even this was scarcely original.101
VII. Conclusion
The Committee of Reports never set itself up to oversee those at the local and/or depart-
mental level who were responsible for the maintenance of law and order, especially when 
breaches of the peace were taking place or the corresponding administrative authori-
ties were unable to subdue these disturbances. In fact, officially, it had never been asked 
to concern itself with the maintenance of law and order, this being a competence of the 
executive power. Nor had it tasked by any founding decree with identifying the causes of 
breaches of public order or with determining the most appropriate means of pacifying 
them. The Committee of Reports, by the terms of the decree by which it was established, 
had been created to receive the reports, complaints and addresses that reached the Na-
tional Constituent Assembly, and to report on those it felt required this attention.102 Ho-
wever, no one had the slightest doubt that this founding decree had been drafted in these 
terms in order not to interfere with the executive power. The first motion that had been 
tabled to establish it called for the creation of a committee within the framework of the 
Constituent Assembly to deal with all matters that had to do with the administration and 
the police: in other words, all the matters that had a bearing on the breaches of order that 
were taking place.103 
98 The majority of historians who have written about the missions of the National Constituent Assembly 
have done so in relation to the mission of the 22 June 1791: Aulard, Recueil des Actes du Comité de Salut 
Public, p. 54; Biard, Missionnaires de la République, p. 33; Biard, ‘Les pouvoirs des représentants en mis-
sion’, p. 4; Bonnal de Ganges, Les représentants du peuple en mission, vol. 1, p. 97; Boulet-Sautel, Cours 
d’histoire des institutions publiques, p. 165 ; Godechot, Les commissaires aux armées, vol. 1, p. 17 and 
Godechot, Les institutions de la France, p. 341.
99 Biard, Missionnaires de la République, p. 38 and p. 60.
100 Castellà, ‘Molt més que un comitè tècnic’, pp. 167-216. 
101 Biard, Missionnaires de la République, pp. 72-73. 
102 Archives parlementaires, vol. 8, p. 292.
103 Ibid., vol. 8, p. 279 and p. 292.
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The fact of receiving correspondence concerning the administration and the police, 
and information relating to the disturbances, as well as the requests, reports and addres-
ses of correspondents, citizens, administrations, popular societies, military corps and 
others, led the Committee of Reports to interfere with one of the most important com-
petences of the monarch: the maintenance of public order and, in the process, to have 
within its purview the local and popular management of the maintenance of public or-
der. To what purpose? To enforce the law, to impose and uphold the order (political, eco-
nomic and social) envisaged by the deputies in drafting their decrees. The management 
of information of an executive cast by the Committee of Reports, and by the National 
Constituent Assembly, had its consequences: the intervention of the legislative power in 
functions of an executive nature, as duly denounced by Jean-Félix Faydel, right-wing de-
puty and three-time member of the Committee of Reports, before the Constituent As-
sembly on 11 March 1791:
You are only here, Sirs, in order to prepare the laws, only to establish a se-
paration of powers which can only maintain our nascent liberty, only to pre-
vent that these powers could ever be combined in the same hands; and no-
netheless we dare to propose to you a decree which evidently seems to bestow 
both of these onto your heads; and to hold you accountable for the anarchy 
which has distressed the most beautiful empire in Europe; because you must 
not hide the fact, Sirs, that if the executive power is lacking in vigour or acti-
vity, that if its agents are not active, that if its tribunals are mute, that if dis-
order has been increasing for eight months, that if the modern laws, like the 
ancient ones, are not always obeyed, that if every citizen, as it were, believes 
that he has the right for his will to prevail, that if the municipalities impinge 
on the power of the judiciary, and if it has not been possible until present to 
remedy these disorders, we cannot blame all these hardships on anything but 
on our too great willingness to receive petitions, complaints, demands that 
the existence, decisions and responses of many of our committees have devia-
ted from their true direction, making us the judge of them.104
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Dreams of ‘moving from the Napoleonic 
code to the new era of the judiciary’ on the 
eve of establishment of the Kingdom of 
Poland (1814-1815)1
Michał Gałędek
I. The Polish state and its judiciary system in the eigh-
teenth century. 
In the mid eighteenth century, Poland was a dysfunctional, even collapsed state in terms 
of the structure and principles which governed the sphere of public life. It stood out in 
Western Europe for its undeveloped state structure, particularly the judiciary and admi-
nistrative apparatus.2 This situation was further aggravated by inept estate and feudal ju-
stice system, and an anachronistic legal system, devoid of codification and largely predi-
cated on customary law.3 However, in the latter half of the eighteenth century, during the 
wave of pan-European Enlightenment, the situation gradually began to change. The re-
forming camp that was consolidating at the time was continuously gaining strength in its 
efforts to modernize the country, leading to fundamental transformations in the politi-
cal system. The first period of political changes began in 1764, with the ascension to the 
throne of Stanisław August Poniatowski, an enlightened ruler and reformer. Stanisław 
August was the last in the line of kings of what had once been an European power, na-
mely the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, a state with a number of particular institu-
tions that resulted in the country evolving a fairly specific and unique republican tradi-
tion. Working alongside the reformist camp, Stanisław August strove to pull the country 
out of the stagnation and political collapse which it had been suffering for over 100 years. 
Taking Western Europe as their main point of reference, a large part of the erstwhile po-
litical elite had grown convinced of the backwardness of the Polish territories and poin-
ted to the weak statehood resulting from numerous defects in the political system. Ho-
wever, an attempt to conduct complex reforms ended in failure in 1795, with the collapse 
of the state due to partitions carried out by the neighbouring powers. Nonetheless, on 
the eve of the collapse, a number of comprehensive governance reforms were successful-
ly implemented, especially regarding the functioning of the Four-Year Sejm (1788-1792). 
1 The present paper has been prepared within the project “National Codification-a Phantasm or a Realistic 
Alternative? In the Circle of Debates over the Native Court Law System in the constitutional Kingdom 
of Poland” financed by the National Science Centre (Narodowe Centrum Nauki) on the basis of decision 
no. DEC- 2015/18/E/HS5/00762.
2 Lukowski, Disorderly Liberty, pp. 1-53; Ludwikowski and Fox, The Beginning of The Constitutional Era, 
pp. 60-61.
3 Bogucka, The Lost World of the ‘Sarmatians’, p. 162. 
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The greatest success of this period was the adoption of a republican Constitution on 3 
May 1791, which consisted of adapting Polish traditions to the requirements of a modern 
state, of course according to the standards of the Age of Enlightenment.4
The constitution, by necessity, had to be a compromise between groups we can re-
fer to as progressives and traditionalists. The reformers not only tried to copy some mo-
dern Western European institutional solutions, but moreover to modify these creative-
ly, combining the Polish republican tradition, a system with roots stretching back to the 
Renaissance organization of state which indirectly referred to Ancient traditions of the 
Roman republic and classical republicanism.5 At the time, the process of modernization 
of Poland drew from the contemporary European canons of Enlightenment philosophy, 
and political thought. What made Poland different from surrounding countries, howe-
ver, was its own political tradition, heritage and a strong ideology of following one’s own 
path. The latter philosophy, according to the traditionalists, as the only one that could 
bring back the old times of glory.6
This debate was reflected, among others, in how the judiciary was reorganized at the 
end of eighteenth century. During the reforms of the Four-Year Sejm the authorities de-
cided to abolish the earlier mosaic of courts7 and, for the first time ever, introduced the 
principle that land courts, municipal courts and supreme courts (two crown tribunals) 
would be ‘always ready’, instead of dealing with cases only at periodically summoned ses-
sions. In addition, there was a ‘still shy, but noticeable tendency to increase the profes-
sional and moral qualifications of judges’, but only in practical aspects. This was becau-
se ‘the candidates were required to have held public offices before, and thus to have some 
level of experience’. However, the reformers still did not fathom the idea that judicial of-
fices should only be given to professional judges with a legal education. To the contra-
ry, they believed that the only way to guarantee that the judiciary would be free of abuse 
was to appoint judges for four-year terms in office, and the only professional qualifica-
tion required was for them to know ‘the law and national procedure’ in general. Howe-
ver, no method of verifying this knowledge was established. It was left to the discretion of 
the electors whether or not a candidate was fitting. Electors consisted of the nobility that 
gathered at dietines, or the townsmen who also elected both judges and administrative 
officials at separate communal gatherings.8 However, there was still a prevailing view that 
holding a judicial or administrative post was an honour and privilege, rather than work 
that deserved remuneration. In line with the republican tradition, offices were to remain 
unpaid, as exercising them was considered a civic duty that every patriot was obliged to 
4 Gałędek, ‘Legal Transfers and National Traditions’. 
5 Grześkowiak-Krwawicz, ‘Noble Republicanism’; Müssig, ‘Reconsidering Constitutional Formation’, p. 
85-90; Müssig, ‘Juridification by Constitution’, pp. 29-34; Tarnowska, ‘The Sovereignty Issue in the Public 
Discussion’, pp. 233-235, 247-249.
6 Jedlicki, A Suburb of Europe, pp. 3-12, 51-63; Janowski, Polish Liberal, pp. 9-19.
7 Vilimas, ‘The Formation of the Land Court System’.
8 Filipczak, ‘Elekcje ziemskich urzędników sądowych’.
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discharge, pursuant to the idea of civic virtues and moral obligation to serve the country, 
including the holding of public offices.9 
II. Reforms of the judiciary system in the Duchy of 
Warsaw. 
Shortly after these reforms Poland collapse and in 1795 the central Polish territories 
came under Prussian rule. From this perspective, the Polish political elites may have felt 
somewhat shocked to experience first-hand the modern Prussian way of organizing the 
judiciary. Under Prussian annexation, judges were consistently required to have legal 
qualifications, and this principle was subsequently upheld once Polish statehood was re-
stored by Napoleon in 1807 as the Duchy of Warsaw under French protectorate. The 
Duchy’s judiciary was organized according to the French model. The latter model was in 
line with the constitution octroyed by Napoleon to the Duchy in 1807 and with the new 
organization of the judiciary system, implemented in 1808.10 The lowest instance were 
courts of peace, established in each poviat. Unlike in France, the court of peace was divi-
ded into two divisions: of arbitration and of litigation. The task of the arbitration divisi-
on was to seek settlements in cases under the jurisdiction of the Departmental Tribunal. 
It was headed by a justice of the peace, who did not have any jurisdictional competences, 
but apart from arbitration also held a number of guardianship functions. The justice of 
peace was chosen by the dietines composed of noblemen, and his selection was confir-
med with a royal appointment. This office was honorary (justices of the peace did not re-
ceive any remuneration from the State Treasury), and they discharged their function for 
three years, in terms of a few consecutive months. The other division, that is the litigation 
one, was headed by an official unknown neither in the French judiciary system, (however 
was somehow an imitation of the French office of suppleant) nor in the Napoleonic con-
stitution of the Duchy of Warsaw assistant justice of the peace (Pol.: podsędek, from La-
tin subiudex, literally sub-judge). He had full jurisdiction in civil and criminal cases, and 
candidates for this function had to meet certain professional criteria: having completed a 
course in law, they took a theoretical examination and a court apprenticeship. They step-
ped into office upon the receipt of a ministerial appointment.11 In each civil department 
there were tribunals of first instance for graver cases and appellate tribunals which ex-
amined appeals in less important cases, alongside an Appellate Court which served as an 
all-national appellate instance and the Council of State acting in the capacity of a cassa-
tion court.12 
9 Michalski, Studia nad reformą sądownictwa, vol. 1, pp. 3-43; Michalski, ‘Zagadnienie reformy 
sądownictwa’.
10 Klimaszewska, ‘Le droit pénal français sur les territoires polonais’; Klimaszewska, ‘The Reception of the 
French Commercial Law’.
11 Mencel, Feliks Łubieński, pp. 61-63; Rosner, ‘Sędziowie i urzędnicy sądów’; Rosner, ‘Stare i nowe w orga-
nizacji’.
12 Sobociński, ‘Sądownictwo Księstwa Warszawskiego’; Krzymkowski, Rada Stanu Księstwa Warszawskie-
go, pp. 178-196.
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Feliks Łubieński, the erstwhile Minister of Justice and the chief supporter of moderni-
zation by way of transplanting French institutions, was heavily criticized from the very 
beginning. His aim was to establish the office of – mentioned above – professional assi-
stant justice of peace. In his defence, Łubieński argued that there was a need to allevia-
te the workload of elected and unpaid justices of the peace and that the present justices 
did not have the qualifications needed to resolve any disputes that required a thorough 
knowledge of the law. The criticism of Łubieński was further inflamed by the unavoidab-
le problems brought by the implementation of the new organization of the judiciary sy-
stem.13
These problems were exacerbated not only by to the lack of traditions regarding the ju-
stice system, but above all because the courts, just like in pre-partition Poland, did not 
operate according to ordered procedures, since the criminal and civil procedures were 
not codified. During the reign of Stanislaw August legal reforms were to follow suit of 
the political reforms. However in the sphere of civil and criminal law these reforms were 
not successful, in particular owing to the Sejm’s rejection of the first codification propo-
sal, the so-called Collection of Court Laws of 1776 penned by Andrzej Zamoyski. The 
second proposal, the so-called Code of Stanisław August which commenced to be pre-
pared in 1791 also was not completed due to the collapse of the Polish Lithuanian-Com-
monwealth.14 In the Duchy, alongside the new organization of the judiciary system, the 
French civil procedure and the Napoleonic Code were also being implemented. As a 
consequence, the old Polish judges, poorly educated and not accustomed to following 
procedural regulations, faced a completely new reality. With varying success they tried to 
deal with these foreign, often mysterious and inflexible procedures. 
The situation was not improved by the fact that there was not a single modern law 
school operating in the country. The first such school of law was opened in Warsaw only 
in 1808, and from then on it educated young disciples of the legal profession according 
to the new standards. However, the new representatives of the legal professions educa-
ted in new schools and in accordance with new principles and programmes, only knew 
the mechanisms of codified laws and procedures, and could not possibly know the Polish 
laws extensively. ‘In the understanding of the old order of things they were, thus, foreig-
ners in their own land, uneducated in the rules of application of the old system of Polish 
law and unable to do it.’15
It was also the case that courts and their organization were affected by a great hosti-
lity toward the Napoleonic Code and the French civil procedure, both from the nobili-
ty and the clergy, who saw the introduction of Napoleonic codification as a real threat 
to their own interests. The negative public opinion of the Napoleonic Code and French 
13 Mencel, Feliks Łubieński, pp. 64-70; Sobociński, Historia ustroju, p. 203; Mencel, ‘L’introduction du 
Code Napoléon’, p. 181-182.
14 Borkowska-Bagieńska, Zbiór praw sądowych Andrzeja Zamoyskiego, pp. 58-152; Szafrański, Kodeks 
Stanisława Augusta, pp. 93-211.
15 Antoni Wyczechowski, Myśli względem prawodawstwa narodowego, 1815, manuscript in Biblioteka 
Książąt Czartoryskich, no. 5259 IV, pp. 72, 73, 75.
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model of judiciary also stemmed from an emotional rejection of foreign law, which was 
seen as contrary to native customs and traditions. The erstwhile Vice-Mayor of Warsaw, 
Stanisław Węgrzecki, noted this ‘sonorous scream against the code’, observing that ‘hard-
ly anyone supports it; even those who do not know it at all, who have not read it, cla-
mour that it is not attuned to our climate [...]. A nobleman is frightened of the code, so 
as to not lose his power over the peasants, he is pained by being put in the same tribunal 
with a townsman and a peasant, by having the same succession laws apply to him and to 
the townspeople [...]. Clergymen suffer over having to relinquish religious rites to free-
dom of conscience and worship.’16 The criticism was fuelled by code provisions that gua-
ranteed equality before the law, regardless of birth, nationality and religion. The correct 
implementation of the code thus required a rearrangement of social relations, especially 
since the code was clearly anchored in the principle of the primacy of positive law, accor-
ding to which it would be possible to abolish the existing laws and customs at any time. 
The landed gentry therefore felt this posed a constant threat to their privileged position.17 
This was accompanied by the hostile attitude of the Catholic church which fiercely op-
posed the provisions for registrar’s offices and lay marriages, as marriage which had thus 
far been a holy union, could now be dissolved contrary to the canon law.18 This fear of up-
turning social relations and of downgrading the position of the nobility and of the clergy 
translated into a landslide of criticism against the transplanted law. 
III. 1814-1815: An attempt to transition into ‘the new 
era of judiciary’. 
The criticism of the new judiciary system during the Duchy of Warsaw focused on the is-
sue of its alleged excessive costs. Many critics deemed the expenses spent on the judiciary 
system as unnecessary and called for the honorary judges to be brought back, as well as 
for jury courts to be established.19 The Napoleonic constitution did not prohibit the in-
troduction of these institutions, but the powerful minister of justice Feliks Łubieński op-
posed such a solution. It was not until the fall of Napoleon that the vision of a complex 
reform finally became realistic. At this time the French protectorate was replaced with a 
provisional government appointed by the liberal tsar Alexander I, who strove to establish 
a Kingdom of Poland under his influence. Alexander I gave the Polish political elites con-
siderable freedom, promising that he would take advantage of their proposals in the im-
plementation of the new political system. By virtue of the ukase dated 19 May 1814, the 
tsar established the Civil Reform Committee. The guidelines issued by the tsar, in which 
he set the desired direction of reforms, included also a directive laying down the bases 
16 Stanisław Węgrzecki, Przestrogi do utworzenia Królestwa Polskiego, 1813, manuscript in Bibliote-
ka Książąt Czartoryskich, no. 5242 IV, pp. 126-127; Kieniewicz, Mencel and Rostocki, Wybór tekstów 
źródłowych, p. 188.
17 Mencel, ‘L’introduction du Code Napoléon’, pp. 146-148, 152-155, 167, 180-185.
18 Pomianowski, ‘Z problematyki rozwodów’, pp. 108-110; Gałędek and Klimaszewska, ‘The Work of the 
Civil Reform Committee’, pp. 184-186.
19 Koźmian, ‘Postrzeżenia ogólne o sądownictwie’; Wężyk, ‘O Wydziale Sprawiedliwości’; Mycielski, “Mi-
asto ma mieszkańców, wieś obywateli”, pp. 60-63; Cichoń, Rozwój myśli administracyjnej, pp. 155-166.
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of the codification strategy: ‘The Napoleonic Civil Code and Judicial Procedure should 
be abolished as soon as possible. The Polish laws, the Lithuanian Statute and the judicial 
forms used before the introduction of the French procedure could be substituted for it. 
The Committee will discuss whether the codes should be eliminated in whole or in part, 
and at what time this abolition could take place. It will also propose a plan and the com-
position of a separate Commission to be created which will be responsible for the draf-
ting of a new Civil Code, Criminal Code and procedures, as well as the final organization 
of the judicial order.’20 The fate of the French law and judiciary system seemed to be et-
ched in stone, and its abrogation was to be a mere matter of time. 
However, the true spirtus movens of these reforms was not Alexander. In reality, he 
had merely accepted the proposals formerly presented to him by Prince Jerzy Adam 
Czartoryski, primarily in a memorandum dated 7 February 1814.21 The erstwhile most 
influential representative of the Polish political elite stepped into the role of ‘a natural in-
termediary between the Russian tsar and the Polish society’, affecting numerous key po-
litical and legal decisions regarding the future status of the Kingdom of Poland, and es-
pecially the contents of the constitution adopted in 1815.22 During the Duchy of Warsaw, 
Czartoryski was among the ranks of adamant opponents of the French modelled reform 
into Polish territories, both for social and political reasons. The Prince ‘was oblivious to 
the institutions of the Duchy […] he was by principle inimical to all things Napoleonic’.23 
Yet this did not stop him from appreciating their positive traits. He believed these insti-
tutions would be a work of ‘insight and reason’ and counted it as one of the more ‘or-
derly’ group of works, from which it would be worthwhile to draw ‘what is useful and 
well-seen’. Yet of decisive significance was Czartoryski’s ideological conviction that the 
introduction of ‘foreign laws [...] and with them - of foreign customs and sentiments’ 
would lead the Polish nation to ‘lose its originality’ and, along with that, ‘its good quali-
ties’. He believed that every nation that decides on a legal transplant ‘acquires [...] in lar-
ge part foreign failings’. For this reason, he proclaimed, perhaps with slight exaggeration, 
that ‘It is the saddest fate of a country, when it must adopt a legislation imposed upon it, 
20 The full original text reads as follows: ‘Le Code Napoléon civil et de procédure judiciaire devrait être ab-
oli le plus tôt possible. On pourrait intérimalement y substituer les lois polonaises, le Statut de Lituanie, 
ainsi que les formes judiciaires usitées avant l’introduction de la procédure française. Le Comité discu-
tera si les codes doivent être abolis entièrement ou en partie, et à quelle époque cette abolition pourrait 
avoir lieu. Il proposera aussi un plan et la composition d’une Commission séparée à créer qui sera char-
gée de la rédaction d’un nouveau Code civil, criminel et de procédure, de même que l’organisation défi-
nitive de l’ordre judicaire.’ (Askenazy, ‘Zagrożenie Kodeksu Napoleona’, p. 375). 
21 In his memorandum dated 7 February 1814, Czartoryski wrote: ‘Le Code de Napoléon civil et de procé-
dure judiciaire doit et peut s’abolir immédiatement, en y substituant intérimalement les lois polonaises et 
le Statut, ainsi que les formes usitées avant l’introduction de la procédure française [...] La législation civi-
le et l’administration du Duché ayant une fois acquis l’esprit et la forme qu’elles doivent conserver, la vo-
lonté de S. M. I. est de joindre successivement au Duché les huit gouvernements polonais, en commen-
çant par les plus voisins.’ Askenazy, ‘Zagrożenie Kodeksu Napoleona’, pp. 374-375.
22 Grynwaser, Pisma, p. 68.
23 Askenazy, ‘Zagrożenie Kodeksu Napoleona’, p. 374.
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no matter how perfect it may be. It is better to then [i.e. successively] improve, supple-
ment its own institutions that to hastily adopt foreign ones and at foreign behest.’24 
The postulate to adjust the law and judiciary system to fit with the Polish specificity 
was in line with the universal expectations of the elites and of the entire landed gentry. 
Following the fall of Napoleon, the opposition of traditionalist circles began to dovetail 
with the general European atmosphere of negating the value of works regarded to be re-
volutionary.25 The Civil Reform Committee, headed by the Prince himself,30 was domi-
nated by the opponents of all the political and legal changes that had been implemented 
in the Duchy of Warsaw.31 Historical literature considers the works of the Committee 
to be the prime moment of Polish conservative activity. This is also seen as the moment 
when they had the best opportunity to come forward with a positive program,26 which 
was not possible in the Napoleonic Duchy of Warsaw. 
A more detailed analysis of debates held within the Reform Committee, not only as 
regards the organization of the judicial system, but also the administration system, in-
dicates that the Committee members had grouped in two camps, in addition to a rela-
tively large wavering group. The fault lines between the two sides were determined by 
their attitude toward the past and contemporaneity. The traditionalists composed the 
most influential group. They were headed by a Lublin advocate Franciszek Grabowski, 
who presided over the Committee’s Court Section (called also the Legislative Section) re-
sponsible for judiciary system and private law reform. Grabowski enjoyed the support of 
other members who represented various factions of opponents to the Napoleonic Code, 
such as the priesthood (in the person of father Józef Koźmian), the clericals (represented 
by Józef Kalasanty Szaniawski), and members of the most conservative nobility from Ga-
licia (Stanisław Zamoyski), and from Lithuania (Tomasz Wawrzecki). Some members of 
the so-called Jacobins, like Józef Kalasanty Szaniawski and Andrzej Horodyski, who sup-
ported the Napoleonic reforms earlier experienced a complete about-face in their world-
views following the downfall of Napoleon. They no longer claimed that Napoleonic in-
stitutions were a universal tool of progress, and instead began to champion traditionalist 
and conservative views, which they previously rejected.
The advocates for the traditionalist group attempted to prove that the organisation 
and legal system of the Duchy of Warsaw did not account for the specificity of Polish cu-
stoms and did not meet the needs of an ‘agrarian country’. These were, thus, the classic 
reasons for opposition against legal transfers.27 They believed it would only be possible to 
build national codification and judiciary system based mostly - if not exclusively - on re-
ferences to old Polish laws. Traditionalists were of the opinion that only this path, combi-
24 Aleksander Kraushar, ‘W setną rocznicę Kodeksu Napoleona’, Gazeta Sądowa Warszawska, 22 (1908), p. 
332; Gałędek and Klimaszewska, ‘A Controversial Transplant?’, p. 269-298.
25 Wyczechowski, Myśli względem prawodawstwa narodowego, 1815, manuscript in Biblioteka Książąt 
Czartoryskich, no. 5259 IV, pp. 77-78.
26 Mycielski, “Miasto ma mieszkańców, wieś obywateli”, p. 133.
27 H. Patrick Glenn, ‘The Nationalist Heritage’, in Comparative Legal Studies: Traditions and Transitions, 
ed. by Pierre Legrand and Roderick Munday (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003), p. 87.
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ned with the complete and possibly immediate rejection of the French law and judiciary 
system introduced in the Duchy of Warsaw, would allow the new legal system to gain the 
features of a national law and organisation. At the same time, they believed it was admis-
sible to implement certain tweaks to the old Polish law to bring it in line with nineteenth 
century standards, and believed it would be possible to do this in a very short time.
The first months of the Committee’s efforts to rebuild the judiciary system seemed to 
confirm that it would be possible to achieve these aims. The Committee members criti-
cism was aimed not at the Civil Code (with the exception of the marital law), but rather 
at the Code of Civil Procedure, especially its executive provisions. Józef Kalasanty Sza-
niawski was the first one to voice his opinion in this regard at the session held on 17 
July. He moved for the Committee to ‘deal with drafting a new court procedure right 
away, as the cumbersomeness of the current one is most suffered by the country’, at the 
same time observing that ‘it will also be necessary to change the hierarchy of courts, as 
it is closely related to procedure’.28 Szaniawski’s motion was seconded only by some of 
the Committee’s members. The unnamed opponents of the proposition doubted whe-
ther ‘an entire new procedure [could be] written with such haste to ensure due precisi-
on’, and feared that this would lead to ‘a commotion’. For this reason, they believed the 
French Code of Civil Procedure as well as the judiciary system should be sustained ‘for 
the time sufficient to draft another [procedure] capable of adequately replacing the cur-
rent one’29. In response, backers of Szaniawski’s idea noted it was not possible to tell in 
advance whether or not writing a new procedure ‘capable of adequately replacing’ the 
old one would be impossible, even in such a short time,30 as, ‘at the current time it is not 
principally about attaching ourselves to the method of laying down a systematic proce-
dure, but rather about rewriting the main laws in a national spirit, while leaving the rest 
to practice’. Szaniawski’s supporters also argued that: ‘Even though Poland did not have 
a systematic procedure before, upholding it through tradition and practice, no one com-
plained about the procedure, but rather about the violence of tribunals and the abuse of 
courts; now, on the other hand, with a methodical procedure, the citizens are falling prey 
to the despotism of patrons, who enrich themselves by pillaging their property’.31 Thus, 
they were of the opinion that certain principles and institutions of the French procedu-
re with their convoluted formulae, and detailed and confusing methods of regulation, 
were harmful and should be replaced immediately even with a make-shift procedure laid 
down according to Polish tradition and national spirit. The argumentation was further 
elaborated on the next session of the Civil Reform Committee on 21 July, when Francis-
zek Grabowski ‘reported on the actions taken up by the Court Section’: ‘Leaving until 
further notice the matters of the Civil Code’, Grabowski agreed that the Section’s works 
should be commenced with the ‘procedure, as the most incommodious to the people’. 
28 Minutes of Reform Committee sessions, manuscript in Biblioteka Książąt Czartoryskich, no. 5233 IV, pp. 
20-21.
29 Ibid., p. 21.
30 Ibid., p. 22.
31 Ibid., pp. 21-22.
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He proclaimed that ‘in the opinion of the majority of the Court Section’, the French pro-
cedure was ‘utterly maladjusted to the country, and difficult - if not impossible - to al-
ter and adapt’, and should be completely abrogated in the course of current organizati-
on of judiciary system, and replaced with another procedure ‘drawn from the volumes 
of Polish laws’, as well as with an ‘organization of courts specific to this country and well-
known to some who still remember it.’32
As a result, merely one month after the commencement of works, during one of the 
August sessions of the Committee Franciszek Grabowski notified all those present that 
the Section had developed a draft ‘entailing the first principles of new judiciary organiza-
tion’. Their author, appellate judge Tadeusz Skarżyński, who was also the member of the 
Court Section, ‘took them from the volumes of old-fashioned Polish laws and introdu-
ced some modifications and additions fitting to the current times and circumstances.’33 
As further clarified by Grabowski, ‘the spirit of this draft [was, firstly], to abolish small 
courts, composed of people whose livelihood is the office and the profits that come with 
it’. Here Grabowski was most certainly referring to the office of podsędek in particular. 
These were judges of the lowest level whose position was a thorn in the side of the critics 
of the existing system. Secondly, the draft author intended to ‘create a judiciary system 
composed of people who are – as he emphasized – truly worthy of the office’, which was 
to be furthered by restoring the old Polish rule that ‘judges cannot be appointed for life, 
but instead elected every five years for the first and second instance’. Thirdly, the draft sti-
pulated the ‘removal [...] from the court staff of the numerous clerks, who do not provide 
any real help to the judiciary system, but are paid by the poor treasury and maintaining 
only those staff who actually do real court work.’ Fourthly, the reorganization of court 
hierarchy was to restore judiciary arrangements from the pre-partition era, that is inclu-
ding land courts (sądy ziemskie) and castle courts (sądy grodzkie) for the nobility and 
separate municipal courts, as well as an appellate court of second instance and the su-
preme court in the third instance, which had revision, but not cassation, competences.34
The Section’s proposals were well-received, as the Committee members agreed that 
court officials, just like administrative officials, should be elected, unpaid and only ap-
pointed to office for a certain term. In other words, they agreed to entrust judiciary func-
tions to the hands of ‘citizens’ and for the courts to be dominated by rotating repre-
sentatives of the wealthy landed gentry, with the exception of cities, where analogous 
functions were to be held by urban property holders. The idea that judges should work 
without remuneration was also particularly popular in this period owing to the catastro-
phic state of public finances related in part to the fact that the Duchy of Warsaw became 
one of the major battlefields of the Napoleonic times. This led the authorities to franti-
cally seek ways to save money, striving to reduce salaries and employment in the public 
sector. This is testified to by the draft of Prince Franciszek Ksawery Drucki-Lubecki, in 
which he scrupulously calculated the scale of savings that could be achieved if his solu-
32 Ibid., p. 24.
33 Ibid., pp. 56-57.
34 Ibid., pp. 56-58.
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tion were adopted. According to his calculations, the expenses of the judiciary system 
could be cut by three-fourths, from PLN 2 453 900 down to 640 000. In comparison, the 
reduction of expenses through changes in the administration of internal affairs would 
amount to only 30% (from PLN 2 866 900 to PLN 2 093 000), even though this was a lea-
ding topic in the Committee’s discussions and an explicitly expressed wish of the tsar.35 
Pursuant to one of the concepts proposed by Andrzej Horodyski, the best solution 
would be for departmental councils, as representative organs ‘composed of people elec-
ted at gatherings’ to be given the competence to ‘propose administrative and judicial can-
didates for offices [...] in departments to the government’. The final say in this matter was 
to be of the highest court magistracy in the country, be it in the form of senate or su-
preme court, but not of the minister of justice, who was a representative of the executi-
ve branch. Moreover, Horodyski proposed that the nominating institution should con-
tinuously monitor the course of service by ‘keeping track of the string of information 
about all public servants’.36
After the presentation of these drafts discussions began in the Civil Reform Commit-
tee on the selection of the most optimal solutions for the future judiciary. Paradoxically, 
it was the president of the Court Section Franciszek Grabowski who expressed a dissen-
ting opinion on the Skarżyński‘s draft that he himself had presented. He explained that 
he disagreed with the concept of appointing judges for five-year terms of office. He ar-
gued that judges of first instance should be appointed ‘for life, firstly in order to tie them 
to the office more effectively, seeing as they are not paid, and secondly, so that when a va-
cancy opens up in higher instances, we can choose from among them, knowing that they 
have the necessary experience’. Nevertheless, the Committee did not agree to the life term 
of judges. Even a former minister of treasury of the Duchy of Warsaw Tadeusz Matusze-
wicz shared such a view which seemed to contrast with his beliefs about administration. 
He was the main opponent of the traditionalist concepts within the Civil Reform Com-
mittee and the staunchest supporter of keeping the foundations of the Napoleonic mo-
del in the Duchy of Warsaw. Regarding the judges, Matuszewicz argued for offices with 
fixed terms, stating that ‘it is impossible to do, or even to wish for, for courts to be com-
posed of only lawyers. It will be sufficient for the law to be watched by two or three peop-
le whose office will not be for a term, namely: the president, the clerk and perhaps the 
vice-president, while the rest of the bench should not be for life, but instead: a great num-
ber of citizens should be chosen, and from among them persons to hold the office of jud-
ges for each term should be selected randomly, to impede early intrigues and meddling. 
The pool of citizens to choose from could include priests, the townsmen, artists, which 
would satisfy the cities and save us the trouble of establishing separate court magistracies 
for them, as in this manner, courts would be composed of both landed gentry and city 
folk’. Then, Matuszewicz noticed, ‘Magistracies [...] would only handle the administrati-
on of cities and, partly, the corrective police’. Moreover, he observed that ‘a similar selec-
35 Ibid., p. 95.
36 Andrzej Horodyski, Myśli względem obieralności urzędników, manuscript in Biblioteka Książąt Czarto-
ryskich, no. 5236 IV, pp. 59-64; Gałędek, Projekty i koncepcje nowego, pp. 410-411.
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tion of judges for the criminal courts would render something akin to the institution of 
a jury, which, although cannot be introduced in our country for the time being owing to 
local impediments, we must strive to at least come a bit closer to this favourable solution.’ 
Matuszewicz’s ideas intrigued other Committee members, who ‘ordered the Court Sec-
tion to elaborate the thoughts concerning selection of judges in its draft’.37
Therefore, Committee members did not have any doubts. All the judges were to be 
elected at dietines, and the issue of professional legal qualifications and of permanent 
employment in the judiciary had to give way to the republican idea that the justice sy-
stem is best served by involving broad circles of the social elites, rotating in the dischar-
ge of their duties. The traditional Polish popular justice played an important role in this 
case, but some foreign solutions, such as the institution of the English jury as suggested 
by Matuszewicz, the French justices of the peace or the Dutch conciliation courts were 
also deemed worthy of imitation by the Committee. The Committee was particularly in-
terested in the idea of ‘introducing a new institution of lay judges to our country, known 
in the English and French legislation as jury’. However, it also noted right away the ‘dif-
ficulties that arise here due to the local conditions, where the population numbers are 
not proportional to the size of the country which would mean that in order to find a suf-
ficient number of fit jury members, it would be necessary to bring them from far away.’38 
Even though the potential institution of the jury sparked great interest, a key issue for 
the reform was the issue of entrusting all judiciary of the lowest instances to elected and 
unpaid judges. Nonetheless, on this matter, the Committee members – except a few tra-
ditionalists – had no intention of bringing back the pre-partition institution. To the con-
trary, they wanted to preserve one of the institutions transplanted from France, name-
ly courts of peace, despite their general hostility toward legal institutions imported into 
the Duchy of Warsaw. The original draft of the Court Section did not mention the need 
to keep courts of peace, however following a discussion of the Committee in this regard, 
its members decided to modify this draft. Courts of peace were to be maintained ‘in or-
der to bring parties to amicable resolutions and thus prevent their cases from going any 
further’. This meant that, in contrast to the times of the Duchy of Warsaw, the prerogati-
ves of justices of the peace would be expanded and now rule in all the less important dis-
puted cases in place of the much-hated professional minor judges, who were nomina-
ted for life and received remuneration.39 There were to be ‘three courts of peace in each 
voivodeship, one court for three, and sometimes four poviats, depending on their size’. 
Regulations concerning exercise of the office stipulated that ‘each poviat [would] elect 
two justices at dietines, who together would act as an established court of peace. They 
in turn will convene to fix the order of seating at court, and should they not arrive at an 
agreement, they will draw lots.’ The intended rotational system was to work in such a way 
that ‘according to the established turns, two justices should always remain in the places 
indicated to them’. In practice, however, the institution of the court of peace boiled down 
37 Minutes of Reform Committee sessions, pp. 154-155.
38 Ibid., p. 136.
39 Ibid., pp. 135-136.
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to entrusting two fundamentally different functions into the hands of two persons. One 
of the justices was to ‘resolve cases’, and the other was to act as a ‘custodian’.40
The most ‘exotic’ idea was put forward by Andrzej Horodyski, who proposed ‘for the 
avoidance of confusion [...] to use the solution functioning in Denmark, by establishing 
conciliation courts which, throughout the years in which the new legal order will form, 
would resolve all pending cases, allowing the cleansed nation to step into the new or-
der of things’.41 The President of the Senate, Tomasz Ostrowski, responded to this pro-
ject by proposing that it be supplemented with an element of Polish tradition, indicating 
that ‘since conciliatory courts cannot issue final judgements in cases where the parties 
do not accept their resolutions, it would be advisable to introduce courts fashioned fol-
lowing the old Polish courts of arbitration (sądy kompromisarskie), which could deli-
ver final rulings in cases between the parties’. Horodyski answered by observing that 
this idea did not in any way conflict with the Danish model, which besides conciliatory 
courts also had ‘another court that issued final [judgements] in those cases that could not 
be resolved by conciliatory courts’.42 Horodyski’s proposition stemmed from a separate 
problem, that is ‘a great number of pending bankruptcy estate cases’ which ‘took up the 
courts’ time that could be otherwise dedicated to ongoing matters, impeding their reso-
lution’. Grabowski believed this meant that, ‘it would be necessary to establish a separate 
commission that would rule in bankruptcy estate cases only.’43 The motion of the Court 
Section’s President was received favourably by the Committee, which ‘approved it all the 
more readily since the cases mentioned go on at a great expense and exhaust the funds of 
bankruptcy estates due to creditors’. The Committee ordered the Section to consider wh-
ether ‘a single such commission will suffice for the entire country’.44
These were the early sessions of the Civil Reform Committee. Its members had not yet 
had the time to fully engage in their work. Most of them supported the opinion of the 
Court Section. They observed that the overarching idea of Alexander’s order was to strive 
to ‘restore the national spirit’. They underscored the fact that their views stemmed from 
the ideological conviction that it is always better for a law to be clad in the clothes of a 
national code. They argued that it is ‘always more pleasant for a nation to have its own 
procedure rather than a foreign one’, even if the latter one is thoroughly and appropriate-
ly adapted to the local relations45. Therefore, the crux of the matter was the propagandist 
announcement of the beginning of work on the national codification and of the annihi-
lation of foreign, imposed laws.
40 Ibid., pp. 175-176.
41 Ibid., p. 14.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid., p. 153.
44 Ibid., p. 154.
45 Ibid., pp. 25-26.
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IV. Conclusion
It should finally be noted that regardless of the universal consensus as to the general di-
rection of the reform, neither the draft of the Civil Reform Committee nor later drafts 
presented by subsequent commissions appointed to prepare the reorganization of the ju-
diciary were ever adopted in the Kingdom of Poland. Each time it was on the table, the 
development was impeded by some political obstacle (such as lack of consent of the Sejm 
or of the monarch) which made it impossible to put the reform into effect. Simultaneous-
ly, the Polish elites were becoming more and more familiar with the professional judi-
ciary, modelled after the French solution and ultimately implemented in the times of the 
Duchy of Warsaw. As everything stabilized, criticism of the system was gradually wa-
ning. In the end, the attempts to abolish the professional judiciary were stifled by the out-
break and collapse of the November Uprising in 1831, which marked the beginning of a 
new era of increasing dependence on Russia for the Polish territories.
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1Establishing republican order in rural 
areas: actions taken by the Republican 
Guard’s mobile columns in the Cisalpine 
Republic (1797-1798)
Francesco Dendena
I. Introduction
The Ancien Régime collapsed northern Italy during spring 1796. This brought both bru-
tal and unprecedented consequences. They were brutal because linked to the military 
victory led by General Bonaparte and his armies, and not due to any internal govern-
ment crisis, as was the case in France just years earlier.2 This event created unpreceden-
ted spaces for popular participation in the heart of a new republican city, which was mo-
delled on the French. The Year III Constitution was meant to become - with a few slight 
variations - the fundamental law of the new Cisalpine Republic, which was founded in 
1797. Most importantly, a daily reappropriation of the revolutionarian habits was being 
seen and, in doing so, becoming the conveyers of democratisation and republicanisation 
of the previous society.3 The new Republic was born, through the prism of the – and so-
metimes cynical - interests, of the French occupying power, the suffering inflicted by the 
war devastation, in a political framework in which limits were set by the Grande Nati-
on.4 Nonetheless, it is still true that the coming of the Revolution greatly altered the citi-
zens everyday life and constituted a profound mutation towards a new area,5 in which the 
national guard’s creation and establishment made it one ground-breaking innovation.6 
Whereas it was formerly assigned to professional forces or to city militia and organised 
in the fashion of the Ancien Régime corporations,7 the responsibility of maintaining the 
1 Methodological note of the author: all the sources of archive, in Italian, have been translated into Eng-
lish.
2 The circulation and penetration of the revolutionary message in Italy have been repeatedly studied: Go-
dechot, La Grande Nation, and Capra, L’età rivoluzionaria e napoleonica. However, the solidity of the 
political system of Ancien Régime has never been questioned, see: De Francesco, L’Italia di Bonaparte, 
pp. 3-13. Bertrand, Frétigné, Giacone, La France et l’Italie, pp. 65- 77.
3 On relations between the Great Nation and the Cisalpine Republic: Zaghi, Il Direttorio francese. De 
Francesco, ‘An unwelcome sister republic’, pp. 211-215.
4 This aspect has been sufficiently emphasized by classical historiography: Zaghi, Il Direttorio francese. 
Sciout, Le Directoire. See also De Francesco, Storie dell’Italia, pp. 41-65.
5 About the impact of the Revolution on everyday life, see: Jourdan, La Révolution, une exception, pp. 143-
211. About the Italian framework, Michael Broers, however, expresses another position: Broers, The Na-
poleonic Empire, pp. 25 39.
6 On this aspect, Livio Antonielli expresses a different judgment, emphasizing the administrative continui-
ty with the previous militias: Antonielli, ‘La polizia nello stato di Milano’, pp. 131-133.
7 About urban militias: Ibid., pp. 118-119. Antonielli, ‘Les réformes de la police’, pp. 159-181. There are 
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law and order in the spring of 1796 fell to ‘all male citizens and their sons capable of bea-
ring arms’. The exercise of ‘the rights of citizen’ consisted in an actual and ongoing con-
tribution to the implementation of the Republican order under development.8 This major 
break, was marked by the emergence of a new kind of armed force capable of overri-
ding the traditional recruiting practices of the forces of public order. The implications it 
brought forth were the affirmation of a new pact – between the citizens and the authori-
ties – which guaranteed the individual’s rights and freedoms that then ensued from the 
collective and shared reappropriation of power in the name of law. From that moment 
on, the power was placed in the hands of the citizens to which it would serve collective-
ly. 9 Although, the rearrangement of the sovereign power and the actual exercise of sove-
reignty could not be separated, and it was accompanied by the establishment of an un-
paralled republican isonomy. This new kind of relationship was built upon a collective 
participation to the State affairs, which became the only guarantee against any risks of 
dissension or any kind of outbreak of tyranny, thanks to the perfect superposition, in the 
same figure, of the National Guard of the one who held the authority and of the admini-
stered who underwent it, though determining it.
Taking this into consideration, studying the organisational processes of the National 
Guard in Sister republics, its social composition and its operational practices, we note 
that their actions were an opportunity to focus on the innovations led by the Revolution 
in terms of the policing of the social and juridical order. On the other hand, this also re-
presented a reason to question the construction of the new political order, its installation 
in a context of repressing different ways of dissidence and criminality, to which the po-
litical order had to face in a climate of mutations of the political principles that founded 
its legitimity. The issue is not only to understand the ways that the land was monitored, 
but also to include these procedures into the process of state-building that they belonged 
to. The aim was to reflect upon this form of popular participation, not only through the 
birth of republican institutions but also through their consolidation, during the period 
of the ‘la transition délicate entre le temps guerrier de l’intrusion […] et le temps policier 
de l’administration’.10 This period appeared to be complex not just because of the criminal 
phenomena it occurred at a time with a tough political backdrop. In effect, the pacificati-
on and the normalisation of the social branch took place in a context of ‘pre legitimity’ of 
other useful considerations, though questionable, in Broers, The Napoleonic Empire, p. 33. Moreover, the 
numerous works written or promoted by Livio Antonielli constitute an unavoidable reference on the sub-
ject. If the site of the Centro Interuniversitario di Studi ‘the Polizie e il Controllo del Territorio’ presents a 
complete bibliography on the subject: https: //www.cepoc.it/materiali/bibliografia-nota/bibliografia-au-
tori, consulted on 23 September 2018. I quote here only the work consulted to write this article.
8 Art. 277 and art. 279 of the Cisalpine Constitution (URL: http://www.dircost.unito.it/cs/docs/cisalpi-
na1797.htm, consulted on 9 October 2018). See also: Antonielli, ‘Tra Polizia e militare’, pp. 57-64.
9 About the history of the National Guard in France, and especially during the Revolution of 1789, see: Du-
puy, La Garde Nationale, and Gainot, ‘La “guerre de police”’, pp. 81-82.
10 Houte, Luc, ‘Introduction’, p. 11.
93
Francesco Dendena
the incipient state,11 which had to turn the action of law enforcement into a means of ela-
boration of a consensus used for its own advantage.
Those two imperatives, political on one hand and of a policing nature on the other 
hand, they justified the creation of the national Cisalpine Guard’s mobile columns, on 
27 Thermidor Year V (14 August 1797). They should represent a strength able “to break 
down the pernicious occurrences of aggressions, extorsions, and arsons that afflict the 
rural areas” which were of close proximity to the city of Milan, having been elevated to 
the rank of capital of the new Republic.12 According to the Cisalpine ministry of Police 
Gaetano Porro, who organizes the columns,13 the threat was so serious that maintaining 
this climate of unrest would threaten the states survival as well as the supply of the ar-
med forces. Indeed, these gangs of ‘robbers, who are trained by deserters or any other 
unpunished and vicious subjects, jeopardise the peaceful farmers, plundering them and 
those of our Republic’.14 Would the ministry inflate the situation? This question is dif-
ficult to answer, and this does not really matter basically. His posture showed less the 
real weakness of the republican institutions than it expressed their elitist fears. The word 
“robber” had several meanings in the revolutionarian language. It described as much a 
criminal reality as any kind of real or purely imaginary resistance to the process of Sta-
te building.15 The denouncing of the danger those ‘robbers’ represented, shows that the 
eradication of crime should be reinforced by a work of republicanisation of rural areas, 
through the conquest of geographical locations, the representation of which remained 
quartered between the timeless myth of the good peasant and the counter-revolutiona-
ry memory.
II. The creation of the Mobile columns
It was the wish of Bonaparte who at this time was the Commander in Chief of the Army 
of Italy, to create the mobile columns. This move represented the culmination of the Na-
tional Guard’s organisation which started right after Milan was occupied in May 1796, 
and continued in the cities of the Republic until months later.16 The aim of organising the 
mobile columns was a logical political move, it was recognised that villages or other litt-
le rural town remained territories which were sometimes unknown, sometimes not well 
controlled by the State.17 It was thus more than essential to settle there the Republican au-
11 About the concept of ‘pre legitimity’: Ferrero, Pouvoir.
12 Archivi di Stato di Milano (thereafter ASM), Militare, parte antica, 147.
13 About Gaetano Porro, see: De Francesco, Gaetano Lodovico Baldassarre Porro Schiaffinati, online (URL: 
http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/porro-schiaffinati-gaetano-lodovico-baldassarre_(Dizionario-Bio-
grafico)/ consulted 9 October 2018).
14 ASM, Militare, parte antica, 147.
15 About the relationship between brigandage and desertion, see: Forrest, ‘Déserteurs et brigands’, but also: 
Rousseaux, ‘Rebelles ou brigands?’, pp. 101-132.
16 On the organization of the sedentary National Guard of Milan: Antonielli, ‘Tra Polizia e militare’, pp. 65-
73.
17 From this point of view, continuity with the old regime is important, especially since the collapse of ab-
solutism causes that of forms of rural militia reactivated during the 1770s. For the first aspect: Capra, Ci-
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thority through “active and effective means” able to ‘remedy the slowness of the standard 
methods’.18 
This fact justifies the operational structure of the mobile columns followed a diffe-
rent pattern to those formerly created by the directorial France, in Floréal year IV, who-
se design had inspired Bonaparte.19 In both cases, the sedentary National Guard of the 
large cities constituted a hiring pool entirely made of men who volunteered to join the 
mobile troops.20 In France like in Lombardia, the mobile columns’action and discipline 
were ruled by the National Guard’s status stationed in the cities.21 Nonetheless, it would 
be complex to find other common points between these two experiments. On one hand, 
Bonaparte insisted on the militarisation of the Cisalpine group, conceding more power 
to the officers who were directly chosen by political authorities instead of being elected 
by the troops. On the other hand, the commander in chief ensured the new organisations 
their complete operational autonomy, which left them appearearing like independent 
forces under the direct control of the supreme authority of the Republic, in other words, 
the Cisalpine Directory. This made it possible to firstly use, and then scatter them once 
these exceptional circumstances, that justified their creation, have ceased.22 
These decisions deeply changed the mobile forces framework, compared to the French 
situation, because they weakened the link between local administrations and this type of 
organisations. The latters were formerly conceived as an extraordinary and punctual ap-
peal aimed at restoring public order disrupted by local elements.23 The decree of 27 Ther-
midor entailed provisions in which left a voluntary power strongly militarised and politi-
serani, ‘Criminalità e repressione’, pp. 1-25. On the same subject: Solavaggione, ‘Brigantaggio e contrab-
bando’, vol. 54, I, pp. 23-49 and II, pp. 375-419. More recently: Antonielli, ‘Il controllo delle campagne 
lombarde’, pp. 1-19.
18 ASM, Militare, parte antica, 147. The creation of the columns is preceded by the approval of the provisio-
nal laws against ‘thieves and criminals’, which established the criminal court and the law against ‘the ene-
mies of public order’ (Raccolta delle leggi, III, pp. 99-101). The existence of a legal framework makes the 
mobile columns profoundly different from the revolutionary armies studied by Richard Cobb, who were 
‘above all groups of armed civilians, [...] they do not militarize, and civil armies have all the weaknesses’ 
(Cobb, Les armées Révolutionnaires, vol. 1, p. 1).
19 The use of mobile columns, composed by soldiers, was not unknown in Lombardy during the 18th cen-
tury. See: Capra, Ciserani, ‘Criminalità e repressione’, pp. 20-22. For France, see: ‘Arrêté du Directoire 
exécutif portant établissement [sic] de Colonnes mobiles dans la Garde nationale sédentaire’ of 17 Flo-
réal an IV (6 May 1796): Collection générale des lois, II, p. 118.
20 Art. 2 and art. 3 of the law on mobile columns promulgated by General Bonaparte on 27 Thermidor year 
V (1 August 1797) (AMS, Militare, parte antica, 147). The commander of the mobile columns is chosen 
directly by the executive power on 11 Thermidor is the adjutant general of the Milan National Guard 
Giovanni Battista Bertoglio. The officers responsible for three columns are named on 29 Thermidor Year 
V (3 August 1797) in the people of Cornelio Garbagnati, surgeon at the city hospital, Giuseppe Strazza, 
merchant, and Francesco Zucconi, unknown profession (Ibid.).
21 See also the regulation drawn up by the commander Bertoglio (Ibid.).
22 Art. 10 of the law on mobile columns. While the political responsibility for the use of mobile columns fell 
on the Directory, their armament and equipment were the responsibility of the Minister of War, their use 
in the field decided by the Minister of Police. These provisions are specified by the directive of the Direc-
tory of 18 Thermidor Year V (5 August 1797) (Ibid.).
23 About the use of mobile columns in France, see: Clay, ‘La Garde Nationale en Provence’, pp. 359-370. Sot-
tocasa, Les Brigands et la Révolution, pp. 335-339.
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cised, which rule was to intervene on a ‘national’ scale, in order to pacify the rural areas, 
a ‘guerre de police’, 24 was being fought against organised crime, it was orchestrated and 
led by the highest instances of the State against large scale banditry.
Each of them being composed of around fifty volunteers, which were under the com-
mand of a captain,25 the three mobile columns were able to deploy and support hea-
vy firepower allowing coverage of a wide geographical area. Their actions were decided 
thanks to the pieces of information received downstream, by the executive power (or 
even, when appropriate, by local populations) while Commissioners of Justice were sent 
to the operating sites to make a selection of the captives, deciding whether they were of-
fered immediate release or referral to the Milan criminal Courts.26 In other words, the 
mobile columns represented a ‘provisional’ and ‘imposed by the circumstances’,27 insti-
tution while still being strong power, this was evidenced by its means and support: Each 
officer had his own funds and, in the event of a dispute, the commander could address 
the highest instances of the Republic in order to impose his own standpoint. It could also 
be regarded that the volunteers enrolment and weaponery were settled at the expense of 
other armed corps, who reported demise of thousands of rifles but also the sudden de-
parture of tens of national guards?28
Confronted by this urgent situation, the actions of the first patrol of the cities southern 
boundaries came before the official constitution of this organisation.29 In the meantime, 
in Milan, at the troop’s barracks, officers began the process of quickly recruiting volun-
teers who were chosen among the members of the central companies and the chasseurs.30 
Among those citizens-soldiers of urban origin, 98% of them were born inside the city or 
in its urban fringe.31 Most of them belonged to the urban working class and were affected 
by the economic downturn of the city.
24 Gainot, ‘La “guerre de police“’ pp. 81-82.
25 Each column is composed of forty-eight volunteers, five non-commissioned officers, two lieutenants and 
a captain (ASM, Militare, parte antica, 147).
26 Art. XII and XIII of the law on mobile columns. These commissioners of justice had under their com-
mand men on horseback who were to ensure the transfer of prisoners in the city (Ibid.).
27 Ibid.
28 For the organization of the Milanese National Guard: Raccolta delle leggi, III, 3, pp. 22-23. 
29 The first report concerns the operations carried out by two provisional columns of forty-five volunteers 
between the 11 and 14 Thermidor year V (29 July-1 August 1797). A second action, this time done by a 
hundred men, is launched between the 18 and on the 26 Thermidor year V (13 August 1797) (ASM, Mi-
litare, parte antica, 147).
30 Recruitment operations are completed on 29 Thermidor Year V (16 August 1797), but the columns will 
take up position in their bases the first days of Fructidor (Ibid.).
31 Punctual recruitments are made at the sites of operation. In total there are a dozen men, half of whom are 
foreigners (Ibid., 147-149). See the following note.
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32
Weavers represented one fifth of the total of volunteers (18.3%), followed by other ar-
tisans or other manual workers such as shoemakers (8%), woodworkers (6.3%), tailors 
(5.1%) or cart-men (4%). Beyond the differences of work, those low-income professio-
nals found in the regularity of their new salary a means to move beyond this casualisa-
tion, imposed by the economic conditions. It was to be found particularly true of the 
younger workforce. 61.7% of them did not reach the age 25 years old, which indirect-
ly means that they might be workers rather than masters, leading them to be entrenched 
in the working-class structures. Students made up (9.7%) and annuitants (2.3% of the 
total)33, who almost always held positions of responsibility, such as deputy officers or of-
ficers, which also shows that this assumption of responsibility attracted lower classes and 
was equally a kind of self-promotion within the republican society. Enrolling in the army 
demonstrated that the social and economical factors were in line with a real ideological 
re-involvement of the National Guard.
32 Here and elsewhere, I have only elaborated data concerning men engaged in Thermidor Year V, the only 
ones concerning age and occupation. No information is available on the other hand about their civil sta-
tus. Then, out of the total of 175 cases identified, I took into account only the most significant categories, 
those that exceed 1% of the total (ASM, Militare, parte antica, 147). Among these, we note that ‘croato’ 
associated with names, however, typically Milanese. No profession was so designated in the eighteenth 
century, with all probability they are deserters of Slavic regiments in the service of the Republic of Ve-
nice, whose names were Italianized. Other foreigners (at least one Romanian, two French, two Spaniards 
and one Piedmontese) are enlisted during the winter to fill the voids left by desertions (Ibid., 149).
33 The important presence of students is also explained by the closing of educational institutions, promoted 
by the Cisalpine Republic, for their reform. See: Brambilla, Università e professioni, pp. 467-481).
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It is telling in that respect that enrolling in the mobile columns was not seen as an ex-
tension or the beginning of a military career. Of those who had decided to join the tro-
ops, less than 5% of men were formerly in the military and around 9.7%, were armed 
force when it dissolved in Ventôse year VI, or February 1798.34 Enlisting in the mobiles 
columns was always considered as an interlude before coming back to the civilian life, in 
one’s home town. These elements explain the high rate of desertions that affected mobile 
columns throughout the fall, when 22.2% of men decided to leave the troops with no au-
thorisation.35 Defections increased when there was a delay in payment, the enforcement 
operations took too long and moving away from Milan towards the Republic boundaries. 
From the volunteers’ view point, these elements changed the temporary nature of their 
situation and showed them the economic benefits they thought they could obtain would 
be lower.36 Henceforth, the fact to desert became the evidence that would quickly drive 
a wedge between male field workers and the political power’s expectations. This power 
would likely turn citizens-soldiers into an ongoing repressive professional force.
III. Repressive uses and relationships with rural 
areas populations
The mobiles columns’ first actions could be compared to simple raids, at the end of Ther-
midor, when the three troops were settled in their headquarters situated twenty kilome-
tres away from the city,37 their actions were repeated and more intense, following a pre-
34 Only 17 men, including the officers, will engage the 3 Ventose Year VI (21 February 1798), in the troops 
of line, including six officers (ASM, Militare, parte antica, 149).
35 In total, 39 men out of 175 deserts (Ibid., 147 and 149, passim.)
36 In their reports, the officers emphasize that their men ‘have other incomes to feed their families than 
their national salary’ and that the regularity of payments is a major stake to guarantee the cohesion of the 
ranks. Ibid, 147. Despite the efforts of Minister Porro, the Executive Board is never in a position to ensu-
re a regular transfer of funds (Ibid., 149).
37 The columns are placed at Melzo to protect the link with Bergamo, at Marignano to clean the roads to 
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cise modus operandi in accordance with the commander in chief of the Armée d’Italie 
instructions. Managed in an autonomous way by a captain who was constantly in contact 
with Milan headquarters, the columns intervened on the field by little groups that cris-
scrossed along sides of the roads leading towards the capital. Because collective actions 
demanded the participation of several tens of men were quite exceptional, the tactical 
deployment of troops quickly evolved into a routine that lasted for nine weeks without 
appreciable variation of time. These small troops were particularly active during evening 
and night-time hours, and would gather together by sunrise, when the National Guards 
would take up their positions in surrounding villages.
Even though their actions mainly took place away from densely populated areas, in the 
form of rummages of isolated farms, dwellings, or cabarets, where most of arrests occur-
red, the little town represented not only a key place in the implementation of the politi-
cal mission of the mobile columns, but also in the groundwork for future activities. Du-
ring their stay in the boroughs, the National Guards would demonstrate the presence of 
the State on the local population and re-establish confidence pact between constituents 
and the Republic. This is done through public ceremonies such as volunteers’ parade or 
plantings of trees of freedom on the main place of the village.38 Most of the time, the rela-
tionship was limited to public discourses between officers on one hand, and local autho-
rities and citizens on the other hand. The latter seized the opportunity to denounce sus-
picious person or activities, which could facilitate the action of maintenance of law and 
order.39 On another note, even though the requisitioning of local guides became a usual 
procedure, it was more exceptional to see populations directly participating to the ope-
rations, despite the National Guards urging. As mentioned in one of the first reports sent 
to the Ministry of Police,40 fears of reprisals ‘against people or dwellings’ were too strong. 
When the villagers took up arms to help the troops, they did refuse to go near the priso-
ners, with concerns they would be identified.41
This peasants’ mistrust was linked to the awareness of the weakness of the repressive 
machinery, supposed to ensure order but it has also to do with a feeling of distrust to-
wards the National Guards. This feeling could scarcely be seen through an active resi-
stance against the troop’s arrivals, (gunshots or sound of tocsin), nonetheless this ho-
stility remained dormant, which exacerbated the troops and their officers’ feelings of 
Bologna and Abbiategrasso to cover the way to the Alps and Turin (Ibid., 147). These are the places tra-
ditionally affected by strong rural crime. For the 18th century, see: Capra, Ciserani, ‘Criminalità e repres-
sione’, pp. 3-5.
38 ASM, Militare, parte antica, 147.
39 See for example the operations of 18 Thermidor Year V (5 August 1797), when the communes provide 
‘guides, explorers and village men in number of 58’ to facilitate the operations of the columns (Ibid.). To 
‘facilitate’ relations with the civilian population and encourage them to collaborate, the captains have the 
sums which they distribute at will from 7 Fructidor year V (22 August 1797) (Ibid.).
40 Ibid.
41 For example, in the vicinity of Pavia, the column manages to seize a man named Giardinetto, ‘a man of 
very bad reputation, brigand, murderer, arsonist, thief and deserter: [...] It must be observed that while 
the volunteers showed the greatest courage, the men of the village did not even dare to approach the rob-
ber and handcuff him while he was disarmed and he invited them [to do so]’ (Ibid.).
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insecurity. This ‘scorn towards Republicans’ felt by the guards partly explained their vio-
lence, in particular in the limits of the département of Olona, when volunteers interven-
ed in Republic of Venise’s former lands, lately operated under the authority of the Cisal-
pine Republic.42 In ‘this really dangerous country’, a land totally unknown by those men 
coming from the cities and who even did not share the same dialects as local populati-
ons, the National Guards operations were tarnished by a large amount of exactions that 
occurred nowhere else, like robbery, damage, threats to the civil population. In Cassa-
no d’Adda, deputy officers, as a direct result of not being housed, pointed an arm at the 
mayor of the city, who was unable to satisfy their demands. In the département of Serio 
(Bergame), the first and only mission ended by a general fight between mobile columns 
and local National Guards.43
At the same period of time, several farms in the surroundings complained about ar-
bitrary requisitions and irruptions into private spaces for no apparent reason.44 Lesse-
ned into ‘jokes’ by the main officers, these actions infuriated local authorities which did 
not wait to denounce to the central power, the indignity ‘of Our republic’. As it was poin-
ted out by the community of Crema, on Vendémiaire year V, ‘there is no more effici-
ent means to disgust the People than these exactions, and the contempt of some of the 
agents. All the energies should be involved, Citizens, to avoid to leave these crimes unpu-
nished and in order to avoid any disturbances, that could constantly occure’.45 The war-
ning, which was an implicit threat of a peasant revolt against armed forces, revealed the 
state of weakness and of tiredness of the villages communities after two years of war. On 
the one hand, it illustrated the appropriation of the republican message, the expectations 
of the change it generated in the little town. Besides, this also showed the deception in-
duced by the mobile columns’ unethical actions, the repetition of which put into questi-
on the citizens’ confidence.46
If these misdemeanours blemished the political message, that the mobile columns il-
lustrated, was their repressive action efficient? Reports sent to the Ministry of Police see-
med to show evidence of a quick improvement of the situation. On 14 Fructidor Year VI 
(31 August 1797), Commissioner for Justice, seconded to the column of Abbiategrasso, 
indicated that ‘the national guards are efficient and less robberies and muggings are re-
ported, compared to the past’.47 Far from being isolated, this assessment of the situation 
42 Ibid.
43 See the report of 8 Fructidor Year V (25 August 1797) (Ibid.).
44 On 19 Fructidor year V (5 September 1797), the Column Commander at Melzo was forced to dismiss 
national guards because of their indiscipline and thefts committed against the local population (Ibid.). In 
total, nine National Guards will be expelled from the ranks for unworthy behaviour (Ibid., 147-149, pas-
sim.).
45 Ibid., 148.
46 Mobile columns replicate the same behaviours of those that had been deployed in previous decades. See: 
Capra, Ciserani, ‘Criminalità e repressione’, pp. 20-21. It should be pointed out, however, that the passa-
ge of mobile columns sometimes encourages emulation, as in Gallarate where volunteers propose to the 
Directory to form a fourth column on 6 Fructidor year V (23 August 1797). The proposal has no follow-
up (ASM, Militare, part antica, 147).
47 Ibid.
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was confirmed by the pieces of information collected by other groups. On second com-
plementary day year V (18 September 1797), the commanding of the columns Bertoglio 
could finally propose a redeployment of his troops, since ‘the inside stillness authorises 
the use of columns to prevent illegal transport of wheat’, which took place on the Repu-
blic southern boundaries.48 Even if, in reality, the actions to pacify the rural areas lasted a 
few weeks, and a column went on crisscrossing across the countryside and ensuring sa-
fety in the villages around Pavie, while others were sent elsewhere to counter smuggling 
operations,49 this evolution of the mobile columns’ actions encourages to investigate on 
the real aims of the maintenance of law and order in the mobile columns.
In green, the mobile columns’ position in the fight against banditry (Thermidor year 
V, Vendémiaire year VI). In red, position adopted to struggle against the illegal trade of 
wheat. (Vendémiaire Brumaire, year VI).
48 Ibid. These places were the hub of contraband since the beginning of the century (Solavaggione, ‘Brigan-
taggio e contrabbando’, II, p. 375).
49 ASM, Militare, part antica, 148.
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IV. From tracking down robbery to the repression of 
marginals
The mobile columns could both efficiently and rapidly struggle against robbery because 
there was nobody to arrest since they met no opposition along their patrols in the Lom-
bardy plains, without any other form of resistance both collective or organised. Amp-
le evidence of this was the arrestation forms, which were often inchoate, and the reports 
of operations sent to the mobile columns’ headquarters. These documents permitted to 
recount, with near precise detail, the actions led on the field by volunteers as well as the 
profiles of the 131 arrested citizens. Within nine weeks, (from 11 Thermidor Year VI to 
21 Vendémiaire Year VI, or from 29 July to 11 October 1797), the mobile columns pro-
ceeded to solely two collective arrests of groups of more than ten people.50
51
Most of the time, patrols arrested individuals or small groups of up to four people, 
composed by young men (26 years old on average) and 42.7% of them were ordinary 
peasants or at times servants (10.7%) who were unable to justify their presence on si-
te.52 It was quite rare to see professional criminals such as smugglers or wanted thieves, 
in which arrests were recognised as a real success by the Ministry of Police. Even though 
the informers of the Ministry of Police continued to allude the existence of criminal or-
ganisations hidden in the woods,53 the authorities pursued these claims to no avail with 
only tracks left behind which led to the arrests of marginal or petty criminals. Their exi-
50 One of the two is due to a brawl broke out at the time of the arrival of the troops. Figures obtained from 
the compilation of data in Ibid., 147 and 148.
51 Ibid., 147.
52 Ibid.
53 See, for example, the report drawn up on the 1 Fructidor Year V (18 August 1797), but especially that of 
the 5 Fructidor year V (22 August 1797), addressed to the Directory, which is very detailed. It mentions 
four gangs of criminals who operate at the eastern margins of the department of Olona. Even if the co-
lumn of Melzo will be directed in these places in the hunt for a band of thirty ‘robbers’ around Caravag-
gio, she cannot find them. 15 Fructidor Year V (1 September 1797) (Ibid., 147).
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stence could be explained by the absence of any State control and by the existence of se-
veral deserters in Lombardy.54 The course of justice was led against characters on the frin-
ge of peasant society, who were not totally excluded of it. Even though they were seen as 
dangerous or suspicious by local communities, they remained tolerated. With the fear of 
reprisals, the local population were left with a presence which was both infrequent and 
yet at time permanent, right up to the moment when the mobile columns arrival became 
the opportunity to get rid of them. For instance, a miller and his son were denounced by 
villagers because of their ‘bad reputation’. They were found in their bed with:
The son: a Croatian rifle, a loaded shotgun, a knife with a bone handle in 
a damaged sheath, a satchel for powder, small calibre ammunitions, two rifle 
bullets, sixty Piedmont pounds of high-denomination banknotes, three ecus of 
France, one Spanish gold coin, one Milanese ecu, a finely engraved time piece 
etched with the face of the Roy de Paris, three policers’ handcuffs.
The father: an old shotgun, a short rifle, a knife, ammunitions of all calibres.55
As seen in this example, more than one third (35.3%) of the arrests led by the Natio-
nal Guard could be justified by suspected thefts, concealment of property, both of them 
being demonstrated by search operations on site, or, most of the time, justified by mere 
declarations from the neighbours. Certainly, the ongoing increase of requests for cart-
ridges showed that the National Guard had to confront real resistance.56 Nonetheless, it 
must be recognised that the crimes of the accused remained ‘des méfaits plutôt ordin-
aires, commis dans des circonstances banales. Il s’agit moins de meurtres [non-existent 
in the cisalpine case] ou de vols de grand chemin que de petits larcins, chapardages ou 
de maraudages’.57 These actions are the direct result of poverty, which was only exacerba-
ted by the war, which perfectly ensured the continuity of the 18th century with traditio-
nal criminal activities. Written in November 1791 by the city of Pavia, these lines could 
not be called into question six years later:
The real balossi [wrongdoers, in the dialect of Lombardy] are the slackers and the 
tramps coming from the national rural areas as well as from foreign countries and the la-
test are the most dangerous. They lived thanks to the resources they could procure daily, 
either innocently, or by the fear they provoked on peasants, threatening them to set fire 
isolated farms. They moved around constantly from shelter to shelter, and they rarely ac-
cepted any form of temporary employ.58
Inspecting the roads and controlling those who proceeded them is in fact a crucial is-
sue for the mobile columns. They multiplied the number of arrests for deserters and fo-
54 Several reports highlight the effects of the presence of ‘deserters from all armies and other individuals 
brought by them who submerge the Republic’ (Ibid.).
55 Ibid.
56 Par exemple, le 1 fructidor an V (18 août 1797), les colonnes reçoivent 1620 cartouches, dix par volon-
taire, qui sont épuisées le 17 vendémiaire an VI (8 octobre 1797) (Ibid.).
57 Forrest, ‘Déserteurs et brigands sous la Révolution et l’Empire: état de la question’, p. 101.
58 Passage quoted by Capra, Ciserani, ‘Criminalità e repressione’, p 9. About the crimes committed: Ibid., 
p. 11.
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reigners (18% of the cases), of citizens without safety card (10%) or in possession of fire-
arms without permission (9%). They would either be expelled from the Republic in one 
case, or sent back home in the other case, all the citizens were immediately released by 
the seconded Commissioners of Justice. Only 62.3% of the prisoners arrested by the Na-
tional Guards were presented to the criminal Court of Milan, including the men accused 
of vagrancy and idleness. It is allowed to wonder how many of them were really condem-
ned. This is impossible to quantify precisely, nevertheless, the first trials, held in Ther-
midor, led to a fight between the judges and the Ministry of Police Gaetano Porro. The 
minister demanded his magistrates to ‘use evidence to show the guilt of common ene-
mies of the Republic in order to inflict them a doctrinal punishment in public’, the jud-
ges replied that, most of the times, the accused are mere citizens ‘who are neither idle nor 
wrongdoers, but only men who devote their time to a peaceful work and who have no 
equivocal conduct’ pleading for their acquittal.59 Formulated at the beginning of the mo-
bile columns activity, those considerations would not be able to sum up the aporia of this 
experiment of popular and revolutionary law enforcement. They revealed all the same 
tensions that characterised the period and explained, in fine, the dissolution of those or-
ganisations, on Ventôse year VI, (Febuary 1798).
V. Conclusion
Certainly, one can recognise that the mobile columns had failures and setbacks from 
Vendémiaire Year V (October 1797), which forced the Cisalpine authorities to make 
quick decisions. Upon ceasing operations against wanted felons, who remained untra-
ceable, the mobile columns were deployed along the boundaries. Firstly, on the west, 
close to Tessin to tackle illegal trade of grain, then on the east side, in the Bergamasque 
mountains, in order to fend off the incursion from the Trentin area. In both cases, they 
were unable to effectively cope against heavily armed groups. During the first theatre of 
operations, well organized gangs, supported by local populations,60 passed through or 
succeeded in avoided detection at the National Guard’s roadblocks. Weeks later, because 
they were weakened by desertions and had settled in a hostile environment, volunteers 
renounced to persecute actively foreign smugglers who would cross the frontier, before 
snow could obstruct mountain passes.61 This inactivity is interrupted by the ‘battle of 9 
Nivôse’ year VI, which ended without casualties nor injuries. It was the last stand for the 
mobile columns.62 
Overwrought by the relationships with local communities, upset by the inefficiency of 
the volunteers, the Cisalpine Directoire decided to call them back to the capital and to 
59 See exchange of 17 and 19 Thermidor (ASM, Militare, parte antica, 147). The same considerations are re-
peated on the 19 Fructidor, Year V (5 September 1797) (Ibid.).
60 According to the reports sent to the Directory, people were shooting on the mobile columns in order to 
make the smuggler’s escape as safe as they could (Ibid., 148).
61 Ibid., 149.
62 Ibid.
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dissolve mobile columns, refusing to grant them with any military honours.63 The propo-
sition of a prolongation of their involvement in the troops ended on a total breakdown: 
95% of them and two thirds of the officers left the army as early as the last dissolution 
of the troops on 3 Ventôse.64 On both sides, these behaviours were the evidence of the 
mixed review of this police experiment. The last events, in particular the operation in the 
Alps, were the opportunity to highlight the limits, showing it was impossible to milita-
rise the mobile columns, to turn them into a professional force able to deal with, to res-
train or to eradicate those kinds of criminality or organised resistance, despite the expec-
tations which had justified its creation.
Nonetheless, if one only takes these circumstances into account it would mean to for-
go an analysis on the real significance of this experiment, but also of the troubles it rai-
sed in terms of popular participation to the enforcement of law and order, at a period of 
political changes, and that – as early as Vendémiaire and thus as early as the first opera-
tion around the capital – had already motivated the idea of a premature dissolution of 
those organisations.65 Once the first period of crisis, a moment of emptiness, during the 
creation of the Sister republic was over, the State authority enforced slowly and gradually 
relegated popular participation. On one hand, forcing the creation of the départements 
allowed to build a viable institutional framework, which was strong and lasting, able to 
monitor the control of the territory, on a local scale, without the intervention of extra-
ordinary forces. On the other hand, the implementation of the Directorial institutions, 
which represented a source of inspiration for the Cisalpine republic, was done through 
their self-empowerment towards its authorised representative, through the distinction 
between the exercise of citizenship and bearing of arms, which characterised the begin-
ning of the republican experiment.
Thereupon, the dissolution of the mobile columns as a body could be considered as a 
way to bring in line with the repressive police actions, and generally, the forms of popu-
lar participation in this directory policy framework.66 This marked the end of an era of 
exceptions, of pacification and the beginning of a stable administrative system, in which 
the implementation of republican isonomy was translated and imposed through the 
sacred status of the institutions, which was called into question by the existence of mo-
bile columns. That is all the more true that their action had been characterised by the 
persistence of previous policing practices that the new republican regime wanted to go 
beyond. Bonaparte, who glorified, on Prairial year V (May 1797), the invincibility of a 
‘whole people [when it] is armed and wants to defend its freedom’, when he left, on 21 
Brumaire Year VI (11 November 1797), merely entrusting the Cisalpine freedom to the 
lawmakers, the army and the Grande Nation. The lack of direct references to the peop-
le and to the National Guards was less an omission than an announcement of a new de-
63 No doubt the resignations of the radical and influential Minister of Police Porro, in Brumaire year VI 
(October-November 1797), weakens the institution of mobile columns (Ibid., 148).
64 Ibid., 149.
65 Ibid., 148.
66 On the decline of the National Guard in France, see: Dupuy, La garde nationale, p. 286.
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mocratic phase that the Sister republic was about to experience. In other words, as well 
as their creation, the mobile columns’fate was tightly linked to political reasoning. With 
the change from the revolutionary state to the constitutional state, the republicanisation 
of the north side of the peninsula moved into an unprecedented phase that demanded a 
new organisation of police forces.
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The National Guard, a concrete but 
temporary experience of popular 
participation in law enforcement. 
The example of the National Guard of Lyon 
from 1830 to 1871
Mathias Pareyre
The National Guard is a particularly interesting institution to study in the context of a 
symposium dedicated to popular participation in law enforcement, since its existence 
has been a very tangible moment during which the people took charge of, and active-
ly participated in, the enforcement of public order in French cities and countryside. Un-
like other law enforcement agencies in the 19th century, such as the police, the gendar-
merie (the national police force), the Royal guard or the Republican guard, the National 
Guard was not a professional troop. It was made up of citizens who only took up arms 
periodically and temporarily. They had other professional occupations and did not live 
in barracks, but at home with their families. Created during the French Revolution, the 
National Guard existed, for better or worse, throughout the 19th century, as it was recon-
stituted in all French towns during each revolutionary outburst, before being disbanded 
or put in abeyance some time later.1
Between 1830 and 1872, when it was definitely done away with,2 the National Guard 
was reconstituted in Lyon during each of the three political regime changes. As such, it 
was active from July 1830 to December 1831, from February to July 1848, and from the 
summer of 1870 to the summer of 1871. These three relatively brief episodes (a maxi-
mum of a year and a half at the beginning of the July Monarchy, and barely five months 
in 1848) nevertheless opened up the possibility of a popular handling of law enforce-
ment. Lyon citizens, like many of their compatriots, carried out daily police tasks in their 
city, and went as far as handing a helping hand to the line troops during the riots or in-
surrections that took place in Lyon throughout the 19th century.
This popular participation was spontaneous, at least initially. Indeed, the National 
Guard was first reorganized by the population of Lyon before the authorities, in a second 
phase, took over the reins and supervised it. The Lyon bourgeoisie played an active role 
in the reconstitution of this popular militia, and it will therefore be necessary to define 
1 Many publications offer overviews on the National guard: Girard, La Garde nationale. Carrot, La Garde 
nationale. Dupuy, La Garde nationale.
2 The National guard was dissolved by the Assemblée nationale on 25 August 1871, then definitely ab-
olished by the law of 27 July 1872 on the recruitment of the army.
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the meaning of the word popular, since the stakes linked to the reorganization of the Na-
tional Guard are quite different, and indeed even opposed, depending on whether one 
adopts the point of view of the bourgeoisie or that of the working classes.
The reconstitution of the National Guard also raises the question of the models and re-
ferences used by the contemporaries to organize the service of the citizen militia: did the 
national guards introduce a new way to enforce public order, or did they reproduce exi-
sting codes and patterns? And if so, which ones?
In order to answer these questions, we will first clarify the conditions and meanings of 
the reorganization of the National Guard during the revolutionary outbursts. Then, we 
will show that the citizen militia was a law enforcement force that was largely influenced 
by the military model. However, we will need to highlight the fact that this popular expe-
rience of law enforcement remained systematically temporary.
I. A popular force imposed to the authorities
The National Guard was above all a ‘popular’ and ‘revolutionary’ force, in that it was im-
posed to the authorities during revolutions and regime changes.
1. A spontaneous and revolutionary reorganization
According to Louis Girard, one of the first historians to work on citizen militia, ‘the guard 
was spontaneously formed when important crises arose, during which, public authorities 
having disappeared, the social order must be saved’3. Even though this quote cannot ne-
cessarily be applied to all of the French National Guards of the 19th century4, it is parti-
cularly relevant for Lyon in 1830 and 1848. During these two revolutionary outbursts, the 
Lyon sources bear witness to the spontaneous and revolutionary reorganization of the ci-
tizen militia.
As had been the case in other French cities as well,5 on 28 July 1830, upon hearing 
about the Parisian events, the liberal bourgeoisie of Lyon decided to re-establish the Na-
tional Guard in order to put pressure on the legitimist authorities. On 28 July and the fol-
lowing days, deputations were thus sent to the prefecture to ask the prefect to ‘make use 
of the natural right to constitute a national guard, so as to guarantee public peace’.6 Ho-
wever, the prefect’s answers remained evasive, and on the morning of 31 July, according 
to the sources, ‘the national guard formed itself ’.7 Indeed, from seven in the morning on, 
embryonic companies of the National guard reconstituted spontaneously and by noon 
3 Girard, La Garde nationale, p. 369.
4 In 1830 and in 1848, the National Guard of Marseilles was reorganized by the authorities (legitimist in 
July 1830, orleanist in February 1848) in the wake of the Paris events.
5 The conditions of the reorganization of the National Guard and the role it played from 28 July to 31 July 
1830 are very similar in Lyon and in Rennes, as Axel Dröber demonstrated in his paper. See also the ex-
ample of Nantes as developed in Pilbeam, ‘Les barricades provinciales’, pp. 73-82.
6 Le Précurseur, n° 1111, 31 July 1830.
7 Ibid., n° 1112, 1 August 1830.
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they had gathered around 1,500 men. This troop managed to put pressure on the legi-
timist authorities, which ended up acknowledging the reorganization of the National 
guard by the end of the day.8
In February 1848, the conditions presiding over the reorganization of the citizen mi-
litia were identical, except the fact that the initiatives to reconstitute the National Guard 
were only made once the news of the abdication of Louis-Philippe had been confirmed. 
On 25 February, the republican bourgeoisie of Lyon, united under the name ‘Electoral 
committee of the Rhone’, sent deputations ‘either to the mayor or to the prefect, to ask 
him permission to organize the national guard that was necessary to maintain public or-
der’. 9 As had happened in July 1830, the authorities made evasive answers to this demand 
and declared that they were waiting for orders from Paris. Meanwhile, numerous groups 
gathered in the main squares of Lyon, including Bellecour, Terreaux and the Célestins, in 
order to put pressure on the authorities meeting at the Hotel de ville. In front of a large 
crowd, the Republic was finally proclaimed in the evening, from the balcony of the Hotel 
de ville, by Emile Laforest, who was then invested temporary mayor.10 Like in 1830, sour-
ces from Lyon insist on the spontaneous character of the reinstatement of the militia. In 
a report dated 1 March 1848, general attorney Laborie evokes this ‘rapid organization 
of the national guard that formed spontaneously through the agency of all the good ci-
tizens, without party distinctions’,11 and the bourgeois Joseph Bergier wrote in his diary, 
on 29 February that ‘the national guard is emerging everywhere, there are posts in the 
streets and in every neighborhood’.12 Official reorganizations of the citizen militia in Au-
gust 1830 and February-March 1848 were thus only institutionalizing and formalizing an 
already existing situation.
In 1870, the reasons for the reconstitution of the National Guard were different. 
France’s declaration of war to Prussia on 19 July 1870, as well as the first French defeats 
in August, pushed the government to reorganize the National Guard, which was concei-
ved most of all as a military reserve able to take charge of the defense of cities against the 
Prussian army. The Lyon bourgeoisie had already been demanding the re-establishment 
of the citizen militia since the beginning of the war13 when on August 8 an imperial de-
cree announced the incorporation in the sedentary National Guard of all citizens aged 
30 to 40.14 On the 12, the first article of the law pertaining to the National Guard official-
ly stipulated that ‘the National Guard [was] reinstituted in all the departments’.15 On that 
same day, the first control registers were already constituted in Lyon.16 But the Lyon mi-
8 Ibid. and Mormand, Une semaine de révolution, pp. 50-54.
9 Bergier, Le journal d’un bourgeois, p. 11. These remarks were written by Fanny Bergier, Joseph Bergier’s 
wife, who sometimes wrote in her husband’s diary.
10 Dutacq, Histoire politique de Lyon, p. 96.
11 Quoted in Ibid., p. 159.
12 Bergier, Le journal d’un bourgeois, p. 34.
13 Crestin, Souvenirs d’un lyonnais, pp. 58-59.
14 Dupuy, La Garde nationale, p. 496.
15 Bulletin officiel du Ministère de l’intérieur, 9, 1870, p. 304.
16 Bleton, Journal d’un garde national, p. 9. Le Progrès, n° 3704, 11 August 1870.
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litia, which the authorities refused to arm, was only reorganized at the very end of Au-
gust, and the first patrols only took place once the Republic had already been proclai-
med. Interestingly, on 4 September, Lyon citizens proved spontaneous once more, as they 
massively went to the forts surrounding Lyon in order to arm themselves. Even though 
one of the first measures adopted by the temporary committee, which had settled in the 
Hotel de Ville that morning, was to proclaim the arming of the National Guard,17 Lyon ci-
tizens equipped themselves by entering rifle yards and seizing arms ‘of every caliber, eve-
ry model and every period’.18 
2. A popular force
The reorganizations of the National Guard, particularly in 1830 and in 1848, gave birth 
to a popular force, since the spontaneous reconstitution of the militia was the doing of 
the people and not of the authorities. But the population of Lyon who asked for the re-
constitution of the National Guard was mostly and almost exclusively made up of mem-
bers of the bourgeoisie: liberal bourgeois in 1830, republican ones in 1848. Claude Mor-
mand, member of the provisional administrative Commission of Lyon in August 1830, 
describes quite accurately the social composition of the ‘enormous crowd’ that deman-
ded the reorganization of the citizen militia on 29 July 1830: 
The men forming it all belonged, without exception, to this intermediate 
class that has constantly protected the people against the attacks of the ari-
stocracy, and the aristocracy against the outbursts of popular anarchy. They 
were merchants, foremen, bankers, doctors, young assistants, etc. Some fac-
tory workers appeared here and there, rather as spectators than as interested 
parties.19
As a matter of fact, the commissioners who were chosen the following day to present 
to the authorities a project to reorganize of the National Guard were all eminent repre-
sentatives of the Lyon liberal bourgeoisie.20 It must be said that the reflex to form a Na-
tional Guard is primarily a bourgeois reflex. During the 1848 revolution, the Lyon fac-
tory workers did not wish for the creation of a National Guard, but formed autonomous 
groups and wore red armbands as a recognition and rallying sign.21 The Lyon bourgeoisie 
was then even more eager to reconstitute the National Guard that it was scared of being 
overrun by the popular arming. This is illustrated by the particularly enlightening testi-
mony of the former mayor of Croix-Rousse, a suburban town of Lyon that was attached 
17 Valin, Mémoires d’un citoyen, p. 77.
18 Crestin, Souvenirs d’un lyonnais, p. 70.
19 ‘Les hommes qui la composaient appartenaient sans exception à cette classe intermédiaire qui a con-
stamment protégé le peuple contre les attaques de l’aristocratie, et l’aristocratie contre les débordements 
de l’anarchie populaire. C’étaient des négociants, des chefs d’atelier, des banquiers, des médecins, de jeu-
nes commis, etc. Quelques ouvriers apparaissaient de loin en loin, plutôt comme spectateurs que comme 
parties intéressées.’ (Mormand, Une semaine de révolution, p. 6).
20 Doctor Trolliet, also a participant in the events and member of the provisory Commission in August 
1830, presents them as ‘the most regarded citizens’ (Trolliet, Lettres historiques, p. 10).
21 Benoît, Souvenirs de la République, p. 83.
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to the Lyon municipality in 1852. Interviewed at the end of the year 1848 by an inquiry 
commission of the Assemblée nationale, he said: 
On February 26 last at around six in the morning, I learned that Mr Lafo-
rest [temporary mayor] was overwhelmed, that his deputies had been forced 
to retreat. Mean-looking men were at the Hotel de Ville with arms and ap-
peared to want to form between themselves a city guard. I thought I needed 
to go to the city hall at once to offer my help to the Mayor and advise him to 
organize the National Guard immediately.22
In February 1848, some members of the committee in charge of reorganizing the Na-
tional Guard did propose to give arms only to licensed citizens23 (which was not accep-
ted), hence revealing the bourgeois prism of the reinstitution of the militia.
Nevertheless, even if the National Guard was reorganized by and for the bourgeoisie, at 
least in 1830 and 1848, it is interesting to see that it was a popular force also in the sense 
that it was comprised of members belonging to all the social classes, including the bour-
geoisie and the proletariat. Even though during the July Monarchy, the National Guard 
was theoretically a bourgeois troop where only the individuals paying a personal con-
tribution were allowed to wear the uniform,24 the sources from Lyon do list many traces 
of the presence of members of the proletariat in the ranks of the militia. On 2 Septem-
ber 1830, the mayor of Lyon wrote to the legion chiefs that he knew that ‘factory workers 
without residence, even domestic servants were counted during controls’25 of the Guard, 
which confirms the popular character of the militia. The opening of the guard to the pro-
letariat is indeed made possible by the relative juridical vacuum regarding the organiza-
tion of the militia that existed from the summer of 1830 to the spring of 1831.26 But even 
after the promulgation of the law of 22 March 1831 about the National Guard, sources 
mention the presence of working-class members, such as Pierre Creppon, a 30 year old 
silk worker living at 2 rue de l’Hôpital, who did not pay a contribution but still served in 
the spring of 1831 in the 1st company of infantrymen of the 2nd battalion of the 3rd le-
gion.27
22 ‘Le 26 février dernier sur les six heures du matin environ j’appris que Mr Laforest [le maire provisoire] 
était débordé, que ses adjoints avaient été forcés de se retirer. Des hommes de très mauvaise mine étaient 
à l’hôtel-de-ville avec des armes et paraissaient vouloir former entr’eux une garde urbaine. Je crus devoir 
me rendre immédiatement à la mairie pour offrir mon concours à M. le Maire et l’engager à organiser 
immédiatement la Garde nationale.’ (Archives nationales [thereafter AN], C 937, Survey in the départe-
ments, Rhône, 33, note given by Mr. Pailleron, former Croix-Rousse mayor).
23 Benoît, Souvenirs de la République, p. 22.
24 Ibid.
25 Archives municipales de Lyon (thereafter AML), 1219 WP 001, file ‘Organisation de la garde nationale’, 
Instructions et règlements, 1830-1833, Letter from the mayor of Lyon to the legion chiefs.
26 Larrère, L’urne et le fusil, pp. 58-59.
27 AML, 1220 WP 34, Control of the 1st company of the 2nd battalion of the 3rd legion. It is true that the 
law of 22 March 1831 took into consideration the factory workers who had been part of the Guard at the 
time of its reconstitution. Article 19 stipulated that ‘the national guards not required to give a personal 
contribution but who, having served after August 1st of last year, wish to continue their service’ would 
join the regular service.
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This popular character, already visible under the July Monarchy, was fully asserted in 
1848. By proclaiming, on 24 February 1848, that all citizens were now part of the Natio-
nal Guard,28 the provisional Government of the second Republic indeed removed wealth 
as a criteria needed to enter the ranks of the militia. As a matter of fact, the Lyon sour-
ces, in very lyrical passages, offer a testimony of this union of the population within the 
National Guard: 
Upon hearing the news of 24 February, the National Guard of Lyons for-
med spontaneously. Many cafés, being easily reachable meeting points, trans-
formed almost everywhere and at the same time in guardhouses; former su-
perior officers, former soldiers of all ranks and arms, rushed there along with 
magistrates, attorneys, civil servants and men of all social classes; the rich, 
the poor, the old, the young - it was a beautiful movement! The law enforce-
ment in our city was at stake, all of them had an interest in it, all understood 
this necessity. 29
The study of census registers of the National Guard of 1848 confirms the impression of 
a social blend, and really shows the popular character of the militia, as all the social clas-
ses are represented in it. A survey, carried out from the controls of the census of the Lyon 
militia constituted in the spring of 184830, allows us to observe that at that point, mem-
bers of the working class represent more than a third of all the members of the Natio-
nal Guard of Lyon, whereas they were excluded from it by law under the July Monarchy.
28 Le Moniteur universel, 25 February 1848.
29 ‘A l’annonce des événements du 24 février, la garde nationale de Lyon s’est spontanément formée. Des ca-
fés, comme points de réunion plus faciles à aborder, se sont, presque partout, et en même temps, trans-
formés en corps-de-garde ; d’anciens officiers supérieurs, d’anciens militaires de tous les grades, de tou-
tes armes, y accourent avec des magistrats, des avocats, des fonctionnaires publics, des hommes de toutes 
les classes de la société ; le riche, le pauvre, le vieux, le jeune, ce fut un beau mouvement ! il s’agissait du 
maintien de l’ordre dans notre ville, tous y avaient intérêt ; tous comprirent cette nécessité.’ (De la Garde 
nationale de Lyon. Question à l’ordre du jour (en faveur de la réorganisation de la Garde nationale). Sig-
né : Un officier. s. d. (octobre 1848) (Lyon : Nigon, 1848, p. 1. BML 351169).
30 The following chart is based on the analysis of the profession held by 3 028 guards (about 10% of the 
members), spread into 30 censs controls of the National Guard of Lyon, constituted during the spring 
of 1848 and kept at the Archives municipales de Lyon (cotes 1220 WP 086 à 1220 WP 115). The way the 
survey was built and the socio-professional nomenclature that allows to interpret its results is detailed in 
the Master’s thesis: Pareyre, La garde nationale. These results are being further analyzed in the PhD the-
sis : Mathias Pareyre, Prendre le fusil pour défendre ou renverser les autorités : le rôle de la Garde na-
tionale à Lyon et à Marseille dans les insurrections urbaines au XIXe siècle, supervised by Sylvie Aprile, 
Université de Lille.
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II. A law enforcement force during revolutions
The National Guard was thus a ‘popular’ force, both imposed by the population to the 
authorities and a place with a mixing and diversity of people, even if the word people 
(peuple) was each time be defined in different, sometimes even contradictory ways. The 
stakes linked to the reorganization of the guard are also numerous, but the citizen militia 
was considered above all as a law enforcement force, the most suitable one to maintain 
public security during the regime changes.
1. Reconstituting the National Guard to defend order and the revolution
The reconstitution of the National Guard, conceived as the embodiment of the armed 
population, answers during each revolutionary episode two main concerns: guarante-
eing the security of the goods and people threatened by the revolutionary troubles, and 
defending the revolutionary process. By definition, the National Guard is a revolutiona-
ry institution, since it is the incarnation of the people’s sovereignty against royal or impe-
rial despotism. Its reconstitution thus participates to the calling into question of the state 
monopoly on legitimate violence, and ‘materializes the right to resist oppression’.31 Du-
ring each revolutionary outburst, the militia was reorganized to defend the new regime 
(the Constitutional Monarchy in 1830, the Republic in 1848 and in 1870), and the Lyon 
national guards therefore became the ardent defenders of the revolutionary process.
If the revolutionary aspect can sometimes be primordial for the reconstitution of the 
National guard, it must nevertheless be noted that its reorganizations throughout the 
31 Larrère, L’urne et le fusil, p. 14.
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19th century come within the scope of the self-defense reflexes32 inherited from the mo-
dern period, and particularly from the bourgeois militias of the Ancien Regime. The Na-
tional Guard, in Lyon as in the other French cities, benefits from a very strong territorial 
integration, and, in the context of revolutionary troubles, the reconstitution of compa-
nies very often corresponds with the reactivation of neighborhood solidarities. It is well 
shown through the example of Bonhomme, a mechanic who lived in Ainay (a neigh-
borhood of the Lyon peninsula) and who, from 26  February 1848 on, took charge of 
the reorganization of the National Guard in his neighborhood. That same evening, he 
managed to gather 80 armed men who stood guard and patrolled the neighborhood to 
protect its goods and properties during eight days and six nights.33
As a matter of fact, a few months after the reorganization of the National Guard, the re-
volutionary dimension of the militia progressively disappears in favor of a mainly securi-
ty-based definition. For instance, in the order of the day of 23 August 1831, the comman-
der of the Lyon National Guard removed all revolutionary references in his definition of 
the role of National guards. To him, the “purpose of their service” is only to “maintain 
public order and tranquility ; to attend to the safety of people and properties, and final-
ly, to assist any public civil servant in charge of the execution of the laws”.34 Incidental-
ly, this definition of the missions of the citizen militia offers a good insight into what law 
enforcement meant for the commander of the Lyon National Guard in 1831.
This ambivalence, sometimes contradictory, between revolutionary agent and law 
enforcement force, is very perceivable at the time of the different attempts that were 
made to establish the Commune in Lyon during the spring of 1871. Indeed, because of 
its very strong social and political heterogeneity, the Guard was perceived in turns as the 
armed wing of the Commune and as one of the principal forces able to fight the commu-
nalist insurrection. Thereby, during the communalist insurrection of la Guillotière (one 
of the arrondissements of the left bank of the Rhône, and mostly working-class) on 31 
April 1871, Bouret, captain of one of the Guillotière battalions, took care of naming him-
self commandant of the National Guard after having proclaimed the Commune from the 
balcony of the Guillotière city hall.35 He hoped to be able to rely on the Guillotière battali-
ons to overthrow the Lyon authorities under the orders of Versailles. Yet a few weeks ear-
lier, the opponents of the Commune had also tried to mobilize the National Guard. Af-
ter the communalist attempt to take Lyon’s Hôtel de Ville on 22 March, the front page of 
a conservative Lyons newspaper, Le Guignol illustré, depicted Guignol, the emblematic 
Lyon marionnette, dressed as a National guard. He was calling for the Lyon population to 
join the ranks of the citizen militia to oppose a new communalist attempt, with much re-
course to local slang: ‘C’est pas que ça risque rien, les gones : mais n’empêche, on ne sait 
32 Ibid. p. 41.
33 La Sentinelle, n° 4, 4 April 1848.
34 AML, 1219 WP 017, Order of the day, 23 August 1831.
35 Crestin, Souvenirs d’un lyonnais, p. 283.
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pas ce qui peut arriver, mettons sur pied note garde nationale. Maintenant qu’y z’y revi-
ennent prendre la Maison de ville !!’36
2. The National guard, a force at the core of a military conception of law enforce-
ment
During the 1830, 1848 and 1870 revolutionary episodes, according to the contempora-
ries, it is the National guard who must be in charge of enforcing public order in French 
cities. One can read in the columns of the Censeur, the reference newspaper of Lyons in 
1848, that ‘in republics, permanent armies have no other purposes than to defend bor-
ders or wage war abroad. Law enforcement within the country is entrusted to citizen 
militias’.37 If the National Guard is considered the most suitable law enforcement instru-
ment, it is above all for practical and symbolic reasons. The citizen militia is, with the 
army, the only force numerically important enough on which the authorities can rely. 
Already, in 1828, the Rhône prefect, the Count of Brosses, demanded that the Minister 
of the Interior organize a paid municipal police force, so as to assist the garrison, which 
was insufficient in numbers and made of non-specialized soldiers, to maintain order in 
the city.38 The National Guard is also the only force that the Lyon authorities can rely on 
in September 1830, the quasi-totality of the troop having been sent to suppress the trou-
bles in Nîmes at the end of August.39 The same happens in the fall of 1870, in the middle 
of the Franco-Prussian war, when the citizen militia carries out alone the postal service 
in the streets of Lyon, the garrison – strongly diminished by the troops having left for the 
war – being confined in the forts around the city. During revolutionary periods, the Na-
tional Guard also seems to be the only legitimate law enforcement force to patrol the city, 
as the line troops had been suspected, during the fall of previous regimes, to be a poten-
tially counter-revolutionary force. As a consequence, the authorities object to using the 
army garrisoned in Lyon to police the streets, and if it needs to be used it is specified that 
it should intervene ‘only together with the National guard’.40
Line infantry and National Guard are in fact quite close in their organization and in 
the missions they carry out, which suggests that the citizen militia is first and foremost 
in line with a military conception of law enforcement. Throughout the studied period, 
the army remains the model of reference that must guide the functioning of the Guard. 
In November 1830, the mayor of Lyon thus evokes particularly explicitly ‘the necessi-
ty of a prompt organization of the service of the national guard insofar as it is desti-
ned to replace the line troop in the guarding of the city and the maintaining of public 
36 Guignol illustré, n° 36, 15 avril 1871.
37 Le Censeur, n° 413526, March 1848.
38 Archives nationales (Paris, France) (thereafter AN), F/9/644-645/b, dossier 1: Seconde Restauration, Let-
ter from the War secretary to the minister of the Interior, 2 June 1828.
39 AN, F/9/399, folder ‘Circulaire ministérielle du 2 septembre 1830’, Report by the Rhône prefect to the 
minister of the Interior, 13 September 1830.
40 AML, 3 WP125, file ‘Troubles de novembre 1831’, Letter of general Roguet, general lieutenant of the 
Lyon garrison, to the mayor of Lyon on 4 November 1830.
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order and safety’.41 This statement is used again almost word for word 40 years later by 
the chief of a National Guard battalion: ‘It is not possible to ask the national guards the 
same service that we used to ask from our troops, and yet the national guard can provi-
de as many faithful results as the army. I am talking of course about the internal service 
within cities.’42 Even though it had not been theorized,43 the National Guard adopts the 
same techniques as the ones used by the line army throughout the 19th century to ensu-
re public tranquility. Empiricism and imitation thus prevail for the militia’s service. It is 
divided between the postal service and the organization of patrols. This functioning has 
the purpose of occupying the urban space and being seen by as great a number of fel-
low citizens as possible, in order to dissuade potential troublemakers by a daily presence 
in the streets. The guard posts are therefore often situated at the foot of or near surroun-
dings of important buildings, such as the Hôtel de Ville, the arsenal, the prisons, thea-
tres, arrondissement city halls, or the Banque de France branch. This location also allows 
the guards to be swiftly present where order is compromised by the beginning of some 
brawl or larceny.
41 AML, 1219 WP 017, Decree of the mayor of Lyon, on 4 November 1830, inserted in the order of the day 
of the Lyon National Guard, on 10 November 1830.
42 ‘Il n’est pas possible de demander aux gardes nationaux le même service que l’on demandait à nos trou-
pes et cependant la garde nationale peut donner tout autant de résultats fidèles que l’armée. Je parle bien 
entendu du service intérieur des villes.’ (AML, 1219 WP 010, file 12th Battalion correspondence, 1870-
1871, Letter of 16 May 1871, to Bourras, commander of the Lyon National Guard).
43 No theory of law enforcement is developed during the first three quarters of the 19th century, except for 
the one proposed by Maréchal Bugeaud, La guerre des rues.
119
Mathias Pareyre
Map 1: Locations of the posts of the National Guard in 183044
For each reorganization, the number of guard posts increases, in correlation to the de-
mographic and urban growth of the city (the suburban towns of Vaise, Guillotière and 
Croix-Rousse are attached to the Lyon municipality in 1852). When there are only 22 
posts occupied by the National Guard in 1830 (cf. map above), there is (though it may be 
an exaggeration) ‘one in each street’ at the beginning of March 1848,45 then 104 in Sep-
tember 1870.46 After a while, the number of posts occupied by the militia decreases sy-
stematically, because of the diminution of the role and influence of the National Guard 
in the months following the reorganizations. As such, there are only 20 posts occupied 
by the militia in June 1871, the others having been either removed or re-occupied by the 
garrison only.47
The organization of day and night patrols at regular intervals complete the measures 
taken to insure the safety of the streets of Lyon. Moreover, the instructions given then to 
44 Amos Frappa gives the location of posts in his article: Amos Frappa, ‘La surveillance nocturne à Lyon 
durant le premier XIXe siècle’, to be published soon.
45 Le Censeur, n° 412011, March 1848. Bergier, Le journal d’un bourgeois, p. 34.
46 AML, 1223 WP 06, Tableau des postes occupés par la Garde nationale de Lyon.
47 Ibid.
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the national guards confirm the influence of the military model on the functioning of the 
militia, as shown by this order dated June 1848: ‘The patrols shall not go further than the 
limit of the indicated itinerary. They shall always walk in good order, observe perfect si-
lence, carefully ensure public tranquility and make themselves known to every post be-
longing to their assigned circumscriptions’.48
The national guards have also sometimes been needed to undertake an extraordina-
ry service in order to re-establish order in exceptional situations, when it was threatened 
by the beginning of riots or even insurrections. In such occasions, the drums of the mi-
litia beat the call to arms in all of the city’s neighborhoods, and the national guards had to 
gather in arms and uniform on their respective parade grounds. They were then tasked 
with re-establishing order along with the garrison troops, and with fighting against the 
rioters if that proved necessary. This is what happened during the Canut riot on 22 and 
23 November 1831, during which 11 national guards still loyal to the authorities were 
killed, and at least 16 injured.
III. A popular, but brief and temporary experiment
If the National Guard did indeed participate in law enforcement, sometimes being the 
main police force on which the authorities chose to rely, its existence was however tem-
porary and relatively short every time.
1. From the initial popular enthusiasm to an ever less assiduous participation
The successive reorganizations of the National guard initially triggered a real enthusiasm 
and a deep passion in the population, be it in 1830, in 1848 or in 1870. During each re-
organization, the headcounts of the National Guard, which were non-existent before the 
revolutions49, reached several thousands in a few days. A few weeks after the reconstitu-
tion of the militia, the inspections organized on 29 August 1830 and on 12 March 1848, 
gathered around 20,000 and 25,000 guards respectively, a third of which were not armed 
yet.50 Each time, the Lyon citizens massively joined the ranks of the militia, because in the 
19th century this popular participation to law enforcement assumes a double dimension 
48 ‘Les patrouilles ne devront point s’écarter de la limite de l’itinéraire indiqué. Elles devront toujours mar-
cher en bon ordre, observer un parfait silence, veiller avec soin à la tranquillité publique et se faire re-
connaître par tous les postes compris dans les circonscriptions qui leurs sont assignées’ (AML, 1219 WP 
018, Order of the day, 20 June 1848).
49 The National Guard is put in abeyance in Lyon during the 1820s and just before the Three Glorious Days, 
it has not been summoned for several years. In 1828, the prefect of the Rhône writes: ‘As for the Natio-
nal Guard of Lyon, it is well known that it has been entirely dissolved, in fact if not by law.’ (AN, F/9/644-
645/b, dossier 1: Seconde Restauration, Letter from the War secretary to the minister of the Interior, 2 
June 1828). Dissolved in December 1831 after the insurrection of November 1831, the militia is reorga-
nized a year later, but it only real exists on paper and is almost never called during the July Monarchy. 
The authorities refuse to re-arm the militia, and the national guards content themselves with parading in 
uniform during official celebrations. Finally, the Lyon National Guard is dissolved again in July 1848 be-
cause of the troubles that happened in the spring.
50 Le Précurseur, n°1137, 30 August 1830. Le Censeur, n°4124, 15 March 1848
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: on the one hand, it is about, as we have already shown, showing one’s adhesion to the 
new regime ; but also, and maybe more importantly for the contemporaries, about expe-
riencing citizenship, which is in this case an armed citizenship. Throughout the French 
revolution and the 19th century, the right to bear arms was a criteria of emancipati-
on and citizenship that was as important as – if not more important than – the right to 
vote. Dominique Godineau notably highlighted the fact that during the Revolution, wo-
men have demanded the right to bear arms and organize themselves in a national guard 
as much as, or even more than, the right to vote.51 It is thus not surprising that the com-
mander of the Croix-Rousse (one of the suburban communes of Lyons) National guard 
declared in April 1848 that the citizen militia ‘is, like the elementary school, the special 
school of civilian life’.52 Besides, the National guard remains an essential place to get po-
liticized and learn democracy, as Mathilde Larrère showed for the Parisian guard under 
the July Monarchy.53 Before 1848, many national guards, being unable to pay a suffici-
ent cens amount, did not have the right to vote at a national level, but were neverthe-
less able to vote within their companies to elect their officers. Likewise, just after the pro-
clamation of the Second Republic, the majority of Lyon’s national guards voted for the 
first time in their lives, not for the April 1848 legislative elections but for the elections of 
the officers and sub-officers of their companies that were organized the previous month. 
To some, the National Guard would therefore be ‘the basis for republican institutions’,54 
which explains the enthusiasm surrounding the militia, particularly in 1848 and in Sep-
tember 1870.
However, after a few months or sometimes even a few weeks, once the revolutionary 
fever has subsided, the participation of national guards to law enforcement becomes less 
and less assiduous, when it does not become downright non-existent. The sources from 
1830-1831, 1848 and 1870-71 insist abundantly on the lack of discipline and absente-
eism of national guards. During the spring of 1848, between 21 March and 26 April 696 
guards appear before disciplinary hearings for having missed their shifts.55 In July 1871, 
less than a year after the reconstitution of the militia, a captain of the 6th battalion gives 
the following bitter observation, which could be applied to the whole period: ‘For a long 
time, I have been, like many others, saddened to see the national guard left to its own de-
vices, meaning that everyone does as he pleases without anyone, or at least very with very 
few, trying to establish the discipline that was the sole basis of its strength’.56
The absence of the guards is all the more glaring when public order is directly threate-
ned by new riots or insurrectional troubles. As such, out of six thousand national guards, 
only a few hundreds answered the calls of 21 and 22 November 1831, and fought the in-
51 Godineau, ‘De la guerrière à la citoyenne’.
52 Le Censeur, n° 4158, Address from Lortet to the Croix-Rousse National Guard, 18 April 1848.
53 Larrère, L’urne et le fusil.
54 Le Censeur, n° 4158, Address from Lortet to the Croix-Rousse National Guard, 18 April 1848.
55 AML, 1222 WP 05, file ‘Conseil de discipline’, 1848.
56 AML, 1219 WP 010, file ‘Correspondance 6e bataillon 1870-1871’, Letter to General Bourras, comman-
der of the National Guard, 24 July 1871.
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surrection that was subsequently called the Canuts revolt. The very weak mobilization of 
National guards, part of whom had joined the side of the rioters, triggered twenty years 
later the following statement by Jean-Baptisme Monfalcon, a contemporary and author 
of a History of insurrections in Lyons, in 1831 and 1834:57 ‘[The National Guard] would 
have certainly succeeded in warding off the storm ; unfortunately, this was not about pa-
rading at a review but shooting and being shot at. Very few citizens answered the pres-
sing call of the drums. Many distraught merchants and landlords fled to the countryside; 
terror and panic were spreading to almost everyone.’58 This quote highlights the proble-
matic character of the National Guard, and more broadly of popular participation to law 
enforcement. The citizen militia is a popular, non-professional force, it is poorly trained, 
undisciplined, and often armed with old, damaged rifles. It is admittedly able to replace 
the garrison to patrol at night in the streets of Lyon, but it appears completely incapable 
of repressing troubles of a bigger scope.
2. From law enforcement force to instrument of disorder: an inefficient and dange-
rous troop
For these reasons, it seems that for the authorities, the National Guard represents a po-
tential force of disorder rather than a law enforcement force on which they can assu-
redly count. The citizen militia is useful to patrol the streets and scatter a few groups of 
gawkers during the day, but it is unable to be an efficient police force when serious trou-
bles threaten the public order. So in the spring of 1848, the Lyon National Guard proved 
unable to protect the interim Public prosecutor when he was physically threatened by the 
crowd. On 18 May, the prosecutor was sequestered by a group of workers and forcibly led 
to Croix-Rousse, where he was imprisoned for a night in a locale. On the way, while cros-
sing the Pierre bridge, the prosecutor and the group of workers did cross paths with a 
unit comprised of between one hundred and one hundred and fifty national guards who 
refused to intervene, considering that they did not have the order to do so.59 A year af-
ter this, the statement made by Constant Galerne, the commissioner general of Lyon, in 
a report addressed to the president of the Republic Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte about the 
events of 1848 in Lyons, was final:
As a consequence, the National guard of Lyons, specifically that on which 
the country needed to count the most, has compromised its responsibility and 
has rendered itself liable of a just mistrust and severe measures that necessi-
tate the law enforcement it was unable to uphold. In any case, the national 
guard of Lyons has really only served to be more detrimental than useful to 
57 Monfalcon, Histoire des insurrections de Lyon.
58 ‘[la garde nationale] aurait réussi bien certainement à conjurer la tempête ; malheureusement il s’agissait 
non de parader à une revue mais de tirer et de recevoir des coups de fusils. Très peu de citoyens répondi-
rent au pressant appel des tambours. Beaucoup de négociants et de propriétaires éperdus s’enfuirent dans 
les campagnes, il y avait une terreur panique, presque générale’ (Monfalcon, Souvenirs d’un bibliothé-
caire, pp. 112-113).
59 Le Censeur, n° 4191, 23 May 1848.
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the moral order, and shall never be able to really help a Republic ridden of 
the old rags of its predecessor! 60
Not only was the National Guard passive, it was also sometimes even responsible itself 
for disorder and for starting insurrectional troubles. Indeed, on 21, 22 and 23 November 
1831, during the troubles that later came to be known as the revolt of the Canuts, the ci-
tizen militia did provide the insurgents with many weapons, and even with a good part 
of its revolutionary personnel. According to Bouvier du Molart, the prefect of the Rhô-
ne at the time of the troubles, the National Guard was only able to gather six hundred 
men, and the battalions from the neighborhoods of Saint-Georges and Saint-Jean, loca-
ted on the right bank of the Seine and comprised mostly of factory workers and little ar-
tisans, joined the ranks of the insurgents, along with the battalions of the Guillotière and 
of Croix-Rousse.61 One of the leaders of the insurrection was in fact a named Buisson, 
captain of the National guard of Caluire, a town neighboring Croix-Rousse.
Accused – often with reason – of sedition, the National guard was systematically dis-
solved in Lyon after a few months or years of existence. It was the case in December 1831, 
because of the role it had played during the November insurrection ; and again after its 
1832 reconstitution, when it was dissolved in the spring of 1834 after the second Canuts 
riot (9-15 April 1834). Reorganized again in February 1848, the Lyon militia was dissol-
ved in 1848, and finally the Guillotière battalions were dissolved in May 1871, just after 
the insurrection of 30 April.
As a matter of fact, the authorities were well aware of the danger that the militia could 
represent, and they did everything in their power in order not to use the national guard 
once the revolutionary fever had subsided. In December 1832, at a time when the militia, 
which had been dissolved in November 1831, theoretically was supposed to be reconsti-
tuted after a year, the Minister of the Interior shared his doubts about the usefulness of its 
reorganization with the prefect of the Rhône. He considered that the authorities of Lyon 
‘had no need, during the Christmas period, of this unit of public force and surveillance 
whose deployment had seemed indispensable the previous year’. 62 Above all, he acknow-
ledged in the rest of his letter that the reorganized militia would be ‘an embarrassment 
much more than a resource’.63 A few months later, while the prefect had been forced to 
pronounce the reconstitution of the militia, the Minister ordered him, in a confidential 
60 ‘En conséquence, la garde nationale de Lyon particulièrement celle sur laquelle la patrie avait le plus à 
compter, a compromis sa responsabilité et s’est rendue passible d’une juste défiance et des mesures sé-
vères qui nécessitent le maintien de l’ordre qu’elle ne sut pas faire respecter […]. En tout état de cause, la 
garde nationale de Lyon n’a servi en réalité reconnue, qu’à être plus nuisible qu’utile sans l’ordre moral, 
et ne saurait jamais rendre de véritables services à une République dégagée des vieux lambeaux de sa de-
vancière!’ (AML, 124II001, folder 3, Report over the events of 1848 by the central commissioner of Lyon, 
pp. 190-191).
61 Bouvier du Molart, Relation de M. Bouvier du Molart, pp. 34-35.
62 AML, 4 II 3, Correspondance d’Adrien de Gasparin, préfet du Rhône, avec le ministre de l’Intérieur de 
juin 1832 à décembre 1832, Letter of the minister of the Interior to the prefect of the Rhone, 31 Decem-
ber 1832.
63 Ibid.
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note, not to arm the guard, estimating that ‘the administration will always, in such a po-
sitive legal disposition, the necessary strength to deny any demand of arming, whatever 
the form they might take’.64 The authorities’ apprehension was similar during the summer 
of 1849, but that time it was the prefect of the Rhône who advised the Minister of the In-
terior against reorganizing the militia a year after its dissolution. The civil servant was 
quite straightforward when he wrote that ‘instead of recalling in any way the existence of 
the Lyon National Guard, it is on the contrary necessary to distance ourselves from the 
idea as much and for as long as possible’.65
IV. Conclusion
To conclude, the National Guard did constitute a rather original popular law enforce-
ment force. During each revolutionary episode, the liberal bourgeoisie reconstituted it 
spontaneously in order to back the new regime and to protect itself from popular vio-
lence. Faced with the fact, the authorities of Lyon had no other choice but to proclaim the 
official reorganization of the militia, a few days after its spontaneous formation. Howe-
ver, during the first days of the revolutions, the National guard proved particularly use-
ful to make up for the absence and lack of organization of the traditional police forces, 
and to maintain order in the streets of Lyon. To some extent, the reorganization of the ci-
tizen militia also provided a frame for the arming of the people triggered by the revolu-
tionary process. Therefore, the authorities preferred this arming to take place within the 
context of the National guard, which was, in theory, a more easily controllable instituti-
on than the other armed groups on which the authorities had no power (such as the Vor-
aces in Lyon in 1848), and also a force comprised in part of bourgeois members attached 
to order.
A troop whose organization was deeply influenced by the military model, the militia 
was nevertheless never a fully efficient law enforcement force, and was, on the contrary, 
the instrument of important disorder. A composite force, often poorly led and insuffici-
ently armed, assembling individuals of widely different social backgrounds and political 
opinions, this popular force quickly became a source of embarrassment for the authori-
ties of Lyon, who did their best to hurry its dissolution once the revolutionary fever had 
subsided.
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Armed citizens and defence of public 
order: the National Guard of Rennes during 
the July Monarchy in France
Axel Dröber
During the outbreak of the French Revolution in 1789, France was swept by a popular 
movement that saw citizens of almost every town or village take up arms and gathered 
to protect the public order, threatened by massive uprisings, revolts and violence.1 In Pa-
ris, the local administration rapidly recognised the newly created units, which became 
known as the National Guard, and appointed the famous General Lafayette comman-
der-in-chief. For both the local administration as well as the revolutionary government, 
the armed citizens were an essential force for public order, since the army remained un-
der the direct command of the King. In 1791, the National Assembly voted to inclu-
de the National Guard in the constitution and adopted a law on its organisation.2 The 
parliament’s deputies maintained certain rules and customs, which had become an im-
portant part of the National Guard since 1789. These included the election of the officers 
by the soldiers and universal service: every man in the town or village was called to serve.
The new law applied only to residents paying direct taxes. The legislation of the first 
constitutional monarchy therefore restricted access to the armed forces significantly, ex-
cluding an important part of the local bourgeoisie and entrusting only those persons 
who, in the eyes of the parliament, had a special interest in the protection of order and 
private property.3 Nevertheless, the creation of the National Guard in Europe was revo-
lutionary for its time. The state called upon its citizens to guarantee the public monopo-
ly on the legitimate use of force.4 For this reason, the French National Guard presents an 
original and also contradictory case of popular policing. The principle of the citizen’s ser-
vice remained in place even during the Restoration and the return of the Bourbons in 
1814. King Louis XVIII reorganised the National Guard, since he did not trust the army. 
He needed an armed force to protect his own regime and to assure the continuity of his 
reign.5 He followed up on the security politics of the Revolution and called only direct 
tax payers to maintain public order.
1 Dupuy, La Garde nationale, p. 41.
2 Ibid., p. 142.
3 Carrot, La Garde Nationale, p. 119.
4 Larrère, L’urne et le fusil, p. 5.
5 Girard, La garde nationale, p. 21.
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The following study focuses on this period of post-revolutionary monarchy.6 It analyses 
the history of the National Guard of Rennes following the Restoration era as well as du-
ring the July Monarchy.7 It reconsiders the role of the armed bourgeoisie within the revo-
lution of 1830, the so-called Trois Glorieuses, and the first years of King Louis-Philippe’s 
reign. On the one hand, the Orleanist regime pushed the idea of popular participation in 
public order service and used the National Guard as its primary security force, seeking to 
demonstrate its commitment to the French Revolution. In 1831, the government passed a 
new law on the organisation of the National Guard, the first one since 1791. On the other 
hand, Rennes looked back on an eventful history since January 1789 when the first con-
flicts between royalists and Jacobins broke out in the city.8 The need for a public force was 
most urgently felt by the local population. The first guard included every male resident, 
before the application of the law of 1791 resulted in a significant restriction of its troops. 
Only the citoyens actifs continued to serve public order, excluding all male residents who 
did not pay direct taxes. During the Trois Glorieuses of 1830, the inhabitants proved their 
commitment to the new regime and went deliberately against the old administration. 
Contemporaries observed how the armed citizens sought to restore customs and traditi-
ons dating from the French Revolution. They took control of the public space by arguing 
that the Guard, since 1789, was in charge of public order.
The term ‘popular’ is used analytically in order to describe the influence and relevan-
ce of the revolutionary tradition as well as the identity of the armed bourgeoisie. It ser-
ves to examine the rapid resurrection of Rennes’ National Guard during the outbreak of 
the Trois Glorieuses and its service during the first months. In the first instance, popular 
characterises views and visions of how the guardsmen understood their roles as a part of 
their community and how they defined the armed bourgeoisie as an organisation called 
to protect public security and private property. At the same time, public declarations 
made by the King directly after his accession to the throne can also be defined as popu-
lar: Louis-Philippe underlined the loyalty of the guardsmen and described their service 
as a sign of the wide support his reign enjoyed amongst the French population. Finally, 
the government and the local administration reflected of how the participation of the lo-
cal population could improve the armed forces– as long as those citizens were part of the 
bourgeoisie and enjoyed a solid reputation in the town. Here, of course, ‘popular’ meant 
quite the opposite of its original meaning, leading the political actors to limit the access 
to the ranks of the National Guard.
The study comprises three points. The first examines the reorganisation of the local 
bourgeoisie, questions the legitimacy that the armed citizens thought to hold and retra-
ces the first months of military service in Rennes. The second section considers at the na-
tional level the institutionalisation of the National Guard by the government under Pri-
me Minister Jacques Laffitte and later Casimir Perier as well as the instrumentalization of 
6 The term is borrowed from Goujon, Monarchies postrévolutionnaires, see in particular p 13.
7 For an outlook on the National Guard during the Restoration, see: Dröber, ‘Verweigerung und Autono-
mie’.
8 Dupuy, La Garde Nationale et les débuts de la révolution, p. 50.
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the armed bourgeoisie within royalist propaganda. The third and last point is about how 
the 1831-law was adopted at the local level. This part looks at guardsmen seeking to in-
fluence the organisation of the armed forces, to change certain terms of national legisla-
tion as well as to re-establish essential provisions of the French Revolution and the law 
of 1791.
I. The legitimacy of taking up arms: the reorganisati-
on of the Rennes National Guard at the beginning of 
the July Monarchy
When in July 1830, a massive uprising took place in Paris against the policies of the re-
gime of Charles X and the first riots broke out,9 the inhabitants of Rennes were worried 
about public order and took the initiative to reform the National Guard. A report by the 
Provisional Commander of the National Guard refers to a delegation of bourgeois infan-
try who went to the Prefect’s house to ask for the reorganization of the National Guard.10 
The magistrate refused the request and ordered them to return home. However, the de-
legation did not accept this setback: on the same day, armed citizens in uniform met at 
the Champ de Mars to find their former units and proceed with the election of their of-
ficers. In the following days, the newly formed troops improvised a parade on the square 
in front of the prefecture and the courthouse, after having prepared the ground: on the 
pediment of the two buildings, the national guards removed the white flag, symbol of the 
reign of Charles X, and replaced it with the tricolour flag, a direct reference to the revo-
lutionary origins of their institution. At the end of the parade, they went to the military 
garrison and forced the commander to deliver 400 guns, showing their determination to 
ensure public order themselves.
The reorganisation of Rennes’ National Guard was therefore carried out spontaneous-
ly, a phenomenon that can also be observed in other cities in the country, such as Lyon.11 
However, the case of Paris is different since only a few inhabitants took up arms during 
the Trois Glorieuses and the first companies came together only when the provisional 
government officially convened them.12 In the Rennes’ Commander’s report, the bour-
geois appear to be the actors of the revolution and regime change since they took up 
arms autonomously and found their former troops who had not gathered since the mid-
1820s. They took control of the city’s public space, organized a military parade and im-
posed the insignia of the new power. In addition, the national guards requisitioned wea-
pons at the garrison depot and obtained supplies at the expense of the regular army, the 
purpose of this operation being to impose the citizens as the only armed force and to 
prevent the army from mobilizing. The latter, often deployed by Charles X’s power for the 
9 Pinkney, The French Revolution, p. 109.
10 Archives départementales (thereafter AD) Illes-et-Vilaine, 4 R 88, report of the provisional commander 
of the National Guard, Laguistière, addressed to the inspector of Ille-et-Vilaine, 15 September 1830.
11 Trolliet, Lettres historiques, p. 25.
12 Larrère, L’urne et de la fusil, p. 40.
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repression of demonstrations, had acquired a reputation for brutality and complete sub-
mission to the monarchical regime.13
The Commander‘s report is of course to be placed in the historical context. Rende-
red in September 1830, when Louis-Philippe came to power, the reading of the events in 
Rennes is in line with the official version of the revolution. The King had indeed affirmed 
the previous month that the armed bourgeoisie had played a decisive role during the 
Trois Glorieuses and ensured the victory of the insurgents.14 At the same time, the mee-
ting of the National Guard on the Champ de Mars in Rennes is well confirmed by other 
administrative sources and by the local press,15 but these sources do not establish the 
identity of the members of the delegation who came to address the prefect. Perhaps they 
were former officers who had ceased their activity during the reign of Charles X. Their 
initiative shows that with the fall of the king in 1830, the reorganisation of the National 
Guard became a matter of course for its members.
From an analytical point of view, the question arises as to what legitimacy the 
bourgeoisie thought it had in order to take up arms, despite the prefect’s refusal. The 
Commander’s report is enlightening on this point, emphasizing the replacement of the 
flag. The tricolour was abolished at the time of the Restoration in 1814 and replaced by 
the royalist white flag.16 By floating it above their parade, the bourgeois of Rennes did not 
only support the change of regime, since the new one had just restored the tricolour flag, 
but they recalled the tradition of the National Guard, created in 1789 to maintain order 
in the commune. During the French Revolution, the Parisian Military Committee, un-
der the command of Lafayette, ordered the guardsmen to wear the tricoloured cocka-
de as the symbol of the revolutionary nation.17 Only armed citizens enlisted in one of the 
local companies were permitted to adopt the new emblem, thereby being identified as 
agents of the city’s police forces. Unlike the uniform, which was not compulsory in the 
19th century, the guardsmen were obliged to wear the tricolour. Failure to do so carried 
a heavy punishment.
The tricolour was hence the symbol of membership to the National Guard. It permit-
ted members to carry weapons and obliged them to maintain public order. It was an es-
sential feature of the identity of the armed citizen and the role that he played within his 
home town or village. During the Revolution, guardsmen throughout France followed 
the example of the capital, adding the new cockade to their dress and taking up arms to 
defend the revolution’s achievements.18 This was also the case in Rennes where members 
of the ‘milice nationale’ wore the tricoloured cockade even before news of the formati-
on of the Parisian National Guard under Lafayette reached the town.19 At the time of the 
13 Carrot, Le maintien de l’ordre, vol. 1, p. 397.
14 Journal des Débats, 23. December 1830.
15 L’Auxiliaire Breton, 1 August 1830.
16 Scholz, Die imaginierte Restauration, p. 60. Girard, La garde nationale, p. 23.
17 Liris, ‘Iconographie et épigraphie’, p. 283.
18 Dupuy, La Garde nationale, p. 66.
19 Ibid., p. 76.
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fall of Charles X in 1830, the resurrection of the tricolour embodied the citizens of Ren-
nes expectations of regime change: they sought to re-establish the National Guard and to 
preserve their right to participate in public policing in service of the city.
In this context, the inhabitants of Rennes also re-appropriated revolutionary feasts and 
rites. A police report of July 1831, a year after the Trois Glorieuses, notes that a group of 
‘jeunes gens’ of the National Guard planted a tree of liberty in the city’s main square to 
celebrate the anniversary of the capture of the Bastille in 1789.20 To the sound of a mar-
ching band, they praised the King, General Lafayette and proclaimed their liberty. The 
term ‘young people’ designated a certain social group among the wealthy bourgeoisie in 
Rennes that had played an important role in public life since the French Revolution. In 
1789, young men, including students of the local law faculty, had created armed units to 
combat the aristocracy and representatives of the Old Regime.21
The police officer reporting the demonstration in the square of arms used the same 
term to identify the group of persons celebrating the 14th July. In his eyes, the demon-
stration was a sign of the lack of discipline of the armed citizens of the National Guard, 
who had gathered in uniform but whose feast had by no means been ordered by the au-
thorities. The fact that the police were concerned about public security in light of the Na-
tional Guard’s poor discipline must also be seen in connection with the unrest that still 
shook the country one year after the July Revolution. In Rennes, too, there were repeated 
riots among workers and craftsmen, protesting their poor living conditions and growing 
poverty.22 The republican opposition encouraged protest against the government of the 
conservative Casimir Perier, calling for political and social reforms.23
It is questionable, however, whether the term ‘young people’ was not simply a foreign 
description, or whether the national guards in question actually sought to continue the 
revolution. There is no doubt that the young guardsmen remembered the Federation 
Day of 14  July 1790, when 15,000 national guards from the whole of France gathered 
in Paris, drawing some 300,000 spectators.24 The armed citizens swore allegiance to the 
King and the constitution, and pledged obedience to the laws of their country. The inten-
tion of General Lafayette, who initiated the Parisian gathering, was to celebrate the unity 
of the nation and to demonstrate the strength and the discipline of the French National 
Guard.25 It was therefore a ceremony to legitimize the monarchy and the new state, not a 
demonstration against the King or a call for political reform.
As a matter of fact, the Federation Day rapidly became part of the myth of the armed 
bourgeoisie, symbolising the emancipation of the third estate, the foundation of the Na-
tional Guard as a driving force of the Revolution and the achievement of political liber-
20 AD Ille-et-Vilaine, 4 M 33, report of the Central Commissioner, 14-15 July 1831.
21 Dupuy, La Garde Nationale et les débuts de la révolution, p. 64.
22 AD Ille-et-Vilaine, 1 M 23, letter from Mayor Lorgeril to Prefect Leroy, 12 December 1831.
23 Le National, 18 June 1831. La Tribune, 6 May/12 May 1831.
24 Carrot, La Garde Nationale, p. 86.
25 Ibid.
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ty.26 The example from Rennes in 1831 shows the transmission of the legacy of the French 
Revolution to the next generation. These ‘young people’ did not experience the fall of 
the Old Regime forty years before and only took up arms in 1830. At the time of the 
July Monarchy, they turned out to be devoted supporters of Louis-Philippe, a veteran of 
the Great Revolution and of the battle of Valmy in 1792. This demonstrated publicly his 
commitment to the legacy of 1789.27 The national guards in Rennes fiercely protected the 
new regime against its reactionary enemies, who were most often loyal to the old King. 
Their main target was the local clergy. The Bishop of Rennes was a regular guest at the Je-
suit seminary in Vitré, a town near Rennes, where he made harsh critics against the July 
Monarchy and the constitutional regime.28 Some armed citizens, having heard of these 
speeches, tried to disrupt the religious ceremonies organized by the bishop in Rennes.
For the Corpus Christi procession of June 1831, gendarmerie officers supervised the 
ceremony so that the faithful could march through the streets of Rennes.29 Their report 
records the presence of young people, recognizable as members of the National Guard 
from their uniforms, in a café on the route of the procession. As the procession passed 
the café, the group noisily began the Marseillaise, seeking to drown out the religious 
songs. The gendarmerie did not intervene, noting that the Marseillaise was no longer de-
fended, as it had been the case during the reign of Charles X, and that the young peop-
le were cheering for the King at the same time. This incident was not escalated and the 
members of the National Guard in the café were not arrested. The following year, the 
entire National Guard refused to participate in the Corpus Christi, following the young 
bourgeoisie in their aversion to the clergy.30 They consented to contribute to the mainte-
nance of public order but declined to take part in the religious ceremony itself as it had 
been previously the custom of the local bourgeoisie.
By demonstrating a virulent anticlericalism, the armed citizens showed that, from 
their point of view, the service of the local population was linked to a mission that went 
beyond the maintenance of public order. At the time of the young men’s protest, the-
re was still a threat emanating from the members of the elder branch of the Bourbons, 
who had been overthrown in 1830, and their supporters. In May 1832, the region of up-
per Brittany around the city of Nantes was the theatre of a royalist upheaval, conducted 
by the duchesse de Berry, who had entered France some months earlier in order to over-
throw Louis-Philippe.31 The Chouan troops then fought in some minor battles against 
the regular army and quickly lost ground. The great revolt that the Duchesse and her 
brother in arms had hoped for did not take place. Nevertheless, the event galvanised the 
national guards’ determination to counter the influence of the clergy. In this case, popu-
26 Many of the Parisian companies during the Revolution adopted the Phrygian bonnet as new symbol, re-
presenting the liberty, see: Liris, ‘Iconographie et épigraphie’, p. 287.
27 Franconie, ‘Louis-Philippe’, p. 105.
28 AD Ille-et-Vilaine, 1 M 120, letter from Military Governor Bigarrés to Prefect Leroy, 12 December 1830.
29 AD Ille-et-Vilaine, 4 M 89, report of the departmental gendarmerie, 5 – 6 June 1831.
30 AD Ille-et-Vilaine, 1 M 120, letter from Military Governor Bigarrés to Prefect Leroy, 8 June 1830.
31 Pinkney, The French Revolution, p. 311.
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lar policing meant defending the revolutionary institutions that were considered to gua-
rantee political liberty.
Indeed, many citizens were ready to take up arms and to participate in combat against 
the royalist insurgents. At the Military Governor’s request, a troupe of 200 volunteers was 
mobilized by the major.32 General Bigarrés wanted to lead the train himself. He ordered 
the troops to report the prefecture square at four in the morning and asked the guards to 
provide two day’s bread and ammunition. The Governor praised the guardsmen for their 
honourable and brave service the following month.33
II. Appropriating the monopoly of violence: the law 
of the National Guard of 1831 and its application in 
Rennes
In August 1830, Louis-Philippe held a parade on the Mars field in Paris.34 On this occasi-
on, all of the thirteen legions of Paris marched to pay tribute to the new King. The Natio-
nal Guard’s support for the new monarchy seemed certain and Louis-Philippe was able 
to present himself as a sovereign close to the people.35 The references to the 1789 Revo-
lution were unmistakable. The presence of Lafayette, who handed out the new flags of 
the National Guard in the tribune in front of the military school, recalled the Federati-
on Day of 1790, which had also taken place on the Mars field under the command of the 
General. Contemporary observers referred to the parade as a moment of unity between 
the bourgeoisie and the sovereign, describing the scene as the coronation of the King and 
the final act of his accession to the throne.36 The August parade was the first chapter in a 
long and complicated history of instrumentalisation, resulting in a change of monarchi-
cal legitimacy which was no longer based upon divine grace, but popular sovereignty.37
Meanwhile, the government undertook the large task of reorganising the Nation’s ar-
med forces. One year after the Trois Glorieuses and the spontaneous reorganization of 
the National Guard, government passed a law to regulate the armament of the bourgeoi-
sie and making it a reliable institution.38 The text stipulated that all Frenchmen aged bet-
ween 20 and 60 were to be part of the National Guard. It also provided for active service 
and a reserve force. The recruitment councils in the cities across the kingdom were re-
sponsible for distributing recruits on both lists. The law also restored the election of of-
ficers by the troupe. However, the election did not concern the senior posts of the batta-
lion such as commander or legion colonel, which remained appointed by the King. The 
32 AD Ille-et-Vilaine, 1 M 112, letter from Bigarrés to Prefect Leroy, 29 May 1832.
33 Ibid., 8 June 1832.
34 Larrère, ‘Ainsi paradait le roi’, p. 11.
35 Larrère, L’urne et le fusil, p. 54.
36 So the journalist Cuvillier-Fleury. Alfred-Auguste Cuvillier-Fleury, Journal intime de Cuvillier-Fleury, 
vol. 1: La famille d’Orléans au Palais-Royal, 1828-1831 (Paris, 1900-1903), p. 272.
37 Franconie, ‘Louis-Philippe’, p. 97.
38 Girard, La garde nationale, p. 196.
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text contained many provisions concerning discipline, anticipating different cases of di-
sobedience.
The law allowed for greater control of the institution, starting with the composition of 
the active troops, the appointment of high-ranking officers and the stipulation of a who-
le series of punishments in the event of insubordination. The aim was to recruit only the 
wealthy part of the population, which was deemed safe and invested in a quick return 
to order. This law must be placed in the tense context of the early years of the monarchy 
when riots and revolts, such as the Canuts revolt in Lyon in November of the same year, 
regularly shook the country.39 By reorganising the National Guard, the regime was see-
king to increase its means of defence and to establish a monopoly on violence.
Thus, in Rennes, the recruitment council, chaired by the Mayor of the city, called about 
1000 men for active service, representing 25% of all recruits. Compare this to an average 
of 18% for the country and 20% for Paris in 1831.40 It is worth noting the continuity in 
relation to the Restoration, during which the same number of men were called upon to 
provide regular service.41 It is the case, therefore, that only a small proportion of recruits 
actually did their military service despite the obligation of all citizens to serve in the Na-
tional Guard as provided for by the new law. The criterion for active duty was the uni-
form, which was very expensive and had to be paid for by the citizens themselves.42 From 
the perspective of local administration and the general staff, it was a useful instrument 
for maintaining a certain social exclusivity: the National Guard, far from being a truly 
popular militia, then represented a bourgeois elite and excluded an important part of the 
population.
Yet, the government and local administration maintained the public narrative of a po-
pular armed force. In their view, this legitimized the Perier government’s policy of public 
order and often harsh action against the opposition. Moreover, the authorities conside-
red the National Guard’s performance to be excellent. For this reason, the military au-
thorities called upon its service at critical times to ensure public safety. In January 1831, 
Governor Bigarrés sent a letter to the Prefect informing him of the desertion of several 
soldiers from the garrison in Vitré.43 The Sub-Prefect in charge had already sent a Gen-
darmerie brigade and a line detachment to look for the deserters. The Governor appro-
ved this measure because he feared the beginning of a rebellion caused by the harmful 
influence of the Jesuit seminary that might affecting the inhabitants of Vitré. For him, the 
agitation led by the Rennes bishop against the July regime had borne fruit, pushing re-
cruits to insubordination and reviving ideological conflicts in the city.
39 Moissonnier, Les Canuts, p. 52. See also for an contemporary interpretation of the events: Journal des dé-
bats, 8 December 1831.
40 AD Ille-et-Vilaine, 4 R 118, number or summary of National Guard census lists, 7 September 1831. Lar-
rère, L’urne et le fusil, p. 130.
41 AD Ille-et-Vilaine, 4 R 87, letter from Mayor Grenédan to General Secretary Kentzinger, 29 March 1816.
42 Archives municipales de Rennes (thereafter AmR), H 21, National Guard of Rennes, control over the of-
ficers, 1 September 1821.
43 AD Ille-et-Vilaine, 1 M 120, letter from Bigarrés, 10 January 1831.
135
Axel Dröber
He therefore wanted to convene the National Guard. He informed the prefect of the 
Ministry of War’s instructions not to put line troops in contact with the civilian popu-
lation without the presence of the armed bourgeoisie.44 The company of national guards 
not only increased the number of troops but gave legitimacy to repression. The armed ci-
tizens represented the nation and the Guard made it possible to show the loyalty of the 
bourgeoisie towards the regime. This allowed the government of Louis-Philippe to di-
stinguish itself from the regime of Charles X, who at the end of his reign had used the re-
gular army and royal troops excessively to repress demonstrations. By contrast, the Na-
tional Guard had played a diminishing role and had almost completely disappeared from 
the public arena.45
The combined use of the regular Army and the National Guard in order to repress de-
monstrations and uprisings was accompanied by local ceremonies in which both soldiers 
and national guards were the main actors. In April 1831, Governor Bigarrés asked the 
prefect to clear the Champ de Mars, the site of major military deployments.46 He plan-
ned a joint parade of troops from the National Guard and the garrison for the King’s Day 
the following month. The aim was to highlight the participation of the bourgeoisie in the 
maintenance of order, to underline the fraternity between the two forces, and to show 
their support for the July Monarchy. The participation of the armed citizens at the King’s 
feast served to affirm the unity of the nation, a sign of the political crisis into which the 
government, strongly contested by the opposition and by mass movements, had fallen.47
Subsequently, the armed bourgeoisie were mobilized more systematically. In April 
1831, Bigarrés commanded a 60-man patrol to support the garrison troops whose infan-
try regiment had just left the town for another mission.48 Two years later there was a large 
protest led by the republican opposition in Rennes. In order to maintain public security, 
the Gendarmerie and National Guard were mobilized to patrol the area around the Pa-
lace of Justice until midnight in order to prevent riots and disperse the crowd.49 The ral-
ly likely took place in memory of the Parisian upheaval during June of the previous year. 
During General Lamargue’s funeral there had been violent riots; the army and the Na-
tional Guard were mobilized to fight the insurgents.50 This resulted in injuries and deaths 
on both sides, including members of the National Guard who had fallen in battle. The re-
gime later used the outcome of these riots to emphasize the strict discipline of the Natio-
nal Guard and the loyalty of the armed citizens to the monarchy.51
The events had a lasting impact on public opinion in Rennes, as the following year a 
large crowd gathered to protest in the city’s main square. The protest was peaceful but a 
44 Ibid.
45 AD Ille-et-Vilaine, 4 R 87, letter from Mayor Lorgeril to Prefect Villegontier, 4 December 1821.
46 AD Ille-et-Vilaine, 1 M 120, letter from Military Governor Bigarrés, 11 April 1831.
47 Gießelmann, Die ‘Manie der Revolte’, vol. 1, p. 105.
48 AD Ille-et-Vilaine, 1 M 120, letter to Prefect Leroy, 4 April 1831.
49 AD Ille-et-Vilaine, 4 M 91, report of the departmental gendarmerie, 12-13 June 1833.
50 Bouchet, Le Roi et les barricades, p. 50.
51 Ibid.
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local Gendarmerie officer claimed to observe that the individuals ‘ayant de mauvaises 
intentions’.52 After all, some of the demonstrators were most likely armed. The officer ex-
pressly praised the members of the National Guard, who had reliably protected order by 
preventing riots. Their good discipline was a sign of commitment to the Orleanist regime 
and showed that the armed citizens were ready to cooperate with other armed forces in 
cases of imminent danger. This was also a result of their integration into a ceremony pro-
pagandising the unity of soldiers from all forces. That guardsmen and soldiers saw them-
selves as brothers in arms was further evidenced by societal rites such as banquets at 
which both the National Guard and units from the Army celebrated together.53
III. How to influence public order policy? The revolu-
tionary tradition of the National Guard and its place 
within the local society of Rennes
The deployment of the armed bourgeois did not always earn public recognition. During 
Louis-Philippe’s reign, members of the National Guard in Rennes were often threatened, 
insulted, attacked and seriously injured. These incidents showed that the armed bour-
geoisie had rapidly lost its unifying force. Once perceived as a civic force and champion 
of the Trois Glorieuses, as had been the case at the beginning of the July Monarchy, the 
National Guard was increasingly assimilated into the Orleanist regime and perceived as 
a monarchist institution, rather than a popular force. Immediately after the July Revolu-
tion, armed citizens were attacked in public. In October 1830, a national guard, wearing 
the tricolour, was insulted by three passers-by who chanted ‘[…] ceux qui portent la co-
carde tricolore sont de la canaille’.54 The motif of the group was not clearly established, 
although the gendarmerie suspected the men to be supporters of the old King.
Another incident confirmed this assumption. In December of the following year, the 
guard at the town hall was verbally attacked, and the delinquent, a member of the mu-
nicipal administration, loudly insulted the tricolour flag raised on the top of the guard 
tower.55 The Central Commissioner expressed his particular concern to the prefect as he 
was in the process of evaluating a secret letter to the Countess of Berry. The address had 
been signed by numerous locally well-known personalities, including a prefectural office 
administrator. The letter assured the countess, who had arrived in upper Brittany in the 
summer of that year, of support for the overthrow of Louis Philippe’s regime. The invol-
vement of local government officials in this affair demonstrated the extent of the Carlists’ 
influence, preparing the ground for a return of the elder Bourbons.
Of course, the Carlists were a minority in Rennes. But the repeated attacks on natio-
nal guards were a sign of the conflicts that shook local society. They showed that despite 
the official propaganda, the inhabitants of the city never reached consensus around poli-
52 AD Ille-et-Vilaine, 4 M 91, report of the departmental gendarmerie, 12-13 June 1833.
53 AD Ille-et-Vilaine, 4 M 33, police report, 22-23 September 1831.
54 AD Ille-et-Vilaine, 4 M 89, report of the departmental gendarmerie, 24-25 October 1830.
55 AD Ille-et-Vilaine, 4 M 90, letter from Commissioner Couarez to Prefect Leroy, 4 December 1832.
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tical questions. On the contrary, the members of the reactionary opposition targeted the 
National Guard to express their protest against the rule of Louis-Philippe. In their eyes, 
the armed citizens stood for the downfall of the hereditary monarchy and the overthrow 
of the rightful heir to the throne. In addition, the armed citizens had repeatedly distin-
guished themselves by their aversion to the clergy and their refusal to take part in reli-
gious festivals. 
Physical and violent attacks showed that the armed citizens had lost public prestige. 
Some were even victims of attempted murder: for example, the hunter Delibon was se-
riously injured.56 In June 1831, he was attacked by several men, one of whom was armed 
with a dagger. Delibon received a several stab wounds and was taken to hospital. The 
search for the assassins was unsuccessful and Delibon was awarded compensation of 200 
Francs by the government.57 The Minister of the Interior declared that Delibon had been 
injured in the performance of his duties. In another case, an officer of the National Guard 
escaped a knife attack thanks only to the help of two comrades who accompanied him 
on a walk in Rennes.58 The Central Commissioner attributed both attacks to workers and 
day-labourers hired by the Carlistian opposition.
It was therefore only logical that the local administration was keen to avoid any influ-
ence of the reactionary opposition within the armed bourgeoisie. While in other towns 
near Rennes, the National Guard had been infiltrated by supporters of the elder Bour-
bons and the local clergy59, the troops of Rennes remained loyal to the authorities. As a 
matter of fact, this was the result of measures taken by the recruitment council headed 
by the towns’ Major. After the adoption of the new law in March 1831, the council got to 
work in order to address the recruitment lists. In June 1831, a group of 360 citizens ap-
proached the prefect to protest their exclusion from active service. They explained:
Un ordre social fondé sur la souveraineté populaire, ne doit admettre 
qu’une exécution franche et loyale des lois en général et surtout de celles dont 
l’objet essentiel est de donner le plus grand développement aux libertés publi-
ques; il doit proscrire toute mesure qui tenterait à priver une partie des citoy-
ens de l’exercice d’un droit que la loi garantit également à tous.60
Thus, the signatories of this petition demanded the application of the 1831 law, stipula-
ting the opening of the National Guard for all citizens. In an explanatory note, the may-
or told the prefect that he had scrupulously respected the procedure.61 No complaint had 
been made within the time limits provided for by law. However, the Prefect maintained 
the exclusion, following the Mayor’s arguments. It is possible and even highly probab-
le that the recruitment intentionally excluded persons who served under the Restorati-
56 AD Ille-et-Vilaine, 4 M 502, letter from Major Longeril to Prefect Leroy, 16 June 1831.
57 AD Ille-et-Vilaine, 4 R 90, letter from Minister of Interior Perier to Prefect Leroy, 31 August 1831.
58 AD Ille-et-Vilaine, 4 M 502, report of Central Commissioner Couraez to Prefect Leroy, 24 June 1831.
59 This was the case for Vitré (see: AD Ille-et-Vilaine, 4 R 88, letter from Sub-prefect Aubin to the Minister 
of the Interior Périer, 23 May 1831).
60 AD Ille-et-Vilaine, 4 R 90, petition to Prefect Leroy, 25 June 1831.
61 Ibid., 9 July 1831.
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on. Indeed, among the signatories were former officers of the National Guard of Rennes, 
such as Colonel Duplessis-Grenédan, who had been appointed Commander in 1814.62 
Moreover, the Mayor noted that all signatories belonged to the Société de l’Amitié, an as-
sociation known for its reactionary orientation.63
Hence, the signatories used the government’s legislation as an argument to claim their 
right to active service. They invoked the new law obliging every male citizen to perform 
military service. By insisting on the principle of universal recruitment, they defended 
the idea that the National Guard should be considered a popular force vital to securing 
popular sovereignty. Of course, the reactionary opposition used progressive ideas and 
measures of wider participation as an instrument to achieve its own political goals and 
to gain influence over the armed forces of Rennes. They demanded to be a part of the ar-
med bourgeoisie, assuring to be all dressed and therefore already suitable to serve.
As a result, this established a political dimension to the National Guard: the notion of 
popular policing as source of popular sovereignty, a connection which the leftist oppo-
sition also made. The newspaper La Tribune explained that the armed bourgeoisie was a 
political institution and a new power within the state.64 At the same time, Auguste Fab-
re claimed that every guardsman should have the right to take part in the elections for 
Parliament as a voter.65 Hence, at the very beginning of the July Monarchy, the Natio-
nal Guard became the framework for political reform and the further democratisation 
of French society. The argument of the left was that the National Guard, through sacri-
fice for the community, proved its commitment to the nation and its ability to participa-
te in political matters.
Three years after the first petition, another reached the authorities in Rennes. In Janua-
ry 1834, the Central Police Commissioner informed the Prefect that the officers François 
Hamelin and François-Adrien Blin, both respectively book dealers and commander of 
one of the hunter companies, had launched a petition in which they requested a reduc-
tion in service.66 They argued that it had become too restrictive for armed citizens who 
pursued a regular profession. The Commissioner noted that the petition, open at the two 
officers’ bookstore, was signed by 200 national guards, including members of the Hame-
lin and Blin companies. At the same time, the signatories called for the lowering of the 
electoral censuses, thus advocating for a reform of the electoral system which, to their 
view, should include all armed citizens.
The signatories were opposed to the unequal distribution of service charges among 
companies. Specifically, this request insisted on an opening of political participation, ho-
wever limited. Note that the census for Parliamentary and regional elections had bare-
62 AmR, H 21, National Guard of Rennes, control over the officers, 1815.
63 AD Ille-et-Vilaine, 4 R 90, letter to Prefect Leroy, 9 July 1831.
64 La Tribune, 1 October 1830.
65 La Tribune, 2 September 1830.
66 AD Ille-et-Vilaine, 1 M 123, letter from Central Commissioner de Miniau to Prefect Leroy, 26 February 
1834.
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ly decreased since the Restoration.67 Moreover, some years later, the French government 
was confronted with a broad movement in favour of abolishing the census for all mem-
bers of the National Guard. Launched by left-wing deputies in 1837 under the slogan 
‘tout garde national doit être électeur’, the demand for political reforms had been very 
successful across the country.68 Hamelin and Blin’s petition showed that at the local level, 
the bourgeoisie called upon to maintain order and insisted on the civic dimension of ser-
vice in the political sense.
Hamelin and Blin were among the city’s leading figures and both voted for the Cham-
ber of Deputies. They acted as advocates for those comrades who did not have the same 
privilege. The petition earned Hamelin the respect of the other citizens and afforded him 
a rapid rise in the National Guard’s ranks. In 1831, he was elected head of his company.69 
He was notorious for his involvement in the Trois Glorieuses for which he had received 
the July cross, a medal awarded to all combatants of the revolution.70 He later succeeded 
in running for the position of battalion Commander in the 1834 election; five years later, 
he was proposed as a candidate for the position of legion Colonel, a position chosen by 
the King.71 In 1839, the outgoing colonel was reappointed but the very nomination was 
a victory for an officer considered close to the opposition. The Minister of the Interior, 
Thiers, criticized the Prefect for failing to prevent Hamelin’s appointment.72
Studies of Paris have shown the local units support for political reform.73 Contempora-
ry sources revealed at the same time that the members of the hunter companies were 
particularly active in participating in public protest and pushing for the right to vote.74 
This was due to the social background of the guardsmen: the men serving in those com-
panies belonged to the petit bourgeoisie and had insufficient income to fulfil the require-
ment of the census. It is more than likely that the situation in Rennes was similar to that 
in Paris. For the hunters, the National Guard was the only place where they could express 
their views and elect the officers.75 In this respect, the notion of a popular force for public 
order took on its full meaning. This explains why the petition for the lowering of the cen-
sus also contained demands for a change in the way that the service was distributed bet-
ween the units. From the point of view of the signatories, service in the National Guard 
should be accompanied by political rights and the participation in national and regio-
nal elections.
67 Goujon, Monarchies postrévolutionnaires, p. 230.
68 Gourvitch, ‘Le mouvement pour la réforme électorale’.
69 AD Ille-et-Vilaine, 4 R 119, minutes of the officers’ election of the first hunter company of the second 
battalion, 26 June 1831.
70 AD Ille-et-Vilaine, 4 M 33, police report, 17-18 August 1831.
71 AD Ille-et-Vilaine, 4 R 150, minutes of the officers’ election of the second battalion, 31 January 1831.
72 AD Ille-et-Vilaine, 4 R 90, letter from the Minister of the Interior Thiers, 19 June 1834.
73 Larrère, L’urne et le fusil, p. 265.
74 Le Constitutionnel, 13 January 1840.
75 Larrère, ‘Les élections des officiers’, p. 464.
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In June 1834, the High Command responded to the petitioners’ complaint. Colonel 
Rubillon suspended daytime service.76 From then on, the National Guard was only called 
for night duty. This decision followed the decline of discipline observed by the General 
Staff; recruitment had been less stringent for several years, which posed a serious risk to 
public order. Rubillon’s intention was to prevent this phenomenon from worsening and 
to stop the National Guard service from becoming irrelevant. As far as political reform 
was concerned, the refusal to abolish electoral census led to a considerable increase in 
the protest movements throughout France and the fall of Louis-Philippe and his govern-
ment in 1848.77
IV. Conclusion
The previous chapters have shown to what extent contemporaries perceived the National 
Guard as a power close to the people. The study focused on aspects and characteristics 
that turned the institution into a popular force of order in the eyes of citizens, armed citi-
zens, local administration and regime. During the reign of the July Monarchy, the armed 
citizens came together spontaneously, took control of the public space and abolished the 
insignias of the old regime. They expressed their loyalty to the new King Louis-Philippe 
by adopting the tricolour flag, a direct reference to the tradition of the armed bourgeoi-
sie and the establishment of the National Guard in 1789. In July 1830, the citizens under-
stood the revival of revolutionary symbols as a prerogative to take up arms in order to 
guarantee security in the town and prevent unrest. At the same time, it expressed the ci-
tizens’ expectations of the new regime to preserve revolutionary institutions and to par-
ticipate in securing the public order.
Rites and feasts held in public were further evidence of this and showed that the 
younger generation among the National Guard, who had not experienced the French Re-
volution in their lifetime, was particularly active in celebrating the revolutionary legacy. 
They resumed the feast of the Federation in 1791 and recalled the unity of the free nati-
on and the loyalty of the armed bourgeoisie to the King. In doing so, they demonstrated 
their autonomous understanding of the role of the armed bourgeoisie as pioneers of li-
beral achievements. This was accompanied by the revival conflicts previously overcome 
since the French Revolution. By taking action against members of the local clergy and by 
engaging in hostilities against the faithful, the National Guards showed their willingness 
to defend the legacy of 1789 with weapons if necessary. This attitude was further confir-
med by the volunteers the Military Governor recruited in order to fight royalist troops 
in May 1832.
At the same time, the myth of the armed citizens was a source of political capital: Lou-
is-Philippe recognized in the National Guard a source of monarchical legitimacy. He in-
terpreted the gathering of units both in Paris and in the provinces as a sign of the great 
76 AD Ille-et-Vilaine, 4 R 88, agenda, 23 June 1834.
77 Goujon, Monarchies postrévolutionnaires, p. 391.
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support the throne received from the centre of society. The march of armed citizens on 
the occasion of official celebrations and military parades not only expressed their loyalty 
to the July regime, but was also intended to seal the glorious end of the 1789-Revolution. 
This had created the conditions for the bourgeoisie to serve the throne and for the consti-
tutional monarchy to triumph over the reactionary powers in 1830.
The government adopted the same strategy of instrumentalization. The Minister in-
structed the prefects to use the regular forces in conjunction with the National Guard to 
repress demonstrations and uprisings. The participation of the armed citizens, highly re-
garded by the public in the early years of the monarchy, should justify the suppression 
of the unrest that flared up repeatedly throughout the country. Since the reign of Char-
les X, the army had a reputation for taking particularly brutal action against any oppo-
sition and demonstration, while the National Guard was perceived to protect the local 
population. As a result, the Rennes National Guard was regularly despatched to counter 
protesters and insurgents, proving to be well disciplined troops in the eyes of the milita-
ry and police.
The commitment to the monarchy led the public to perceive the National Guard as a 
representative of the Orleanist regime. This resulted in hostilities towards the National 
Guard, attacked and sometimes seriously injured. The fact that these attacks were most-
ly perpetrated by members of the ultra-royalist opposition was partly due to the fact that 
the young national guards had distinguished themselves as virulent opponents of the 
clergy. On the other hand, these incidents proved that the armed bourgeoisie did not 
play a unifying role in society, rather they intensified political conflicts and thus deepe-
ned the division of the country. This was further encouraged by the law of March 1831 
that allowed only wealthy citizens to enlist in the service, thus aggravating social tensi-
ons.
Against this backdrop, there was resistance to the implementation of the law at the lo-
cal level. Armed and uniformed citizens were arbitrarily banned from active service lists 
and placed in reserve by the city’s recruitment council. The persons concerned had ser-
ved as officers under the rule of Charles X and were members of an ultra-royalist asso-
ciation in Rennes. They expressed their complaint in a petition addressed to the Prefect 
that insisted on the principles of popular sovereignty. In doing so, they carefully avoided 
reference to the revolutionary nation. Instead, they insisted that participation in the po-
lice service was a right of the entire local population, some of which could not be exclu-
ded arbitrarily.
Further petitions showed that the notion of popular sovereignty had been reinterpre-
ted in political terms. In view of the conditions during the census monarchy, the left 
voiced criticism of the exclusion of the majority of society from political participation. In 
Rennes, members of the hunting companies supported claims by their officers to extend 
the right to vote to all guards. Even before the left-wing opposition launched a nationwi-
de campaign in 1837 based on the same demand, the armed citizens of Rennes adopted 
this idea. Service in the National Guard was supposed to enable them to assert their own 
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interests with regard to the government of the country and the administration of their 
home town. The pioneer was the active citizen, as provided for in the Law of 1791, which 
in principle was extended to all armed citizens, regardless of their income or wealth. Ad-
mittedly, by ostentatiously attaching to the revolutionary legacy, the regime itself had 
provided the model for this historical recourse. The fact that, in reality, it lagged behind 
the claim of a popular and politically responsible form of order represented a dilemma, 
leading to the deadlock and overthrow of Louis-Philippe’s rule in 1848.
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How to build a dissident public order. 
Actors and strategies of the Neapolitan 
folks’ political mobilization during the 1848 
revolution
Pierre-Marie Delpu
When revolution broke out in Palermo on January 12 1848 and then spread throughout 
the whole Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, it constituted the first experience of massive po-
litical mobilization in the state. It followed from a long tradition of riots and revolutions 
since the Early Modern period1, and very quickly became part of a wider revolutionary 
wave, both Italian and European, and mainly characterised by the delegitimation of the 
Bourbon monarchy as an institution and as a means of government. The Meridional po-
litical propaganda, which was widespread at the European scale – the most famous ex-
amples being the well-known caricatures by French illustrator Honoré Daumier2 – high-
lighted the main target of the revolution: the king-tyrant Ferdinand II, targeted mainly 
because he carried out atrocities against civilians, most notably the struggles of 15 May 
1848.3 Such events gave a decisive impulse to mobilizations of opposition to the King, 
and led to a new evolution, opposing to the royal malgoverno, a Meridional society tra-
ditionally faithful to monarchy, as since the Early Modern period it had constituted one 
of the main elements of the social contract underlying the ‘Neapolitan Nation’ as a coll-
ective identity. This trend explained the weakness of republicanism and the limited ca-
pacity of mobilization of the Parthenopean Republic of 1799 to which the popular San-
fedist insorgenze put a stop.4
The popular participation in revolution is linked to the building of a public sphere of 
opposition, which constituted an underlying trend of the 1840s and reached a peak in 
Summer 1848, chiefly in the peripheral provinces of the kingdom. The actors of revolu-
tion very quickly sought to contain it by establishing revolutionary institutions of main-
tenance of order, such as the National Guard, but this quickly reached its limits when re-
1 Lerra, Musi, Rivolte e rivoluzione
2 From August 1848, Honoré Daumier began to publish a series of political caricatures devoted to the 
« Neapolitan case » in the French satirical newspaper Le Charivari. Like the most famous cartoons in 
the series (« À Naples, le meilleur des rois fait régner l’ordre dans ses États », 27 août 1848), those devo-
ted to the Neapolitan case stage the political abuses of King Ferdinand’s monarchy through his politics of 
maintaining order, relying on coercive tools which were unfavourable to the people. The idea was taken 
up widely in the European liberal propaganda of the 1850s (Moe, The View from Vesuvius).
3 Recent historical works on the Mezzogiorno have shown the extent of that turn, linked with the 
monarchy’s politics of maintaining order (Mellone, ‘Dopo i fatti napoletani del 15 maggio 1848’).
4 Davis, ‘Rivolte popolari e controrivoluzione’.
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volutionary counterpowers emerged in the face of the moral discredit surrounding the 
monarchy, particularly in the provinces of Salerno and Calabria where the insurrection 
was at its most radical.5 In order to fight against a regime considered to be a tyranny, the 
revolutionaries had to make the ordinary folk participate in police and justice practices 
within the framework of a dissident public order, based on the appropriation of the com-
petences and practices of sovereignty. This appeared as a complex process which invol-
ved the establishment of normativities alternative to the ones the monarchy was relying 
on, the use of the traditional tools of revolutionary public policing, including the Natio-
nal Guard, and the display of new features of massive mobilization of the people against 
the monarchy.
I. Dissident normativities
Since it was established in the first months of 1848, the revolutionary public order was 
dependent on specific normativities. These included the inversion of policing practices, 
making the people actors in a process against the monarchical order which was conside-
red to be illegitimate. The repertory of collective actions of radical mobilizations showed 
it: although the sources here are very scarce, the judiciary sources linked with the politi-
cal processes which took place between 1849 and 1854 still allow us to comprehend the-
se actions. The systematical target of the mobilisations was the king and his representati-
ves: there were frequent trials of the royal couple’s statutes, put on in the public arena, and 
ending in death sentences being given to effigies of the sovereign. The use of iconoclasm, 
which was frequent during the 1848 revolutions, particularly in the Italian States6, consi-
sted of ritualized destructions of symbols of the monarchical authority, destined to clean-
se the public space from representations of kingship. This practice was most prominent 
in Citerior Calabria, around Cosenza, where 575 subjects were given various sentences 
after the trials which put a stop to the revolution. These were both spontaneous expressi-
ons of the ordinary hatred against the Bourbon monarchy, fuelled by political emotions, 
and also conscious acts designed to eliminate from the public space the king’s emblems, 
portraits and statutes, in order to mark an inversion of the norms and the appropriation 
of authority.7 In the absence of being able to directly attack the king who didn’t leave the 
kingdom’s capital during the whole period of the insurrection, the attackers instead di-
rected their attentions towards the symbols which embodied his power. Other one-off at-
tacks were aimed at representatives of authority, particularly the gendarmerie, but they 
were very scarce in comparison to other European states at the same time, such as Fran-
ce. In the province of Cosenza, only 110 cases were judged during the political proces-
5 Buttiglione, La Rivoluzione in “periferia”.
6 See Fureix, Iconoclasme et révolutions. In the Italian states, the 1848 revolutions saw a significant increa-
se in iconoclastic practises as one of the most common forms of contesting the established order (Arisi 
Rota, ‘„Così brutale insulto“’).
7 I have already studied this point elsewhere in relation to the Calabrian provinces (Delpu, ‘Les acteurs po-
pulaires face aux images de la monarchie’).
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ses that followed the revolution, equal to hardly more than 3% of the subjects submitted 
to a sentence.8
These practices throw light on the concurrent representations of authority which op-
posed around the gestion of public order. Here again, the turning point of 15 May 1848 
was significant, and the initiatives first came from private individuals as distinct from 
the institutions established by the monarchy to contain the revolution in its four first 
months. For most of the provincial revolutionaries, particularly those linked with the ra-
dical movement, the struggles were a sign that the king had breached his political con-
tract with Neapolitan society. In that respect, the monarchy appeared as disloyal, and 
so needed to be replaced by other forms of authority, considered more valuable, even 
though these other forms were uncertain as they were not precisely defined. Rather than 
normative redefinings, the actors’ social practises highlighted the substitution of one 
form of legitimacy for an other one, supported by people who were well-known at the lo-
cal scale of the village communities. In Castelvetere, a little town of the Reggio province, 
on 16 May 1848, one of the local landowners, Ilario Scutari, publically called for the exe-
cution of the subjects who refused to remove the royal proclamations put up on the walls 
of the town chancellery.9
The speed with which events happened, just the very next day after the slaughter, can 
be explained by the circulation of information which was facilitated by the telegraph, a 
device to which some specialists attribute the success of the revolution.10 The initiative 
was part of a complex plan of action which included destruction, substitution of objects, 
and simulated tyrannicides, and which were all directed towards a monarchy regarded as 
failed. Much more than subversion of the monarchical order, such rituals built on practi-
ces of popular and spontaneous justice and they highlight how the revolutions’ stakehol-
ders, particularly the most radical of them, used to plan moral constructions in the pu-
blic space of the insurrection: if the alternative order had never been defined nor named 
but was left to the initiative of provisional organizations formed by the revolutionaries 
themselves, it has an implicit moral objective, which consisted in substituting a more ac-
ceptable system of power in place of a perjurious monarchy.
Within this process of inversing norms, the role played by the population was decisive. 
This did not constitute a truly new phenomenon, as the last decades of the Early Modern 
era already saw an important incease in the participation of the population in political 
mobilization, particularly around local stakes and in the opposition to the power abuses 
of the lords during the « wars against tyrants », of which the Calabrian provinces inclu-
ded numerous examples.11 But the mobilizations of 1848 stand out, both for their num-
8 This figure comes from the political trials hold in the province of Cosenza at the end of the revolution 
and until the 1850s (Archivio di Stato di Cosenza [then ASCS], Intendenza, Processi politici). It appears 
very low in comparison with the French situation, where altercations with the police were one of the 
most common practises of the mobilisation of insurgents (Lignereux, La France rébellionnaire).
9 Archivio di Stato di Reggio Calabria (then ASRC), Atti di Polizia, I, 1, ad nomen.
10 That aspect of circulation of ideas and practises has already been studied for the Kingdom of the Two Si-
cilies (De Lorenzo, ‘Il 1848-1849’).
11 Cecere, Le armi del popolo.
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ber and for their stronger democratic orientation, in continuation of the Meridional li-
berals’ efforts to open the political field to the masses by the 1830s. Those efforts lead in 
particular to a wide network of secret societies which used to give more interest to lo-
cal problems than to the wider independence of Italy.12 Such instances of democratic re-
sistance, which did not start in 1848, were part of a double evolution: first, the populati-
on resisted the centralized politics of the kingdom and its land and tax circumsequences, 
second, they refused Bourbon absolutism, reduced to its coercive practises and the abu-
ses in its administration and army. The combination of these two motives was the princi-
pal source of the popular mobilizations which relied on the economic and social protests 
in the 1840s which contemporaries used to call rivindiche.13 However, the people’s par-
ticipation in such mobilizations had been neither autonomous nor systematic: it was al-
ways framed by local elites who were well-known to local folks, as they were part of the 
same community. The mayors and intendants were part of that framing as many of them 
supported the dissidence movement, for example in Cosenza where the mayor Tomma-
so Ortale and even more so the intendant Tommaso Cosentini played an essential role at 
the insurgents’ side.14 More frequently, priests used to encourage those mobilizations to 
a wider extent, using their authority linked with their social and religious function and 
delivering politicized sermons, a privileged means to spread if not liberal or democratic 
ideas, at least revolutionary exhortations to which populations were at first scarcely re-
ceptive.15
In this respect, the integration of ordinary people into the alternative order which the 
revolutionaries wanted to construct appeared as a top-down politicization process, dra-
wing on local elites and depending on the local political stakes. The involvement of the 
traditional authorities, particularly the borghesia rossa which was mostly found in the 
Southern part of the kingdom, contributed to the movement and linked the Mezzogio-
rno to a Mediterranean scheme of the ‘birth of modern politics’.16 But it was not built in 
an uniform way, and had to face some opposition: during a riot in September 1847, in 
Bovalino, a village close to Gerace, there were two priests who appealed to the people to 
make and defend the revolution, Francesco Jelasi and Giuseppe Zappia. They were houn-
12 On the construction of the Southern Italian liberal movement, see Delpu, Un autre Risorgimento.
13 This word, used in the stakeholders’ vocabulary as revindica or rivindica, depending on local variants, 
refers to the protest movements linked with popular demands about ownership of the common lands. 
Antonio Buttiglione has suggested that they have been one of the main dynamics of the rural masses’ 
support for the 1848 revolution in the whole Southern part of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies (Buttig-
lione, La Rivoluzione in “periferia”, pp. 38-62).
14 Andreotti, vol. III, p. 334.
15 On that practice, see Delpu, ‘La parole des prêtres’.
16 That scheme had first been brought out for nineteenth century Spain by Jean-Philippe Luis, who then 
wondered about its validity for other States having comparable social and political structures (Southern 
France and Italian states, see Luis, ‘Réflexions autour de la naissance de la politique moderne’). It is based 
on converging data which enlighten the modernization of the political frame after the revolutionary era 
(emerging from national political space, birth of parliamentary sovereignty, broadening of the public 
space through press).
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ded by the people of the village and beaten until they bled.17 Such tensions, which resul-
ted in outbreaks of popular violence, were a symptom of a political fight which seemed 
like a generalized civil war. They reflected a territorial crisis which linked the kingdom 
with other territories affected by the deligitimation of the Bourbon monarchies.18 While 
the revolutionaries constituted one of the parties in that conflict, they planned to arm the 
people to defend the revolution and so maintain the public order they wanted to esta-
blish.
II. The Neapolitan National Guard, a limited tool of 
popular mobilization
As in many European States which took part in the revolutions in the first half of the ni-
neteenth century, the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies was equipped with a tool to control 
public order, the National Guard, starting from the first institutional forms of revolution 
in February 1848. As an armed corps formed from the bourgeoisie, and relying on elec-
ted representatives, the National Guard was a legal way to defend revolution, and which 
had existed on and off in the Meridional political landscape during the earlier two re-
volutions in the Kingdom in 1799 and in 1820-1821. Consisting of local battalions esta-
blished at the level of the municipalities, the guard was characterised by its wide geo-
graphical and strategical reach.19 It had not been the only form of armed mobilization 
of ordinary citizens. There were also popular militia which arose in a more spontaneous 
and informal way, which had been one of the more efficient methods of mobilization 
the legitimists wanted to oppose to the revolution, particularly during the inzorgenze of 
1799.20
The National Guard’s main aim was, as in the other countries where it existed, to inte-
grate people into the defence of the revolution and also the maintenance of law and or-
der, seeing as initially there was some reluctance to get involved in revolution. However, 
as the revolution’s stakeholders were divided between moderates who were in favour of a 
reformist path which would support the monarchy, and radicals who supported a more 
accomplished revolution, the initiatives for integrating people into the maintenance of 
public order quickly expanded beyond the National Guard, which was seen to be weak 
in mobilizing people, essentially as it was a tool in the service of the kingdom’s elites. The 
radical press of the Kingdom used to express this argument: the democratic newspaper 
Mondo vecchio e mondo nuovo, for instance, denounced the National Guard as an op-
portunist institution, devoted only to satisfying the ambitions of several local elites and 
17 Messina, Il clero calabrese p. 45.
18 Pinto, ‘Una prima guerra globale’.
19 See De Angelis, Difendere la Rivoluzione, and, on the province of Salerno, Ferrari, La guardia nazionale 
a Salerno. The role of those institutions in post-revolutionary European societies is well-known: see for 
instance and on the French case, Bianchi and Dupuy, La Garde Nationale, and for the Italian one, Fran-
cia, Le baionette intelligenti.
20 The role of ordinary Neapolitan folks in the monarchical militias of 1799 has been studied by París Mar-
tín, ‘Le peuple royaliste en armes’.
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unable to really provide for the defense of liberties in the kingdom’s provinces.21 It was 
precisely the grabbing of the positions by a small number of people, mostly provincial 
notabilities, that was the main reason for that argument. Others denounced the Guard 
as a coercitive institution which, instead of integrating the people into revolution, would 
submit it to constant repression by suppressing all subversive activities, as suggested, af-
ter the failure of the revolution, by the democrat Ferdinando Petruccelli della Gattina:
The moral misery of Naples’ common people (popolo basso) has no measu-
re. As it is gifted by nature of a svelt and prolific intelligence, the necessity to 
silence it appears all the more dangerous and regrettable. […] The turbulent 
movements of the Neapolitan plebe […] force us to arm ourselves with the re-
sentment of having maybe to rise up against our brothers. […] The Neapoli-
tan plebe, we can’t ignore this, is a pious, ignorant, greedy, talkative one, full 
of curiosity and awkwardly religious. Gifted with such features, it ponders 
only weakly the hand ruling it, so long as it has means of subsistence, free-
dom of speech and freedom to take part in celebrations and religion. In that 
respect, not only its needs are not opposed to a constitutional government, 
but can favor it. 22
Such a portrait of Neapolitan folks made them a collective stakeholder in the revolu-
tion, compatible with it on the condition of wanting to arm these folks with appropri-
ate tools. Here Petruccelli voiced one of the most frequent arguments used by the demo-
crats, namely the fact that the National Guard was unsuited to the precise situation of the 
Neapolitan people as it was a foreign and imported force. This unsuitability for the local 
conditions of the Mezzogiorno explained why the institution was considered to be inef-
ficient, while it would actually have rather been the support of political revolutionary so-
ciability than of a real support of revolution.
21 Mondo vecchio e mondo nuovo, I, 40, April 12 1848, p. 157.
22 Petruccelli della Gattina, La rivoluzione di Napoli nel 1848, pp. 148-149.
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Picture 1 : The National Guard on a war footing (taken from the satirical newspaper L’Arlecchino, May 1848)
Picture 2 : The café of the National Guard in Naples (ibid.)
This accounts for the various attitudes to moving forward past the first aims of the 
National Guard, either by disarming it as it was no longer useful, or by adapting it as it 
would otherwise only be a tool to reproduce the traditional social and political order 
which would prevent the further spreading of revolution. These attitudes developed es-
sentially after 15 May 1848, when the monarchy dissolved the National Guard as the go-
vernment grew anxious about the democratic election of officers. However, even if the 
institution was outlawed, it went on existing in the provinces and areas which the central 
monarchy could only control with difficulty, being often informal and weak to meet the 
needs of defending the revolution. Some of the local revolutionaries were looking to ma-
ster its working within the framework of isolated initiatives. In the last days of May 1848, 
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Antonio Montagnese and Giuseppe Villone, two landowners of Iatrinoli near Reggio Ca-
labria, were hoping to prevent the municipality’s National Guard from obeying General 
Nunziante’s orders.23 Some others were hoping to develop the mobilizing function of the 
National Guard by making it a tool of the dissidence native to the kingdom’s southern 
provinces. The province of Reggio offered the most significant cases: one of Castelvetere’s 
landowners, Ilario Scutari, forced the municipal administration to enrol the names he 
indicated amongst their recruits.24
Such alternative uses revealed the limits of the National Guard as a tool for massive po-
pular mobilization and for the collective defence of the revolution. Other tools appeared 
more effective in a political and social context which was overdetermined by traditio-
nal moral economies. From that point of view the circulation of information appeared 
more efficient, with the recurrence of false rumours reporting the king’s death. In Cala-
bria, these rumours lead to the destruction of statues of the emblems of monarchy in an 
attempt to turn an established fact, the vacancy of power, into a much more systemati-
cal political opposition to the monarchy. Such a practise became rooted in the fragmen-
tation of the political communities built at the local scale of the village or the valley, of-
ten self-structured. The connections with other political spaces were thereby reduced to 
few people, essentially local elites or state employees who used to subvert the informati-
on they were spreading.25 Other practices were part of that repertory of collective actions, 
as political speeches by the democratic priests were used to incite the people to defend 
the revolution against the forces that could threaten it, particularly the Bourbon mon-
archy. This practice was however depending on personal initiatives which, even if they 
were often converging, were sometimes criticised by the most radical element amongst 
the democrats. In the newspaper Mondo vecchio e mondo nuovo, in the last days of 
March 1848, Petruccelli denounced, for example, the inefficiency of these political spee-
ches, both because they were not regular and also because unknown political notions 
were not always clearly explained to people.26 That is why the practices of political mobi-
lization diversified, relying on initiatives which aimed to integrate the people into efforts 
to maintain revolutionary order. They revealed the agency of the Meridional revolutio-
naries and their strategies to include the people in the insurgent order.
III. Integrating ordinary people into efforts to 
maintain order
The failure of the most frequent practices of political mobilization pushed the 
insurrection’s stakeholders to consider other strategies. The most specific consisted in 
delivering money to the general population to incitate them to take part to the defence of 
the revolutionary order. In the light of the National Guard’s inefficiency, and while sever-
23 ASRC, Atti di Polizia, I, 1, ad nomen.
24 Ibid.
25 Caglioti, ‘False notizie, complotti e vociferazioni’.
26 Mondo vecchio e mondo nuovo, I, 25, March 25th 1848, p. 99.
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al people regretted the census requirement which limited the number of men authorized 
to involve, democrats such as Aurelio Saliceti proposed including common men from 
the central neighbourhoods of Naples, while most of them had supported the Bourbon 
monarchy and had taken part in the suppression of former revolutions.27 Popular resi-
stance to the revolution were the main issue at stake in these debates. Despite the liberals’ 
increased efforts to integrate people in the revolution, this only resulted in very little po-
pular support, while the economic and social demands linked with the question of ow-
nership, constituted one of the most relevant arguments.
In such conditions, the financial mobilization had been a decisive tool in rallying 
people to join the insurgent order. The economic crisis of 1847, whose repercussions 
were perceptible in the Mezzogiorno until the 1850s, contributed to the success of the-
se initiatives. From that point of view, the raising of armed voluntaries was first organi-
zed by individual and isolated people, who promised a daily compensation of three carli-
nes to anyone who would take up arms to defend revolution. The distribution of money, 
which was the main way of raising up of men, relied on local networks at the level of the 
neighbourhood or the village, and these were most numerous in the province of Reggio 
Calabria. In that region which gave rise to conflicting political mobilizations, that prac-
tice would have facilitated the stabilization of the revolutionary order. In Spring 1848, 
Giuseppe Idone, a landowner from the Calanna village, recruited men to defend the re-
volution. He hoped to place these men in the campi rivoltosi, informal structures created 
from June 1848 to defend the local positions of the insurgents against a possible incur-
sion of the Bourbonian army. Idone’s action relied on a family-based network: his brot-
her Pasquale, a landowner, asked the communal cashier (cassiere comunale) for the ne-
cessary funds, withdrawn from the taxes collected by the municipality, while their cousin 
Rocco, a farmer, took care of educating the new recruits in the arms drill.28 This familial 
and local centering reveals the strategies of politicization according to which the revo-
lutionary public order should be constructed in informal ways. However, these did not 
prevent initiatives of coordination being taken to harmonize the raising of men, such 
as those of the post inspector Achille Parise in the province of Cosenza. Here, during 
Spring 1848, Cosenza took care of recruiting emissaries in order to raise armed groups, 
which were one of the most frequent models of military formations in nineteenth centu-
ry Italy. The revolutionary committees from the province had endorsed this role by na-
ming Parise as a war commissary.29 The funds given to the revolution’s defenders were 
also a decisive factor in the increase of popular participation, and most often involved 
people who already had an experience of arms drill. The sources available give very litt-
le information on military learning; we only know that the connections with Sicily, faci-
litated by geographical closeness, facilitated the circulation of arms among the Calabrian 
27 Di Ciommo, La nazione possibile, p. 257.
28 ASRC, Atti di Polizia, I, 1, ad nomen.
29 Archivio di Stato di Napoli (then ASNA), Archivio privato Borbone, 1044, 38, ad nomen. On guerra per 
bande, the main form of popular armed mobilization in nineteenth century Italy where it has been par-
ticularly promoted by Giuseppe Mazzini, see Della Peruta, ‘La guerra di liberazione spagnola’.
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revolutionaries. One landowner in Bagnara (province of Reggio), Giuseppe Veneziano, 
provided insurgents with arms and hid in the village church several cannons given by Si-
cilian insurgents.30
Due to the lack of a coordinated public subscription, the recruitment of men was taken 
care by local elites and took place through several ways, ranging from criminal to lawful 
methods. The province of Reggio offers an example where we can observe the diversity 
of cases. The first consisted of stealing public funds, and was a continuation of numerous 
revendications against the abusive taxes asked of the kingdom’s subjects since the reform 
of the French occupying monarchy during the Napoleonic era. The people’s demands 
dealt with the most contested tax as it was considered the heaviest, the fondiaria, while 
some insurgents considered the possibility of replacing this with a direct contribution to 
the campi rivoltosi. From that point of view, some employees of the supply office who su-
stained the revolution played a decisive role. These included men such as Lorenzo Pitti, 
municipal cashier in Laureana, who in July 1848 embezzled the amounts collected in the 
municipality in order to give funds to the insurgents. Others managed to raise popular 
support by spreading false rumours: for example, the priest Giuseppe Galloro, from Ga-
latro, pretended during mass that he had stolen a huge suitcase full of money belonging 
to the main stakeholder of the repression, the general Alessandro Nunziante, appoin-
ted by the Bourbon monarchy in June 1848.31 These developments sometimes came with 
pressure from revolutionaries on tax administration employees: one of the landowners 
of Casoleto, Luigi Longo, forced the municipal cashier Angelo Calvo to give funds to the 
insurgents, threatening that he would capture the village landowners’ oxes, and this allo-
wed him to extort 100 ducates which he then divided between the revolutionaries.
More legal ways also contributed to financing the revolution, drawing on donors’ indi-
vidual initiatives. One example occurred in Santo Stefano, one of the villages of the pro-
vince of Reggio where the insurrection was particularly developed around the Romeo 
family who had been involved in the liberal movement since the 1820-1821 revolution. 
There, a craftman, Stefano Surace, gave money to the insurgents to accelerate the mobi-
lization and support his brother Demetrio’s action. He was one of the priests of the vil-
lage and since May 1848 had preached against the king’s tyranny. Some others proposed 
coordinating their efforts to give the insurgents from the province a common fund al-
lowing them to finance their activities. For this reason, in July 1848 three landowners 
from Bova, Concetto Malgeri, Pasquale Parragia and Saverio Polimeni, who were them-
selves donors, organized a subscription list on a provincial scale; the list was devoted 
to covering the needs of revolutionary public order. Even if it was essentially a case of 
proposals, the appropriation of some prerogatives by dissident revolutionaries explained 
that the raising of funds could have been more prescriptive. The involvement of some 
employees of tax or justice administration also contributed to it: in Seminara, the lo-
cal judge Antonio Foti sought to impose by force a tax in order to give the proceeds to 
30 ASRC, Atti di Polizia, I, 1, ad nomen.
31 Ibid.
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the insurgents and to encourage the revolution.32 Such practices reflect the major social 
structure of the insurrection, at first focused on the local elites, then spreading according 
to a top-down model of politicization, which was common with other Southern Euro-
pean countries. They enlist popular participation to maintain order. During this period 
in a wide part of the Mezzogiorno, a democratic movement had been spreading since the 
1830s, and the involvement of ordinary people in maintaining revolutionary order was a 
particularly efficient means of appropriating the competences of sovereignty.
IV. From participation, to maintaining order, to the 
appropriation of sovereignty
While the revolution wanted to invert some of the kingdom’s political and social hierar-
chies by establishing an alternative order, the maintaining of order appears to have been 
a global process in the service of this political ambition. Revolutionary leaders adopted 
practices of control and normalization which took place in a wider process of the appro-
priation of sovereignty, when local communities were demanding autonomy from a cen-
tralized monarchy which was considered abusive. The capacity to maintain order is one 
of the regalian competences whose appropriation, even if sporadic and progressive, went 
hand in hand with the controlling of places of power. Most of these cases were found in 
Reggio: after 15 May 1848, the lawyer Domenico Muratore, former republican of 1799, 
installed the direction of the local revolutionary committee in the premises of the pro-
vincial intendancy, and gave his tacit agreement to several seditious demonstrations or-
ganized against the king, to sustain the Sicilian insurgents.33 A comparable situation took 
place in the province of Cosenza where the intendant Tommaso Cosentini, although 
moderate, at the same time installed the revolutionary Ricciardi Committee in the pre-
mises of the administration of which he was in charge.34 Far from being limited to ordi-
nary seditious practices, such appropriations were an answer to a project, linked to the 
political learning of the Meridional provinces and to the transfer of monarchical sove-
reignty to the people. This relied on the idea that the political contract between the king 
and the people had been broken, which was a central point in Neapolitan revolutiona-
ry propaganda, and concentrated the political debate on the theme of tyrannicide. The 
spreading of false rumours was a particularly efficient means of mobilization, and it corr-
oborates that idea: in the province of Cosenza, one of the members of the revolutiona-
ry committees of Spring 1848, Stanislao La Mensa, spread the rumour King Ferdinand II 
had been destituted and taken prisoner.35
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid. The provincial police sources remind us that such supports had appeared starting from May 16 
1848 when, thanks to the quicker circulation of information via the telegraph, the news of the slaughters 
from Naples had become known in Calabria, where locals revived the radical political mobilization (De 
Lorenzo, ‘Il 1848-1849’).
34 ASCS, Processi politici, 47, 273.
35 ASNA, Archivio privato Borbone, 1044, 38, ad nomen.
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Such rumours were numerous, and fed another aspect of the revolutionary maintai-
ning of order: ruling on the king-tyrant’s fate by means of popular justice practices which 
were common in Mediterranean Europe at that time. The informal trials of the king and 
his representatives used political charivaris, a privileged way of integrating the popular 
masses into politics during the European revolutions of 1848.36 As they wanted to aven-
ge the ordinary folks who they believed had been sacrificed by the Bourbon monarchy 
and erected them as martyrs of the liberal cause, they wanted to execute the torturers at 
whose mercy they found themselves. This was a continuation of a widespread symboli-
cal plan, using ritualized destructions of monarchical emblems. But the acts of expiation 
were transferred into the figured representations of monarchy, most of which involved 
stoneware statues placed in the public buildings. In Postiglione, in the province of Saler-
no, in Winter 1848 the pharmacist Nicola Cafaro slashed a portrait of King Ferdinand I 
who had already died in 1840.37 Such objects were targeted as they were the only ones of 
the monarchy to stand in the living spaces of subjects in peripheral provinces. Other sac-
rilegious practices pertaining to spontaneous justice were also staged by local populati-
ons as mock courts: in Cosenza, the judiciary sources mention – without naming him – a 
priest who in Summer 1848 baptized a ram and a cow with the royal couple’s first names, 
giving them a sentence of execution, making them burn publically, serving them dinner 
at an opposition banquet and then throwing their bones in the common grave.38 The pu-
blic staging of such trials confirm they are practices of spontaneous justice, aiming to be 
a spectacle for local people. These used to rely on common practices revealing ordina-
ry hatred for the Bourbons, but these also enlighten the way dissidence supported po-
pular justice as it was enacted in the construction of autonomous political communities.
While from April 1848 onwards, the Bourbon monarchy started a progressive conser-
vative evolution which became more precise after the slaughters of 15 May, the maintai-
ning of revolutionary order by ordinary people reveals the scale of the protest, which 
gained a new focus on local space. Slaughters were indeed perceived as a breach of oath 
against the political community, which had been regarded since the Early Modern Era 
as nazione napoletana according to a tacit agreement between the people and the king.39 
From then on, since the very days after 15 May 1848, the maintaining of order had been 
assumed by revolutionary committees which were equipped with regalian practises. The 
Ricciardi committee demonstrates this. It was established in order to federate the radi-
cal opposition on the provincial scale in Calabria. It developed police, justice and tax pr-
erogatives, and especially focused on building municipal committees at the scale of the 
villages, through the decisive involvement of local elites. The Cassano committee, in the 
province of Cosenza, was built around the priest Nicola Minervini.40 In Majera, the lo-
36 Delivré.
37 Archivio di Stato di Salerno (then ASSA), Processi politici, 279, 15.
38 ASNA, Alta Polizia, 640, 2563.
39 For more on this, see Musi, Mito e realtà della nazione napoletana: the late eighteenth century saw the 
birth of a difficult coexistence between the Neapolitan nation, still considered as pre-eminent, and the 
Italian one.
40 ASNA, Archivio privato Borbone, 1044, 38, ad nomen.
157
Pierre-Marie Delpu
cal committee was created in June 1848 on the initative of a landowner, Francesco Bra-
ni, who was a regular correspondent of revolutionaries linked to regional elites such as 
Tommaso Ortale, former mayor of Cosenza, and Domenico Mauro, main figure of the 
Calabrian rural protests of 1848, or national political stakeholders like Giuseppe Ricciar-
di.41
During Summer 1848, those dissident powers became rooted in new political spaces 
which were equipped with regalian prerogatives, according to which they organized the 
defense of the Southern provinces against the Bourbonian armies. Established from June 
1848 onwards, these groups constituted tools of massive mobilization, such as in Spez-
zano Albanese where streamed about 3 000 members. Their prerogatives of sovereignty 
particularly consisted of fiscal ones, through the appropriation of government practices 
with the support of competent personnel, while some employees of the administration 
were sustaining the liberal movement. In Cosenza, in July 1848, the Ricciardi Commit-
tee charged one of its members, Bruno Rongelli, to raise funds as a controller of the pro-
vincial taxes.42 In these alternative spaces of sovereignty, the defence of popular fiscali-
ty was a central focus, and explained the setting of popular governments. The camp of 
Santa Eufemia, in the north of the province of Reggio, was one of the most revealing ca-
ses. Established starting from June 1848, it was helped by widespread popular mobiliza-
tion supported by local elites. One month later it got a provisory government, lead by a 
lawyer from Bova, Giuseppe Tripepi, who was awarded the statute of president although 
no legal text prescribed this.43 At the same time, considering the involvement of local ad-
ministrative employees such as Benedetto Accorinti, some go-betweens of that dissident 
government settled in the district of Gerace, which had been the scene of a relevant pro-
test movement since September 1847, which saw the execution of five young local insur-
gents and their immediate edification as political martyrs.44 Accorinti established a Co-
mitato Distrettuale which was charged with the task of fund-raising in order to ensure 
the maintaining of order. The appropriation and defence of the tax competences was also 
expressed in other ways, because the 1848 revolution had resulted in alternative tax sy-
stems in the central neighbourhoods of Naples, lead by ordinary folks linked to the ca-
morra and wanting to finance the resistance against monarchical authority.45
Despite the great diversity in local situations, the progressive integration of ordinary 
people into the defense of the new powers as established by the insurgents took place in 
the wider context of the translation of authority, which awarded self-proclaimed coun-
terpowers who were pretending to be democratic. The rural spaces of the Southern part 
of the kingdom saw the emergence of ‘plebeian kings’ (re del popolo basso) who ap-
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 ASRC, Atti di Polizia, I, 1, ad nomen.
44 The district of Gerace, in the northern-eastern part of the province of Reggio, was for a long time immu-
ne to the insurrections in the rest of the province, due to its geographical isolation (Cataldo, Cospirazio-
ni, economia e società).
45 Fiore, La strutturazione del fenomeno camorrista, p. 369.
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peared as liberators, or were considered as substitutes for the king’s authority. In the Ita-
lo-Albanese village of San Lucido, Carlo Manes, a landowner and captain of the local 
National Guard, had been considered that way by the municipality’s inhabitants, and in 
Summer 1848 was acclaimed to the cries of viva la libertà, morte al Tiranno, viva il capi-
tano Carlo Manes.46 Such substitutions of authority gave legitimacy to revolutionary lea-
ders: in December 1848 in San Cosmo, a client of the Mauro family, Gervasio Protasio 
Bua, announced the king’s forthcoming destitution suggesting that the throne would get 
given back to Domenico Mauro.47 However, there was no consensus on the form which 
these dissident powers should take: some of them, as in Santa Eufemia, appeared as in-
surrectional governments, revealing their provisory aspect, while the republican procla-
mations remained occasional and isolated, and more often used to express spontaneous 
protests rather than real political projects. In Paola, on the western coast of the provin-
ce of Cosenza, Luigi La Costa proclaimed a republic by destroying the statues of the king 
with other villagers, but he neither wanted to settle a government nor to appropriate the 
regalian prerogatives, nor to build a defence system destined to ensure its continued exi-
stence.48
In conclusion, the 1848 Neapolitan revolution reveals the real participation of ordi-
nary people in the process of maintaining the dissident public order. This was part of a 
double process of politicization of the masses, at first directed towards the ‘people’, un-
derstood as civil society at whole, and especially towards the popular masses in a descen-
ding politicization scheme, relying on local stakeholders who identified as revolutionary 
elites. The question remains whether this evolution, which can be observed at the same 
time in other European Mediterranean states,49 led to a real popular appropriation of po-
litics. The reinvestment of a part of the regalian competences it carried out including se-
curity and taxes, reveals a political transition to the advantage of dissident and informal 
political communities. However, the process in general had been widely controlled and 
gathered by local elites and it contributed to their social and political promotion. The 
municipal or regional sovereign governments they formed did not have any real political 
foundations, and the initiatives they supported rather came from protest practices than 
from political projects destined to continue to exist. Such political education had thus 
occurred in the context of systems doomed to be provisory, without a real awareness of 
the sense of the movement. It shows that the shift of the Southern Italian masses to poli-
tical modernity, even if this noticeably increased in 1848, still remained unequal and in-
complete.
46 ASNA, Archivio privato Borbone, 1044, 38, ad nomen.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 See Luis, ‘Réflexions autour de la naissance de la politique moderne’. More recent works have shown that 
such situations were frequent in the Italian states around 1848 (Francia, 1848. La rivoluzione del Risorgi-
mento).
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Policing a Capital City during a 
‘Revolution’ – The squadre in Palermo at the 
Time of the Italian Unification (1860)
Emilio Scaramuzza
I. Introduction
In an article written in 1990, Paolo Pezzino highlighted the strong connection, which, he 
claimed, existed throughout the 1800s between the emergence and actions of the Sicilian 
squadre (squads) and the development of delinquent phenomena such as the mafia.1 This 
partially teleological interpretation, further developed a few years later in a successful 
work focused on the ‘congiura dei pugnalatori’ (‘stabbing conspiracy’),2 has recently been 
scaled down by the points suggested by Francesco Benigno in his work on the origins of 
the mafia and the camorra.3 From a number of points of view, the theme of the Sicilian 
squads is however central within the revolutionary season of Southern Italy in the nine-
teenth century and therefore lends itself to various interpretations. As a matter of fact, 
the squads had a key role in one of the pivotal moments of Sicilian history between 1820 
and 1866 (the year of the ‘Sette e Mezzo’ revolt) and beyond, and in particular during the 
1848-49 revolution and Garibaldi’s campaign of 1860.
In the year that de facto coincided with the fall of the kingdom of the Two Sicilies and 
with the attainment of Italian unity, the Sicilian insurgents, hurriedly grouped into ar-
med mobs, once again found themselves on the front lines during Garibaldi’s advance to-
wards Palermo. However, while the main object of study has been the ‘military’ role of 
these squads,4 on the other hand one must consider the events that took place after the 
city being taken by Garibaldi’s red-shirted volunteer army to understand the role of the-
se local individuals in the urban landscape and its immediate vicinity. To this end one 
may refer to the categories which are typical of the history of police,5 which will cer-
tainly be useful to analyse how, in the weeks that followed the liberation of the island’s 
main urban centres, Garibaldi’s new establishment and, consequently, the Sicilian insur-
gents (primarily the squads) managed to face the delicate problem of public order ma-
1 Pezzino, ‘La tradizione rivoluzionaria siciliana’.
2 Pezzino, La congiura dei pugnalatori.
3 Benigno, La mala setta. See also Benigno, ‘Mafia o maffia?’.
4 Corselli, La liberazione della Sicilia nel 1860; Merenda, ‘Contingente delle squadre siciliane d’insorti’; 
Pieri, Storia militare del Risorgimento.
5 Antonielli and Levati, Controllare il territorio; Berlière and others, Métiers de police; Davis, Conflict and 
control; Denys, Police et sécurité au XVIIIe siècle; Emsley, Policing and its context. For the question of 
the relationship between the police and national uprisings see Bayley, ‘The Police and Political Develop-
ment in Europe’, while for the specific case of Sicily one must refer to Riall, ‘Liberal policy and the control 
of Public Order’, and Riall, Sicily and the Unification of Italy.
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nagement. This will therefore be the meaning of the present article: the presentation of 
new elements related to Sicilian squads within a historiographical scenery, which is al-
ready wide and varied. We shall therefore elaborate on the origins and composition of 
the squads, later concentrating on the policing activity performed by those in Palermo in 
1860, a prime study example due to the role and importance of the city which had soon 
become Garibaldi’s new capital. In other words, in light of mostly unreleased archival do-
cumentation and substantial bibliographical research, 6 we shall attempt to provide a dif-
ferent interpretation of the events and, most of all, of the participants in the police acti-
vity in Palermo, so as to understand and evaluate the characteristics of a popular militia 
activity in a period of vast political change.
II. A question of definitions, a question of bodies
In first place, one must provide clarifications regarding old and new players on Palermo’s 
political theatre at the time of Garibaldi’s arrival – starting with the ‘armed mobs, which 
in Sicily were known as squads’7 – defining each one’s role. A philological premise is 
therefore necessary: in the sources one may find the terms banda, squadra, squadrig-
lia and even guerriglia (‘band’, ‘squad’, ‘squadron’ and ‘guerrilla’) to define the same sub-
ject.8 The definition ‘armed band’ maintains a generic nature (a mob may as a matter of 
fact be formed by bandits or highwaymen,9 deserters, draft dodgers and fugitives,10 ar-
med peasants, insurgents, etc.),11 while other definitions tend to refer to a solely milita-
ry aspect, the last case in particular. In most cases, however, these definitions are asso-
ciated to popular forces which are mainly rural (and therefore not urban) and which are 
commanded by charismatic leaders: said leaders were often local persons of importance 
or barons who were capable of gathering a vast following. The intention of these leading 
figures was to control the insurrection so as to defend their own status and their position 
in the region. Finally, the squads could also be led by common delinquents and bandits 
who – taking advantage of the insurrectional nature of the events and hiding their cri-
minal actions behind the Italian flag – would then pillage the towns of the province. The 
most striking case, with a tragic ending in October 1860, was the one of the bandit Santo 
Meli,12 who had been a squad commander since the arrival of Garibaldi and was charged 
6 The archival documentation widely mentioned in the following pages is drawn from the State Archi-
ves of Palermo and Turin, where extensive research has been made on military and police documents, 
and in particular the papers of the police headquarters and the prefecture of Palermo, as well as those 
from the Sicilian military archive, stored in Turin. Furthermore, a number of public and private archi-
val collections have been explored, belonging to Italian patriots of the Risorgimento such as Francesco 
Crispi, Agostino Depretis, Vincenzo Orsini, Giuseppe Oddo and others, who will punctually be mentio-
ned further into this text.
7 La Farina, Istoria documentata della rivoluzione siciliana, t. 1, p. 38.
8 Fiume, Le bande armate in Sicilia (1819-1849).
9 Hobsbawm, Bandits.
10 Lignereux, La France rébellionnaire.
11 Pelleriti, ‘Fra città e campagne’.
12 Riall, Sicily and the Unification of Italy, p. 93.
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with a number of crimes towards persons and property.13 Meli was then executed in Pa-
lermo after two separate trials; his “exemplary” sentence was firmly petitioned by Gari-
baldinian highest authorities, and in particular by the General’s right-hand man, Fran-
cesco Crispi.14
In light of the above, one may suggest a possible usage of the term ‘popular’: the squads 
are ‘popular’ as they are mostly composed of armed peasants. Their forces are therefore 
drawn from the most disadvantaged social classes. It is harder to ascertain the possibility 
that the great involvement of subordinate classes may have been due to economic and so-
cial reasons,15 or if this widespread popular participation to the insurrections of 1848 and 
1860 was the indication of a far more deeply-rooted political awareness. The bad harvest 
of 1859 will certainly have taken its toll to a certain extent, as the redistribution of land 
and the restoration of the public use of commons were still a fundamental objective for 
Sicilian peasants; Garibaldinian reforms would only partially have gone in the direction 
wished by the people. We are therefore confronting a social and popular dimension, and 
a political dimension, which may not be detached if one wishes to fully understand the 
significance of the events surrounding the Italian unification, when the Sicilian squads 
reappeared, this time supporting Garibaldi, to support his national project. In 1860, the 
priority was not to support the island’s unrealisable dream of being autonomous from 
Naples, but instead to introduce Sicily into a wider, Italian, framework.16
On account of these considerations, squads represented a double-edged sword for 
Garibaldi’s new-born government, due to their rural composition and their political and 
social aspirations, if present. Garibaldinians also had to rely on squads when marching 
towards Palermo and, most of all, after the city’s liberation. In those crucial moments 
it was inevitably necessary to entrust them with public order management, similarly to 
what had occurred in the previous revolution; to paraphrase the renowned expression 
coined in a completely different context by Parisian prefect Marc Caussidière: to ‘faire de 
l’ordre avec du désordre’ (‘to work out order through disorder’).17
In parallel to Garibaldi’s new government’s use of squads, the authorities quickly acti-
vated to reconstitute the entire range of Sicilian law enforcement, which had disappeared 
shortly after Garibaldi’s arrival, starting with the police. The institution of Palermo’s 
Questura (‘central police station’), the first one in Sicily, had been an immediate conse-
quence of the battle to liberate the city.18 Its role, and the actual amount of public safety 
13 Dumas, Les Garibaldiens, pp. 137-155.
14 ASRAM (Archivio Storico Risorgimentale Antonio Mordini, Barga (Lucca)), b. 16, f. Q.
15 Renda, ‘Garibaldi e la questione contadina’.
16 De Francesco, ‘Cultura costituzionale e conflitto politico’.
17 Caussidière, A ses concitoyens, p. 5.
18 La Lumia, La restaurazione borbonica e la rivoluzione del 1860, p. 123.
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(i. e. police) guards 19 soon became quite notable in Palermo’s political theatre,20 managing 
to compete with other institutions which had the same tasks and were also still in deve-
lopment, such as the city’s national guard.21 The reconstitution of the latter was origina-
ted by multiple impulses: to swell up Garibaldi’s exhausted army, to introduce a set of ru-
les similar to that of the Piedmontese kingdom in view of the then-imminent unification, 
and to protect the island’s traditions, which saw the national guard as the ‘palladio della 
libertà’ (‘defender of freedom’).22
Another key player on the Sicilian scene in general, and Palermo in particular, was 
of course Garibaldi’s army. Basically composed of volunteers from Northern Italy and 
some Sicilian contingents,23 the army was a fixed presence in Garibaldi’s capital. The ‘Red 
Shirts’ would patrol the city’s streets at night,24 protect connections with the municipali-
ties in the province, and control the new Sicilian government’s centres of power. Natural-
ly, the primary role of Garibaldinian army, as for any other army, did not consist of police 
duties. With the exception of greater operations of a repressive nature – for example, the 
well-known case of Bronte25 – Military authorities would generally attempt to delegate 
police activity to other law enforcement authorities. One of these was the militi a caval-
lo (‘horseback soldiers’), a police force assigned to surveillance of the countryside, origi-
nating from armed bands of Bourbon times,26 and the carabinieri,27 strongly endorsed by 
both of Garibaldi’s pro-dictators, Agostino Depretis and Antonio Mordini.28 This proli-
feration of units and institutions with duties that were essentially similar was an obvious 
indication of a fragile situation among the institutions originated from Sicilian revoluti-
on: conflicts of jurisdiction and personal clashes were a common occurrence.29 The pres-
ence of squads in Palermo, especially in the early weeks of Garibaldi’s government, only 
managed to make the situation even more chaotic, despite the extreme need for order. 
Garibaldi’s provisions aiming to form an efficient army and national guard, and conse-
quently to limit the fragmentation of power into hundreds of different directions, are to 
be understood in this sense. The situation needed to be brought back to normality, and 
19 ASPa, RSLG-RP (State Archive of Palermo, ‘Real Segreteria di Stato presso il Luogotenente Generale – 
Ripartimento Polizia’), b. 1561, ‘Notamento approssimativo della forza addetta alla Questura del Distret-
to di Palermo’, 8 june 1860.
20 Di Benedetto, Conto della gestione tenuta dalla questura di Palermo.
21 Dupuy, La Garde nationale. 1789-1872; Francia, Le baionette intelligenti.
22 Giornale Officiale di Sicilia, 25 november 1860.
23 Scaramuzza, ‘Il volontarismo garibaldino’.
24 MRM (Museum of the Risorgimento, Milano), ‘Archivio Guastalla’, c. 2, b. 14, letter from Palermo square 
control to the 3rd Brigade control, 24 june 1860.
25 Radice, ‘Nino Bixio a Bronte’; Riall, ‘Nelson versus Bronte’; Riall, La rivolta. Bronte 1860.
26 Fiume, Le bande armate in Sicilia (1819-1849).
27 Carbone, Gli ufficiali dei Carabinieri reali; Ibba, ‘Il generale Giovanni Battista Serpi nel Risorgimento’. 
On this specific point, see also Gramsci, Quaderni dal carcere, pp. 242-243.
28 Librino, ‘Agostino Depretis prodittatore in Sicilia’; Maraldi, ‘La rivoluzione siciliana del 1860’.
29 ASTo, AMS (State Archive of Turin, ‘Archivio Militare di Sicilia’), m. 4, f. 1, c. 6 and ASTo, AMS, m. 22, f. 
1, sf. 2, c. 47.
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a draft of contingents from the island, to be trained and equipped over a short period of 
time, appeared to be the solution most favoured by the authorities.
III. Popular militia and revolutionary war
Another relevant point to be made before continuing with the interpretation of the 
events that followed the liberation of Palermo concerns the theoretical and democratic 
roots of the draft of Sicilian insurgents in the spring of 1860. Not long after the expedi-
tion of the Thousand, Garibaldi found himself addressing over 20,000 perfectly trained 
and equipped Bourbon soldiers. Therefore, the original unit of red-shirted volunteers 
needed to be reinforced with a proportionate introduction of local contingents so as to 
approach the confrontation with the bulk of the Bourbon troops in more favourable con-
ditions. Despite the local population’s reluctance,30 not being accustomed to support war 
efforts in ways other than large-scale taxation, Garibaldi’s government introduced mili-
tary draft to the island. The experiment did not encounter the expected success and, lak-
king alternatives, Garibaldi had to make virtue of necessity and take advantage of the di-
sorganized enthusiasm of insurgent peasants.
The Sicilian draft provision planned by the General was planted on a democratic, deca-
des-old reflection on military matters.31 Ever since the 1830s, Piedmontese patriot Carlo 
Bianco, Count of Saint Jorioz, had theorized the use of popular forces in war intended as 
a guerrilla movement against reactionary powers,32 such as Austria, which were instead 
equipped with large regular armies.33 Popular forces could therefore reveal themselves to 
be a fundamental resource not just for the achievement of insurrectional projects concei-
ved within Mazzini’s partito d’Azione (‘Action Party’),34 but also for Garibaldi’s men who 
drew widely from the volunteer element to support the project of unification.35 In 1853 
even Giuseppe Mazzini, the champion of Italian unity, had managed to reclaim the theo-
ries of Count Bianco of Saint-Jorioz in a short publication, which was nowhere near the 
analytic detail and scope of the Piedmontese patriot.36 According to Mazzini, a revolu-
tionary direction of war had a double advantage: on the one hand, it made the war effort 
popular (being supported by the armed population, who shared the objectives and ideals 
with passion), on the other it made war ‘moral’, de facto transforming ‘opinion into na-
tional enthusiasm’.37 In his opinion, however, the risk of anarchy spreading among popu-
lar ranks needed to be avoided at all costs. Said pressure could have been generated due 
30 Pezzino, Il Paradiso abitato dai diavoli.
31 Del Negro, ‘Garibaldi tra esercito regio e nazione armata’, pp. 253-310.
32 Della Peruta, Democratici premazziniani, mazziniani e dissidenti, pp. 39-75; Della Peruta, ‘Le teorie mi-
litari della democrazia risorgimentale’, pp. 61-82.
33 Bianco di Saint Jorioz, Della guerra nazionale d’insurrezione.
34 Frétigné, Giuseppe Mazzini, pp. 110-112.
35 Alberton, ‘Finché Venezia salva non sia’; Cecchinato, Camicie rosse; Cecchinato, ‘Il Regno delle camicie 
rosse’; Isastia, ‘La guerra dei volontari’; Molfese, ‘Lo Scioglimento dell’esercito meridionale garibaldino’; 
Spagnolo, Il volontarismo democratico; Trevelyan, Garibaldi and the making of Italy.
36 Sarti, Mazzini, p. 62.
37 Mazzini, Della guerra d’insurrezione, p. 5.
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to lack of proper control from democratic cadres upon drafting armed mobs. This would 
have had vast political and social repercussions, practically estranging the popular clas-
ses, which should have been the largest contingent of the new army, from the thinking 
class. This fear was also shared by Francesco Crispi who, already in 1855, was imagining 
the possibility of a new Sicilian insurrection and, knowing the actual situation on the is-
land well, was aware of the need to reconstruct the army and police force immediately af-
ter the earliest successes, so as to maintain a firm hold on the country, unlike what had 
happened in 1848.38
In the squads of 1860 one may therefore see a concrete application (and the limits) of 
these signature theories of the radical Italian left, which saw the problem as mainly con-
sisting of the composition of these armed mobs, tied to their leaders by relationships of 
loyalty which would sometimes prefigure typical relationships of patronage, perhaps an-
ticipating mafia relationships.39 Naturally, this question was posed all the more after the 
liberation of Palermo, when squads gradually lost their military role and acquired a new 
faculty as a police force, as after all had already happened during the previous revoluti-
on.40
IV. The 1848 precedent
Ever since the unsuccessful revolution of 1848-49, squads had represented the primary 
resource for the Sicilian population to confront Bourbon military and police forces.41 In 
January 1848, the first revolt in Europe to overthrow a reigning dynasty had begun in Pa-
lermo, close to Fieravecchia, in the middle of the city centre.42 Subsequently, as described 
by Giuseppe Farina, “Small armed mobs started to form in various points of the town, 
and where there was no superior command, leadership went to anyone with the audacity 
of action: those with weapons would follow his example more than his commands; they 
38 In 1855 Crispi wrote the following, from London, to Nicola Fabrizi, a patriot from Modena who at the 
time was in Malta: ‘Pippo [Mazzini] and I have engaged in lengthy reflection regarding the Italian south. 
Instructions to be sent should be few and precise. Besides a proclamation which, upon occurring, should 
not obstruct the triumph of the great idea of a united nation, you must insinuate that leaders aim to three 
points: first, finding money in legal manners, whilst remaining revolutionary; second, organising the 
country and the armed forces hand in hand as the insurrection expands; Third, to organize public safety 
as much as possible so as to avoid thefts, which would turn the great party of landowners against our cau-
se.’ (Crispi, Lettere dall’esilio (1850-1860), pp. 101-102, the original can be found in MCRR (Museo Cen-
trale del Risorgimento, Rome), b. 656, fasc. 30).
39 Pezzino, ‘La tradizione rivoluzionaria siciliana’.
40 Fiume, La crisi sociale del 1848 in Sicilia.
41 Cfr. Pezzino, Il Paradiso abitato dai diavoli, p. 22. On the actions of squads during the upheavals, see 
also the writings of Calvi, 1851. The squads had in fact revealed themselves to be excellent for urban 
clashes, but much less, due to obvious limitations of discipline, preparation, and weaponry, in the open 
field. Calvi, who had been a minister during the 1848 revolution, writes: ‘Most of the people who formed 
the squads were worth very little in a conflict with true dangers: being used to fight in closed areas, they 
could not avoid giving bad performances when forced to fight without the protection of a shelter’ (Ibid., 
p. 323).
42 Rapport, 1848.
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had no rules, no order, no designs”.43 Simply put, few citizens armed in a makeshift man-
ner had attacked police posts (slaughtering the despised birri, for example in the assault 
to the Prefecture) and then the barracks, taking the authorities by surprise and seizing 
the weapons needed to continue the insurrection. However, there had already been war-
ning signs for the insurrection.44 The first squads of peasants had appeared shortly the-
reafter, arriving from the nearby countryside. These were mainly formed by farmers ar-
med with a few shotguns and many hand weapons: knives, pikes, and other tools related 
to country life.45
On 20 January 1848 the organisation of bands began. What had begun as a city re-
volt soon showed all the characteristics of a revolution, covering the entire island:46 As 
would also have happened in 1860, local committees everywhere were arming squads 
with equipment so they could join the insurrection and at least in part attempt to rule 
over it, while in larger cities, such as Palermo, a city national guard would form just to 
protect order and properties, thus attracting severe criticism from the more progressive 
elements of the island’s society, who saw the new institutions as a restraint to the legiti-
mate social requests of most of the population:
The institution of the national guard, essential in times of reform to block 
inclinations of absolute control, reassure the citizens, maintain public order, 
and protect the concessions which have been obtained, is an obstacle and 
a hindrance during revolutionary movements […]. [In 1848] the national 
guard was therefore only originated as auxiliary units for the squads pro-
tecting public order; this however was only the appearance, a justification: it 
had actually been created by the eternal suspicion that those who own have 
towards those who do not.47
Leaving behind the classist interpretation given by La Farina to the institution of the 
National Guard, he had correctly understood a point which was crucial to the results 
of the Sicilian Revolution: the insurrection had left traditional channels and was acqui-
ring a popular characterisation. The division between the democratic and the aristocra-
tic, traditionalist, elements would have been one of the causes for the 1848 revolution’s 
failure.
In those particularly tense circumstances, squad activity had shown to be important 
in relation to controlling the city of Palermo, despite conflicts with the central institu-
tions and the aristocratic and bourgeoise classes, which were sometimes implied and 
43 La Farina, Istoria documentata della rivoluzione siciliana, t. 1, p. 29.
44 Cfr. Romeo, Il Risorgimento in Sicilia, pp. 256-316.
45 Giuseppe La Farina, a protagonist and witness of these events, writes: ‘Help from the countryside and 
from nearby municipalities started to arrive during the night: the first were sixty peasants from Villabate, 
then others from Misilmeri, from Bagheria, from other places: they were received with applause, embra-
ces, kisses; and so by the morning of the 13th one could count about 300 men armed with rifles, and just 
as many with scythes, bill hooks, knives, and those steel instruments which popular enthusiasm makes 
into weapons’ (La Farina, Istoria documentata della rivoluzione siciliana, vol. 1, p. 31).
46 Ibid., p. 56.
47 La Farina, Istoria documentata della rivoluzione siciliana, t. 2, pp. 110-112.
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other times quite evident. As a matter of fact, cautions Paolo Pezzino, the 1848 Sicilian 
government’s illusion to ‘maintain order with the squads’ is only momentary,48 specifical-
ly due to their composition: ‘Rustic and rough men, accustomed to all sorts of danger, of 
uncultured morality, armed, within a society with no repressive public force, soon reali-
zed that all was allowed to them’, as noted by an observer of the Sicilian situation of the 
time. 49 The result was therefore a
situation of institutional vacuum where a popular and vulgar armed force 
finds itself in a position of power, contrasted not by governmental instituti-
ons, despite protecting “classist” interests while nonetheless being an expres-
sion of power that is considered to be legitimate, but instead by other armed 
forces, also characterized by an organized private use of violence.50
This was therefore a volcanic situation, changing continuously and constantly. In 1848-
49, Sicilians improvised themselves as soldiers with a certain success until, when the in-
ternational political situation changed, the Bourbons managed to establish a strong con-
tingent that was sent by sea to recover control of the island, so the Sicilian political class 
and administration, already weak due to internal conflicts, collapsed before the Neapoli-
tan menace, generating a flow of migration towards all of Europe, composed of the elites 
who had jeopardized their position due to the revolution.51
Peasant uprisings had also periodically occurred on the island after the restoration,52 
driven by individuals such as baron Francesco Bentivegna.53 In these cases, the role of ru-
ral populations had once again turned out to be fundamental. This would become all the 
more realistic in 1860 when, in reaction to the failure of the Gancia uprising in Palermo, 
the resistance remained active in the countryside around the city thus making it difficult 
for the authorities to subdue the reluctant populations of the Sicilian inlands. Relying on 
confident knowledge of the areas, which were often irregular woodlands – as is obvious 
still today to anyone who observes the so-called Conca d’oro (‘golden basin’) which sur-
rounds the Sicilian capital – and consequentially provided with great movement capabi-
lity, the squads were capable of resisting to the attacks of the military factions sent against 
them by the Neapolitan authorities. They were not however able to make a move on the 
city, as it was firmly controlled by Neapolitan soldiers.
48 Pezzino, ‘La tradizione rivoluzionaria siciliana’, p. 52.
49 Calvi, Memorie storiche e critiche della rivoluzione siciliana, p. 211.
50 Pezzino, ‘La tradizione rivoluzionaria siciliana’, p. 57.
51 Recent studies on Italian exiles of the Unification movement are by Bistarelli, Gli esuli del Risorgimento 
and Isabella, Risorgimento in esilio. For further information on the case of the Mediterranean, see Isa-
bella and Zanou, Mediterranean Diasporas. On specific relation to the case of Sicily, see instead Ciampi, 
‘Gli esuli moderati siciliani alla vigilia dell’annessione dell’isola’.
52 For the question of the peasants’ revolt in 1860 see Mack Smith, ‘The peasants’ revolt of Sicily in 1860’, pp. 
201-240.
53 Sansone, Cospirazioni e rivolte di Francesco Bentivegna and Spiridione, Storia della rivolta del 1856 in 
Sicilia.
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V. Palermo in the summer of 1860
In 1860, the ancient capital of the kingdom of Sicily was a city with about two hundred 
thousand inhabitants, enclosed by a circle of walls interrupted by about fifteen doorways. 
It was through one of the latter that Garibaldi entered Palermo on 27 May 1860.54 After 
about a week of combat he took control of the city,55 which had been weakened by the da-
mage provoked by Bourbon shellfire, as proven by historical images collected by French 
photographers Eugène Sevaistre and Gustave Le Gray.56
Fundamental for the expansion of the already worn out ranks of the Thousand, after 
the clash of Calatafimi in particular, squads had a decisive, albeit noisy and disorderly, 
role in the breach of Palermo. They could therefore be found within the city already on 
the day after its liberation, counting on hundreds if not thousands of men.57 According to 
what had been written at the time, during operations around the city ‘The squad of Cari-
ni, the one of Capaci, the one of cav. Santa Anna, the one of mr. Coppola, the one of Bor-
getto and finally the one of Oddo were in action’.58
On the days that followed their arrival, they seemed to have been spread throughout 
the urban area, due to needs which were initially military, as long as the clashes with the 
Bourbons continued, and later mainly deployed in protection of the area, so as to ensu-
re a tangible presence on the territory. In 1848, squads were stationed in eight districts, 
spread in the residential areas ‘so all points of the city would be protected’.59 A similar dis-
tribution was repeated in 1860.60
54 Trevelyan, Garibaldi and the making of Italy.
55 Mundy, “Hannibal” at Palermo and Naples.
56 https://fotografieincomune.comune.milano.it/FotografieInComune/ricerca?query=sevaistre.
57 Numbers vary depending on the sources, but it is conceivable that they were composed of at least 3000 
men.
58 SSSP (Sicilian Society of Storia Patria, Palermo), ‘Sala Lodi’, b. 10, n. 1080.
59 Di Marzo Ferro, Un periodo di storia siciliana, p. 84. In 1848, the districts assigned to the squads had 
been those of the Carmine convent, the Carminello convent, the convent of S. Francis of Assisi, the con-
vent of S. Nicola of Tolentino, the convent of S. Augustine, the Jesuit college, the police station at S. Do-
menico and the house of Olivella (ibid.). In particular, at the Carminello convent were the squads of 
Giuseppe Oddo – who will be mentioned several times in the next pages – Francesco Cortegiani, and 
Tommaso Giordano.
60 There were many similarities between 1848 and 1860 in Sicily, especially regarding public safety and 
its management. To this end, a section of Pasquale Calvi’s study on 1848 can easily convey the simila-
rity between both revolutions: ‘The revolution, as said, had destroyed the government, had dismantled 
law enforcement, had suspended the magistrates’ authority, had dissolved all the state’s public admini-
strations, as well as those of the communities. Nobody could know how much time, and how many great 
works, would be needed to replace the moral and civil chaos that follow a revolution of this nature with 
the normal pace of affairs. – Private and public safety, a precious result of the government’s moral and 
physical strength, of respect for the magistrates, of the strict and inescapable application of the law, is first 
of all the primary condition for an uncontested collection of public contribution, and when it is drained 
by opposing forces, industrial activity decreases, production from properties decrease, as they may only 
thrive in the shade of security, and consequentially the nation’s revenue dries out, becoming incapable to 
provide the necessary means for conservation and defence of the State’ (Calvi, Memorie storiche e criti-
che della rivoluzione siciliana, p. 211).
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A contribution by Pietro Merenda at the eighteenth social congress of Palermo, held in 
the Sicilian capital in May 1930, specifically deals with the contingent of Sicilian insur-
gents and their distribution within the capital on the early days of June 1860.61 Here Me-
renda related a large amount of data contained in the writings from 1860 and 1861 by 
Sicilian general Giuseppe La Masa, a veteran, along with other patriots, of the 1848 upri-
sing; in this sense, the continuity between both revolutions is undeniable. The contribu-
tion of Merenda’s data, along with other contemporary publications, has allowed to chart 
a map of the distribution of squads in Palermo in 1860.62
1 Porta di Ossuna 10 Papireto 19 Calderai 28 Porta Montalto
2 Porta Carini 11 Celso 20 Fieravecchia 29 Porta S. Agata
3 Porta Carini 12 Protonotaro 21 Fieravecchia 30 Porta S. Antonino
4 Porta Macqueda 13 Piazza Bologni 22 Gancia 31 Porta S. Antonino
5 Porta San Giorgio 14 Piazza Bologni 23 Gancia 32 Porta Termini
6 Cantone Aragona 15 Cantoni 24 Porta dei Greci 33 Magione
7 S. Agostino 16 Università Q.G. 25 Salita Banditore 34 Porta Reale
8 S. Domenico 17 Università Q.G. 26 Albergaria 35 Orto Botanico
9 Papireto 18 Università Q.G. 27 Carmine 36 Orto Botanico
61 Merenda, ‘Contingente delle squadre siciliane d’insorti’.
62 Pecorini Manzoni, Storia della 15a divisione Türr.
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The deployment of squads in inhabited areas complied with a firm strategy of territory 
control, in the vicinities of the doorways just as much as within the bastions. As a matter 
of fact, they were allocated so as to occupy key nodes of the urban fabric: squares, mona-
steries, barracks, the town hall (Palazzo Pretorio), the university’s areas, the central po-
lice headquarters, and so on. As can be easily imagined, this distribution branches out 
abundantly. Thanks to their presence in the urban setting, squads were able to help the 
authorities protect public order and, consequentially, the new political order risen with 
the ‘revolution’.
However, this deployment of squads also hides a second motivation. Fearing the return 
of the same situation as 1848, when many groups had become incontrollable, Garibal-
dian authorities had established that squads were to be confined to quarters just like ‘re-
gular’ troops. After the first chaotic days, Garibaldinian officers had assigned the squads 
to barracks and monasteries: the situation was returning to normal,63 the Bourbon me-
nace was moving further and further away, and the need to maintain thousands of armed 
peasants within the capital or in the surrounding woods was no longer on the agenda.
VI. Sicilian squads and police
As written by Francesco Renda, participation of peasants in the first weeks of the cam-
paign was extremely important, if not decisive,64 save for then losing strength and moti-
vation as the new power, despite being revolutionary, started to form, in good measure 
protecting the previous social and economic order. Furthermore, the need to guarantee 
order within the city and the countryside required greater professionality from the po-
lice forces. On the other hand, the peasant squads, which had been at the centre of tho-
se early days were defined by their pronounced improvisation. According to ‘a note of 
forces guarding the Carminello district from 12 to 13 June 1860’, the squad commanded 
by Colonel Giuseppe Oddo would have been formed of 150 men, 81 of whom were ar-
med with rifles and 69 with blades.65 This evidence could have applied perfectly to any of 
the squads, which had joined Garibaldi in the late spring of that same year.
From a monetary point of view, as well as for weaponry, the squads of Palermo depen-
ded on the State Secretariat for War, at least in theory. Payment, which was sometimes ir-
regular, varied depending on rank but was generally not too high (on average, it was set 
to 3 or 4 tarì – the Sicilian currency – per day for a basic soldier, the equivalent of a day 
labourer’s salary). The main difference from the case of Catania, where squads were also 
present, is that in Palermo, despite being composed of volunteers from the countryside 
63 An exceptional testimony in this regard comes from historian Michele Amari, who disembarked in Pa-
lermo on July 1st, 1860 and was soon afterwards destined to be given assignments within Garibaldi’s go-
vernment: ‘In Palermo one does not hear of the robberies nor the murders nor the other brutalities of 
‘48’ (Amari, Carteggio, vol. 2, p. 97) and also: ‘one lives in full safety of persons and of possessions: busi-
ness and commerce are carried out as always, people are circulating on the streets until the late night’ 
(Ibid., p. 98).
64 Renda, Storia della Sicilia dal 1860 al 1970, pp. 155-163.
65 SSSP, ‘Sala Lodi’, b. 42, n. 2067.
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around the city, squads were paid with military funds. In the case of Catania, on the other 
hand, squads, mainly assigned to the protection of public order, were partly composed of 
volunteers, who therefore received no financial subsidy, and the rest were individuals de-
fined as ‘hired soldiers’, who therefore served in return from payment by the local muni-
cipal institutions. In the new capital of Garibaldi’s dictatorship part of the squads’ forces 
would soon have merged with the police, under direct orders of the Questura.66
As mentioned previously, in Palermo public order was guaranteed by various players, 
mainly by Garibaldi’s army, gradually assisted by the ‘public safety guards’, hurriedly or-
ganized by the new government and by the national guard. However, among the papers 
of colonel Oddo, squad commander, besides a number of documents related to the use of 
the squads he gathered for the battles in Palermo, we can also find key information rela-
ted to public safety in the early days of the capital’s liberation.
The regulations issued by the colonel to control the discipline of his men closely re-
mind of those for military districts but, reading between the lines, besides the most com-
mon rules in matter of cleaning and of orders of service, appeals, and reviews, one may 
also find some references to the role that squads might also have taken in an urban con-
text. The eighth and final article in Oddo’s regulations, redacted several times, says in its 
second comma that ‘when the National Guard will require reinforcements of men, in this 
case the Leaders of the centuria [i. e. a sub-division of the squad] may relocate as many 
men as are requested by aforementioned Unit’.67 The possibility of the squads’ interven-
tion in matters of public order, which then punctually happened between the 19 and 20 
June, for that matter without being called by the national guard, was therefore expected 
not just as a theorical possibility. That night a patrol, after hearing loud noises coming 
from a house at half past four in the morning, decided to intervene after distinctly hea-
ring screams of ‘ “thieves, thieves” coming from the Cassero, and these screams came 
specifically from the building of S. Margherita, and due to this problem – wrote the pa-
trol leader in his report – I hurried to go there, along with my squad, and upon arrival 
there [...] and having found a person disturbing the De Stefano family, who lived in said 
house, I promptly took him in, along with two women who live on the top floor’. Tho-
se arrested, the attacker and two women, very probably two prostitutes, would then have 
been entrusted to the national guard, which had also arrived in the meantime. Therefore, 
although the duty of Palermo’s squads was not to perform police activity in a strict sense, 
they were also allowed to and were even required to intervene when offences were being 
committed, or if they were called to intervene. It was therefore not infrequent that cer-
tain patrols drawn from the squads left the barracks along with Garibaldi’s red-shirted 
volunteers to inspect the city streets, especially by night.
66 Di Benedetto, Conto della gestione tenuta dalla questura di Palermo. In the first weeks, large sums of mo-
ney were granted to the Questura by Garibaldi’s military superintendence to pay the salaries of soldiers 
and of squads controlled by police authority. Afterwards, the entire police division came under the or-
ders of the Secretary of Internal Affairs.
67 SSSP, ‘Sala Lodi’, b. 42, n. 2040.
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However, it was mainly outside urban areas, in the rural zones closest to the city, that 
squads could have an important role, be it positive or negative. For example, around 
mid-June 1860, in Monreale, few kilometres away from Palermo, the criminal actions of 
an armed band brought to the intervention of the authorities, who in turn sent a squad, 
led by Giovanni Corrao, a high officer among those closest to Garibaldi, to attempt to 
solve the situation. It is interesting to note that in that occasion, along with Corrao, one 
of the city’s commissioners, Salvatore Cappello, also left from Palermo. The message sent 
to the capital’s Questura by the leaders of the Ministry of War says the following:
It is known to us that in Monreale are certain unruly individuals who, as 
leaders of bands, instigate internal discordance, causing foul behaviour from 
the people and thus breaching public peace, which is so important to our Go-
vernment, especially when it is lacking.68
The operation was a success and Corrao’s squad stayed in the city some days longer to 
fully restore public order. The case of Monreale in June 1860 is of particular interest as 
the situation that had brought to the decisive action of Garibaldinian authorities had de-
veloped due to an exceedingly premature disbandment of the local country squad, due to 
the excessive burden its support had had on the town’s expenses.69
The presence of squads in the countryside could therefore have been the cause of ac-
tual problems of public order, due to their composition, their indiscipline, and their ac-
tions, which were sometimes openly criminal.70 Historiography is well aware of this per-
spective. As had already happened in 1848, ‘discipline, which had always been little in the 
squads’,71 also proved to be a problem of some relevance in 1860. To this we must add an 
inherent tendency to unlawfulness from some leaders, which could in certain cases re-
sult in prevarication and brutality towards specific individuals or entire communities.72
For example, in those troubled days it was also not uncommon in coastal areas very 
close to the capital for some squads to bring about unorthodox, if not openly criminal, 
behaviour. Vincenzo Orsini, secretary of War, wrote the following to one of his subordi-
nates, Baron Bentivegna:
The secretary of State for Internal Affairs has informed me of the deep grie-
vances forwarded by the Pretore [Mayor], as the forces assigned to Acqua 
dei Corsari had blocked the transport of large amounts of bread towards Pa-
68 ASPa, RSLG-RP, b. 1560, c. 506, La Porta to S. Cappello, june 1860.
69 ASPa, RSLG-RP, b. 1560, c. 572.
70 ASTo, AMS, m. 12, f. 5, c. 199.
71 La Farina, Istoria documentata della rivoluzione siciliana, vol. 2, p. 7.
72 In this regard, an event which occurred in late August of 1860 is worth mentioning, when a battalion 
of Palermo’s national guard, led by colonel Amato Poulet, had to travel to Capaci to overcome a squad 
which had de facto become the ruler of that entire municipality, and the population had become its pri-
soner: ‘That municipality’s destiny had been handed to wrongdoers who allowed themselves any abu-
se, any brutality, any infliction, any misdeed. The inhabitants were subject to the strength of these men 
from the worst class of society, who were keeping the town in complete disarray so as not to be hindered 
in their own intentions. Furthermore, these men imposed a wheat tax and obstructed the formation of a 
National Guard, “element of order and of safety”’ (ASTo, AMS, m. 1, f. 2, sf. 7, cc. 93-96).
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lermo. As I am shocked by how forces assigned to maintain good order al-
low themselves to act against their own duties, I encourage you to express my 
personal [...] resentment to the leader of said forces, hoping that these incon-
veniences no longer occur from now on, to avoid the implementation of se-
vere measures.73
In other words, a squad assigned to protect a portion of territory very close to the 
dictatorship’s capital had exceeded their limitations and the government had pronoun-
ced itself ready to intervene. Episodes such as these could only undermine trust in 
Garibaldi’s government’s trust towards squads, a trust which was already damaged. In 
June 1860, once their positions in Palermo had been ensured, the quickest solution to 
come before the executive power was therefore to disband the squads, also considering 
the experiences from 1848.74 The dismantlement was gradual and lasted several weeks. 
In fact, while on the one hand the disbanding of the squads responded to a logic of strict 
maintenance of public order, on the other there was the problem of managing the flow of 
men, in the hundreds if not thousands and often armed, who were dispersing out from 
the city and into the surrounding countryside, sometimes causing trouble.
VII. Conclusion. The disbanding of the squads
To achieve a balanced judgement of Sicilian squads and their actions, one must highlight 
the fact that due to their composition and indiscipline they would often establish them-
selves as disturbing agents rather than as guardians of public order. Over a short peri-
od of time, this consideration brought to the discontinuation of the squads; their place 
would have been taken by the army and the national guard, which Crispi was attemp-
ting to assemble. On 25 May 1860, in a letter to colonel Vincenzo Giordano Orsini, soon 
to be the Secretary of War, the Sicilian statesman declared: ‘Please, ensure that you orga-
nize the troops, so that we may free ourselves of the squads. You have all the power and 
the means.’75
Now free from Bourbon domination, what Sicily increasingly required was order; in 
first place, to ensure the stability of its financial and social structures, as well as of its eli-
te class,76 and then to allow Garibaldi and his army to travel beyond the strait of Messi-
na and accomplish the project of Italian unity. An updated and efficient management of 
public order was also necessary to provide Europe with a reassuring image of Garibaldi’s 
government, which in the continent’s chancelleries was prematurely being classified as 
one of many left-wing radicalisms. Restructuring the national guard and organising the 
police force would have been a response to these views.
73 ASTo, AMS, m. 12, f. 5, c. 199, draft letter of V. Orsini to F. Bentivegna, 16 june 1860.
74 Giornale Officiale di Sicilia, 15 June 1860 and La Masa, 1861, p. 173.
75 Biblioteca Ambrosiana Milano, b. Y20 inf., n. 14.
76 Benigno and Torrisi, Elites e potere in Sicilia dal Medioevo ad oggi.
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From a typically liberal point of view, the police force represented an instrument 
that was required not just to control the territory, but also as an instrument that would 
maintain discipline of civil life, of the community, and more in general of the entire 
country. Therefore, in view of the Italian unification, the undisciplined enthusiasm of the 
squads needed to be substituted with the new political order initiated by the ‘Sicilian re-
volution’; in other words, a popular police force had to be replaced by a professional one. 
The composition of the squadre and their revolutionary past, and present, caused their 
role to be limited in time and in space, until their gradual distancing from the capital. 
The Government’s decision would have finally led to the overcoming of the impasse of 
1848 and, on the other hand, would have begun the process of standardisation of the Si-
cilian government’s institutions, and notably their police forces, to those of the kingdom 
of Sardinia in view of the unification, thus providing further drive to the quick political 
and institutional transition between a ‘before’ and an ‘after’: from a fragmented and divi-
ded Italy to a unified Italy.
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Cooperation or Confrontation? The 
interaction between police forces and 
vigilante groups during the postwar years 
(1918-1923) in Barcelona
Florian Grafl
I. Introduction
Gerardo Doval, a well-known criminologist, was sent to Barcelona in March 1919 by the 
then Spanish Prime Minister Álvaro Figuero y Torres Mendieta, also known as Count 
Romanones, to take over the police department. On 8 April, shortly after his arrival in 
the Catalan metropolis, he reported his first impressions in the following letter:
At my arrival, the police faced signs of disintegration, which were caused 
by complete negligence within the last four years. During that period, several 
police units formed up both within and outside the authorities, which stood 
in the way of the official police. The Captaincy General established its own 
police. They recruited its members from policemen, which had served the 
German Secret Service before. High-standing officials of the Captaincy Ge-
neral called for Bravo Portillo as person of their absolute trust. This police-
man, apart from some positive qualities, is driven by impulsive powers, set 
free by a twittered, displeased system, which make it impossible for him to 
guarantee a matter-of-fact, objective investigation. Having been put on the 
throne of the Captaincy General today, he exploits his impunity to put for-
ward unjustified accusations against citizens who without doubt are inno-
cent. Based on these facts, I have rejected his integration into our police, de-
spite the advocacy by the Captaincy General in that matter.1
The person mentioned in this letter, Manuel Bravo Portillo, was born in 1878 in Ma-
nila on the Philippines, which back then was a Spanish colony. He came to Barcelona in 
1909 where at first he joined the official police corps.2 For several years, he did service in 
the fifth district, which also included the Barrio Chino, (‘China Town’), the Barceloni-
an port area where it was said that most of the city’s drug traffic and other criminal acti-
vities took place.3 At the beginning of the year 1913, he replaced Francisco Martorell as 
the chief of the so-called ‘Special unit to fight anarchism and syndicalism’.4 He remained 
1 Cited in: Del Rey, Proprietarios y patronos, pp. 489-90. For the political career of Count Romanones see 
for example: Moreno Luzón, Romanones, caciquismo y politica.
2 Del Rey, Proprietarios y patronos, p. 479.
3 García Sanz, España en la Gran Guerra, pp. 209-10.
4 González Calleja, El máuser y el sufragio, pp. 122-123.
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inconspicuous until the beginning of 1918, when rumors began to spread that he would 
cooperate with the German Secret Service. In concrete, he was blamed by the Barceloni-
an workers’ movement to have organized the assassination of José Alberto Barret, a po-
werful industrialist, who was supposed to produce goods for the Allied forces.5 On 9 
June, Solidaridad Obrera (‘Workers’ Solidarity’), the mouth pipe of the CNT, the domi-
nant Barcelonian trade union, published documents which were supposed to proof that 
Bravo Portillo had passed information to the German Secret Service. That information 
was later used by the German navy to sink the Spanish ship Mumbru. As a result, the au-
thorities finally felt obliged to act.6 Bravo Portillo was suspended and remained in cust-
ody from June to December 1918, when he was admitted to bail.7 Later the charges were 
dropped due to lack of evidence.8
Soon afterwards, he offered his services to Milans del Bosch, the Captain General of 
Catalonia. He became the leader of a small auxiliary police unit which the local press de-
picted as Banda Negra (‘Black Gang’) and which was established and supported by the 
Federación Patronal (‘Employers’ Association’), the association of Catalonia’s most po-
werful employers.9 The foundation of the group was mainly a result of the lack of trust in 
the official police forces. Furthermore, del Rey argues that the reason why exactly the Fe-
deración Patronal acted as the driving force behind the foundation of that unit was that 
this organization mainly consisted of entrepreneurs from the sectors where the CNT was 
most active and which so far had been mostly affected by the attacks on the entrepre-
neurs.10
II. First popular policing attempts in Barcelona at 
the turn of the century
Actually, the official Barcelonian police was not only just in a bad shape in the years be-
fore Doval’s arrival as he argues in his letter, but had already been facing severe problems 
for decades which made it rather difficult to guarantee law and order in the city. Conse-
quently, the Barcelonian upper class, which had the biggest interest to maintain the status 
quo in the city felt obliged to establish additional forces to maintain law and order. Their 
fears had grown considerably in the 1890s, when the city was struck by a series of anar-
chist bomb attacks. In the forthcoming years, two different types of popular police were 
established in Barcelona, which will be examined in this paper.
5 Del Rey, Proprietarios y patronos, p. 480.
6 García Sanz, España en la Gran Guerra, pp. 316-317.
7 Smith, Anarchism, Revolution and Reaction, p. 298.
8 Del Rey, Proprietarios y patronos, p. 484.
9 González Calleja, El máuser y el sufragio, p. 146, who states that this group was build up on the 9th April 
1919, one day after the letter from Doval quoted above.
10 Del Rey, Proprietarios y patronos, p. 496, but the same author admits that only in one document the Fe-
deración Patronal admits a connection to Bravo Portillo, p. 494.
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The first type of popular police resulted from the attempt by the political catalanism at 
the beginning of the century to establish an additional police which in contrast to the of-
ficial police should be under the command of the local authorities. The spokesperson of 
the Catalan nationalists, Enrich Prat de la Riba, justified this measure in an article pu-
blished in the catalanist daily newspaper La Veu de Catalunya (‘The Voice of Catalonia’) 
on 27 December 1906 in the following way: ‘The Spanish police, as all institutions of the 
State, nowadays have become useless. A primitive instrument, a disused fossil. Trying to 
fight terrorism in Barcelona with it is similar to form up with lances and stones against a 
heavily armed army’.11
Influenced by the worldwide Sherlock-Homes-fever which had arisen from the novels 
by Arthur Conan Doyle, in July 1907 the 46-year old chief inspector of Scotland Yard, 
Charles Arrow, was hired. His job was to establish and to direct an independent police 
unit in Barcelona with the special task to investigate and prevent anarchist bomb attacks. 
Arrow neither spoke Spanish nor Catalan and his crime fighting methods differed a lot 
from those of the Spanish police and, as he had to realize step-by-step, could not be ap-
plied in Barcelona. Therefore, his commitment was soon doomed to failure.12
Besides the establishment of this official special police unit, nearly at the same time a 
group of police informers was made up, which should use their insider knowledge of the 
criminal milieu they predominantly stemmed from to gather information about forth-
coming bomb attacks in order to prevent them. This gang was commanded by Joan Rull, 
who had been on demand for fifteen months due to his alleged participation in a bomb 
attack in September 1904. Since the policemen in Barcelona usually came from other re-
gions of Spain and therefore did not know their operation area so well, the police depen-
ded on the assistance of snitches. This practice seemingly was so common during that 
period that every policeman cooperated with a multiplicity of informers and there were 
trials in which the police had to side with accused snitches to prevent them from convic-
tion.13 Since the postwar years, this had not changed much, and consequently, many snit-
ches who had been uncovered were found dead on the Montjuïc or its surroundings.14
A similar group had already been established by the then civil governor Ventura Diaz 
in the year 1847. This group, which mainly consisted of former convicts, murderers, rak-
keteers and professional counterfeiters and conducted numerous crimes, officially was 
under the command of the head of the police, but its true leader was a criminal.15 60 years 
later, the gang commanded by Joan Rull was not very successful neither. After a new se-
ries of bomb attacks had taken place in Barcelona from 24 December 1906 to 8 April 
1907, Joan Rull, his brother Hermenegildo and his parents were arrested under the ac-
11 Cited in: González Calleja, La Cataluña ingobernable, p. 50.
12 For a detailed examination of Charles Arrow’s engagement in Barcelona consult: Herrerín López, Anar-
quía, Dinamita y revolución and González Calleja, La Cataluña ingobernable.
13 Herrerín López, Anarquía, Dinamita y revolución, pp. 265-266. Those informers that were a valuable 
source for the police in Barcelona is already stated by Brenan, The Spanish Labyrinth, pp. 72-73. Pestaña, 
Terrorismo en Barcelona, p. 80 shows that this fact was already well known to the contemporaries.
14 Del Rey, Proprietarios y patronos, p. 541. Planes, Els Gàngsters de Barcelona, p. 15.
15 Villar, Historia y leyenda, p. 64.
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cusation that they themselves were responsible for this new series of bomb attacks. Af-
ter the trial, which took more than one year, Joan Rull was executed on 8 August 1908.16
Five years after the execution of Joan Rull, the predecessor of Bravo Portillo as chief 
of the special unit to fight anarchism in Barcelona, Francisco Martorell, was accused by 
the Republican newspaper El Progreso (‘The progress’), to have engaged a gang of in-
formers.17 This gang was established during a strike in the year 1913 and supposedly 
consisted only of four members, Lluís Mas Terrades, Frederic Roigé Navero, Amadeu 
Camprubí Soler and Maria Sanz Pau. All of them derived from the criminal milieu and 
together were involved in numerous criminal activities.18 Like the examples described 
above, this gang was not very successful neither. Lluís Mas Terrades was severly woun-
ded on 10 February 1914 in a shoot-out. When trying to take revenge, Mariano Sanz Pau 
was arrested and imprisoned.19 Roigé together with Epifani Casas, who, as it seems, was 
also related to Martorell’s gang, was hired by the direction of the factory España Industri-
al in Sants as strike-breaker and as a result was assassinated on 31 May 1917.20
The bomb attacks and shoot-outs for which the gangs commanded by Martorell and 
Rull were responsible gave reason for the worker-friendly press to put violent or crimi-
nal acts, which one would normally suspect to be committed by militant trade unionists, 
down to policemen or informers under the service of the state. One striking example, 
that this practice was still frequent in the postwar years, is the coverage by España Nue-
va (‘New Spain’) on 11 March 1920 of a bomb attack in Barcelona. Surprisingly, accor-
ding to the Madrilenian newspaper not the trade unions were responsible, but Francis-
co Martorell had to be blamed for the attack and the survey concluded with the words: 
‘Remember Rull!’21
III. Some theoretical reflections on vigilantism
Even though the two forms of popular police in Barcelona described above differed to 
some extent, they never the less can be described as ‘collective vigilantes’ according to the 
definition of the American political scientist David Kowalewski. As ‘vigilantism’, he clas-
sifies activities with the purpose to oppress deviance, i.e. attitudes which in a significant 
way deviate from the established social norms of a community. But in Kowlewski’s opini-
on, it is not deviance itself, but only its abrupt growth which gives the impression that the 
authorities are overwhelmed. As a consequence, this lead to the sudden appearance of vi-
gilantism as backlash. These theoretical considerations can well be applied to the Barce-
16 For a detailed biography of Joan Rull, consult: Dalmau, El Cas Rull.
17 Marinello Bonnefoy, Sindicalismo y violencia, p. 315. These accusations later were supported by leading 
figures of the worker’s movement, see for example Pestaña, Terrorismo en Barcelona, pp. 81-82.
18 A detailed description of their criminal records is provided by Marinello Bonnefoy, Sindicalismo y vio-
lencia, pp. 316-319.
19 Ibid., p. 318.
20 Ibid., p. 363.
21 España Nueva, 11 March 1920, p. 1.
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lona case which is studied in this paper. As Kowalewski further states, the acceptance of 
vigilante groups both by the state as well as by the society is rather ambiguous. On the 
one hand, the authorities support them by providing them with weapons, accommodati-
on and information in order to be able to use violence against deviance without being di-
rectly involved. On the other hand, the shared interest of these two actors to curtail de-
viance can soon cease leading to violent rivalry between vigilantes and ordinary forces as 
the police. A similar ambiguity seems to prevail regarding the relation between vigilante 
groups and society. On the one hand, vigilante groups contribute to the containment of 
deviance. On the other hand, in doing so, they often perpetrate the law which puts them 
outside the social norms and makes their behavior deviant too.22
The apparent paradox to form these vigilante groups as for example in the case of Joan 
Rull and his accomplices with criminals actually makes a lot of sense since both parties 
profit from this alliance. For the police, the cooperation with criminals is effective be-
cause they already know them well and the criminals are already accustomed to use vio-
lence and weapons, so they are rather uninhibited in that aspect. By taking part in vigi-
lant activities, the criminals can continue with their antisocial behavior without having 
to fear prosecution and instead can hope for recognition for their deeds. The main rea-
son why vigilante groups nevertheless rather contribute to the escalation of violence than 
to its containment, as it will be shown in the case of Barcelona, is that by fighting violence 
with violence they become a mirror image of the deviant groups themselves. Due to the 
fact that the protection by the state saves them from persecution and the control of their 
activities in most cases is rather limited, the application of violence by them to an incre-
asing degree gets out of control and more and more targets randomly selected innocent 
people as well.23
Although the first attempts to establish a popular police in Barcelona had been a com-
plete failure, in the postwar years two very different types of popular police played an im-
portant role in the violent conflicts in the Catalan metropolis that will be closely exami-
ned in this paper. While the already mentioned Banda Negra only existed for about one 
year, the militia Somatent established itself as a significant additional law enforcement 
force until the end of the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera in 1929.
IV. The militia Somatent
On 19 August 1921, the local newspaper El Diluvio (‘The Diluvian’) reported a shootout 
between workers and a group of Somatent, which had taken place on the eve of the day 
before: ‘According to official sources, shortly before 7 pm four workers appeared in the 
street Horta de la Bomba to encash the union contribution from the workers of the fac-
tory of Mr. Blay. According to the official sources, shortly afterwards, at the same place a 
few members of the Somatent appeared and demanded from those trying to encash the 
union contribution to abandon the street. One of the unionists fired a shot of his revolver 
22 Kowalewski, ‘Vigilantismus’, pp. 426-428.
23 Ibid., pp. 431-433.
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at the group of Somatent which responded the attack with a series of gunfire that caused 
panic among the residents and the passer-bys. The 34-year old Hilario Felipe Lazano and 
the 8-year old girl María Tarín were wounded.’24
The Somatent, which are mentioned in the article just quoted, was a kind of vigilante 
group that can be traced back to medieval times. The expression ‘Somatent’ derives from 
the Catalan phrase ‘So metent’ which can be translated as ‘Be on guard’. Their motto was 
‘Pau, Pau, sempre Pau’ which means ‘Peace, peace, always peace’. Therefore, we can as-
sume that the idea behind the foundation of the Somatent was to create a kind of civil 
guard to guarantee law and order. At first, the Somatent was established in the Catalan 
countryside to protect the people from robbers. Like many Catalan manners and traditi-
ons, the Somatent suffered repressions by the Spanish Crown since 1640, the year when a 
Catalan uprising had been put down. Only in the second half of the 19th century, when – 
thanks to the growing Catalanism – many Catalan traditions were revived, the Somatent 
started to regain significance in the rural areas of Catalonia. 25
The first time the Somatent were employed in Barcelona on a large scale was the Ca-
nadenca strike in 1919. Canadenca was an electric company which produced most of 
the steam used in Barcelona and therefore, the strike left the city for some weeks in dar-
kness and led to an almost complete standstill. In March 1919, about 8000 Somatent pa-
trolled the streets of Barcelona. They were armed with guns and their recognition feature 
was a red bracelet.26 Their task was to guard the trams, to control suspicious persons and 
to force the shops and stores to reopen.27 The members of the Somatent in Barcelona at 
first had been mainly upper class, but later more and more people from the middle class 
joined. Conditions of admissions were the Spanish citizenship, an age of at least 22 years, 
having lived at least one year in Barcelona and the proof to have a profession or to be a 
proprietor. Furthermore, it was necessary to be a ‘man of recognized morality and nob-
le manners’. 28 Every member had to make sure to bring his own gun and only the leaders 
were allowed to be armed with pistols.29 The Somatent in Barcelona were locally organi-
zed in the city district and every barrio, the smaller organization unit of the districts, has 
its own leader. 30
Analyzing the cases in which the Somatent were involved in acts of violence from the 
end of the First World War to the Dictatorship of Primo de Rivera in 1923, one can draw 
24 El Diluvio, 19 April 1921, p. 16. Solidaridad Obrera a few years later published a series of articles under 
the headline ‘Chronology of white terror’ to reveal the crimes against the working class. In this series, the 
incident is not depicted as a shoot-out but rather as an ambush by the Somatent, Solidaridad Obrera, 11 
August 1923, p. 2. Only a few days later, the same newspaper reported another violent assault, in which 
a worker was brutally beaten up by two members of the Somatent, Solidaridad Obrera, 15 August 1923, 
p. 4.
25 González Calleja, Del Rey, La defensa armada, p. 72.
26 Huertas Claveria, Obrers a Catalunya, p. 189, González Calleja, ‘El ejército y orden público’, p. 82.
27 Smith, Anarchism, Revolution and Reaction, p. 298.
28 González Calleja, Del Rey, La defensa armada, p. 91.
29 Ibid., p. 86.
30 Ibid., p. 83.
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the following conclusions: There were no violent incidents between the Somatent and 
the Guardia Civil (‘Civil Guard’), the official police during that period of time. It seems 
that both organizations were closely working together and there is no evidence for any 
kind of rivalry. In contrary, the tasks of the Somatent were quite similar to those of the 
Guardia Civil, so it seems that the Somatent were acting as a kind of auxiliary unit to 
the official police forces. This is also proven by the fact that as well as ordinary police-
men, members of the Somatent often were injured or even killed by the attempt to ar-
rest suspects. On the other hand, it is striking that there were many reports that mem-
bers of the Somatent by accident wounded or even killed people who they suspected to 
be robbers.31
The appearance of the Somatent in Barcelona in 1919 is comparable to the ‘Unions Ci-
viques’ in France and the ‘Citizen’s Guards’ in Great Britain, vigilante groups which also 
were employed for the first time on a larger scale in the big strikes in the postwar years. 
32 Dirk Schumann, who has studied the German case, states that ‘Einwohnerwehren’ in 
Germany also were founded shortly after the First World War and in 1919 had grown to 
about 400,000 members. Their social profile was quite restrict and they almost exclusive-
ly included professions as land owners, teachers and other civil servants, business people 
while few workers joined this paramilitary group.33
After the Canadenca strike, the Somatent had another heyday in the summer 1923, 
when they reappeared regularly in the streets in the summer 1923. The reason was that 
armed robberies in Barcelona at that time had become frequent and in order to prevent 
them, the Somatent patrolled the streets. 34 After his military coup in September 1923, 
Miguel Primo de Rivera established vigilante groups similar to the Somatent in all re-
gions of Spain.35 With the fall of the dictator, the influence of the Somatent decreased. 
Nevertheless, on the eve of the Second Republic, which began in April 1931, the Soma-
tent still had 22,000 members all over Spain.36 But at the beginning of the Second Re-
public, the Somatent were dissolved and only continued to exist in the rural areas of 
Catalonia.37At the end of the Second Republic, there was a vigilante group in Barcelona 
similar to the Somatent called Acció Ciudadana (‘Civil Action’), but it never gained as 
much popularity as the Somatent.38
31 Ealham, Anarchism and the City, p. 75, González Calleja, El máuser y el sufragio, p. 88.
32 Schumann, Gewalterfahrungen, p. 12-13.
33 Schumann, Politische Gewalt in der Weimarer Republik, p. 74.
34 El Diluvio, 11 August 1923, S. 8-9. An example of an armed robbery which was frustrated by the Soma-
tent is documented in El Diluvio, 21 October1923, p. 15, El Noticiero Universal, 23 August 1923, p. 6 and 
22 October 1923, p. 15.
35 The function of the Somatent during the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera is analyzed in Ben-Ami, El ciru-
jano de hierro.
36 Blaney, ‘Keeping order in republican Spain’, p. 40.
37 Rodríguez Cámera, II República, p. 43. In the year 1934 El Diario de Barcelona (‘The Barcelonian Daily’) 
in two articles announced a reintroduction of the Somatent, which as it seems, at the end did not take 
place (El Diario de Barcelona, 17 May 1934, p. 6 and 14 October 1934, S. 13-14).
38 This view is expressed for example in El Correo Catalán (‘The Catalan Post’), 4 January 1935, p. 1.
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V. The Banda Negra
Manuel Casal Gómez, who was a police inspector in Barcelona in the first decades of the 
20th century in Barcelona, later published a book in which he mainly tried to reveal the 
racketeerings of the Banda Negra.39 The first victim of the gang was presumably Pablo Sa-
bater, the president of the trade union of the dyers which at that time were on strike for 
higher salaries.40 Manuel Casal Gómez described the assassination of Sabater on 17 July 
1919 as follows:
Between half past two and three o’clock in the morning, a luxurious, glos-
sy car appeared in the Calle de Mallorca. It stops in front of the beer facto-
ry ‘Bohemia’ and three persons get off, looking like hangmen. One of them, 
tall and elegantly dressed. […] shouts: ‘We are already there’. He turns to the 
other persons and commands them imperiously to ring at street number 274 
and arrest in due form Pablo Sabater, president of the trade union of the dy-
ers. […]. The detainee staggers, tortured by the terrible pain which is caused 
by the handcuffs on his wrists. At the street, the three men take and hustle 
him like a bale of straw in the interior of the car. With the spotlights turned 
off, the car heads for the Carretera de Montcada. […] In the middle of the 
Carretera de Montcada, close to the Torre Baró, the car stops his racy drive 
with a full breaking next to the ditch and the three evildoers, who have been 
inside the car, command the detainee to get out of it, threatening him with 
his Star-Pistols. […] ‘Don’t kill me! I beg you mercy for the sake of your mo-
thers, of your children! Have a heart! Have a heart!’ he begs on his knees. But 
those grim, cruel and satanic men throw him violently in the ditch and all 
three of them shoot simultaneously at the handcuffed, defenseless unfortu-
nate. […] The murderers, having accomplished the atrocity, the outrageous, 
monstrous deed, get in the luxurious, glossy car and, bursting of satisfaction, 
return into the illuminated city [...].41
This assassination caused a huge setback for the labor movement in Barcelona, since 
Sabater was a person of note, which for example is illustrated by the fact that he was de-
scribed as ‘father figure’ by Ricardo Sanz who himself later became a labour leader. Ac-
cording to him, it has been mainly Sabater’s merit that the dyers had become one of the 
strongest and best-organized trade unions in Barcelona.42 Sabater only had been released 
39 After the restructuring of the police in Barcelona in the year 1917, Manuel Casal Gómez had been, as 
Bravo Portillo, the head of one of the ten police stations in the city (El Correo Catalán, 29 August 1922, 
p. 3).
40 The strike of the dyers in July 1919 is mentioned by Abad de Santallán, Contribución a la historia, p. 241.
41 Casal Gómez, La ‘Banda Negra’. The assassination was also covered extensively in the local press, for ex-
ample in El Diluvio, 23 July 1919, p. 9; 24 July 1919, p. 9; 25 July 1919, p. 9; 27 July 1919, p. 9; as well El 
Noticiero Universal, 20 July 1919, p. 3, 31 July 1919, p. 4; 6 August 1919, p. 5.
42 Sanz, El sindicalismo español, p. 109. Federica Montseny in her autobiography also remembers Sabater 
as ‘central figur in the labour movement during that period of time’ (Montseny, Mis primeros cuarenta 
años, p. 33).
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from prison three weeks before, after he had been absolved of the assassination attempt 
on the entrepreneur Trinchet.43 Already in February the year before, he had been suspec-
ted to be involved in the assassination of the directory of a factory and was on demand 
together with eight other suspects.44 For this reason presumably Sabater was on a black 
list together with six other persons, from whom only José Castillo is known, who was 
murdered only a few days later than Sabater.45 A very similar attempted murder as the 
one Sabater fell victim to in which the perpetrators masqueraded as policemen had al-
ready taken place on 23 April, leaving the secretary of the trade union of building trades, 
Pedro Masoni, wounded, while the perpetrators were able to escape.46
In May 1922, nearly three years after the assassination of Sabater, Luis Fernández was 
accused but finally released due to lack of evidence. Nevertheless during the trial he ad-
mitted that shortly before the deed he had left France, where he already had collabora-
ted with the police as well. When he arrived in Barcelona, he was provided with accom-
modation by Bravo Portillo and in return was in charge of spying workers, presumably 
to prevent strikes.47 Even though nobody was sentenced for the assassination of Sabater 
at the end, it is likely that Ángel Pestaña and other authors rightly claim that the gang of 
Bravo Portillo was responsible for Sabater’s death.48
In comparison to the already mentioned gangs of Joan Rull and Francisco Martorell, 
Bravo Portillo’s auxiliary police was much bigger and better organized. It was subdivi-
ded into three small groups. The task of the members of the first group was to gather in-
formation, the second group infiltrated the working class community and the members 
of the third group acted as agent provocateurs in factories and other working places.49 
The claim that the Banda Negra also carried out contract killings and in doing so was re-
sponsible for several assassination attempts on leading figures of the worker’s movement 
seems exaggerated, since only the assassination of Pablo Sabater can be attributed to this 
43 Pestaña, Terrorismo en Barcelona, p. 104.
44 El Diluvio, 22 February 1918, morning edition, p. 7.
45 Leon Ignacio, Los años del pistolerismo, p. 71. The assassination of Castillo is described by Balcells, Vio-
lència social i poder polític, p. 23.
46 The assassination is documented in España Nueva, 9 July 1919, p. 2.
47 The trial against Fernández Garcia is covered in El Diluvio, 26 April 1922, p. 14 and 12 May 1922, p. 27; 
as well as El Correo Catalán, 12 May 1922, p. 1-2. and La Publicidad (‘The Public’), morning edition, 12 
May 1922, p. 3.
48 Pestaña, Lo que aprendí, p. 81.
49 González Calleja, El máuser y el sufragio, p. 146. Casal Gómez, La ‘Banda Negra’, p. 108.
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gang.50 All members got weapons and a daily payment.51 If any of them wanted to leave 
the gang, he was threatened.52
Although many sources claim that the gang consisted of 50 to 60 members, Ángel 
Pestaña’s estimate of 15 to 20 members seems more realistic given the fact that few of 
their members later became known publicly.53 All sources agree that the head of the part 
of the gang which was responsible for the violent acts was Antonio Soler, a former con-
vict from Mallorca.54 The other members of the gang were recruited from the lower clas-
ses and the criminal milieu as well.55 Among the members of the gang were also Epifanio 
Casas and Mariano Sanz, who, as it seems, already had been at the service of Francisco 
Martorell.56
As the members of the gang of Martorell about five years before, the Banda Negra be-
came the target of assassination attempts as well. The leader of the gang, Manuel Bravo 
Portillo, was shot on 8 September 1919, probably by someone belonging to the action 
groups of the CNT.57 Only twelve days later, Eduardo Ferrer, who also was a supposed 
member of the Banda Negra and had been involved in the assassination of Pablo Saba-
ter, suffered the same fate.58 Especially the murder of Bravo Portillo was warmly welco-
med by the Barcelonian working class because they hoped that after his death the Banda 
Negra would be dissolved.59
50 The claim that it would have been the task of the Banda Negra to eliminate activists of the labour move-
ment is formulated by Madrid, Ocho meses, p. 59 and Pestaña, Terrorismo en Barcelona, p. 106. In con-
trast, del Rey argues that the gang besides the assassinations already mentioned only was responsible for 
one or two deaths and several injuries until its dissolution in May 1920. But these causalities did not re-
sult from assassinations or assassination attempts but rather from shoot-outs between members of the 
Banda Negra and the action groups of the CNT (Del Rey, Proprietarios y patronos, p. 518).
51 According to Madrid, Ocho meses, p. 59 the weapons were provided by a military called Perales on the 
authority of Bravo Portillo. Concerning the payment, Serrano, La ciudad de las bombas, p. 172-173 and 
Ventura Subirats, ‘La verdadera personalidad’, p. 114 gave the figure of 50 pesetas, while Madrid, Ocho 
meses, p. 58 and Leon Ignacio, Los años del pistolerismo, p. 66 only gave 15, which nevertheless would 
have been a much higher salary then an average qualified worker at that time would receive.
52 Madrid, Ocho meses, p. 64.
53 Pestaña, Terrorismo en Barcelona, p. 38. According to Leon Ignacio, Los años del pistolerismo, p. 117, 
the gang had 70 members.
54 Madrid, Ocho meses, p. 61, Ventura Subirats, ‘La verdadera personalidad’, p. 112, Pestaña, Terrorismo en 
Barcelona, p. 106 and Leon Ignacio, Los años del pistolerismo, p. 66.
55 Ventura Subirats, ‘La verdadera personalidad’, p. 112, Leon Ignacio, Los años del pistolerismo, p. 117 and 
Madrid, Ocho meses, p. 58.
56 Marinello, Sindicalismo y violencia, p. 319.
57 The assassination of Bravo Portillo was extensively covered in the local press, for example La Publicidad, 
3 September 1919, p. 3; El Diluvio, 6 September 1919, p. 10-1; 7 September 1919, p. 9; 9 September 1919, 
p. 7; 12 September 1919, p. 9; as well as El Noticiero Universal (‘The Universal Correspondent’), 5 Sep-
tember 1919, p. 7; 6 September 1919, p. 5; 19 September 1919, p. 5; 6 September 1919, p. 23.
58 The assassination of Ferrer is documented in La Publicidad, 18 September 1919, p. 3 and España Nueva, 
18 September 1919, p. 2. In the same newspaper, two articles on his life were published, España Nueva, 
23 September 1919, p. 1 and 24 September 1919, p. 2.
59 Madrid, Ocho meses, p. 60.
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Instead, Rudolf Stallmann took over. He had come to Barcelona in September 1918 
as a spy in the course of the First World War, pretended to be of aristocratic origin and 
called himself ‘Baron von König’.60 After the death of Bravo Portillo, Stallmann got into 
contact with the Federación Patronal, but the employers’ association refused to support 
him as they had backed Bravo Portillo and the head of the police, Arlegui, on 22 Decem-
ber ordered a house search at Stallmann’s place. After having had a conversation, as it 
seems, both came to terms and the Banda Negra under the lead of Stallmann became a 
kind of auxiliary police that was allowed to execute searches and to detain syndicalists.61 
This turn seems a bit surprising, since Doval, who was cited at the beginning of this pa-
per, about half a year after his arrival in Barcelona complained in one of his reports that 
the official police and Stallmann’s gang would compete with and hate each other.62 Fur-
thermore, Stallmann’s gang was supposed to blackmail entrepreneurs. The British writer 
Gerald Brenan who was one of the first foreign authors who after the Civil War wrote on 
the history of Spain went further and asserted that the gang even shot entrepreneurs who 
refused to pay. This, however, is not documented in the sources available.63
Rudolf Stallmann and Antonio Soler barely escaped assassination attempts.64 On the 
23 April 1920 the Banda Negra was involved in a shoot-out with an action group of the 
CNT, after which one member of the Banda Negra, Bernardo Armengol, got arrested. In 
prison, he gave a detailed report on the Banda Negra, which enabled the CNT to hunt 
down its members.65 Only a few days later, close to Ronda de Sant Antoni at a place called 
‘Peso de la Paja’, which was used by the Banda Negra regularly for its meetings, another 
shoot-out took place. Two members of the gang, Pedro Torrents Capdevila and Mariano 
Sanz got wounded and an activist of the CNT was shot.66
These incidents caused huge protests, which made the Federación Patronal distance 
itself publicly from the Banda Negra. Therefore, Tomás Benet, the representative of the 
Federación Patronal in Madrid, on 17 May 1920 wrote a letter to the newspaper El País 
(The Country), which was published two days later. In this letter, he insisted that the em-
ployers’ organization never had cooperated with Stallmann and would disapprove his 
measures. One week later Stallmann responded to Benet with a letter which was made 
official by the Madrilenian newspaper El Sol (‘The Sun’) only on 11 June. In this letter, 
Stallmann refers to himself as the leader of the Policia Patronal (‘Police of the employers’) 
60 Casal Gómez, La ‘Banda Negra’ as well as Del Rey, Proprietarios y patronos.
61 Del Rey, Proprietarios y patronos, p. 514.
62 Ibid., p. 492.
63 Brenan, The Spanish Labyrinth, p.  72-73. On contrast, for example Romero Salvadó, ‘“Si vis pacem”’, 
p. 180-81 only states that the gang tried to blackmail entrepreneurs.
64 The assassination attempt on Stallmann is described by Calderon, Memorias de un terrorista, p. 278, 
while the assassination of Antonio Soler is mentioned by Madrid, Ocho meses, p. 71.
65 Smith, Anarchism, Revolution and Reaction, p. 324.
66 A report of an eye-witness was published in El Sol, 30 April 1920, p. 1. A detailed description is provi-
ded by Madrid, Ocho meses, p. 74-76 and Leon Ignacio, Los años del pistolerismo, S. 122-123. Nearly 
two years later, Restituto Gómez, Alberto Manzano Casabalder and José Berros Sánchez were on trial for 
their participation in the shoot-out, El Diluvio, 16 March 1922, p. 19.
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and claimed that the Federación Patronal would have promised him 200,000 pesetas in 
the case that something would happen to him. Furthermore, he announced in this letter 
that his group had been dissolved two weeks before on the grounds that he could coope-
rate any longer with the president of the employers’ association Fèlix Graupera, who was 
said to be hostile to Germans.67 At the beginning of June, the Minister of State instructed 
Salvatierra, the governor of Barcelona who until then had supported Stallmann, to deta-
in him. Stallmann voluntarily turned himself in to the police on 3 June and at the end of 
the month was expelled from Spain.68
After the expulsion of Stallmann the Banda Negra quickly fell apart. Some of its mem-
bers fled from Barcelona, among them Antonio Soler, who was assassinated on his 
flight.69 Only two gang members who remained in Barcelona were sentenced for their de-
eds.70 Other members of the gang were shot. Pedro Torrens, who had been wounded in 
the shoot-out at the end of April, was killed only a couple of weeks later.71 Mariano Sans, 
Julio Laporta and Ernesto Queralt, all of them supposed members of the Banda Negra, 
were assassinated as well and on 19 May 1923, Bernardo Armengol, the last remaining 
member of the Banda Negra, suffered the same faith.72
In summer 1922 some of the local Barcelonian newspapers reported that several in-
dustrialists would have restarted to support a gang similar to the Banda Negra, in which 
Pere Màrtir Homs would have a leading position.73 Homs was a lawyer who in the past 
had defended activists of the CNT at court but later, as it seems, had switched sides.74 The 
gang was made responsible for having murdered the moderate labor leader Salvador Se-
gui.75 Homs was supposed to have actively taken part in some of the assassinations of this 
gang and later he also became the target of an assassination attempt himself.76 About ten 
years later, in the time of the Second Spanish Republic, the head of the police in Barcelo-
na, Miguel Badia, tried to establish a similar auxiliary police as the Banda Negra, but his 
attempt broke down due to the personal intervention of civil governor Lluís Companys, 
who was afraid that this measure would initiate a new wave of pistolerismo.
67 Del Rey, Proprietarios y patronos, p. 517. The correspondence between Benet and Stallmann is docu-
mented in El Fructador 19 June 1920.
68 Pradas Baena, L’Anarquisme i les Iluites, p. 143.
69 Del Rey, Proprietarios y patronos, p. 518. Both España Nueva, 28 March 1920, p. 3 and Casal Gómez, La 
‘Banda Negra’, p. 153, assume that several members of the gang fled to other countries. The assassinati-
on of Soler is reported in El Correo Catalán, 21 July 1920, p. 3. Leon Ignacio, Años, p. 126-127 states that 
there were also other reports which claimed that Soler would have survived his flight.
70 Leon Ignacio, Los años del pistolerismo, p. 126-127.
71 Ibid., p. 125. The trial is documented in El Noticiero Universal, 3 April 1922, p. 9.
72 Leon Ignacio, Los años del pistolerismo, p. 126-127, p. 135, p. 142, p. 169 and p. 282.
73 Termes, Historia del anarquismo, p. 326. According to Madrid, Ocho meses, p. 120, Homs not only plan-
ned the assassination of workers but armed robberies as well.
74 García Oliver, El ecos de los pasos, p. 72.
75 Smith, Anarchism, Revolution and Reaction, p. 347.
76 An assassination attempt, in which Homs was supposed to be involved, is reported by El Noticiero Uni-
versal, 26 April 1923, p. 14 and 27 April 1923, p. 7. The assassination attempt on Homs, in which one po-
liceman was killed, is documented in El Noticiero Universal, 4 June 1923, p. 12.
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VI. Conclusion
Summing up, one may conclude that the popular and auxiliary polices which acted in 
Barcelona in the postwar years very well correlate with the theoretical considerations 
concerning ‘collective vigilantes’ by the American political scientist David Kowalewski. 
The militia Somatent as well as the Banda Negra were established to support the police, 
who obviously was not in the condition to guarantee law and order in such a conflict-la-
den city as Barcelona during that time. But both the Somatent as well as the Banda Ne-
gra rather contributed to the escalation of violence, confirming the thesis of Kowalew-
ski that vigilantes often abscond from the control of the authorities and as a consequence 
use violent measures in an inappropriate way. While the Somatent during the strike of 
Canadenca and the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera to some extend helped to maintain 
law and order, the Banda Negra, especially after the assassination of their first leader Ma-
nuel Bravo Portillo, more and more became an obscure force which was not manageable 
by the authorities anymore. This development to some extend only was consistent, given 
the fact that while the Somatent mainly consisted of middle-aged men from Barcelonian 
middle and upper class who were eager to maintain the status quo in the city, the mem-
bers of the Banda Negra mainly were recruited from the criminal milieu. As a conse-
quence, the Banda Negra more and more became similar to the forces it was build up to 
fight against. In general, it cannot be denied that all attempts of popular policing in Bar-
celona from the turn of the 19th to the 20th century until the beginning of the Civil War 
were a complete failure which only sharpened the conflicts in the city rather than cal-
ming them down.
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Police authority and popular behaviours 
(Lisbon, c. 1867-1910)
Maria João Vaz
I. Introduction
The founding of the modern state implied enacting legislation designed to ensure the he-
gemony of state power throughout the entire extent of both the territory and the popu-
lation. In seeking to instil compliance with the law and penalise any infractions, the state 
implemented mechanisms able to achieve such objectives. Correspondingly, in the Por-
tuguese society of the second half of the 19th century, the establishing of police forces 
represented a central factor within the framework of a more global dynamic striving to 
build and strengthen formal mechanisms for social control and the imposition of state 
power. Henceforth, these police forces would play an important role in the development 
of the state and the domination and control that it wielded and, over the course of time, 
gradually substituted by other forms of policing, including measures involving popular 
participation within the scope of ensuring public law and order prevailed.
The organisation of police forces and their development in the 19th century reflects an 
issue that has already attracted substantial interest from historiography, with varied ana-
lytical approaches and with occasionally divergent interpretations. Some authors percei-
ve in the launching of these police forces a response to problems raised by increasing le-
vels of criminality, a mechanism for combating insecurity and disorder that played an 
important role in the emergence of a consensual society. In turn, other authors attribu-
te the founding of police forces to the need of the elites in power for a tool deployed to 
maintain their dominant positions, controlling the social order, disciplining the new in-
dustrial working class, particularly in urban contexts.1
Indeed, Portugal, in the second half of the 19th century, accompanying an internatio-
nal trend, the importance of establishing modern police forces became affirmed with re-
newed strength and urgency. The Legal Charter dated 2 July 1867 stipulating the foun-
ding of the Polícia Civil de Lisboa (Lisbon Civil Police), determined the setting up of a 
police force for Lisbon, the kingdom’s capital. The force would answer to the district civil 
governor, the entity representing the central political order to organs of local power. This 
would be denominated the Civil Police in order to ensure a clear differentiation with the 
already existing militarised police forces and would have as its core objective the preven-
tion of crime and guaranteeing security, order and public stability.2
1 Emsley, Policing and its context. Taylor, Crime, policing and punishment. Gonçalves, Civilizing the 
police(man).
2 The same law establishes the creation of an identical police force for the city of Porto, the second largest 
Portuguese city.
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This was already a hierarchically and bureaucratically organised police force, designed 
above all for urban contexts, with its police guarding and patrolling public spaces, un-
armed but in uniform, a measure considered as dissuading criminal practices3. This po-
lice force thus joined the other police forces that were already present in Lisbon and with 
compliance of its objectives requiring proximate and daily interactions with the popula-
tion that lived and worked in the city.
In this article, we seek to analyse the way in which a significant proportion of the Lis-
bon population welcomed and interrelated with this new police force that began public 
patrols in 1867. This was a relationship interspersed with challenges and confrontations 
with the police force encountering major obstacles to establishing its own recognition 
and authority.
II. The Lisbon Civil Police
The need to set up a civil police force in the main cities of Portugal dates back to the first 
liberal experience (1820-1823). In 1821, parliament received a public security plan that 
foresaw the launching of a civil police force with the core function of preventing crimi-
nality. This was a constantly affirmed failure but that nevertheless took time to overco-
me. This demand grew in strength in the wake of 1834 with the establishing of an order 
in Portugal that proclaimed liberalism and the subsequent return to the country of many 
of the political exiles. Some had experienced, to a greater or lesser extent, lengthy peri-
ods of exile in France or Great Britain, where they came into contact with the policing sy-
stems in effect there.4 In particular, those who had fled to Britain would have experienced 
the early years of the Metropolitan Police, founded in London in 1829. Within a transna-
tional circulation of ideas and models, this was the type of police organisation that recei-
ved majority backing in Portugal and thus came to be adopted.
The context of serious political violence and social conflict ongoing in Portugal through 
to 1850, ensured delays to its founding. At the beginning of the second half of 19th cen-
tury, in 1855, the Portuguese parliament debated the non-existence of a civil police force, 
designed to prevent crime, but justified as stemming from the violent behaviours of the 
population. Following the proposal to establish an unarmed police force in Lisbon, simi-
lar to the Metropolitan Police in London, one member of the parliament responded that 
he considered such a measure inopportune, explaining this as due to ‘the diversity in the 
customs and character of the two peoples, the British and the Portuguese’. Such diversity, 
he maintained, would hinder the affirmation of a civil police force in Lisbon from being 
able to act without the assistance of a military force: ‘I see that our people do not yet re-
3 Later, at the end of the 19th century, it will be considered an inadequate measure for the detection of cri-
me.
4 In Portugal, after the first victory of Liberalism (1820, there were periods of return to Absolutism:1823 
to 1826; 1828 to 1832). From 1832 to 1834, there was a civil war that opposed liberals to absolutist and 
ended with the victory of the Liberals. During these periods, several liberal politicians lived in exile, in 
France and in England. After 1834 they occupied relevant government functions.
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spect, disgracefully, anything other than an armed soldier, and I do not know whether 
they would respect any such man if not duly armed’.5
While implementation came at a later date in comparison with other European cities, 
there were in the meanwhile repeated affirmations of the need to set up police forces, 
purpose designed for the prevention of crime, in the main Portuguese cities that would 
subsequently be expanded to the rest of the country. The justification presented invariab-
ly revolved around having to combat criminality in Lisbon, perceived as constantly ri-
sing, as a means of modernising the city through endowing it with professionals prima-
rily dedicated to ensuring law and order across its geographic extent.
In fact, the number of crimes recorded in Lisbon was very significantly higher than 
those registered in other parts of Portugal both in absolute terms and relative to the 
number of inhabitants living there. In 1859, the data conveys the leading role played by 
Lisbon in terms of the incidence of crime in Portugal. This was far and away the district 
with the most crimes and in both absolute and relative terms. With a national average of 
1.2 crimes per thousand inhabitants, the district of Lisbon accounted for around 5 cri-
mes per thousand inhabitants. No other national district even reached an average of two 
crimes per thousand inhabitants.6
While the lack of reliability of these then contemporary statistics, especially as regards 
criminal practices, at the time they did serve to justify many of the decisions taken by 
those in power, in particular as regards reforming and founding police forces in the city 
of Lisbon.
Through to 1867, various measures were proposed and put into practice for organising 
the police in Lisbon but all turned out to be only of brief duration. The exception was the 
setting up of the Guarda Municipal de Lisboa (Lisbon Municipal Guard) in 1834 with 
the set objective of ‘keeping the public quiet, enhancing security in the city, without th-
reatening its liberty’.7 Hence, from 1867 onwards, two police forces, the military style Lis-
bon Municipal Guard and the Lisbon Civil Police, as its title suggests a civil based insti-
tution, were encharged with maintaining public law and order and general peace in the 
city. Alongside these, there were the actions of the traditional police authorities made up 
of individuals or groups who, very commonly on a voluntary basis, implemented securi-
ty strategies as a secondary activity.
Lisbon became the most policed city in the country and hence rendering the detection 
of crime by the authorities easier. Thus, it was also correspondingly easier for the popula-
tion to gain access to intervention by the police authorities given their common presence 
in the social life of the city both in places of work during the working day and, most es-
pecially, in the places and times of leisure.
5 Diário da Câmara dos Deputados, session 23 de May 1855; intervention of the deputy Silvestre Ribeiro.
6 The data on crime were published in Boletim do Ministério dos Negócios Eclesiásticos e da Justiça, n.º 2, 
Lisboa, Imprensa Nacional, 1860, pp. 4-21. The data on the population were published in Censo da Po-
pulação do Reino de Portugal no 1º de Dezembro de 1890, Lisboa, 1896. About the crime in Lisbon in 
this period, see: Vaz, O Crime em Lisboa.
7 Law of 3 July 1834 that establishing the Guarda Municipal de Lisboa.
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III. Means and functions of the Lisbon Civil Police
The Civil Police officers were divided into four police divisions with each attributed one 
of the city’s neighbourhoods. In each division, there were police stations with a number 
defined in accordance with the characteristics of the site and its inhabitants. The scope of 
police action was also set out in terms of the streets and squares under surveillance being 
attributed to each respective police station.8
In 1867, Lisbon was allocated a maximum number of twelve police stations on the 
grounds that this would always enable swift reactions by police officers. The stations were 
specifically located in order to be able to provide reciprocal backup and support in case 
of any such need and enabling larger numbers of men to be deployed to curtail any un-
rest.9
Initially, the plans indicated a total of 250 officers with each station having its own 
commander. The peak of the command structure came with a government appointed ge-
neral police commissioner. Under the orders of the district civil governor, the general 
police commissioner was responsible for commanding the police force, supervising the 
entire police service and undertaking its inspection. The structure also defined the role 
of special commissioners, within the framework of each respective division, responsib-
le for criminal investigations. The members forming the base of the police hierarchy, the 
corporals and officers were not there to undertake criminal investigations but rather to 
send to the commissioners all of the information obtained as regards crimes and infrin-
gements.10
While the debate over the limitations on individual freedoms resulting from setting up 
a police force might only ever have attained very modest dimensions in Portugal when 
compared with what took place in Britain, for example, over the founding of the Metro-
politan Police of London, there were some concerns expressed on this issue. Additional-
ly, the different Civil Police Regulations systematically warned as to the need to ensure 
police actions did not come into conflict with the individual freedoms of citizens.
Even if clearly dealing with a somewhat rhetorical concern, this did gain material ex-
pression not only in the repeated affirmations about how police officers might only make 
arrests in flagrante delicto (otherwise detentions could only follow either a written or-
der signed by the police commissioner or a judge issued mandate) but also in the con-
cerns expressed over preserving private spaces where the police may only enter after ha-
ving been requested to do so.11
The competences and functions of the Lisbon Civil Police were stipulated by the force’s 
own Regulations, which determined that the police service took on a permanent charac-
8 Charter of Law of 2 June 1867, that establishing the Policia Civil de Lisboa and publish the Regulations 
for this police force.
9 Charter of Law of 2 June 1867, art. 11.
10 Charter of Law of 2 June 1867.
11 The Guarda Municipal de Lisboa could proceed to arrests, delivering the detainees to the commissioners 
of the Policia Civil de Lisboa.
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ter.12 All members of the force were obliged to turn up and provide service whenever ne-
cessary and exempted only when on leave of absence or sick.13 The police officers recei-
ved specific prerogatives due to be observed in their interactions with members of the 
public. They correspondingly state that ‘The commissioners and police guards are not 
to be disturbed in exercising their functions’ and that ‘any insults, acts of disobedience 
or resistance to their mandates are punished in accordance with penal law as if made 
against administrative or judicial magistrates’.14 Furthermore, they also defined the boun-
daries for policing actions:
The acts of civil police officers or any others deemed equivalent that di-
sturb citizens when exercising their individual liberties that the law gua-
rantees them, are deemed as abuses of authority» and «the civil police of-
ficers or any others deemed equivalent that engage in abuse of authority, 
illegally arresting and holding arrested any individual for more than twenty-
four hours without due charge, in those cases where it is illegal to hold them, 
shall incur the penalties stipulated by the law.15
The men joining the Lisbon Civil Police had to meet certain requirements.16 They nee-
ded to be able to read and write in a country in which the illiteracy rate stood at 80%; 
demonstrate their physical robustness, ‘good appearance and an age of between 22 and 
40’. They were also required to demonstrate ‘excellent behaviour’ and having completed 
army military service. They also had to commit themselves to working for the Civil Po-
lice for a minimum of five years.
In addition to the functions directly connected with preventing criminality and 
maintaining public law and order, the civil police officers were attributed a vast set of 
tasks with broad social significance, designed to contribute towards a consensual ambi-
ence and the general wellbeing of the city. Such functions above all focus on the desire 
to discipline the popular classes and cultures within the city’s scope in addition to gua-
ranteeing public hygiene in urban spaces. The main function of the Civil Police officers 
and corporals was to patrol the city streets by day and by night with the objective of pro-
tecting ‘effectively the security of people and property and the other rights of citizens’. 
However, the majority of their tasks involved disciplinary actions for particular beha-
viours along with the repression of habits, often very deeply rooted, in particular of po-
pular groups, considered as undesirable and needing to be eradicated from the urban pu-
blic space. In this sense, among others, they should strive to ensure compliance with the 
Municipality’s Positions and Regulations, in particular as regards sanitary inspections, 
12 From 1867 until 1910 there are three Regulations for the Policia Civil de Lisboa: Regulamento para os 
Corpos de Polícia Civil de Lisboa e Porto. Criados pela Lei de 2 de Julho de 1867 (Lisbon: Imprensa Na-
cional, 1867). Regulamento dos Corpos de Polícia Civil aprovados por Decreto de 21 de Dezembro de 
1876 (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional, 1877). Regulamento da Polícia Civil e Judiciária de Lisboa aprovado 
por decreto de 12 de Abril de 1894 (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional, 1894).
13 Charter of Law of 2 June 1867, art. 18.
14 Ibid., art. 25.
15 Ibid., art. 42 and art. 43.
16 Regulamento para os Corpos de Polícia Civil de Lisboa e Porto. Criados pela Lei de 2 de Julho de 1867 
(Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional, 1867).
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verifying that commercial establishments met the appropriate conditions, maintained 
their buildings and the utilisation of public spaces while also performing assistance ro-
les, accompanying lost or abandoned children, providing first aid in case of injuries, assi-
sting the sick, alienated and drunk individuals they encountered in the street, transpor-
ting the sick and injured to places of treatment; they were also to deal with fires; oversee 
traffic movements and prevent accidents; preventing load and carriage pulling animals 
from maltreatment by their owners; prevent the usage or carrying of forbidden weapons; 
suppress begging; strive for compliance with the norms of decorum and decency in pu-
blic spaces, preventing, among others, prostitutes from causing scandals; monitoring the 
beggars and other persons considered of ‘poor behaviours’.17
The police officers were compulsorily dressed in uniform and unarmed while they 
might be carrying a terçado, a short-bladed sword, in a period when men generally had 
the habit of carrying penknives and knives. Such was reinforced by the ban on carrying 
walking canes or umbrellas, objects that swiftly transformed into weapons in the many 
interpersonal conflicts that took place in the city. They also carried a whistle that served 
for calling up reinforcements whenever necessary.18
The police were forbidden from entering private residences without the prior authori-
sation of the owners except whenever so requested. Their scope of action was the public 
space. They also defined the set of disciplinary measures for police actions so as to ensu-
re officers did not apply their authority in order to gain personal benefits. Hence, among 
other stipulations, they were not able to enter taverns or whore houses; they were not 
able to ask for loans or to act as guarantor; they received no tips or gratuities; they were 
also not able to request free entry into public performances.
The development of the Civil Police force between 1867 and 1910, when the monar-
chy was deposed in Portugal, headed in the direction of attempting to affirm how police 
officers should act in an impersonal manner, according to a type of bureaucratic profes-
sionalism. The number of full time officers would continue to rise and stood at over 1300 
men in 191019. Furthermore, some police officers began specialising in criminal investi-
gations following the setting up of a specific unit in 1894.
Lisbon became the most closely policed and watched city in the country. Considering 
its population, according to the 1864 Census, there was a total of 163,763 inhabitants in 
Lisbon, should the 250 maximum number of officers have been met, there would be one 
police officer for every 655 inhabitants, a ratio significantly greater that that existing in 
London for the similar period.20
17 Regulamento para os Corpos de Policia Civil, 1867. Regulamento da Polícia Civil e Judiciária de Lisboa 
aprovado por decreto de 12 de abril de 1894 (Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional, 1894).
18 The use of a pistol became mandatory in 1836, under the dictatorial regime.
19 The final increase in the numbers of Lisbon Civil Police officers considered here took place on 28 May 
1902.
20 See: Taylor, Crime, policing and punishment, p. 88.
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The relationship between the number of police officers and the number of inhabitants 
in the city of Lisbon would also head downwards over the course of time as while the 
city’s population would rise at a good pace, the number of Civil Police officers would rise 
at an even faster rate. According to the 1878 Census, the population of the city of Lis-
bon totalled 187,404 inhabitants, with the Civil Police deploying a maximum of 350 of-
ficers, thus, one civil police officer for every 535 inhabitants. In 1894, following another 
rise in the number of officers but with the population having surged to 301,206 inhabi-
tants in the meanwhile, the ratio became 1 civil police officer for every 376 inhabitants. 
In 1900, with the city’s population at 356,009 and with the number of civil police officers 
having been boosted to 1,125 men in 1898, the ratio dropped back to 1 civil police officer 
for every 316 inhabitants. This was also prior to another expansion in the police force in 
1902 that then deployed 23 police station commanders, 112 corporals, 235 first class of-
ficers and 1,069 second class officers.21
Hence, the trend was very much in favour of a rising number of civil police officers 
in the city of Lisbon all the while developing greater diversity and specialisation in their 
functions. The rise in their numbers was able to outstrip the increase in the population 
they served and correspondingly ensuring a greater presence in the social life of the city. 
Hence, Lisbon became an ever more policed environment over this period.
The civil police force established a clear presence in the city’s social life. Furthermo-
re, the desire to impose a police force that engaged in actions defined by rigour and the 
search for consensus emerged in the norms stipulated for its actions. In addition, the fact 
of remaining practically unarmed while on patrol, which restricted the scope for their 
imposing authority through brute force and threat of weapons, was designed to ensure 
more consensual, more persuasive and more peaceful interactions with the members of 
the population the police officers encountered while out on patrol.
In the rules and diplomas regulating the actions of the Civil Police, two further aspects 
particularly stand out. On the one hand, police disciplinary procedures and actions were 
set out so as to inhibit the police, preventing them from abusing their authority or gai-
ning personal benefits. On the other hand, efforts targeted establishing a police force able 
to serve as a reference for the population in general. In this sense, there were recommen-
dations such as, when in contact with the population, police officers were to set the ex-
ample and correspondingly ‘applying in all their interactions with citizens, the greatest of 
maturity and urbanity’. Officers were to maintain attitudes of firmness and energy and si-
multaneously prudence and moderation. The disciplinary regulation for the Lisbon Ci-
vil Police force thus reflected the prevailing ideal of what was considered a good citizen. 
Police officers were to strive not only for the observation of the ideals, values and legali-
ty defended by the socially dominant groups, capable of stating and defending the norms 
and laws to which all citizens were subject. The civil police force was therefore encharged 
with setting the example for the rest of the population.
21 Law of 28 May 1902. Data on population were taken from Censo no 1.º de Janeiro de 1864 (Lisbon: Im-
prensa Nacional, 1868). Censos de 1878 (Lisbon: Tipografia Universal, 1879). Censo da População do 
Reino de Portugal no 1° de Dezembro de 1890 (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional, 1896).
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The competences and ways in which the civil police officers were to engage in their ac-
tions and their respective behaviours were defined in the Regulations handed down to 
command and control the police institution. Nevertheless, the ways in which they ac-
tually acted and behaved, just how they interrelated with others depended not only on 
the regulated behaviours demanded of them but were also conditioned by their own so-
cial identity and certainly in addition to the individual personality characteristics of each 
civil police officer.
The relations between the population of Lisbon, in particular certain popular strata of 
this population, and members of the Lisbon Civil Police were very variable and depen-
dent on concrete situations. The same person might at one moment criticise and express 
disgust at the actions of the police and, in some following moment, be requesting their 
intervention. On some occasions, members of popular groups engaged in deep collabo-
ration with police actions while on other occasions demonstrating their bitter opposition 
to such actions. There was never any total rejection nor any constant cooperation with 
the popular groups inhabiting the city, and the members of the Lisbon Civil Police even 
while confrontation and hostility rose to the fore on many occasions.
IV. Disobedience, aggressions and insults to authority
The founding of the Liberal state, capitalist and bourgeois, led to the affirmation of a 
new operational logic and the imposition of new behavioural norms. Society as a who-
le should function according to a vast normative and legal framework, with criminal law 
practices demonstrating the clear objective of preserving the existing social structure. 
Therefore, police repression preferentially targeted the popular, mass strata, above all in 
urban contexts, with the set goal of somewhat brutally eradicating their ways of life, ex-
pression and leisure in order to chasten their habits, to instil in them ideas around re-
spect for property and working discipline, among other aspects, within the scope of nur-
turing a liberal and consensual society.
In acting in accordance with the normative framework and the values belonging to the 
socially dominant groups, policing actions frequently collided with the habits prevailing 
among the lower strata of society, their ways of living, working and their leisure activi-
ties. The police were very often perceived by the common folk of Lisbon as a strange and 
hostile element in defending interests, norms and values, ways of being and behaving 
that were not their own. This clearly constituted the source of the greatest number and 
most serious misunderstandings and confrontations between civil police officers and po-
pular urban groups. There were various situations that triggered conflicts between the 
population and the police and with abundant illustrations of such occurrences.
Between 1888 and 1892, 13% of arrests made by the Lisbon Civil Police were accoun-
ted for as ‘disobeying authority’, a situation that remained constant through to at least 
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1910.22 Such disobediences, slander and assaults on authority were offences otherwise ab-
sent in the national panorama but in Lisbon constituted one of the most common forms 
of crime. In Lisbon, in 1893, 1894 and 1895, the type of crime that led to the largest num-
ber of convictions was that of disobedience and resisting authority, essentially for th-
reatening police authority.23
Many of these acts of disobedience stemmed from the intervention of police officers 
in the daily routines of the population with a clearly disciplinary objective. Such was the 
case for many coach drivers and carters approached by the police who considered that 
they were in some way disturbing the circulation and hindering the movement of people 
and vehicles. In a considerable number of cases, the disobedience of authority, insulting 
and assaulting of police officers resulted from the actions that followed such approaches.
A carter was arrested on 1 August 1902 for being, along with the wagon he was dri-
ving, blocking the movements of a Carris de Ferro tram. In addition to insulting the pas-
sengers on the tram and, when presented to a criminal court, he attempted to flee with 
it thus becoming necessary ‘to use force for restraint’.24 Another carter got arrested on 6 
June 1902 for trying to get up a very steep road with a wagon that was too heavily over-
loaded for the animal to cope with according to the judgement of the police officer. This 
carter also insulted and assaulted the officer with a punch and a bite when getting arre-
sted.25
However, the coach drivers and carters were not the only workers to demonstrate such 
behaviours. A fish seller was arrested on 8 September 1910 for disobeying an officer who 
had ‘on more than one occasion’ ordered the ‘removal of a stall with fish that had been 
set up on the lateral footpath of a public thoroughfare’, alleging that this was blocking 
‘the legal transit of passers-by’.26 On this same date, a pedestrian was also arrested for di-
sobeying an officer who had ordered the removal of railings from a building27 and, two 
days earlier, another man was arrested for not having moved on from his spot in a square 
when the police officer ordered him to. He was there selling postcards and the police de-
emed he was interfering with passers-by.28 Still another man ended up arrested for not 
obeying when a police officer ordered him to move on from the entrance to a building 
where he was stood shouting; calling for a woman to come out and speak to him.29
22 Mapas estatísticos do ano de 1888 da Polícia Civil de Lisboa; Mapas estatísticos do ano de 1889…; Mapas 
estatísticos do ano de 1890…; Mapas estatísticos do ano de 1891…; Mapas estatísticos do ano de 1892… 
(Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional, 1889-1893).
23 Data on convictions: Alfredo Luís Lopes, Estudo Estatístico da Criminalidade em Portugal nos anos de 
1891 a 1895 (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional, 1897).
24 National Archives (Lisbon, Portugal)–ANTT (thereafter NAL), Fundo Crime Antigo de Lisboa, n° de 
transferência 1958, Cx. 2, n° 62 (provisional number).
25 NAL, Fundo Crime Antigo de Lisboa, n° de transferência 733, Cx. 2, n° 37 (provisional number).
26 NAL, Fundo Crime Antigo de Lisboa, n° de transferência 2069, Cx. 2, n° 77 (provisional number).
27 Ibid., n° 71 (provisional number).
28 Ibid., n° 62 (provisional number).
29 NAL, Fundo Crime Antigo de Lisboa, n° de Transferência 1958, Cx. 2, n° 46 (year 1902) (provisional 
number).
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Such minor acts of disobedience made up the day-to-day relationship of the masses 
with civil police, disobedience in the face of a frankly disciplinary and constantly intru-
sive attitude towards the livelihoods of the popular classes. There are situations of diso-
bedience that occurred between individuals reprimanded by officers that generally en-
ded up with the former getting arrested not for the gravity of the act that triggered the 
admonishment but rather for contesting the police action. In a central Lisbon square, an 
officer would tell a man sat on the floor to get up. The man did not obey, stating that he 
had no such obligation to do so. He was arrested for the crime of disobedience and sub-
sequently sentenced to one and a half months imprisonment.30
In fact, this disciplinary task was clear in the majority of policing actions, frequently 
resulting in situations of confrontation between the individuals targeted by such repri-
mands and the police officers and commonly leading to the arrest of the former. Howe-
ver, those who were already present and witnessing the occurrence would sometimes opt 
to intervene and challenge the policing action. On 26 December 1910, a man was urina-
ting on the pavement having been warned by a police officer who was witnessing the act. 
However, a stonemason who was passing by ‘got involved in the service of the officer’, sta-
ting that ‘if it were him, he would not dare to advance against him’, while simultaneous-
ly putting his hands in his pocket ‘making reference to pushing some iron’ into the police 
officer. This led to the grounds for his arrest, which led the transgressor then attempting 
to assault the police officer in refusing to accompany him.31
Some of the assaults on officers took on a serious nature, preventing them from tur-
ning up for duty for periods of a greater or lesser extent. Such was the case of an officer, 
assaulted and wounded to the lip, who was not able to turn up for work for various days.32 
On 26 February 1881, an officer was assaulted in the street after having attempted to re-
store order inside a food and drink establishment. His life was reported as in danger.33 
Another officer was stabbed with a knife by a worker who had been told to get off the pa-
vement where he was, according to the officer, blocking the traffic.34
Some of the arrests made were contested by those in attendance and to the extent of 
attempting to help the detained to flee in a frontal and hostile challenge to the police 
action. On 17 October 1901, on a street in the city centre, a man was arrested for di-
sobeying a police officer who had ordered him to get off the pavement. Three other indi-
viduals, saying that this was ‘badly done’, sought to ensure the arrestee was able to escape. 
They instead all ended up under arrest following the intervention of other officers who 
were in the vicinity.35
30 NAL, Fundo Crime Antigo de Lisboa, n° de Transferência 733, Cx. 3, n° 62 (year 1902) (provisional 
number).
31 NAL, Fundo Crime Antigo de Lisboa, n° de transferência 14, Cx. 1, n° 86 (provisional number).
32 Diário de Notícias, 1 January 1881, p. 1.
33 Ibid., 28 February 1881, p. 1.
34 Ibid., 11 March 1881, p. 1.
35 NAL, Fundo Crime Antigo de Lisboa, nº de transferência 733, Cx. 1, nº 3 (provisional number).
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Within the scope of their disciplinary framework, civil police officers particularly 
sought to clamp down on drunkenness, the second largest cause for arrests made in Lis-
bon between 1888 and 1892, a situation that also did not undergo any significant change 
prior to 1910.36 The consumption of alcohol was then perceived extremely negatively, di-
sturbing the habits of work and life that the force wished to see respected. There were 
many men arrested for drunkenness who then contested their arrest through resisting 
and insulting the officers.
Disobedience, resisting and insulting authority represent the daily facts of life that re-
flect the prevalence of hostile attitudes towards the actions of the police and both a failu-
re to recognise their authority as well as not sharing in the norms and values that the of-
ficers were encharged with upholding and defending. The police force, put forward as a 
solution to the problem of rising criminality and disorder, acted in ways designed to be 
impersonal and professional in the sense of fostering a disciplined society, obedient and 
observing the law and the order that the socially dominant groups wished to see imple-
mented.
Even though the defendants involved in such disobedience, slander, insults and as-
saults on authority belonged almost exclusively to the popular groups, the criticism of 
the police actions did not exclusively arise from these classes. There was a generalised 
perception that the civil police officers lacked in training and their actions were poorly 
targeted with the affirmation of the need for them to become a moralising and instruc-
tional example to society as, should this not occur, they would become another factor fo-
stering disorder rather than guaranteeing security: ‘One of the elements to maintaining 
order and internal security is the policing organisation; but for this to perform its missi-
on, it should be moralising, strong but prudent and, in many cases, instructive, and be-
nevolent without inequalities; otherwise, this might well turn into an element promo-
ting disorder’.37
Some of those arrested accused the officers of recourse to violence and maltreatment 
when they appeared in court; a fact that the police officers sought to devalue, arguing 
that such was no more than a strategy designed to denigrate their actions.38 Accusati-
ons of violent treatment made by those arrested and charged resulted in some criminal 
processes, sometimes undertaken with a great deal of authority. The lawyer for one de-
fendant, facing charges of murder, set out a defence that, in addition to putting forward 
reasons testifying to the innocence of his client, a rural labourer from the outskirts of 
Lisbon also accused the police authorities of using violence against the defendant in ef-
forts to extract a confession, which they did not achieve.39
36 Mapas estatísticos do ano de 1888 da Polícia Civil de Lisboa; Mapas estatísticos do ano de 1889…; Mapas 
estatísticos do ano de 1890…; Mapas estatísticos do ano de 1891…; Mapas estatísticos do ano de 1892… 
(Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional, 1889-1893).
37 Guimarães, Curso de Sciencia da Administração. See also Hespanha, Guiando a mão invisível, p. 289.
38 NAL, Fundo Crime Antigo de Lisboa, n.º de Transferência 733, Cx. 2, nº 30 (year 1902) (provisional 
number).
39 NAL, Fundo Crime Antigo de Lisboa, nº de Transferência 985, Cx. 1, nº 10 (years 1901/1902) (provisio-
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The press also published criticisms of the authorities and alleging abuse of authority by 
some police officers. Diário de Notícias, the newspaper with the largest national circula-
tion figures in this period, referred to how a police officer decided to follow a man who 
was arguing with a woman, arresting him and alleging that he both resisted and failed 
to show respect for the police. Presented in court, the man was freed and the police of-
ficer responsible for his arrest was termed as displaying ‘a tendency towards an excess of 
authority’.40
The police force, however, had few resources and technical means to effectively comp-
ly with their function of preventing and prosecuting crime. Police investigations did take 
place, especially after 1894 and the founding of the Policia Judiciária e Preventiva de Lis-
boa (Lisbon Judicial and Preventive Police Force), but they were only rudimentary, based 
on some know-how and objects and above all leveraged by the witness accounts of tho-
se present or who knew the victim or those suspected of criminal acts. This drew criti-
cism from among the population accusing the police force of failing to comply with their 
primary function: preventing and suppressing crime. This perceived the police as agents 
from a strange group, sent to restrict their activities that they did not perceive as social-
ly reprehensible while allowing the criminals to go about their business. When, in 1893, 
the body of a murdered woman was discovered, the police encountered major difficul-
ties in discovering the author of this crime. The population then staged violent demon-
strations against police actions and their lack of any effective capacity to prevent and re-
press criminality.41
The Lisbon Civil Police was still only a recently founded institution that was going 
through a process of legitimisation that also involved the professional learning of its 
members. While criticised by many, they were also subject to campaigns of support with 
the Civil Police having clearly elected ensuring that their authority prevailed among the 
population as their main task. Indeed, this is generally the first task that the public insti-
tutions designate for themselves: gaining recognition of their authority among the com-
munities in which they act.42 This purpose emerges clearly out of the actions of the Lis-
bon Civil Police but the repeated challenges and clear hostility is also equally in relation 
to their actions among the popular strata of Lisbon society, which constituted a priority 
target for their actions. In general, the response of the police authorities was to strive to 
further strengthen their authority and demonstrate the power that had been delegated to 
them. Generally, among the broader population, the demonstrations of authority tended 
to lead to a deepening of the resistance, disobedience and criticism, frequently insulting 
in tone and content, of the activities carried out by the police force.
Such was the generalised nature of this opposition to the police that it led to declara-
tions in defence of the police and criticism of the population for not concurring with 
nal number).
40 Diário de Notícias, 27 January 1881, p. 1.
41 Galeria dos Criminosos Célebres, vol. II (Lisbon: Palhares, 1897), pp. 80-95.
42 See: Garland The Culture of Control.
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police authority. Such a position affirmed that there was an «inveterate vice and an un-
equable pleasure of the Portuguese to talk badly about the police», and blaming parlia-
ment itself for the example that it set:
Should a police officer make some small infringement, the world comes 
down on the police corporation like a ton of bricks and the case gets long ar-
ticles in the newspaper and causes appeals to made in parliament. – What 
does the minister of the Kingdom say to this scandal of officer 229 from third 
division having assaulted Mrs Maria Antónia? Under what regime do we 
live, President? What measures has your Excellency President of the Council 
taken as regards this most serious case? Really, the police is the target of all 
ill-will, all of the hatred and all of the anger.43
Such criticism emerged from various sectors of society, including the press. When the 
press did not support police actions, the counter accusation charged the newspaper with 
acting against security and public order:
The people present in turbulent neighbourhoods are constantly in open 
conflict with the agents of authority. […] Very often, rowdy sailors would 
cause reasons for police interventions so that they could enjoy doing battle 
with the security officers. The people are always on the side of the sailors and 
the reportage also on the side of the sailors and the people who cause disor-
der.44
They published articles in which they sought to affirm the importance of police actions 
and police officers in defence of general security: ‘Before the existence of these police, 
who deal with so much unfair hatreds and with all the weight of such ingratitude, nobo-
dy was safe whether on public paths or at home. […] Today, thanks to the much defamed 
police, we are able to go through the most labyrinthine and eccentric neighbourhoods 
of the capital, at any time of night with a gold purse in each hand and nobody is going to 
touch us’, while adding that the importance of the police force extended beyond comba-
ting crime to also include assisting those who fall sick in the public domain, getting them 
to hospital, among other actions of a civic character.45
In fact, the police also received expressions of support and congratulations. When po-
lice actions that sought to capture the perpetrator of some serious offence ended suc-
cessfully, the population would show its support by clapping and saluting the officers re-
sponsible. On other occasions, regular members of the population would, according to 
their own sense and values of justice, assist the officers in countering crime, helping to 
arrest those who had broken the law or providing relevant information enabling the cap-
ture of criminal suspects. Members of the population helped officers capture two indivi-
duals who had ‘contended’ with a woman, making her drop her 3-year old daughter she 
43 Galeria dos Criminosos Célebres, vol. IV (Lisbon: Palhares, 1900), p. 203.
44 Ibid., p. 205.
45 Ibid., vol. II, 1897, p. 84.
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was carrying. As the arrested persons refused to accompany the police, some bystanders 
intervened and employed ‘muscular force to lead them to station’.46
Some interventions sought to praise and compliment the role of assistance and civic 
behaviours of Civil Police officers, for example affirming: ‘The police is the corporation 
that provides the greatest level of services. […] In healthcare, security, public order, in 
afflictions of all the types that we might experience, we always think it better to have a 
police friend and protector close to hand ready to supply us with assistance’.47 However, it 
was finally through its role in preventing and combating criminality that ensured the po-
lice force might improve their relations with the population of Lisbon, in particular the 
popular groups inhabiting the city. While these proved the source of the overwhelming 
majority of individuals involved in crime, they were also the source of the majority of 
victims of their crimes. These were the persons that most sought out assistance from the 
police. They were not the elite members of society that sought to protect themselves and 
their assets through the actions of the police but rather came from the socially disadvan-
taged layers of society who most needed and who actively sought protection and secu-
rity from the police. They correspondingly made an enormous number of complaints to 
the police in this way seeking mediation in the conflicts that they had become immersed 
in and thus attempting to protect their own interests. The police force was correspondin-
gly requested not only to rule on the conflicts that emerged in public spaces but also that 
took place within homes, in domestic family contexts.
V. Conclusion
In Lisbon, the rise in police activities over the course of the second half of 19th centu-
ry, the diverse, different reforms, the increase in the number of police officers and the 
technical means and resources made available ensured more effective police actions in 
the prevention and repression of crime. This fact furthermore enabled an increase in the 
number of crimes detected and investigated by the authorities and with a level of oc-
currence that we today know. The argument that criminality was relentlessly rising was 
deployed as the main justification for the need to found a civil police force dedicated to 
preventing and combating crime in the city of Lisbon. However, the actions of the po-
lice certainly also contributed to boosting the number of crimes detected and reported to 
the authority underpinning the idea, even if possibly artificially, that criminality was on 
a constantly rising trend, especially in the city of Lisbon.
From the state’s perspective, it was important to affirm its capacity for vigilance, imple-
menting norms and imposing its authority and coercive power, in particular in the city 
of Lisbon, the capital of the kingdom and the empire. However, the apparatus of the li-
beral state, still under construction, held only a limited capacity to control the totality 
of the territory and its population, especially as regards the observance of criminal laws. 
46 NAL, Fundo Crime Antigo de Lisboa, nº de transferência 12, Cx. 2, nº 87 (provisional number).
47 Galeria dos Criminosos Célebres Portugueses, vol. II, 1897, p. 84.
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They therefore opted to prioritise channelling the resources they had available into the 
largest city in the kingdom and the leading political, administrative and cultural city in 
the country. The power and the authority of the state was thus above all experienced in 
Lisbon, leading to greater demands over compliance with the law and correspondingly 
greater intransigence and intolerance for any actions in breach of the law.
The police emerged as a solution for the rise in criminality and public disorder, acting 
within the scope of implementing a disciplined and obedient society that observed the 
law and order that the dominant social groups wished to see established. It was above all 
attempting to fulfil this disciplinary task that clashed most strongly with the popular at-
titudes and behaviours, resulting in in a high number of charges for disobedience, resi-
stance, insulting and violence against the authorities.
The members of the Lisbon Civil Police represented the authority of the state and held 
important discretionary activities in applying the law, deciding in each precise moment 
just who should be reprimanded and what might be allowed. Furthermore, it was the 
members of the population who, displaying behaviours that the law criminalised, ended 
up most frequently in conflict and direct opposition to the police officers. The role of the 
Lisbon Civil Police officers was to implement the then established legal framework, see-
king to impose its norms and values, ways of living and socially engaging that were fre-
quently not then shared by the population inhabiting the city. This was the main factor 
driving the lack of understanding of police actions among representative sectors of the 
Lisbon population who, therefore, grew hostile towards the police.
At a first level, the police officers were the first to exercise their discretionary powers 
over just what constituted a violation of the law and duly deserved to be punished even 
while it would be the courts that would later rule on whether there had been any effective 
violation of criminal law and determine the appropriate penalty according to the juridi-
cal framework in effect. The police force was the state authority closest to the population. 
The inhabitants of Lisbon would daily pass by civil police officers who correspondingly 
became the closest representatives of the law and the means through which that law was 
experienced and thereby conditioning the relationship the mass population built up in 
relation to their rulers and their representatives.
However, due to the different functions and situations in which the police might ap-
pear in the lives of the people of Lisbon, their attitudes towards officers and the force in 
general tended to remain ambivalent. There was systematic recourse to the police in at-
tempts to ensure their interests prevailed in mediation over their conflicts. However, the-
re was also constant criticism and hostility towards police actions. While acceptance of 
police actions became, step-by-step, greater, it would nevertheless remain fragile throug-
hout a long period of time and subject to swift breakdowns. With the passage of time, 
there emerged a rising level of acceptance of policing actions and becoming understood 
as something that made up part of daily life in the city. Simultaneously, there was also a 
growing understanding that the actions of the police did not only bring benefits to the 
socially dominant groups. Among the working population, the police gradually develo-
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ped more positive relationships even while always remaining rather unstable and easily 
breaking down. The attitudes of the population towards the police force therefore reflec-
ted the ambivalence with which penal law may be perceived. In seeking to punish beha-
viours that were frequently not assimilated negatively by the general mass of the popu-
lation, the law and police actions might thus be considered as simultaneously a tool of 
justice and a system of oppression.
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Maintaining public order without the 
participation of the population – Policing 
of crowds by the police of public opinion 
(France, late nineteenth century)
Laurent López
Jules Bonnot had already been dead for a fortnight after being assaulted by the police of-
ficers and Republican guards and gendarmes of the Seine company, when two of his ac-
complices were spotted in the eastern suburbs of Paris, on 14 May 1912. Apart from the 
device created in a hurry to besiege the attackers, between the shots and the explosions, 
there was also an individual who intervened joining the reunited forces of the order to 
support the operation inside the house. A commentator in Le Petit Journal mocked it af-
terwards:
A Parisian brought a dog who had been trained in a kennel of the Nogent 
prefecture, and he asked permission to let his animal come inside the villa. 
We have acquiesced to his request and the dog has been thrown by his master 
into the house. The animal ran to the end of the property and attacked agents 
barricading the exit. Guards were attacked by the dog who had not under-
stood the command of his master. The poor animal got kicked and the expe-
rience has not been pushed further. 1
In these circumstances where mass-media gave huge exposure to the incident, popu-
lar participation in maintaining order failed and even became a joke. However, this epi-
sode and the story are directly significant in several ways for the topic developed in the 
present volume. Firstly, the conclusion (‘the experience has not been pushed further’) 
highlights how the decades preceding the First World War are indeed, a moment when 
the participation of the population in the maintenance of order is no longer appropriate; 
the bourgeois guard, civic guard and other national guards2 are memories that no Repu-
blican, sitting on the right or left in the Chamber of Deputies, wants to revitalize. A se-
cond aspect is relevant: the haunt of Octave Garnier and Rene Valet – the members of 
the ‘Band Bonnot’ mentioned above – are loaded incarnations of all components of the 
national3 policing landscape of that time. More specifically, within the hybrid body built 
for the maintenance of order, the gendarmerie played a vital role in terms of numbers. A 
third element of the iconic episode is the pressure of the press and more broadly of public 
1 ‘On n’a pas eu recours aux chiens policiers’ (Le Petit Journal, 16 May 1912, p. 2).
2 Learn more about this from the aforementioned source article.
3 Learn more about this from the aforementioned source article.
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opinion on what constitutes public security.4 Because, if the population no longer directly 
participates in the maintenance of order, this does not mean that they plays no role at all 
in an extended sense of the term. The role of the public is not only limited to the policing 
of crowds in the streets (or in the countryside), but is also about preserving socio-poli-
tical order in which citizens participate and exercise their democratic rights, along with 
their representatives. If the maintenance of order results in chaotic policing of crowds, 
nonetheless it cannot be reduced to the accidents which happen , even if they are tragic. 
As well as representing a challenge, this public policing is also, and perhaps above all a re-
sult of a more stable, daily, peaceful relationship with the population.
At the turn of the twentieth century, the maintenance of order in the strictest sense 
therefore tends to become the monopoly of gendarmes in France. If in the rising demo-
cratic and parliamentary Third Republic, there can be no question of associating the po-
pulation with maintaining order, at least not directly, the participation of the population 
seams to follow the police role in a political way. Thus, the elected leaders and munici-
pal councils now answer to the population’s complaints, people ask for more surveillance, 
more repression, more forces for law enforcement and simultaneously, more individual 
rights and collective freedoms. These claims may have an impact on the recruited police 
officers, but also on the nature of the police force and the means employed. In a way, the 
population is shaping the function assigned to gendarmes and the police in the democra-
tic regime that is finally settling at the time.
I. Gendarmerie, one of the conditions of the structure 
of republican democracy
1. Gendarmes first and foremost
The confidential circular of Pierre Waldeck-Rousseau, Minister of the Interior, addressed 
to the prefects on 27 February 1884 is a cardinal text on the maintenance of order in 
France in contemporary and recent history. The gendarmerie was born in 1791 and soon 
established itself as a privileged player. On the other hand, its actions must constant-
ly be moderated as much as possible. The prefects’ assigned objective should ‘help them 
to achieve the double result of ensuring both freedom of individuals and public security.’ 
The government aims to promote the right to gather while preserving one of the ‘natu-
ral and imperceptible rights’ set out in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citi-
zen, namely security. As such, the prefects have to ensure resolution of conflicts by ‘words 
of conciliation’ as ‘the gendarmerie is the only public force that [they can] use to ensure 
the order and protect the peace; this is their principal mission, the troops have a different 
one’.5 Regarding uniforms, the objective is to limit as much as possible the use of the tro-
4 For more information, we refer you to Laurent López, ‘La bande à Bonnot: l’assaut final à Nogent (14-
15 mai 1912)’, Criminocorpus [Online], Histoire de la police, articles available online from the 1 January 
2009, consulted 11 July 2018. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/criminocorpus/269.
5 Archives nationales (Paris, France) (hereafter AN), 19940500, art. 3, minister of the Interior confidential 
circular to the prefects on policing and the role of the gendarmerie, released on 27 February 1884.
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ops who are less experienced in policing crowds, including troops mainly composed of 
conscripts likely to panic in front of demonstrators and react by firing or, on the contra-
ry, those suspected of sympathizing with them.6
As the gendarmes learn from the Republican Guard where ‘the first page to be written 
by the new recruits’ and ‘copied in the notebooks’, reasonable use of public force against 
instinctive violence is defined according to the decision of 3 August 1881 specifying their 
service. The text requires that guards ‘should use force only after exhausting all peace-
ful means of persuasion [emphasis added] and use their weapons only in case of neces-
sity, in self-defense when their lives are threatened’.7 As we can see, if the public cannot 
be involved in the maintenance of order, interior minister Waldeck-Rousseau’s circu-
lar intends to encourage the participation of the population in the new republican order 
which has gradually been put in place since 4 September 1870.8 ‘Thanks to the progress 
of the opinion that is increasingly shaped by the mores of liberty’ to quote again the man 
who worked also to legalize the unions in 1884, the democratic expression of the roots of 
the Republic system in the people, as its forces of order are essential to the exercise of the 
former in the service of the latter. This specification works only if the policing is based on 
well-mastered practices, regulated and responsible constraint that will as far as possible 
allow the elimination of brutal, unrestrained and dehumanizing violence.9
In 1884 formalization and acceleration had worked for the pre-eminence of the gen-
darmerie in the matter of policing. Here, a fine chronology is necessary. The confidenti-
al circular of Minister Waldeck-Rousseau dates from the end of February. However, soon 
after on 5 April, the great law of the municipal organization of 1884 is published, a law 
which is one of the pillars of the structure of the territorial Third Republic. Two weeks 
earlier, on 21 March, the same minister is behind the law on the creation of professio-
nal unions. Is it a coincidence that these two events happen almost simultaneously? Most 
likely not because the February confidential circular also underlines the government’s 
commitment to the people’s ‘right to coalition’. This was a precursor of the text on ‘secu-
rity and freedom’ that came back in the late 1970s in France and remains until today. It 
must be noted that the confidential circular on the maintenance of order and the predo-
minance given to the gendarmerie promotes the expression of democratic freedoms. In 
that regard, the construction of the regime and the structuring of its public force fit well 
with the legacy of the Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen of August 1789 in 
which ‘raising taxes’ and ‘maintenance of the public force’ go hand in hand with the Dé-
claration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen of August 1789. Similarly, the references to 
‘raising taxes’ and ‘maintenance of the public force’ go together perfectly.
6 Bruneteaux, Maintenir l’ordre.
7 Service historique de la Défense, fonds gendarmerie (hereafter SHD), GD 1 H 88.
8 Berlière, ‘Du maintien de l‘ordre’, pp. 6-29.
9 See: Déviance & Société, 32, 1 (March 2008), special issue: La violence d’état. Les fragiles naissances du 
maintien de l‘ordre en France (1800-1939).
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2. Dualistic and hybrid monopoly on policing
The 1880s appear as a period of consolidation of the hybrid policing that first emerged 
in 1791, on the order of police commissioners during the first year of contemporary 
French public force. In fact, at the beginning of its founding year, the National Gendar-
merie succeeded the Royal Maréchaussée; in September of the sam year, police commis-
sioners were reborn ‘in all cities of the kingdom where they would be judged necessary’ 
(Decree of 21-29 September 1791 on the establishment of police commissioners). The re-
volutionaries, who intend to overthrow the Ancien Régime, nevertheless need a force al-
lowing them to establish and maintain a new political order, and as Paolo Napoli points 
out they need to question the nature of the concept of public ‘force’.10 The law of 10 July-3 
August 1791 legally and durably establishes hybrid and dualistic policing as the link bet-
ween these two components of the police force by, setting the terms for the requisition of 
armed force by the civil authorities.
From then on, the maintenance of order in France is characterized by the interdepen-
dence and complementarity of the institutions that have to ensure it: the police – in the 
first place the commissioners – and the military – in particular the gendarmes. However, 
in the Third Republic the former was largely devoid of agents because the authorities re-
sponsible for paying the municipal staff lack resources or refuse to devote resources to 
the Commissioner as this was the incarnation of central power. The gendarmes thus are 
the armed wing indispensable to security agents and they must help them when needed. 
Conversely, the gendarmes are strictly subject to the civil authorities, who alone can pro-
ceed to the summons authorizing the use of weapons except in cases of self-defense or 
protection of persons and buildings attached to the institutions. The Waldeck-Rousseau 
circular of 1884, already mentioned, is therefore one of the illustrations of the ‘révolution 
qui entre au port’ (‘revolution that comes into port’), to use François Furet’s classic for-
mula; in this case because the institutions appeared during the Revolution are firmly at-
tached to the regime and they guarantee the correct functioning of the regime. In this di-
vision of roles in the service of the executive power, there is no place for the population. 
On the contrary, laws are imposed to counter the people, even when their actions appa-
rently seem legitimate and conform with the established order.
In Burgundy, for example, circumstances illustrate both this exclusion of direct par-
ticipation of the population in police work and also the lack of close collaboration bet-
ween police and gendarmes. For example, a municipal commissioner witnesses the esca-
pe of frightened individuals. After reassuring them, he asks about the cause of their fear 
and they claim to have been attacked by a showman, a ‘Hercules or wrestler armed with 
a sword that he wanted to use to hit one of the them’. The officer undertakes to search the 
city for the alleged author of the disturbances and then faces the population who ‘in the 
presence of these provocations and threats [...] was indignant and was already looking 
for ways to demolish his barracks [...]. Immediately, and in the absence of a police officer 
in the office, we [the Commissioner] required the Gendarmerie’s sergeant-general to put 
10 Napoli, Naissance de la police, p. 195.
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at our disposal a few men to arrest this dangerous wrestler. Assisted by four gendarmes, 
we [...] found the individual in question [...]. Once again invited to follow us, he finally 
ended up getting up and walking with the officers after being grabbed by the arm.’11 In the 
growing Third Republic, there is no more question of public participation in the main-
tenance of order, as was perfectly demonstrated with the previous example. Or rather, is 
this contribution reserved for only part of law enforcement, which bears, in this case, the 
policeman’s uniform or is flanked by the tricolor scarf of the police commissioner. Here, 
the action of the public force consists of protecting the showman from popular anger. El-
sewhere, the representatives of national sovereignty, which is more or less popular, can 
first participate in public disorder by thwarting gendarmes and police actions, including 
substituting a local law with the international law.
II. Public force against community order
1. Who will watch over the guards?
During the Third Republic, even more than before, the police represents not only one 
of the institutional manifestations of the nation but it is also both a symbol and, equal-
ly an instrument of the democratic regime. As such, police practices become fully politi-
cal, and not just preventive or repressive actions. In an article entitled the ‘Good Citizen 
of Tarare’, published on 16 May 1897, a newspaper from Rhone accuses, the gendarmerie 
of harming the government and lowering approval of the Republic due to the severity of 
the traffic police. More directly, people must intervene against the guardians when their 
actions become inappropriate. One of the gendarme’s patrols in the cabarets of a town in 
Saone-et-Loire not only causes a scandal because of the gendarmes’ behavior, but the of-
ficers also refuse to regulate their alcohol consumption when asked to do so by the owner 
of the place. The proprietress recriminates and is handcuffed and prepared to be taken to 
the prison. When the inhabitants intervene to defend the unfairly arrested woman, the 
gendarmes threaten them with their swords and their revolvers. The intervention of inf-
antrymen and garrison officers saves the defenders from the further fight.12
2. Officiousness is harmful to public order
There are other examples where the military threatens the established order and violates 
public trust. In the next case, it is not a question of law transgression or any case of vio-
lence as we saw in the previous section, but of an excess of zeal – or at least events expe-
rienced as such – making the implementation of the law unbearable. In the early 1890s, 
a Burgundian sub-prefect, informed by the central commissioner of Châlons-sur-Saô-
ne, notes that relations between the population and the gendarmerie have become ten-
se, noting a significant increase in complaints. He reports ‘an increase which does not 
11 Archives départementales (thereafter AD) de la Côte-d’Or, U XI D7, Minutes of Beaune Police Commis-
sioner on the arrest of a fairground fighter, 13 November 1887.
12 AD Saône-et-Loire, 5 R 3, Letter from the Directorate of General Security to the prefect of Saône-et-
Loire about an article published in le Progrès de Saône-et-Loire concerning events in the city of Saint-
Laurent involving gendarmes of the brigade of Saint-Germain-du-Plain, 2 August 1878.
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seem justified by any reason’, in his opinion. The officiousness would be stimulated by 
the sergeant-in-chief who shows a list every month of all the gendarmes and the respec-
tive number of protocols which have been drawn up. The sub-prefect concludes that ‘it 
is at the instigation of the leaders that the gendarmes are also hard on the population’ of 
Le Creusot. The latter was however usually viewed as having a good temperament. To re-
store an order which was disturbed by his guards, the officers ask for the removal of gen-
darmes who ‘would be welcomed with satisfaction not only by the Republican party in 
Le Creusot, but also by the majority of the inhabitants themselves’.13 Here again we see 
that political considerations at least partly condition the estimation of police activities 
and the influence is rather mutual. The public impression of the military is still perceived 
through their service for the Second Empire, yet on the other hand their loyalty to the 
Republican regime seems suspicious for some supporters of the second. A few years ear-
lier, a sub-prefect in Gironde had felt ‘still obliged to return to the gendarmes’ to report 
complaints about two Republican candidates during elections. The sub-prefect had recei-
ved complaints from hunters accusing the gendarmerie of pursuing them excessively on 
the grounds of the ‘the countryside that is visited all day long, and disturbed according 
to their inhabitants. Certainly, vexation arises as the last election is approaching. Ano-
ther fact that should be noted is the general concern for the roads being traveled along 
by suspicious groups of individuals, and that the gendarmerie does not ensure safety on 
these roads.’14 The sub-prefect suggests intervention from the police moderation to pro-
mote the political stabilization of a republican order in the department, barely ten years 
after the promulgation of the constitutional laws. We observe here a local process of im-
planting the national structure, not by a one-off control from the population but rather 
by standardized practices of those who are specifically in charge.
III. When people’s representation provokes disorder
1. Law influenced by local pressures
The law involuntarily and indirectly releases the expression of popular disorder through 
the municipal authorities. Consequently, three types of difficulties arise showing the ten-
sion between the submission of the gendarmes to national state order and the temptati-
on of the officials to allow municipal standards to prevail, sometimes treating the popu-
lation as political clients. The first frequent type of incidents is when gendarmes come 
up against a mayor who blames them for their officiousness relative to closing drinking 
places to conform with the legal hours. Opposition to gendarmes or to the police com-
13 AD Saône-et-Loire, 5 R 3, Report from the sub-prefect of Autun to the prefect, on the situation of the 
gendarmerie in the city of Creusot, 15 October 1891. On 7 April 1891, a letter from the mayor of Clu-
ny to the prefect concerning ‘the new Marshal of the gendarmerie F [sse] far too dutiful he draws up mi-
nutes accusing good people for insignificant violations’. He goes on to say that ‘in making such trials, the 
gendarmerie only attracts the contempt of honest people, and their vexations have a deplorable effect on 
the political point of view’.
14 AD Gironde, 5 R 11, Letter from the sub-prefect of La Réole to the Gironde prefect, 12 October 1885.
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missioner is usually even stronger when the delinquent is a person familiar – friend or 
relative – to the city official concerned. The mayor of Saint-Claude thus ensures surveil-
lance of the cafes by his agents and asks the police not to patrol during the closing hours 
of drinking establishments. The arrondissement commander points out that the may-
or cannot limit his supervision by noticing some violations and ‘turning a blind eye to 
others’.15 This example illustrates the frequent type of conflicts between city officials and 
gendarmerie, particularly regarding regulation of drinking places. The collision of local 
practices and global norms are increasingly influenced by anti-alcoholic leagues and hy-
gienist principles, a development which seems almost inevitable in the places where ma-
sculine sociability and virile expression are exacerbated by alcohol.
2. Force of the law or partisan opinions?
The second type of disorder is more political, relating to situations when a mayor is un-
willing to provide accommodation for gendarmes mobilized in places of social unrest. 
These quarrels multiply during the early years of the twentieth century in socialist com-
munities, including the Paris suburbs which constitute the ceinture rouge (red belt). A 
member of the Seine region – the mayor of Ivry-sur-Seine, the socialist Jules Coutant, a 
friend of Jules Guesde – for example, intervenes in the matter of policing reinforcement 
against striking workers who want to violently block the entrance to his factory. Questio-
ning the request of the deputy, the prefect Lépine justifies the maintenance of the device 
applied by the Minister of the Interior on the basis of the reports of the police commis-
sioner and the gendarmerie officer who command the arrondissement.16 The elected of-
ficial does not seem to be satisfied, and the episode reveals converging constraints im-
posed on those people responsible for maintaining order and the political stakes that 
motivate those officials. In the particular configuration of the police prefecture, the chief 
and his authority protect this establishment against the pressure of elected officials. Ho-
wever, things function differently way in provinces where the General security officials 
and the gendarmerie soldiers appear more directly exposed.
3. Public finances against public order
A third category of conflicts is the refusal, or at least opposition, to pay for the police 
commissioner. Since the 1790s, every city with more than 5,000 inhabitants had had to 
pay for one of these offers, and some municipal councils were opposed to the burden of 
this charge on their budget. At the height of summer in 1892, the director of the Gene-
ral Security, Soinoury, sends a reminder to the prefects inviting them once again to pay 
a municipal police commissioner (law of 28 Pluviôse year VIII, article 12). This obliga-
tion applies to municipalities exceeding the threshold of five thousand inhabitants. Ac-
cording to the law, municipal councils close to this threshold must vote to provide one 
15 SHD (Archives of the gendarmerie), 39 E 49, Letter from the Borough Commander to the Mayor of 
Saint-Claude, 8 December 1912.
16 Archives of the préfecture de police (hereafter APP), DA 447.
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thousand francs in order to create a fourth category police station.17 This administrative 
injunction is an answer to several crimes including, for example, one a few weeks earlier 
in Burgundy committed by the municipal council of Nuits-Saint-Georges. In fact, he ab-
olished the position of commissioner ‘thinking that the service of the internal police of 
the City would be sufficiently covered by the gendarmerie brigade and the officers sworn 
especially for this purpose’. The prefect intervened next to request the restoration of this 
post on the grounds that ‘the number of vagrants and beggars passing through Nuits 
that has increased considerably recently; whereas, furthermore, certain public establish-
ments should be monitored more closely in order to ensure public safety and peace, and 
that to be truly effective, the police must consist of the officers with great recognition and 
authority’.18 The rich viticultural community obviously refuses to devote part of its bud-
get to a new police representative. While it is difficult to separate the political reasons 
from the economic motives, we can however note that there has been no questioning of 
the presence of the national gendarmerie at the expense of the state which paid for their 
men, and the department which paid for the barracks.
The behavior of municipal representatives is therefore diverse and ambiguous. The city 
councils call for more staff to enforce the law for the sake of people’s safety.19 The citi-
zens protest when they start to lose control under the police; on the other hand, the may-
ors try to maintain control over gendarmerie. This provokes conflicts with the hierarchy 
of the latter. A general inspector notes with bitterness that ‘a mayor demands that gen-
darmes must testify against their enemies and never against their friends’.20 According to 
him, this exploitation would weaken the gendarmerie’s militarism and put it on the path 
to unfortunate ‘policiarisation’. In other words it could turn into an increasingly poli-
ced institution, forgetting at the same time the purpose of its mission, meaning gendar-
mes would lose their identity. This contemptuous insinuation against the police officers 
does not tell us anything about these officers expressing similar grievances about simi-
lar contexts.
IV. Policing under the influence of public opinion
1. Public moods and petitions to claim more security
The typology given so far is incomplete and even one-sided. In fact, there are also situa-
tions where the elected representatives are under pressure from their voters to reinforce 
the police resources already available. Compared to recent news,21 we can see that for 
17 ‘Obligations of the municipalities with 5000 inhabitants’ (Journal de la Gendarmerie, 1684 [21 July 
1892], pp. 331-332).
18 AD Côte-d’Or, 20 M 387, Part of the record of proceedings of the municipal council of Nuits-Saint-Geor-
ges, 1 June 1892.
19 APP, DA 448, Deliberation of the municipal council of Levallois-Perret, 17 May 1882.
20 SHD, 701, 4th legion of gendarmerie in Le Mans, General inspection, 1902.
21 In the spring of 2018, elected officials, particularly from the suburbs of Paris, complained again about the 
insufficient police resources in their area. According to politico-police contexts, similar grievances have 
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more than a century the dialectical central state and municipal powers in France have ex-
pressed concerns related to security. To put it simply: too many police would prevent or 
oppress municipal liberties; not enough of them, would let the communes fall under the 
control of criminals. The last part of this chapter presents a case which is complementa-
ry to the previously described cases. We see the elected officials demanding additional 
means in the form of police to deal with an increasing and omnipresent threat, such as 
vagrants, marauders, beggars. The mood of insecurity grows proportionally to the eco-
nomic crises which are making unemployed people go out into the streets, for examp-
le at the end of the nineteenth century, when fears of anarchists mixed with fear of va-
gabonds. Public opinion becomes an important influence on police organization. At the 
end of the nineteenth century, the prosecutor in Chinon asked the director of the Gene-
ral Security ‘to send a police officer to examine a recent murder committed in Chinon. 
The Police Commissioner and the Gendarmerie have made every possible effort to find 
the person who is responsible for the crime.’ Approving this request, the Minister of the 
Interior asks the commissioner to send one of his best men ‘because of the general thrill 
provoked by this crime’ although he is aware that it is probably ‘too late’22 for that. We see 
in this case that if the minister considers a procedure futile, he will not agree to answer 
the needs of the police investigation except in an urgent local context. In short, policing 
succeeds above all if a certain position is made clear before the police act on the repre-
sentations of worried or angry citizens.
One sign which adds to the image of suburbs ridden with crime is the petitions calling 
for the creation of police stations or additional gendarmerie buildings on the outskirts 
of cities are published by ‘faits divers’ published in daily newspapers. In December 1898, 
the General Secretary for the police wrote to the colonel commander of the 14th gendar-
merie legion in Lyon to ask him to create a gendarmerie brigade in the suburb of Saint-
Fons, following deliberation by the municipal council. The council follows a petition pre-
pared by local communities complaining about the insecurity in their city caused by the 
lack of the police. The petition is published by the local press who then raises the questi-
on of unrest in the suburbs of Lyon, reminding us also of the murder committed in Saint-
Fons, less than two years ago.23
In the same year24 the municipality of Asnières does not demand the establishment of a 
group of gendarmes, as the municipal council in Saint-Fons had done a few months ear-
lier, but rather calls for the creation of a new police station following a petition of neigh-
boring municipalities:
resurfaced since at least the end of the nineteenth century.
22 AD Indre-et-Loire, 4 M 3, Letter from the Minister of the Interior to the Director of General Security, 17 
January 1900.
23 AD Rhône, R 657, Saint-Fons suburbs inhabitants’ petition on the outskirts of Lyon, demanding the 
creation of a municipal police, March 1896.
24 The case of the serial killer Joseph Vacher is still present in peoples’ minds and most probably multiplies 
this type of request at the time.
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Many depredations are committed every day in this district abandoned 
by the police. Complaints addressed to the Gendarmerie remained avowed-
ly unanswered, gendarmes are powerless; they cannot watch effectively over 
a too large area assigned to them. The more we search, the more we find si-
milar opinions expressed inside the Gendarmerie, a police station is required 
at the site indicated.25
The creation of such a position and the increase in the number of employees was de-
manded in 1883 in the ‘Gazette de Neuilly and Courbevoie’. In another Sequanian com-
mune, the commissioner realizes his powerlessness and concedes ‘willingly that the crea-
tion of a gendarmerie brigade in this commune [...] would be of real use and would give a 
legitimate satisfaction to the wish of the municipality and the population [...]. I can only 
support, in my case, the request of the Municipality of Alfortville.’26
2. When the police pleads for more gendarmes, and vice versa
If, in Asnières and Alfortville, the commissioners support the arguments of the respecti-
ve municipal councils asking for the arrival of gendarmes in their district, the gendarmes 
themselves want to multiply the number of policemen in the communes they patrol. Du-
ring a period of downsizing brigades, the surveillance exercised by the military is dimi-
nished and only the Ministry of the Interior can remedy the situation by deploying new 
forces. Complaints from municipal councils complaining about the insufficient security 
for inhabitants result in demands for the creation of new police forces or the reinforce-
ment of those already existing in the communes. They multiplied on demand, not only 
in urban territories. Thus, at the end of the 1900s, the prefect of Haute-Garonne noted 
that ‘a certain panic has seized our rural population followed by an increasing number of 
thefts and crimes committed in the region, unfortunately the policemen are infrequent, 
and so unable to catch the perpetrators.’ His ultimate argument for seeking to have in-
creased police resources at his disposal is that public opinion would be pleased to see that 
strong measures are being taken to protect countryside areas against the criminals that 
have appeared due to the harvest deficit and related misery.27
3. News supporting peace and improving police efficiency
The press plays an important role in this context of diverse moods that are creating a par-
ticularly delicate situation in the parliamentary republic. Whether at the national, Pari-
sian or provincial level, news is omnipresent in daily newspapers or weekly illustrated 
magazines. And the press is claiming to be the echo of the citizens, accusing policing me-
thods of being ineffective, outdated, lazy by their nature, unsuitable in terms of equip-
25 APP, DA 446, Record proceedings from the municipal council in Asnières, 18 November 1898.
26 APP, DA 446, Report of the police commissioner in Charenton answering the letter returned by the pre-
fect of the police on behalf of mayor of Alfortville, 11 July 1890.
27 AN, 19940493, art. 27, 415, Police Haute-Garonne department files, General secretariat of the prefectu-
re of Haute-Garonne, Monthly report on the ‘rural police agents contest on the repression of crimes and 
offenses’, November 1910.
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ment, etc. Depending on the context, the police tactics are either considered outrageous 
– as for example during the siege of Jules Bonnot’s two accomplices in May 1912 in No-
gent-sur-Marne – or notoriously undervalued – as for example during the strikes of 
1910. More broadly, the press usually designate an individual or group accusing them 
of public vindictiveness, journalists often direct security concerns using people’s real or 
imagined emotions as elements to guide and organize policing.28
Indeed, at the end of the nineteenth century, various waves of fear come together in 
French society under the influence of the press, the political environment, publicists, 
novelists and even memorial police. Since the 1870s there had been two important ele-
ments present, a fear of German espionnage and recidivism. In addition, there is fear of 
the anarchist attacks of the early 1890s, relayed at the turn of the nineteenth and twen-
tieth centuries, and the fear of rural tramps and ‘apaches’ in cities against a backdrop of 
xenophobia. There is intense questioning of public force. Police issues are political issu-
es, and vice versa. The work of the police draws attention to questions about how the fee-
ling of insecurity contributes to the political construction of citizenship and its social re-
presentation.
The police are blamed for certain areas being considered less secure than others. Cer-
tain social groups are perceived as criminogenic. The press still plays an opinion-forming 
role. The question remains whether journalists are not actually creating the threat that 
they are supposedly denouncing? In any case, journalists claim to act in public interest 
demanding better security as a basic people’s right: ‘Every day brings us new facts that 
prove the necessity and the urgency for reforms, we demand security in the suburbs’.29 
Journalists blame the insufficient police forces for these misdeeds, others seek the pro-
blem in their quality, as many police agents are old and the same goes for the gendarmes, 
and they also lack the necessary means.30
V. In search of lost order
1. Crimes everywhere and police nowhere…
Police manpower is perceived as insufficient, as the social demand for safety is a basic 
need of ‘honest people’ and it is very often disturbed by the threat which they perceive 
as proliferating and ever more dangerous. In sum, the growth of crimes would undermi-
ne the civilization underpinning the industrial success carried by a positivist philosophy, 
including the field of public security, as if a golden age of peace had been lost already, or 
was right in the process of being lost. A southern municipal council mentions the mur-
der of one of the inhabitants in his commune and the arrest of two people who followed 
28 López, ‘“Voici les faits qui nous ont paru suffisants ”’, pp. 233-249.
29 Anonymous, ‘L’insécurité en banlieue’, La Nouvelle Presse (22 March 1905).
30 ‘It has become usual for inhabitants of suburbs of Paris to point out and experience the lack of securi-
ty. In the absence of major crimes, it’s brawls, nocturnal attacks, burglaries of houses, depredations of all 
kinds, especially theft of crops that become frequent’ (Gibart, ‘Le manque de sécurité’, pp. 2573-2575).
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him, which would have provoked ‘terror among the population’. Indeed, an alarming re-
port argues in favor of restoring the local brigade of five soldiers:
People dare not go out at night to carry their food to neighboring cities. 
Many, if not everyone complain about the number of gendarmes that has 
been reduced, while the criminals are increasing in number and in cri-
mes. What can three or four gendarmes do if they are always occupied with 
anything but watching over the criminals! Yes, the three gendarmes cannot 
cope with everything and public safety suffers considerably from these cir-
cumstances.31
2. When it is no longer a question of maintaining order but of restoring it
There are also situations where the legal order seems utterly flouted, leaving people and 
the public authorities distraught, in search of restoring order. In a long report, a commis-
sioner of the mobile brigade in Bordeaux relates the difficulties posed by nomads. With 
four inspectors (about half of the staff), the policeman goes to a fair where, in his own 
words, ‘gypsies were reported’. Before dealing with this particular case, his attention is 
drawn to couple of beggars in a Basque commune. The city clerk tells him that they be-
long to several dangerous families who have been ‘terrorizing the whole region’ for many 
years. Police have attempted to control their identity cards, but they refuse to show any 
documents, and the incident is also accompanied by obscene gestures. Moreover, the-
se rebels are being joined by their accomplices who attacked the police and start to hit 
the officers. Facing this group attack, the commissioner asks for help from the gendar-
mes whose brigade is four kilometers from the incident, especially since the band has at-
tacked them again with sticks and knives. After an hour of struggle, two inspectors and 
two gendarmes manage to join the police forces which were trying to reestablish order. 
The criminals escape, after having hurt one of the officers in the arm. The commissioner 
learns that this group have prospered greatly for many years, because there are too few 
‘Gendarmes and they are powerless’.32
3. Consent of the population, a prerequisite for maintaining order
In this regard, the long sociopolitical tendency to exclude the population from policing 
by giving public force agents ‘the monopoly of the legitimate constraint’ was underlined. 
However, human actions, local realities, conjunctions of circumstances are willingly lea-
ving this global analytical framework. What is policing beyond balancing the power bet-
ween a crowd and those in charge of maintaining the order? Is it the result of this ba-
lance, or it is not rather the output of a conjunctural and empirical co-production? Can 
policing be exercised in all circumstances? Does the force always remain within the law? 
One viewpoint is put forward by the Canadian sociologist Jean-Paul Brodeur who op-
31 AD Alpes-Maritimes, 5 R 6, Letter from the municipal council of Cagnes-sur-Mer to the sub-prefect of 
Grasse, September 1st, 1900.
32 AN, 19940493, article 43, 1856, File of the 7th brigade of Bordeaux, Report from the mobile police com-
missioner Chalmel to the divisional commissioner, chief of the 7th brigade in Bordeaux, 17 April 1910.
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posed a vision of police activity as a deployment of legitimate coercion, a vision sup-
ported by the Weberians like Egon Bittner or Dominique Monjardet more than by Max 
Weber himself, who never uses the word police in his works. Brodeur argues that for se-
curity forces to maintain order, a minimum degree of pacification of social relations is 
necessary, as the action of the public force implies a pre-existing regulation of violence. 
In other words, the maintenance of order cannot be accomplished without the populati-
on; without people’s prior consent it becomes destruction or even civil war.
The study of an incident which involves both gendarmes and policemen occurred in 
Saône-et-Loire, at the end of the nineteenth century, it allows us to analyze the above 
questions. In March 1899, the public prosecutor reports to the Attorney General of the 
Civil Court of Autun ‘a complaint in the form of petition, dressed against the police com-
missioner of [the city] and the agents’.33 They are accused of perpetrated violence on the 
participants in a charivari34 ‘against a widow […], who wanted to get married’. The ma-
gistrate says that ‘proportions of this event exceeded the expectations. The commissio-
ner and their [sic] agents who went to the scene were overwhelmed and had to call upon 
the gendarmerie. The crowd was very excited, they booed gendarmes and agents. Many 
reports were drawn up and sent either to the police or to the criminal court as a result 
of the outrageous conduct that the gendarmerie experienced. The police took the unu-
sual step of seeking leniency upon the outrages committed against the agents and used the 
minimum coercion required by the circumstances. This is fully confirmed by the gen-
darmes, and all the good faith witnesses interviewed during the investigation by Special 
Commissioner Vierrou. Evidence given by witnesses was unanimous.’35 In their report, 
Autun brigade gendarmes certify that they did not see the police commissioner or his 
agents exert any violence during the charivari incident. They write:
When we arrived, the Commissioner of the Police was surrounded by 
the crowd, he was calm and behaving advisedly despite the excitement of 
hundreds of people. Nobody complained to the gendarmerie about being 
brutalized by the municipal police and we heard no rumor accusing the po-
lice of having done anything other than their duty [...]. Just like the police, 
we were the object of insults from distant groups of people, we heard words 
like: ‘Go to hell cops! Go to hell gendarmerie!’ […]. In our opinion, if we had 
not intervened in this case, on the requisition of the Police Commissioner, it 
could have turned bad for to the police.36
33 AD Côte-d‘Or, 2 U 232, Letter from the public prosecutor to the Attorney General of the Civil Court of 
Autun, 10 March 1899.
34 ‘Charivari is the most effective way to force the deviant to give up his project [...]. If the transgression is 
considered minor, the charivari lasts only a few moments; if it is considered more important, it may ex-
tend over a week; if it is interpreted as a serious breach, it may not know limits and impose the arrival of 
gendarmes to put an end to the actions of the village’ (Chauvaud, De Pierre Rivière à Landru, pp. 50-51).
35 AD de la Côte-d’Or, 2 U 232, Letter from the Public Prosecutor to the Attorney General of the Civil 
Court of Autun, March 10, 1899.
36 AD de la Côte-d’Or, 2 U 232, Report from the marshal of the Autun’s brigades commander to Public Pro-
secutor, 27 February 1899.
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The Police Commissioner, meanwhile, says he applied ‘[s] all means possible to 
maintain order and prevent any demonstration against personal freedom.’ In the cabaret, 
where the commissioner and his agents went to keep warm, the police attend the rally of 
‘800 to 1000 people’: ‘We summoned everyone to disperse, but nobody has taken into ac-
count our requests’. On the contrary, the police quibbles:
Finally, seeing us powerless to overcome the resistance of all these demon-
strators [we emphasize], I sent the police officer Berthault to notify the Com-
mander of the gendarmerie so they could send me all his gendarmes avai-
lable. About half an hour afterward three gendarmes [...] arrived and helped 
us to disperse the crowd. It was then that several individuals shouted: ‘Take 
away the cops! Take off the gendarmerie!’ Then they run away, but two of 
these disruptors were arrested for insulting the gendarmerie. The gendarmes 
left the place and took the prisoners and we remained alone to proceed the 
maintaining of the order. It was not until about half-past eleven that we were 
able to leave the premises, having returned to the normal state.37
This episode justifies the long transcript; first, because it reveals the forced relationship 
between police and gendarmes in their policing efforts which has already been explai-
ned. Secondly, if the force has certainly remained with the law, it was at first violated: the 
policemen must give up exerting their authority, which represents a failure that the pu-
blic prosecutor conceals while congratulating the discernment and the calm of a com-
missioner for having used the ‘minimum of coercion’. Could the behavior of the three 
policeman be different as they were probably unarmed, in front of a crowd of several 
hundred angry people?
Contrary to the commissioner’s report, which gives the impression of calm being quik-
kly restored, the report of the chief of the sergeant-general states that the gendarmes 
had to remain on the spot for about three more hours , because of the ‘the crowd excite-
ment’. ‘Furthermore, the excitement lasted several days’ and the soldiers ‘had to return 
to Saint-Blaise during the evenings of 17, 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 February to prevent the 
disorder revival’.38 While the presence of unarmed police officers seems to have no effect 
on the crowd, the help of gendarmes turns out to be decisive. It is therefore the presence 
of armed soldiers who are likely to use all the violence permitted by the regulations that 
seems to allow the return of peace. But the threat of the use of force is not the use itself 
and the troubles remain for nearly a week; policing becomes possible again when the agi-
tation ceases on its own, precisely because legal coercion has not been used.39 The examp-
le of powerlessness of the police and compromised maintaining of the order is not rare. It 
perfectly sums up the weak points of the municipal police and the national gendarmerie, 
37 AD de la Côte-d’Or, 2 U 232, Report from the Autun police commissioner to the Public Prosecutor, 25 
February 1899.
38 AD de la Côte-d’Or, 2 U 232, Letter from the Public Prosecutor to the Attorney General of the Civil 
Court of Autun, 27 February 1899.
39 Aurélien Lignereux tries to answer the question of how in certain situations, ‘authority derives from a 
free will, which excludes the use of coercion’ in his article ‘La force morale de la gendarmerie’.
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allowing them to assume their relative role of force in maintaining order: if their partner-
ship is dictated by the law it is, more surely, simply necessary.
VI. Conclusion
Max Weber defined the state as a ‘political enterprise of an institutional character’ that 
‘claims, the application of the regulations, the monopoly on legitimate physical violence’.40 
Retained today as a classic definition, we have seen here precisely that the maintenance 
of order as it is exerted at the end of the nineteenth century in France tends to get rid 
of more and more of its violence, trying to become more controlled, constrained, lea-
ding to a formalized preoccupation in true doctrine during the summer of 1930.41 Note 
that in 1961, even though that year marks one of the bloodiest periods in the war in Al-
geria in terms of the forces of the order, a similar concern was expressed at the highest 
level of military authorities42, evoking the long-standing trend of declining intensity and 
number of police violence. And if murderous episodes do exist, they make us forget that 
most of the time the maintenance of order happens without force, using Victor Hugo’s 
term by ‘denervated’ means (orig. dénervé). The appreciation of Julien Freund appears 
much more enlightening to understand what is at stake: ‘There is no state without force, 
but a really strong state is the one which succeeds in concealing this force in peaceful 
forms like mores and institutions that do not have to intimidate or threaten their mem-
bers. The constraint becomes almost insensitive, because legality coincides with legiti-
macy, power being a guarantee of security [...]. In this sense, strength is an insurance 
against violence’.43
The monopoly on policing being reserved for specialists not yet specialized persisted 
until the appearance of a mobile gendarmerie in 1921 and in fact excluded the role of 
the population in the matter.44 Consequently, people found another means of participa-
tion through the press or the elected representatives, or by proxy in some way. In mo-
dern France, the idea of the National Guard has not only re-emerged, driven by the ter-
40 Weber, Le savant et le politique.
41 ‘It is advisable to appease the excited masses of people by the use of more peaceful means than by fire. 
One can imagine, for example, the extended use of tear-gas products, sound means, to be heard by peop-
le and to give them clear instructions to calm down; possibly, for the night, luminous means able to blind 
the population, without really hurting her’ (SHD, GR 1 R 96-1, file 5, Note of the division ‘Organization’ 
of the state – joint commander to the military chief of staff on a ‘draft decree to increase the heavy wea-
pons staffing of police personnel’, signed by Air Corps General Martin, Chief of State – Major of the Ar-
mies, 14 July 1961).
42 ‘Just as it is right to quiet and harmonize the  excited masses, it is better to use more peaceful means 
than fire. One can imagine, for example, the development of tear-gas means products, the use of suitab-
le sound means so the people can hear clearly the instructions to calm down, possibly, at night, lumino-
us means able to blind the population, without really hurting it’ (SHD, GR 1 R 96-1, file 5, Division note 
‘Organization’ of the Joint Staff for the Military Chief of Staff on a ‘Projet de décret tendant à augmenter 
la dotation en armement lourd des personnels des forces de police’, signed by Air Force General Martin, 
Chief Staff Staff, 14 July 1961).
43 Freund, Qu’est-ce que la politique, pp. 131-132.
44 Houte, ‘Policiers de bonne volonté’, pp. 159-170.
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rorist context, but has been achieved in pursuance of the ideas of François Vidocq from 
almost two hundred years ago, who praised the bourgeois guard: ‘What would be a bet-
ter guarantee then the continual presence of a bourgeois guard watching and acting in-
cessantly under the auspices of legality and honor? Do we replace an institution so nob-
le, so generous by a shaky police’.45 Re-appropriation of the police by the population, or 
the opposite?
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Snitches and Informers. Popular 
Involvement regarding the ‘High Police’ 
under the Consulate and the First Empire 
(1799-1815)
Jeanne-Laure Le Quang
A Frenchman who conspires tells so many people that he does, that it would 
be really extraordinary if, in the number of his confidants, he did not meet a 
‘friend of the Minister or the Prefect of Police. The real political police, in our 
country, is the unofficial police, the police of conversation and indiscretion.1
This excerpt from the Memoirs of Pierre-François Réal, one of the main police chiefs 
under the Consulate and the First Empire, invites us to consider the place occupied, 
in terms of political police, by persons other than just official police officers. Napoleon 
Bonaparte’s first Empire is often presented as a police or authoritarian state.2 However, 
several recent studies have undermined the idea of a dictatorial regime that would impo-
se itself from top to bottom, by studying the different attitudes of the French towards the 
regime. Natalie Petiteau and Aurélien Lignereux have demonstrated that Napoleonic so-
ciety is neither unanimously rallied behind the Emperor, nor uniformly silent or apathe-
tic.3 They pointed out that some latent opposition persisted throughout the period, from 
1799 to 1815. However, at the same time, we can also see the active participation of a si-
gnificant part of the French in the regime’s security policy. The hypothesis we propose to 
examine here is therefore to consider the maintenance of order ‘at ground level’, noting 
how much this Napoleonic ‘police system’ was based on significant cooperation from ci-
vil society. It is therefore a question of dispelling the myth of a police force that would 
operate univocally, oppressively, on a submissive and silent society.
The Napoleonic police relied on the participation of part of the population in the ‘high 
police’ (‘haute police’), that is, in order to eradicate any threat to State security, and thus 
guarantee the survival of the regime and its leader, Napoleon. As during the Ancien Ré-
gime, the Napoleonic police used members of civil society to ensure effective preventi-
ve surveillance: snitches, or other secret agents. However, the central place occupied by 
Vidocq’s character in the legend surrounding the Napoleonic police, until today, should 
not obscure the existence of a more punctual participation in the maintenance of order 
and in this ‘high police’ surveillance of voluntary, unpaid individuals. We can therefore 
1 Réal, Les indiscrétions, p. 2.
2 Brown and Miller, Taking Liberties; Brown, Ending the French Revolution; Hicks, ‘The Napoleonic po-
lice’; Sibalis, ‘The Napoleonic Police State’.
3 Petiteau, Les Français et l’Empire; Lignereux, La France rébellionnaire.
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postulate a two-tiered popular participation in police surveillance: on the one hand, an 
occasional and voluntary, almost ‘spontaneous’, participation by anonymous individuals, 
and on the other hand, a more sustainable and explicitly paid participation by the police, 
that of the snitches.
In what way did the people seized the ‘political’ police and the question of suspects un-
der the Empire? Was this popular participation in police surveillance a sign of the active 
support of part of the population for a strengthening of the weight of the police, and thus, 
for a restriction of individual freedoms? What were the links of these individuals with the 
official police? And finally, how did this active public aid question at the same time the 
possible instrumentalization of police practices by the population itself?
I. Fouché’s snitches: from fantasy to reality 
The myth surrounding the Napoleonic police refers to a massive use of snitches, who-
se archetypal figure is embodied by the character of Vidocq, a former convict who beca-
me the head of a secret police force – called ‘Brigade de Sûreté’ (security brigade) – made 
up of former prisoners, who disguised themselves to avoid recognition and infiltrate cri-
minal circles.4 Several Memoirs published at the Restoration, by Napoleonic police chiefs 
but also by former opponents, mentioned the idea that when three or four people were 
discussing, there were always ears to hear, and report the statements to the police.5 This 
myth feeds an entire imagination forged around the Underworld, which could only be 
penetrated and understood by men from and belonging to these environments, and not 
by ‘traditional’ police officers.6 Paradoxically, this legend is not retrospective, but has 
been deliberately created during the Consulate and the Empire. The Napoleonic police 
had an active policy of playing on emotions, aiming to build a reputation for omnisci-
ence, insisting on the supposed extent and severity of police surveillance. Affirming that 
‘in itself, the police is only an occult power, whose strength lies in the opinion it knows 
how to give of its strength; then it can become one of the state’s greatest resources’7, Jo-
seph Fouché insisted in his Memoirs on the way in which he ‘administered much more 
through representations and apprehension’ than through real coercive means.8 This rhe-
4 Vidocq has been the subject of a large literature since the 19th century (where it inspired the characters of 
Javert in Hugo‘s work and Vautrin in Balzac‘s work), and then of a very abundant filmography. It has been 
the subject of a few scientific publications: Parinaud, Vidocq; Roy-Henry, Vidocq; Giraudet, François Vi-
docq.
5 ‘It is certain that I had the ability to spread and make it appear that wherever four people gathered, there 
were, in my pay, eyes to see and ears to hear.’ Fouché, Mémoires, p. 221. See also Réal, Les indiscrétions, 
pp. 349-350; Bertier, Souvenirs inédits, p. 129.
6 Kalifa, Les bas-fonds, pp. 9-15 and 52-68.
7 Fouché, Mémoires, p. 404.
8 Fouché, Mémoires, p. 221. Jean-Paul Brodeur, however, underlines the continuity of this rhetoric, aimed 
at creating a fear ‘disproportionate to the material importance of the police apparatus they led’, from the 
first police lieutenants of Paris, Argenson and Sartine, to Fouché. Jean-Paul Brodeur, ‘La police: mythes et 
réalités’, pp. 26-27.
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toric of instrumentalizing fears thus contributed, in the end, to strengthening the foun-
dation of the Napoleonic regime, by creating the illusion of its solidity.
Faced with the persistence of this myth of the omnipresence of police snitches, it is ne-
cessary to try to understand precisely how the police relied, in terms of ‘high police’, on 
unofficial, secret and non-professional agents.9 As Hugues Marquis points out, legend 
has it that the police in Fouché used 10,000 snitches for the whole of France, to which 
should be added 5000 snitches for Paris.10 This reality is most likely exaggerated. Never-
theless, it is difficult to find these unofficial police personnel in the archives. Informers 
wrote under a pseudonym, or were identified only by the first letter of their name, and 
the police generally did not keep originals. Their reports were transcribed, disappeared 
from the archives or were dispersed in different files. Each informer had only one contact 
with one agent, usually the one who recruited him.11 Finally, it seems proven that Fouché, 
Minister of Police from 1799 to 1810, burned his lists of indicators at the time of his dis-
grace and his replacement by Savary, to force his successor to rebuild his own networks.12
Nevertheless, it can be estimated that about 200 to 300 snitches were employed by the 
Napoleonic police in Paris. The only list of snitches kept in the police archives was com-
piled in 1799 by a police officer, Louis-Charles Dupérou, who betrayed his administrati-
on for the benefit of the royalists, by retrieving a list of all snitches employed by the po-
lice.13 The list included 253 police informers or indicators. Other sources, in particular 
the expense accounts of Parisian peace officers, which sometimes mention the remune-
ration of secret agents, make it possible to estimate that the total number of secret agents 
employed throughout Paris in 1804 would be about 130 secret agents, less than half of 
Dupérou’s 1799 list14. The legend of a Paris with 5000 bugs is therefore very much exag-
gerated. 
These unofficial police officers were primarily used for missions that fell within the 
scope of the ‘high police’, such as surveillance, information gathering or undercover ope-
rations. These were therefore preventive missions, not investigations conducted after a 
proven crime. It is in this sense that Fouché refered to snitches as ‘mobile phalanxes 
of observers’.15 As Dupérou’s list reveals, snitches were recruited from all social back-
grounds, from the most disadvantaged (cabaret owners, wine merchants, servants) to 
9 The use of snitches by the Napoleonic police has been the subject of several studies, often ancient, most 
often focusing on the biography of a specific snitch. D’Hauterive, Mouchards et policiers; Blanc, Les espi-
ons de la Révolution et de l’Empire; and Madame de Bonneuil; Pingaud, Un agent secret; Douay and 
Hertault, Schulmeister. From an anthropological perspective, we can also mention Alain Dewerpe‘s stu-
dy on the spy and the political uses of secrecy. Dewerpe, Espion, p. 15.
10 Marquis, Agents de l’ennemi, p. 126.
11 Brunet, La Police de l’ombre, pp. 8-9.
12 Lentz, Savary, p. 245.
13 AN F7 6247. Madelin, Joseph Fouché, pp. 401-402.
14 AN F7 3183, ‘Frais de surveillance par des inspecteurs et autres agents’, second division, germinal-fructi-
dor an XII (March-September 1804).
15 Fouché, Mémoires, p. 221.
Snitches and Informers
234
the nobility.16 In the case of the most popular social strata, the permeability of the border 
between suspects and snitches, between offenders and unofficial police officers, was very 
high.17 Pierre-François Réal refered in particular to these flies as ‘marauders [‘gens sans 
aveu’] [...] whom the police of the Prefect of Police monitor when they do not use them’.18 
Among these, the figure of the ‘sheep’, in other words the prison snitch, is frequently di-
stinguished in the archives, revealing the use of certain prisoners as indicators, most of-
ten on an occasional basis, but sometimes more regularly.19 The surveillance carried out 
by these unofficial agents from a popular background was sometimes targeted at a spe-
cific individual, subject to police suspicion, and sometimes extended to the surveillance 
of a given geographical area, in order to accumulate information, and to identify pos-
sible suspicious movements. In Dupérou’s list of 1799, we find Gilbert Cordier, shoeshi-
ne boy at the Palais-Royal, Lecompte, ‘snitching on small theatres’, Morelli, ‘snitching on 
gambling houses’, or Jacotot, apple merchant pretending to be crippled, in charge of stu-
dying the walkers of the Palais-Royal.20 The rumors circulating in the cafés were careful-
ly noted, especially everything concerning the news of the army, in order to stop any def-
eatist news.21
These snitches were also responsible for searching for, monitoring and even arresting 
ordinary criminals – thieves, beggars, vagrants, etc. Thus, out of a list of nine ‘secret 
agents’ – five men and four women – employed in January 1808 in a Paris police divisi-
on, eight were paid for their contribution to the search for and arrest of thieves, counter-
feiters or former convicts.22 This task reveals the permeability of the border between po-
litical control and social control in the area of ‘high police’. Although the surveillance, by 
means of snitches, of these ‘dangerous classes’ was part of an ‘ordinary’ social control, it 
was not without political stakes: it was a question of purging Paris of individuals conside-
red undesirable or dangerous for the tranquillity of the society. It was also part of an ef-
fort to depoliticize expressions of opposition to the regime.
In addition to these informers from working class backgrounds, who were general-
ly paid between 12 and 24 pounds according to the expense records kept23, there were 
16 This list divided the snitches employed by the Parisian police into three classes, from the most disadvan-
taged, employed on an occasional basis, to the greatest nobles, who received a regular salary.
17 For example, a police report said: ‘On the loose on surveillance if he refuses to serve: Eyseman, leader 
of a gang of fraudsters, confessed, he can be used as a secret agent’. Bulletin of Wednesday, 9 May 1810, 
d’Hauterive, La police secrète du premier Empire, t. 5, p. 395.
18 Réal, Les indiscrétions, p. 223.
19 AN F7 3183, ‘Frais de surveillance par des inspecteurs et autres agents’, second division, germinal-fructi-
dor an XII (March-September 1804). Jacobin opponent Eve Demaillot also mentions ‘sheep’ in his pam-
phlets. Demaillot, Tableau historique, pp. 83-91.
20 AN F7 6247. Madelin, Joseph Fouché, pp. 401-402.
21 See for example AN F7 7012, Dubois to Fouché report, 14 fructidor year XII (1st September 1804); AN 
F7 3180, Report of Lemoine, 26 brumaire an XII (18 November 1803); d’Hauterive, La police secrète du 
premier Empire, t. 4, bulletin of Tuesday 30 August 1808, p. 344; and bulletin of Wednesday 31 August 
1808, p. 346.
22 AN F7 3191, ‘compte de l’an 1808, mois de janvier. Dépenses, frais d’officiers de paix, inspecteurs et autres 
agens de surveillance’.
23 AN F7 3183; AN F7 3191.
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also snitches from noble backgrounds. These noble informants were used by the police 
on a much more regular basis, and received monthly salaries – rather than one-off sala-
ries – much higher.24 Among them were first and foremost many former chouans or for-
mer emigrants, whose services to the police – spying on royalist circles or on abroad – 
enabled them to avoid a death sentence or a long prison sentence.25 But the police use of 
nobles from the highest lineages can also be attested, as revealed by the attentive listening 
of conversations in the Parisian salons.26 The bulletins of the Ministry of Police sent daily 
to Napoleon regularly reported the rumors circulating in these salons.27
To this ‘passive’ role of listening and surveillance in public places or closed spaces – 
from the tavern to the salon frequented by the nobility – was finally added an ‘active’ role, 
in the form of a hidden propaganda activity. The snitches were responsible for influen-
cing public opinion, by instilling opinions in favour of the regime, in the cafés and salons 
where they operated.28 A secret agent wrote in a report that he mistakenly believed that 
a man he was in charge of supervising was himself a secret agent, because he expressed 
opinions so favourable to the government that they seemed ‘exalted’.29 In his memoirs, 
Fouché also mentioned his ‘three hundred Paris regulators’ in charge of ‘mastering’ the 
‘salon talks’.30 This close intertwining between control and the spread of rumours shows 
the central place of snitches in the process of shaping public opinion, thus participating 
in a ‘fabrication of consent’ that seemed to be one of the central aspects on which the Na-
poleonic regime was based.
Of course, the police were persistently suspicious of these snitches, and were not fooled 
by the amplification or even invention necessary to justify a regular salary.31 The snitches 
were frequently arrested and briefly detained, but also sent to controlled residence.32 Ne-
vertheless, a few rare snitches experienced an exceptional social rise during the Empire. 
This is particularly the case of Pierre-Hugues Veyrat, a watch merchant and then pawn-
broker, who informed the police from 1797, before being promoted, after the 18 fructi-
24 According to Ernest d‘Hauterive, the royalist informer Rochejean received an initial sum of 6000 francs 
‘as a starting point’, then was paid 1500 francs per month – a sum that corresponded to his high social 
status. D’Hauterive, Mouchards et policiers, p. 135. Réal also mentioned the remuneration of a lady from 
the aristocracy for 1000 francs per month, and the Duke of Aumont for 24,000 francs per year. Both were 
in charge of spying on Louis XVIII’s court in Hartwel. Réal, Les indiscrétions, pp. 161-163.
25 Fouché claims to have defeated the chouannerie by this means. Fouché, Mémoires, p. 98-99. See the jour-
neys of Philippe-François Rochejean or Jean Marie Édouard de L..., retraced by d’Hauterive, Mouchards 
et policiers, pp. 110-160.
26 On the other hand, the use by the police of Empress Josephine herself, or other high nobles close to Na-
poleon, such as Bourrienne, traditionally mentioned, cannot be attested by any archival evidence.
27 D’Hauterive, La police secrète du premier Empire; Gotteri, La police secrète du premier Empire.
28 Jean-Paul Brodeur has shown how ‘the exacerbation of insecurity through the spread of rumours is [...] a 
striking feature of the use of informants by the police’. Brodeur, Les visages de la police, p. 250.
29 APP Aa 270-1, doc. 71, note for the Prefect of Police, [undated].
30 Fouché, Mémoires, p. 246.
31 Réal, Les indiscrétions, p. 1. 
32 AN F7 3027. A file of ‘arrests and surveillance’ dating from 1800-1801 contains, out of about fifty indivi-
duals sent under controlled residence (called ‘surveillance spéciale’), several former police officers. The 
royalist snitch Rochejean was also arrested in 1808 and from 1813 to the end of the Empire. D’Hauterive, 
Mouchards et policiers, p. 135.
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dor (4 September 1797), to Inspector General at the Ministry of Police, then at the Pré-
fecture de Police of Paris. He kept this position from 1802 to 1814, having under his 
command the 24 peace officers of the capital.33 Another example is Jean-André Fran-
çois, a royalist agent linked abroad, who was first under surveillance and detained in the 
Temple in 1797, before collaborating with Veyrat from the prison in 1799 and obtaining 
a position of trust in the Ministry of Police : the drafting of the daily bulletin addressed 
to Napoleon, which compiled the various police reports arriving from all over France. 
He kept this position until the fall of the regime in 1814.34 While these two individual 
trajectories are obviously extremely rare, they testify to the blurred and permeable bor-
ders between official and unofficial police under the Consulate and the Empire. This de-
liberate vagueness was maintained with a view to achieving greater effectiveness in poli-
tical surveillance.
II. An important ‘civic denunciation’
However, in addition to these unofficial agents regularly employed by the Parisian police, 
there was an indefinite number of occasional police informants, who escape any quan-
tification. In most cases, this voluntary popular participation offered to the police took 
the form of a letter of denunciation.35 This important place of denunciation appears as 
a legacy of the Revolution. During the years 1789-90, with the realization of the fragili-
ty of a Revolution perceived as surrounded by threatening enemies, the authorities sho-
wed a new encouragement for citizens to denounce.36 The denunciation was justified by 
the imminent danger of the collapse of the Revolution, which made it possible to legiti-
mize the resurgence of the use of police ‘observers’ who symbolized the Ancien Régime 
and its opaque practices, while the Revolution promoted transparency as a value. Thus 
the distinction appeared between ‘délation’ – an act with a negative connotation, which 
would be driven by personal or unfair interests, synonymous with treason, which would 
harm society by undermining its cohesion – and ‘dénonciation’, which took on a comple-
tely positive value, by becoming a true act of civic virtue and duty.37
33 However, Veyrat was briefly dismissed several times for his involvement in misappropriation cases. Tu-
lard, Dictionnaire Napoléon, article ‘Veyrat’; d’Hauterive, Mouchards et policiers, pp. 141-170.
34 D’Hauterive, Mouchards et policiers, pp. 144-154; Marquis, Agents de l’ennemi, p. 200-203, et Montarlot, 
‘Un agent de la police secrète’, pp. 1223.
35 Jean-Paul Brunet establishes a similar typology for the 20th century between ‘denunciation and more or 
less voluntary help’, ‘occasional indicators’ and ‘regular indicators from the community’, practising ‘entry-
ism’. Brunet, La Police de l’ombre, pp. 32-53.
36 Fitzpatrick and Gellately, ‘Introduction to the Practices of Denunciation’, p. 750; Lucas, ‘The Theory and 
Practice of Denunciation’, p. 769.
37 This distinction has existed since the publication of Diderot’s Encyclopédie ou dictionnaire raisonné 
des sciences, des arts et des métiers, but it was introduced into current language around 1792. Lucas, p. 
763 and 774. According to Virginie Martin, the new virtuous ‘citizen-denouncer’ had to act – unlike the 
snitch of the Ancien Régime – according to three criteria: ‘gratuity’ (he was not remunerated), ‘disinte-
restedness’ (he acted in the name of the general interest, not for his own benefit), and ‘spontaneity’. Mar-
tin, ‘La Révolution française ou „l’ère du soupçon“’, p. 133.
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The Consulate and the Empire, inherited this culture of denunciation, and also erected 
it as a civic virtue, because it would represent a gift of self to the country – in the same 
way as being a soldier. While the Empire was almost constantly at war with its neigh-
bours, each citizen, by bringing the little knowledge at his disposal, could help to save the 
State from its enemies.38 The police authorities explicitly called on the population to ac-
tively participate in policing and thus contribute to the survival of the regime. Two weeks 
after his appointment as Minister of Police, Fouché made a declaration to the French ci-
tizens which ended with a real call for denunciation:
I have made a promise to restore inner peace, to put an end to the mas-
sacres and oppression of the Republicans, to stop the plots of traitors and to 
abduct abroad up to the hope of an accomplice. Help me, citizens, in this ho-
nourable task. Support me with your zeal, surround me with your patrio-
tism, and may this collaboration of citizens and magistrates be the sure sign 
of the Republic’s triumph.39
With this proclamation, printed in thousands of copies, Fouché intended to reactiva-
te the collaboration between police and citizens established during the Revolution, based 
largely on the practice of denunciation. The Prefect of Police of Paris Dubois had a simi-
lar attitude when he took up his fonctions. Five days after his appointment, he concluded 
his first proclamation to the Parisians by declaring: ‘so help me with your lights and your 
zeal. If I assure your rest, I will not regret my waking hours’.40 This place of denunciation 
at the heart of relations between police and citizens was also legalized by the important 
work of codification undertaken under the Consulate and the Empire.41 The 1810 Penal 
Code participated in the institutionalization of denunciation, introducing severe penal-
ties for failure to denounce crimes against state security, and offering exemptions from 
punishment for denunciators… but also providing measures (ranging from fines to im-
prisonment) against ‘slanderous denunciations’.
As a result of this active encouragement by the authorities, it can be said that the Con-
sular and Imperial period was the time of intense use of denunciation. Most of the letters 
denounced precisely identified individuals, and concerned demonstrations of hostility 
towards Napoleon Bonaparte himself. The letter of denunciation written against a man 
named Pigenat Lapalun in 1809 is an archetypal example.42 The denouncer, named Nou-
rrier, reported the hateful remarks about Napoleon that this man made the day before 
38 However, the rise of denunciation should not be seen as the ‘only result of political will’, of a call for 
denunciation from the authorities, since the population chooses whether or not to cooperate. Charageat 
and Soula, Dénoncer le crime, p. 11.
39 Proclamation by the Minister of the General Police to French Citizens, 16 thermidor year VIII (4 August 
1800), quoted by Madelin, Fouché, p. 226.
40 Proclamation of Dubois to Parisians, 25 ventôse year VIII (15 March 1800), quoted by Rigotard, La po-
lice parisienne de Napoléon, p. 46.
41 In the continuity of the revolutionary legislation (Sieyès ‘grande police’ law of the 1er germinal year III, 
and Code des délits et des peines of the 3 brumaire year IV).
42 APP, Aa 317, letter of 26 August 1809. This letter was addressed to an unidentified ‘general’, but came into 
the hands of the Prefect of Police Dubois, who himself reproduced it in a report to the Minister of Police 
on 9 September 1809.
Snitches and Informers
238
in his home. The whole letter first explicitly presented the denunciation as an act of civic 
duty, in order to justify the denunciation of a close friend. Indeed, the letters of denun-
ciation kept for the period almost always included a deep concern for moral justificati-
on on the part of the denunciator. The very content of the denunciation against Pigenat 
Lapalun, for example, was framed by the justification that the denouncer gave to his act. 
The letter began with these words: ‘General, I hasten to take another opportunity to pro-
ve to you my zeal for the interests of our August Sovereign and for public order’. The con-
clusion of the letter repeated the same rhetoric: ‘I hand him over to your supervision and 
I am happy to have fulfilled, once again, my duty to a sovereign so worthy of our esteem 
and love’. The denunciation, then, took on the appearance of a selfless act, symbol of total 
adherence to the regime and boundless devotion to Napoleon.
While the First Consul wanted a return to order and the elimination of all factions, 
the act of denunciation was proof of patriotism, making it possible to make oneself un-
suspected. By describing the person he denounced as a ‘monster’, the informer could 
thus appear by contrast as a model and virtuous subject, and avoid becoming a suspect 
himself in the eyes of the police. This is evidenced by the rhetorical insistence he placed 
on clearing himself of the remarks he was reporting, showing that he did not share them 
in any way. He even apologized twice for having to repeat them: ‘Convinced that you will 
excuse the need, where I am, to report to you his horrible and revolting words’, ‘Once 
again, General, please excuse me; the truth is that I have to put these infamous insults 
and shouts on paper’. 
But above all, the letter of denunciation against Pigenat-Lapalun – like others – see-
med to have truly integrated police vocabulary, particularly in the detailed physical de-
scription of the individual denounced, closely resembling the reports issued by the po-
lice. Finally, it revealed an integration of police concerns regarding the ‘high police’. The 
denouncer, by reporting the ‘insulting’ remarks, was referring to a whole combination of 
the elements most likely to interest the police and lead to the arrest of the denounced: di-
rect threats to the Emperor’s person – called ‘villain, scoundrel, whoremonger [...], that 
damn scamp, that damn Corsican’, and adding ‘he must perish, and he will perish’ –, pes-
simistic news about military campaigns, and the emphasis that it was not an isolated dis-
gruntled person, pointing to the existence of rallies of royalists, potentially preparing for 
a possible plot. While it is impossible today to distinguish between truth and slander in 
this letter of denunciation, the undeniable mastery of police rhetoric by the whistleblo-
wer may give rise to the suspicion that this individual was attempting to instrumentalize 
the police in the service of his own interests.43
Indeed, whether implicitly or more openly, a number of these voluntary ‘high police’ 
aids reveal a partially interested act on the part of the denouncer.44 Some letters of denun-
43 Martine Charageat and Mathieu Soula evoke in the same manner the way in which, since the Midd-
le Ages, denunciations made before the courts had to adopt a particular language, in order to promote 
the success of the case, which implied knowing, even briefly, the codes of justice. Charageat and Soula, 
Dénoncer le crime, pp. 15-16.
44 Of course, this is not a particularity of denunciations under the Consulate and the Empire. Fitzpatrick 
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ciation requested a reward, most often of a monetary nature, in exchange for the infor-
mation provided. The police offered rewards for revelations after each conspiracy. In his 
Memoirs, Fouché stated, with regard to the royalist conspiracy of Cadoudal and Piche-
gru in 1804, that he ‘[had] soon, in fact, by the mere beginning of a reward of two thou-
sand louis, all the secrets of Georges’ agents, and I was put on their trail’.45 These indi-
vidual requests for rewards can be seen throughout the period, asking for example for 
reimbursement of expenses that the whistleblower would have incurred in order not to 
lose the denounced person’s traces.46 But the expected reward could also be a job in the 
police or gendarmerie47, a title or a decoration. For example, a man named Félix Macaux 
solicited the ‘star of the Legion of Honour’ for having ‘denounced and led to the arrest’ 
of a man named Robert, who, in a cabaret, had ‘announced the project to attack the days 
of the savior of France’.48 Finally, the whistleblower’s interest could lie in the elimination 
of a person, or a group, with whom he felt enmity, both politically49 and personally.50 The 
denunciations could also be part of ‘localist’ tensions, between two cities or two districts, 
as evidenced by an anonymous letter addressed to the Police Commissioner in Versailles 
stating that the attack on the ‘Infernal Machine’ had been ‘directed by the inhabitants of 
Versailles’, out of hatred of Parisians.51
Studying denunciation as an act partly driven by personal interests therefore makes it 
possible to relativize the univocal idea of a population ‘victim’ of ‘high police measures’, 
and to reverse the perspective. While the police system was therefore founded in part on 
cooperation between the police and the population, based on voluntary assistance from 
the latter, it appears that part of society had sufficiently internalized police thinking pat-
terns, what for the police was part of the suspicion register, to be able to use them for 
their personal benefit. It was a reversal of the balance of power between police and citi-
zens, an instrumentalisation of the former by the latter, which could therefore take place: 
some denunciators could have individuals arrested by giving them the appearance of the 
police suspect, by speaking the police language, by using the concepts forged by it, which 
shows how the state could be ‘internalized’ by citizens.52
and Gellately, ‘Introduction to the Practices of Denunciation’, pp. 757 and 762-763.
45 Fouché, Mémoires, p. 167. Similarly, during the attack on the ‘Infernal Machine’ in 1800, a list mentioned 
the names of the people the police paid to find one of the conspirators, Carbon. APP, Aa 278.
46 AN F7 3183, letter from Bertrand to the Prefect of Police, 5 prairial year XII (25 May 1804).
47 APP Aa 270-1, document 33.
48 AN F7 7012, Félix Macaux’s file, letter from Dubois to the Minister of Police, 3 June 1806.
49 APP, Aa 281, document 272, Undated anonymous letter denouncing the ‘scoundrels of septembrisers 
and jacobins’.
50 A prisoner named Desforges claimed to have been denounced by a man who divorced his wife because 
of him. AN, F7 6267, Desforges’ file, letter from Desforges to the Minister of Police, 28 ventôse year IX 
(19 March 1801).
51 APP, Aa 281, document 102, anonymous letter to the citizen Pille, Police Commissioner in Versailles, 11 
nivôse year IX (1st January 1801).
52 Fitzpatrick and Gellately, p. 763. See also Brodeur and Jobard, Citoyens et délateurs.
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The police were of course not fooled by these attempts at citizen instrumentalizati-
on – just as they were wary of regular indicators, described by Fouché as ‘often dubi-
ous instruments’.53 Pierre-Marie Desmarest – the chief of the secret police at the Ministry 
of the General Police – mentioned in his memoirs the police mistrust of these letters of 
denunciation and referred to conspiracies and denunciations as ‘two plagues that mul-
tiply one by the other’.54 He also deplored the large number of slanderous denunciati-
ons received by the Ministry of Police.55 As a result of this police mistrust, the reported 
facts seemed to be fairly systematically verified. Several individual surveillance files con-
cerning suspicious individuals testify to the police investigation following a denuncia-
tion.56 Nevertheless, these denunciations, once verified, constituted a central tool used 
by the Consular and Imperial police in the area of ‘high police’, in two ways. They were 
first of all the frequent starting point for placing an individual under surveillance, thus 
becoming a suspect, or the origin of the intensification of the surveillance of an already 
known suspect. They could also form the basis for a detention by ‘high police measure’ – 
that is, without going to court. This was the case of Pigenat-Lapalun, arrested the day af-
ter his denunciation.57
Many letters from detainees by ‘high police measure’, sent to the Senate Committee on 
Individual Freedom (‘Commission sénatoriale de la liberté individuelle’) – an institution 
that was supposed to guarantee citizens against arbitrary detention – claimed to be vic-
tims of slanderous denunciation.58 For many of them, it was probably an additional rhe-
torical argument to claim their innocence, and not necessarily reality. However, the very 
fact that denunciation was an argument that was so frequently considered to be put for-
ward is indicative of the very importance of the existence of this practice at the time.
In addition, the police made even more intensive use of these letters of denunciation in 
a conspiracy context. In 1800, for example, in the few days following the explosion of the 
‘Infernal Machine’, which almost killed Bonaparte but exploded, killing 22 people and in-
juring around 50, the police investigation involved a central task of collecting testimo-
nies and denunciations, in particular by distributing the reports of the conspirators and 
their equipment in the press or on posters, with a promise of a reward for giving infor-
mation to the police. The police asked also the health officers to inform the police com-
missioners of the injured individuals they had treated on that day, hoping in this way to 
find possible accomplices on the run.59 As a result of these active police incitements, the 
53 Fouché, Mémoires, p. 92.
54 Desmarest, Témoignages historiques, p. 24.
55 One example is the case of Joseph Benoît Coney, detained by ‘high police measure’ for the continuous 
sending of false denunciations to the police, and for whom Fouché wrote that ‘this individual‘s mania 
for denunciations was increased to an incredible extent’. AN O2 1430A, file 36, letter from Fouché to the 
Commission sénatoriale de la liberté individuelle, 2 thermidor year XII (21 July 1804).
56 AN F7 4260.
57 APP, Aa 317, Dubois to Fouché report, 9 September 1809.
58 AN O2 1430-1436.
59 APP, Aa 278, document 86, Basile Jacques Louis Colin ‚s interrogation, 3 pluviôse year IX (23 January 
1801).
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Paris Police Prefecture received about thirty anonymous denunciations in three days, to 
which several dozen others were added in the weeks that followed.60 Again, these letters 
reflected a strong preoccupation with moral justification on the part of the whistleblo-
wer. They expressed the ‘guilt’ that there would be not to denounce, ‘at a time when the 
first consul has just been exposed to the greatest dangers’.61
The study of these denunciations makes it possible to sketch out how the population 
denounced its surroundings or neighbourhood, and according to what criteria. Thus, 
neighbours, or merchants, were often denounced for comments against the government. 
For example, a man named Poacher was arrested for saying on the night of the explosi-
on of the ‘Infernal Machine’: ‘It’s nothing, let’s have a drink to Bonaparte’s health’.62 In a 
context of strong emotion linked to the attack, any words that were not sufficiently pa-
triotic were perceived as suspicious, by the police but also by the people themselves. 
Other denunciations were made on the criterion of non-belonging to the neighbour-
hood, which became all the more suspicious in this post-attack context. For example, a 
baker, Simonnan, reported that on the day of the attack, he saw a bloody man entering 
his home. He insisted on asking for his papers, under the pretext of calling a car to take 
him home; then, faced with his refusal, he left him in his shop to denounce him to the 
police station on rue Saint Nicaise, and asked ‘that someone go to his house to find out 
who this individual was’.63 Finally, it was sometimes simply the suspicious attitude that 
aroused popular suspicion. For example, a cooper came to the police and told them that 
he had encircled a barrel in a shed where he had seen a little mare and a cart, and de-
nounced the person who had commissioned this work because he had ‘noticed that he 
looked and stared a lot at the pavement, and looked dreamy like a worried man’.64
Thus, the Parisian people were largely confronted with police mental categorizations: 
the supposed link of the man denounced with the conspirators, the adequacy of certain 
men with the police figure of the suspect, the non-appartenance to the neighbourhood, 
the departure from habit, comments against the government, a suspicious attitude, etc. 
It was just as much the police that conformed to the suspect’s popular conceptions (with 
the notion of belonging to a community) as the opposite: if any denunciation is a subjec-
tive interpretation of reality, the informer seemed to use the police’s language well, to be 
sure that he was understood by the police and that his information was considered of the 
highest importance by the police.
In addition, the denunciations also evolved during the police investigation after the 
‘Infernal Machine’, following the evolution of the criteria of police suspicion. While the 
first letters mainly mentioned individuals ‘known for their Jacobin convictions’65, the fol-
60 APP Aa 276 and 281. See also Salomé, L’ouragan homicide, p. 111.
61 APP, Aa 281, document 248, anonymous letter [undated].
62 APP, Aa 281, document 163, report on Braconnier, 1er pluviôse year IX (21 January 1801).
63 APP, Aa 278, document 26, declaration by citizen Simonnan, baker, 4 nivôse year IX (25 December 
1800).
64 APP, Aa 278, document 41, delaration by citizen Baroux, cooper, 9 nivôse year IX (30 December 1800).
65 Salomé, p. 111; APP, Aa 281, document 272.
Snitches and Informers
242
lowing letters denounced royalists, which shows the adequacy between ‘official’ police 
research and voluntary public aid.66 Desmarest thus reported in his memoirs that at the 
time Fouché provided proof that it was the royalists who committed the attack,
Opinion suddenly turned, and people began to arrest what were called 
chouans. It was to whom would bring before the Minister any man who bore 
any resemblance to these once so despised records; and, as we could see them 
everywhere, Mr. Fouché still had to defend himself against this new zeal.67
As Karine Salomé points out, these letters of denunciation reveal ‘the context of tensi-
ons and cleavages in which the attack on rue St Nicaise took place’, and the permanence 
of ‘resentments’ and ‘hatred’ behind the shock caused by the attack.68
III. Other occasional citizen assistance to the police
The occasional assistance provided to the police by individuals, on a voluntary and spon-
taneous basis, in terms of ‘high police’, could finally take other forms than that of denun-
ciation. A few individuals offered to help the police by sending projects to improve the 
action or the workings of the police itself. These proposals for improvement were some-
times a pretext for requesting a position or compensation, the project remaining vague 
or confusing. However, other improvement projects were more concrete. This is the case 
of a letter sent by a soldier named Lesavre Caillier to Napoleon in 1812, stating that Pa-
ris needed more surveillance, especially at night, because ‘it is in the darkness that plots 
are formed’.69 Noting that the size of the police districts was too large to allow a night pa-
trol to prevent all crimes, he proposed the formation of a night guard who would take up 
his duties from sunset until dawn, with the aim of ‘completely eliminating those disrup-
ters who, in full peace, demand that the quiet inhabitant stand on his guard’. This guard 
would have numbered more than 1000 men each night: he planned to create 24 compa-
nies of 75 men each, not counting officers and non-commissioned officers, and conside-
red the smallest details: financial treatment of each policeman, financing of this guard by 
establishing a new tax on owners and tenants, ‘proportionate to the price of rents above 
one hundred francs’, recruitment methods for guards, uniform, model of pass,... It was 
therefore a project to set up a large-scale surveillance system, based on the traditional 
police idea, visibly integrated by this individual, that any person found on the street at 
night was suspicious and must be the subject of intense surveillance.
The vocabulary used here again echoed the suspect’s police rhetoric, evoking ‘vile in-
triguers’, ‘men unworthy to exist in society’, ‘disruptors’, or ‘corrupt beings, who must no 
longer be counted among a people as polite and civilized as the French’. The criteria for 
dangerousness advanced are very similar to those used by the police in surveillance re-
66 Indeed, the attack was first attributed to the Jacobins, before its royalist origin was discovered by the po-
lice investigation.
67 Desmarest, Témoignages historiques, p. 46.
68 Salomé, L’ouragan homicide, pp. 109-111.
69 APP DB31, Petition by Lesavre Caillier to the Committee on Petitions, 21 January 1812.
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ports, showing the integration, and reuse, by Imperial society of police thinking patterns. 
How did this soldier justify his project, and his very approach? As with the letters of 
denunciation, the intertwining was fine between the declaration of a deep attachment to 
the regime, the promotion of oneself as the paragon of the perfect virtuous subject, and 
the act of self-interest. In the hope of obtaining a position in this new night guard, Les-
avre Caillier once again testifies to the way in which a proposal for voluntary police as-
sistance could also reveal an attempt to instrumentalize the police for its own purposes, 
while knowingly contributing to the strengthening of the regime.
The last example of this interweaving is a collective petition of the prisoners of Bicêt-
re, written to ask Napoleon for their pardon, in a context of regime change – since it was 
written two days before the official passage to the Empire.70 This request for pardon was 
accompanied by a plan to improve the prison system, which would be based on a kind 
of quota system, by reducing the number of prisoners in the Empire to 30,000, which 
would have had the effect, according to the authors, of instilling in the released indivi-
duals a feeling of ‘gratitude’ towards the regime, and an unconditional love for its lea-
der. This project is thus similar to the previous one in the way it would both strengthen 
the regime – at least in theory – and at the same time bring a reward to its authors: here, 
their release.
IV. Conclusion
While we must be careful not to exaggerate or generalize – since part of society has re-
mained reticent towards the regime – this observation of active popular participation in 
the political police, under the Consulate and the Empire, leads us to deeply relativize the 
idea of a Napoleonic police force as an all-powerful and tentacular institution, weighing 
on a society unanimously victim of Napoleonic tyranny. The very idea of a highly forma-
lised police system, with a solid foundation, is an illusion, since the ‘high police measu-
res’ were based to a significant extent on a multifaceted and shifting network of exceptio-
nal informants or snitches.71
The importance of denunciation can be read in particular as a sign of genuine indivi-
dual participation in the Napoleonic regime, a voluntary citizen assistance indicating the 
consent of at least part of the population to ‘high police measures’, in which the infor-
mer would feel responsible for a ‘civilian surveillance’72 role. However, beyond this role as 
a disinterested ‘high police’ actor, finally, there is a suspicion of a conscious use of ‘high 
police’ tools in the service of the whistleblower’s own interests, who cannot be seen in a 
simplistic way as the regime’s simple zealot. This popular participation clearly reveals the 
70 AN O2 1430A, file 19, petition of the 27 prairial year XII (16 June 1805).
71 As Clive Emsley points out, ‘the apparent centralization and professionalization of the police has often 
concealed the local impulses that actually ensured the balance of the police forces and guaranteed the ef-
fectiveness of the social regulations they claimed to exercise.’ Emsley, ‘Police, maintien de l’ordre et es-
paces urbains’, pp. 11-12.
72 This term is borrowed from Brodeur and Jobard, Citoyens et délateurs, p. 87.
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possibilities of the police being instrumentalized by the citizens themselves. We could 
thus speak of ‘internalisation’ by the population of police rhetoric: letters of denunciation 
in particular were able to borrow the police word, to internalise their expectations and 
their way of thinking. These speeches are therefore not a pure reflection of reality, but a 
reality that can be seen under an appearance likely to convince the authorities, a con-
struction that conformed to police expectations, in order to try to instrumentalize the 
police to achieve their own ends: a financial reward, a job, or their release. Therefore, any 
denunciation should not be read as a reflection of blind faith in the regime.
But at the same time, by providing occasional assistance, these citizens contributed to 
the strengthening of the regime, by helping to legitimize it, by recognizing its domina-
tion as an institution constituting the monopoly of legitimate physical violence and by 
‘participating in the process of criminalizing certain behaviours’.73 It was in this sense that 
the police authorities explicitly encouraged popular participation in policing throughout 
the Consular and Imperial period.
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‘There are Boches everywhere...’ – 
Popular participation in tracking down 
and controlling ‘the enemy from within’ in 
France during the First World War
Ronan Richard
The inhabitants of Plouézec do not like to be praised for their police feats, 
their very special self-esteem is not consoled for having done a bad job. Ho-
wever, that adventure at least resulted in calming down the exaggerated fear 
of spies. The fleeting gleams in the night went out, the mysterious cars and 
ghost submarines disappeared, there was only the tolling of the knell, alas re-
peated too often, which came to remind us of the nightmares of the war.1
This chronicle written by a teacher from Côtes-du-Nord narrates the arrest of a spy, 
imaginary as always, by a group of local people. It is a perfect summary of the popu-
lar excesses seen in every town and village on the French home front due to the ambi-
ent spy mania during the First World War. In a context marked by mourning but also by 
irrational fears fed by the wildest rumors, the general mobilization of the nation leaves 
no room for disinterest or idleness. The war effort and the sacrifices made by the com-
batants on the front are mirrored by a symmetrical duty of implication from civilians on 
the home front. As early as August 1914, in a context of ‘jingoistic outburst’,2 members of 
the public spontaneously participated in a real hunt for ‘the enemy from within’ that is to 
say, searching for any individual representing a threat to national defense ‘through sub-
version, terror, sabotage, spying or betrayal’.3 Within this varied sample group, individu-
als put on file in Carnet B for antimilitarist activities are quickly removed, and then with 
the help of Union sacrée the figure of the spy will at once mobilize all the attentions and 
all the energies of patriotic watchers. The tenacious fantasy of a clandestine enemy pe-
netrating into the home front calls for the entire population to get involved in the natio-
nal defense by actively supporting the efforts of the specialized counter-intelligence ser-
vices to flush out the ‘Boche in our home’ and render him harmless. Driven by different 
motives, not always in line with the ideal of national defence, this patriotic exercise takes 
a twofold form. At first, it is a question of hunting down spies by engaging in daily sur-
veillance of any suspect elements. A stranger, a weird rig-out, odd behaviour, a German-
sounding name, a villa with closed shutters; everything becomes shady. But the populati-
1 Plouézec municipal notice, Côtes d’Armor Departmental Archives, 1 T 402.
2 Becker, 1914, p. 513.
3 Bavendam, ‘L’ennemi chez soi’, pp. 707-714.
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on does not just watch for suspicious behaviour, it also acts to eradicate any threat from a 
national point of view. If denouncing and spreading rumours are more common, it is also 
not rare to see physical intervention by a crowd and there is also sometimes recourse to 
summary justice. This contribution, which brings into question the cultural mobilizati-
on and the relations between the popular masses and the constitutional bodies during the 
First World War, will be based primarily on our research on Western France, interspersed 
with other national examples.
I. The varied motives of the hunt for ‘the enemy from 
within’
From the beginning of the war, there is a natural and conscious division of tasks between 
the combatants and the civilians. The former had to fight the war and win it, the latter 
had to contribute to victory by annihilating any threat to the nation at war. From the first 
days of mobilization, the violent nationalist excesses testify to a spontaneous will of po-
pular participation, conveying a true drive to cleanse. Chauvinism, anguish, early mass 
mourning and an ambient Germanophobia inherited from the Pre-war era combine to 
explode into popular violence against everything that ‘sounds German’. This spontaneous 
anarchy fuelled by false news primarily affects the rural world, where the fear of spies 
spreads. The deputy of the Morbihan department, Regis de l’Estourbeillon, thus gets car-
ried away in his efforts against ‘the home front poisoners’ finding in the ignorant and cre-
dulous country masses a breeding ground admirably willing to welcome and spread the 
false reports responsible for people’s suspicion. On the fly, he jokes about those peasant 
women accusing a fellow citizen of sending a gold bar to Germany every week, hidden 
in a lump of butter, or about a priest entrusting a sailor with all the local bank’s gold eve-
ry evening: it is his responsibility to send it to the Pope, who will hand it over to Emper-
or William.4
This fantastical fear of the enemy is also present in urban areas. In Paris, the psycho-
sis of light signals intended for enemy aircraft triggers dozens of denunciations.5 In Saint-
Brieuc, commercial travellers and German industrialists are accused of covering Fran-
ce with a suspicious coat of advertising inscriptions for Kub stocks which constitute as 
‘markings for saboteurs’ like the one adorning the viaduct of the Paris-Brest line.6 The 
spy mania is even more acute on the coast, in holiday resorts which had been fashiona-
ble for many German families since before the war. A teacher in the Paimpol area reports 
that the fear of spies, maintained by gossip at washing places, made the most familiar fi-
gures look suspicious, the vibrations of supply vehicles for submarines were heard each 
and every night, light signals running around like big will-o’-the-wisps were glimpsed 
4 Le Nouvelliste, 1 September 1915.
5 Loez, ‘Lumières suspectes sur ciel obscur’, pp. 166-188.
6 Le Lannou, Un bleu de Bretagne, p. 74.
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at night, and where people would have sighted the mythical Korrigans, they now report 
sightings of Boche spies disguised as nuns.7
After the first feverish weeks, the fear of spies keeps smouldering, just waiting for a si-
gnal to wake up. It is fuelled by some newspapers promoting preventive posters inspired 
by the Ministry of War – ‘beware, keep quiet, enemy ears are listening to you’. Others pu-
blish photographs showing the executions of spies or open their columns to stressful se-
rials, such as ‘Demon Boche’ published from June 1915 onwards by Ouest Eclair, which 
fuels the myth of old German spying activities firmly fixed on the Breton coasts. Books 
and press drawings complete the paranoia by listing an elaborate vanguard of the Ger-
man army formed by those spies hiding in the country, while creating the illusion of lar-
ge numbers. People who claim they contribute to the national defence are driven by seve-
ral motives. The great majority are led by the genuine concern to serve France. Driven by 
a kind of uselessness complex, those zealous patriots seek to rid themselves of the guilt of 
not being on the front and transcend the status of mere passive spectators of the conflict. 
Tracking down and interning the enemy from within is somehow waging war too, in 
another way. ‘Between two prefectural glasses of red wine’, Maurice Le Lannou reports, 
the rural policeman of Plouha, in Côtes-du-Nord, had understood ‘both the danger and 
his duty’, that is to say keeping a daily watch on the famous Kub advertisement painted 
on a small and modest local bridge.8
In addition to the desire to take part in the war effort, hunting the enemy from within 
is also a form of patriotic leisure. The pleasure taken in watching and locating spies ser-
ves the nation as well as relieving the boredom of its citizens. A third motive, more 
shameful and therefore always anonymous, is the matter of individual malevolence, whe-
reby the war serves as an alibi for people to settle small personal scores cheaply. ‘It is al-
ready enough to skilfully throw a name to the crowd to get rid of a rival’ priest Lelièvre, 
a witness to the agitation of the early days of the war, reports.9 In one place, employees 
rouse the crowd to take revenge on an unpopular boss by revealing his alleged German 
origins.10 In another place, a lay teacher is denounced as a spy by the village priest, buil-
ding on very old political quarrels in the background.11 With those multiple intentions 
in mind, the ‘snifflers’ take a sharp and paranoid look at some potential spies archetyp-
al figures.
7 Plouézec municipal notice, Côtes d’Armor Departmental Archives, 1 T 402.
8 Le Lannou, Un bleu de Bretagne, p. 75.
9 Pierre Lelièvre, Le fléau de Dieu (Paris: Ollendorf, 1920), p. 5.
10 Breton, A l’arrière, p. 22.
11 Folder of the teacher Théodore Chalmel (1885-1935), Departmental Archives Ille-et-Vilaine, 1 F 1768.
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II. Who are the “enemies from within”?
1. The real German
Naturally, the enemy from within is first associated with the Germans. That suspicion 
particularly sharpens people’s eyes in the towns and on the coasts, where the ‘bland Ger-
man tribes’ installed in hotels and villas are seen as vanguards of the German army. What 
does it matter if those dangerous Huns are actually Alsatians, like Louise Weiss who 
takes refuge in a family villa in Saint-Quay-Portrieux, where many Protestant families 
from Upper and Lower Rhine have formed small settlements that local people quickly 
call ‘nasty Boches’.12 The archetypal spy figure here, inherited from before the war, is that 
of the banker Kahn. Anxious to give substance to Leon Daudet’s predictions of a po-
tential German landing on the island of Bréhat, the Breton regional press picked up the 
story as early as August 1914. To prepare and lead such a military campaign – the po-
tential landing of 200,000 men on the island is evoked without batting an eyelid – a po-
tential subject for suspicion is needed, and Maximilian Kahn, the son of an influential 
Jewish banker in Frankfurt and owner of a wealthy villa on the island, is the one. Alt-
hough groundless, those ‘Bréhat rumours’ sharpen the paranoia of spy hunters.13 Actual-
ly, nothing proves that Kahn was really chased out of Bréhat by a popular riot, as some 
‘witnesses’14 argue, and the figure of the spy Kahn is above all a media construction ex-
posed to public condemnation, which sees a good opportunity with the presence of this 
idle, German, Jewish bourgeois, with old anti-semitism competing with ambient back-
ground Germanophobia.
2. The fantasy German
However, the popular suspicion of people ‘being a Boche’ also takes aim at the fantasy 
German. In this context of irrational fear, confusion prevails and any figure that doesn’t 
fit the local setting is immediately considered a potential danger. Foreigners, Swiss, Rus-
sians or others are concerned, especially when they are tall and blond. The internment of 
civilians from so-called ‘oppressed nations’ – Poles, Czechs, etc. – but also many Alsati-
ans and people from Lorraine reveals the importance of this precautionary principle, re-
inforced by the ignorance of the low-level civil servants who were in charge of separating 
the wheat from the chaff, and who cautiously prefer to intern many more suspects than 
necessary rather than to let loose potential spies. The population gives into that suspicion 
even more. People are suddenly inflamed by certain names that were familiar to them be-
fore the war. ‘For a few days, it was not good not to be called Dupont, Martin or Bernard, 
because a Teutonic-sounding name cast suspicion over its owner, who got abused [and] 
was threatened’, 15 Victor Lecas reports, evoking the traders who have to demand pro-
tection from the authorities and to stick the words ‘French house’ or some official docu-
12 Weiss, Mémoire d’une Européenne, p. 172.
13 Le Journal de Paimpol, 13 February 1916.
14 Le Moniteur des Côtes-du-Nord, 29 August 1914.
15 Leca, A bas les Boches!, p. 98-100.
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ment on their windows to ease people’s suspicion. In addition to the ‘dirty name’ crime, 
the population also succumbs to prejudice against any singular-looking intruder. Other-
ness puzzles and worries people, and not only in isolated rural areas. ‘Tall, with a blond 
moustache, blue eyes and very educated, this is obviously a Prussian officer’16 the regu-
lars of a café in Fougères conclude, on seeing an unknown customer. Those archety-
pes related to appearance and novelty lead to a few rather ubiquitous popular blunders 
about alleged ‘Boche spies’ disguised as women, at a time when persistent rumours eve-
rywhere also warn people against a woman with a large feathered hat moving around in 
a car and distributing poisonous sweets to children on the home front.17 In May 1915, an 
‘agent from Germany’ suspected of supplying the ‘starving Boches’ was thus apprehen-
ded by the crowd at the cattle market in Lannion. Unmasked by his tall height, his wig 
and his dense pilosity clumsily concealed by a fresh shave, the person incriminated is in 
fact a female merchant from a neighbouring village. She thus justifies the physical stig-
mata behind the mistake: ‘What can you do? Being afflicted by nature, I have only found 
one way to hide this ugly down: I do like you, I shave!18 In Plouézec, near Paimpol, the 
population rejoices similarly in the summer of 1917 on apprehending a Boche spy dis-
guised as a woman found lurking around the semaphore, not far from the island of Bré-
hat which had been rustling with rumours of a German landing. The premonitory echo-
es peddled about her are imbued with the same fantasies: a horrible figure, gigantic feet, 
hairy hands. Before the gendarmes, the Boche spy disguised as a woman dispels every 
doubt with dignity: it is actually the widow of Jean-Marie Toussaint Pendézec, a former 
Army Corps general and Army General Chief of Staff, deceased in 1913, who is on ho-
liday in Plouha.19 We could multiply the examples of misadventures happening to brave 
French people whose only crime is not to have been familiar figures for natives who have 
been made a little finicky and paranoid by the circumstances.
3. The assimilated German
By extension, the hunt also affects all those who are associated with Germans through 
marriage or acquaintance, presumed or real. The same goes for French women married 
to Germans and their children. 800 of them are thus gathered during the first days of the 
war in the jail of the police headquarters in Paris with the motive of potential spying. 
They are massively denounced everywhere and then transferred to internment camps 
where they represent between 5 and 10 percent of the workforce in the autumn of 1914. 
Internees’ letters note that they are sometimes not treated as well as women who are Ger-
man by birth.20 The preventive confinement also extends to women suspected of going 
around with Germans in the occupied departments of the East and North. 150 of those 
‘dubious women’ are thus confined in the hotel of Kergroës, in Finistère, on the grounds 
of social and/or moral anti-conformism supposed to hinder the nation at war. If prosti-
16 Le Réveil fougerais, 14 August 1914.
17 Becker, 1914, p. 509.
18 Le Moniteur des Côtes-du-Nord, 20 May 1915.
19 Richard and Richard, ‘Rumeurs et espionnite en Bretagne’, pp. 419-432.
20 Jouguet internment camp, Internees letters, Côtes d’Armor Departmental Archives, 9 R 7.
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tution alone constitutes a form of ‘social leprosy’,21 the suspicion that a woman is having 
a relationship with Germans, as it is, is an act of collaboration and clearly renders the-
se women enemies. It should be noted that this camp, outside the scope of ordinary laws 
and poorly secured, constitutes a relative threat for the public order, as the surroundings 
of this depot attract curious onlookers, most often men, and the authorities states a net 
revival of prostitution in the local taverns.
This lack of trust extends to refugees, not just those who have lived in the occupied 
territories and who would have been ‘infected’ by their contact with the enemy. On the 
home front, especially in remote rural areas, many refugees suffer from suspicion which 
is too often targeted at migrants. If the local populations fear that, because of the great 
exodus of August and September 1914, spies could join this ‘massive trek of migrants’ 
converging on the home front, they have become alarmed more generally about the in-
truder, the stranger to their ‘little homelands’, with the timely name ‘Boche du Nord’ used 
to stigmatize him further and to attract suspicion to him. The aim is to push him to leave, 
even though he has never come into contact with Germans. It is more the fear of the mi-
grant that creates this timely assimilation with the enemy, with the sole unadmitted and 
inadmissible objective of sowing the seeds of doubt and confusion.
4. Surveillance of ‘spy nests’
Once interned, the doubt piled on the enemy from within doesn’t dissipate. The neigh-
bouring residents are watching over the situation and while they insist that internment 
camps do not become ‘golden cages’, they also fear that these will become real nests of 
spies. Popular suspicion falls on these establishments which are subject to frequent wild 
accusations. In the abbey of Langonnet in the Morbihan, for example, where Austro-
German ecclesiastics are interned, is denounced at the end of 1915 by a French comba-
tant on leave as an intelligence centre and as a landmark for enemy planes, flying over 
the area on dark nights. ‘A discreet investigation could be fruitful in the result’22 conclu-
des the informer. Coastal camps are obviously privileged targets for such rumours. In 
Noirmoutier, Guérande, Sarzeau or Carnac, there are countless cases of luminous signals 
supposedly being sent to German submarines. These accusations are clearly guided by 
malice. Some merchants and local craftsmen criticize the unfair competition from pro-
duction workshops in some camps while elsewhere, the mere presence of these undesi-
rables and the inconvenience caused by their security perimeters feeds the rumours ai-
med at getting these civil prisoners transferred elsewhere.
III. Popular modes of intervention
The hunt for the enemy from within takes two main forms during the war, one individu-
al, the other collective. The sharing of roles is pretty clear. The individual ‘sniffs’ and de-
21 Le Naour, Misères et tourments de la chair, p. 156.
22 Langonnet internment camp, Departmental Archives Morbihan, 4 M 526.
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nounces suspects at the first suspicion, the crowd gathers and admonishes and then the 
authorities apprehend the suspect and investigate, and if necessary punish him.
Whether it actually provokes a rumour or is the result of rumours, denunciation is 
one of the preferred popular modes of intervention. Anonymous letters flourish ‘with 
remarkable intensity’23 according to a report to the prefect of Vendée in August 1915, 
the snitch denouncing any suspicious signal or presence. ‘Monsieur the prefect, do you 
know that the mayor of Maroue has a Boche domestic servant at home?’ ask thus ‘a fa-
ther who has his children on the front’.24 The prefectural archives are full of letters of the 
same type while other informers also act verbally to stir up the crowd. ‘Shout down the 
spy! It’s the German we need!’25 says a passerby in Rennes station, intrigued by the sus-
picious appearance of a man. Once started, the rumour is collectively assumed and the 
individual immediately blends anonymously into the crowd. The recourse to collective 
physical intervention against the enemy from within goes back to the first days of mo-
bilization, all the emotions of the moment exploding impulsively on a basis of a simple 
rumour. ‘The French were as crazy’ writes a German civilian internee in a letter.26 Refer-
ring to the destruction and looting of stores and the obsessive tracking of the spy, Hugo 
Ringer, interned near Saint-Brieuc, describes a wild populace sniffing out everything that 
has a foreign character and also describes scenes of lynching during which suspects had 
their clothes torn off and were knocked to the blood. According to this internee, ‘more 
than one [...] would have left his life under the fists of the fanatical mass during the-
se days of horror’.27 Throughout France, there are traces of these violent arrests and lyn-
ching scenes perpetrated by the raging and repulsive ‘populace’ that André Lorulot ac-
cuses of wresting simple suspects from the hands of the police in Marseilles in order to 
trample them.28 This testimony questions the role of public authorities during these days 
of popular outbursts. Sources disagree on this point. If some witnesses claimed that the 
police were guilty of brutal threats, insults and violence against foreigners,29 it seems that 
more frequently, the intervention of the authorities’ representatives made it possible to 
restore public order and decrease tensions, which explains why, once confined to the de-
pots, many internees confide that they feel safe and secure, protected from the popular 
violence.
If this popular fever of the first days soon dissipates, it awakens again at the slightest 
opportunity. Some poison pen letters addressed to the prefect make their full intention 
clear, as in one village of Côtes-du-Nord where a vigilant patriot has located ‘his Mata 
Hari’, actually a simple German servant employed by a local notary: ‘If you don’t sort it 
23 Departmental Archives de la Vendée, 4 M 265.
24 Jouguet internment camp, dossiers des internés, 9 R 2, Côtes d’Armor Departmental Archives.
25 Ouest Eclair, 15 August 1914.
26 Jouguet internment camp, Côtes d’Armor Departmental Archives, 9 R 7.
27 Ringer, Boulevard des étrangers, p. 23.
28 Lorulot, Barbarie allemande et barbarie universelle, p. 13.
29 Ringer, Boulevard des étrangers, pp. 23-24.
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out, we’ll clear it up, we’ll set fire to his home and we’ll put her in the water’.30 Physical in-
tervention is not always just a threat. It is part of a sort of ritual involving, in turn, denun-
ciation, crowds of pedestrians and the arrest of the suspect by the mob who turn him 
over to the authorities in charge of the examination. During this active phase, the crowd 
exhibits a virile form of defiance in order to put pressure on the authorities. Insults and 
threats fuse, but never transgress the established order, thanks to the presence of a hand-
ful of individuals representing authority. At Fougères, the Prussian pseudo-officer, escor-
ted by firemen, old soldiers, and the local rural policeman, is surrounded by an aggregate 
of exasperated patriots proposing nothing less than to shoot him without delay.31 In Ren-
nes, a suspect is led in procession to the police station by 200 to 300 over-excited people 
shouting death threats and at the passage of the Saint-Georges Bridge to proposing throw 
the suspect into the water. The intervention of armed soldiers escorting the suspect, re-
inforced by military nurses, helps calm the spirits and lead him to the police station.32 In 
Plouézec, the ‘German spy disguised as a woman’ is also escorted ‘by a screaming crowd 
of shameless kids and shrews armed of pitchforks and sticks’, surrounded by two customs 
officers in uniforms ensuring her protection.33
In the end, these popular stirrings are more about ritual bidding than a real desire to 
do justice in place of the public authorities. This collective violence allows the populace 
to evacuate the accumulated tensions while giving its contributors the feeling they can 
act against the enemy almost as much as the combatants at the front. Yet this is in vain 
because these enemies from the interior are always imaginary and the verdict of the au-
thorities everywhere stifles this thrill felt at the prospect of having seen the shadow of the 
enemy ‘in a mouse hole’. In all these cases after the first weeks, the authorities clearly as-
sume their role. Unwilling to apportion on these cohorts of zealous patriots, partly inspi-
red by the state policy of national defence, the authorities work conscientiously to inve-
stigate every denunciation and to as much as possible prevent any temptation of popular 
justice. The memory of the events of the first days of August 1914 precludes the authori-
ties from underestimating this risk, although it is all the more embarrassing as spies al-
most always don’t exist. The ambiguity of the role of the public authorities can be read 
clearly in these words of the Police Commissioner of Rennes:
In these days, we cannot be too careful. But all the same, we should not im-
pose excessively on caution. Supervising suspicious people; examining their 
facts and actions is alright. But arresting without any reason, treating these 
people like bandits is exaggerated. Once again, do not worry, let us keep our 
composure: circumstances require it!34
30 Jouguet internment camp, Côtes d’Armor Departmental Archives, 9 R 2.
31 Le Réveil fougerais, 14 August 1914.
32 Ouest Eclair, 15 August 1914.
33 Plouézec municipal notice, Côtes d’Armor Departmental Archives, 1 T 402.
34 Ouest Eclair, 15 August 1914.
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IV. Conclusion
Can we, ultimately, understand these forms of popular policing as a translation of this 
culture of war, defined as a set of shared representations and practices, a complete rup-
ture with pre-war ideas, fuelled by exacerbated patriotism, hatred of the enemy and new 
forms of radical violence? Admittedly, the perceptions of the foreigner, and especially the 
German, changes radically from the mobilization. Hugo Ringer notes it well in his diary 
when he expresses how he deplores those friendships that had lasted for years and had 
suddenly changed into ‘ferocious hostilities’.35 However, this monolithic cultural analy-
sis must be qualified with some remarks. On the one hand, as we have seen, the motiva-
tions of the spy hunters are not all related to the war but sometimes to personal or fami-
ly grudges. On the other hand, the most violent behaviour doesn’t help in strengthening 
public order. By its destruction, its beatings, its gatherings and its blackmail with an ex-
peditious justice, the crowd acts outside the law which ought to guarantee public order. 
It creates more disorder, behind the easy alibi of a national defence which is itself mis-
guided. These practices, furthermore, are not unanimous. Many observers admit their 
shame at the popular and disturbing abuses of what André Lorulot calls ‘popular peat’.36 
The arrests of some ‘thugs’ are also allowed thanks to many denunciations. As Jean-Jac-
ques Becker notes, if public opinion seems for a while to have been an accomplice, it 
quickly recovered.37 In the same way, the practice of the snitch has its detractors, inclu-
ding among the local press. And then, as always, there are in the population people who 
are undoubtedly indifferent, passive, those who are always hidden from the eyes of histo-
rians. As for this hatred of the enemy, a supposedly essential component of the culture 
of war, which would be the matrix of a radical violence against the German and a ruth-
less pursuit of the enemy from within, it is not consubstantial with the French populati-
on. The real enemy is, in fact, all but hidden: he is in the countryside, in the forests, on 
the roads, in the factories, in the ports, where more than 300,000 prisoners of war are at 
work in November 1918. And the mistrust towards them has quickly faded, even in re-
mote rural areas. Formerly abhorred, this ‘retrograde barbarian’ has meanwhile beco-
me a providential worker whose contribution is so appreciated that one quickly forgets 
all safety precautions. At the end of the war, these prisoners working out of camps which 
were described at the beginning of the war as ‘spy nests’ are used in campaigns separate-
ly and are almost unattended. Because of its disorganized, unconventional and unpredic-
table nature, essentially irrational and impulsive, popular participation in the eradication 
of the enemy from within is ultimately more embarrassing than helpful for the authori-
ties. In the absence of a real enemy, this gives an outlet for part of the population. The 
suspects thus previously hunted serve as scapegoats in order for the population to feel 
less guilty about not being in the front and to exorcise tensions, mourning and anxiety 
caused by the conflict. This exercise, felt as patriotic, also often reflects, in the most iso-
35 Ringer, Boulevard des étrangers, pp. 22-23.
36 Lorulot, Barbarie allemande et barbarie universelle, p. 13.
37 Becker, 1914, p. 505.
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lated areas, a natural temptation to withdrawal. The stranger to the closed world of the 
village community, this ‘little homeland’ constituting the most reassuring level of iden-
tification, naturally arouses fear and suspicion. Mysterious, he inspires distrust and in a 
context of fear fed by the wildest rumours, there is a step, quickly crossed, between the 
intruder, the suspect and the enemy.
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Investigations into the kidnapping of 
young Malméjac (1935) – Police, Justice and 
Population
Laurence Montel
The expression ‘popular policing’ enables us to identify and study the forms and mo-
ments of population mobilisation in the service of public order and security. The esta-
blishment of militias or civic security forces, the exercise of citizen vigilance in the 
service of the power in place and the denunciation of suspects are all examples of the po-
pulation carrying out so-called “administrative” police missions, the aim of which is to 
guarantee public order. This is distinct from criminal investigation policing, which invol-
ves the search for offenders. Repressive rather than preventive, it aims to restore the pu-
blic order which has been compromised. This article will focus on the possibility of the 
popular exercise of such a police mission, based on a case study: the kidnapping of young 
Claude Malméjac, 18 months, in Marseille outside a park, on 28 November 19351. Marie 
Cardin, 68, and André Clément, 26, a mother and son, were on the verge of bankrupt-
cy when they formulated the plan to kidnap the child of a wealthy family. They chose the 
Malméjacs as their target, Jean, the father, being a professor of medicine at the faculty in 
Marseille, and demanded a ransom of 50 000 francs. As soon as news of the abduction 
reached the public prosecutor’s department, examination proceedings were opened un-
der the supervision of Judge René Minnard. It was in this context that a search was or-
ganized with a view to finding the child. Whilst the search involved the judge’s marshals, 
and particularly the Sûreté in Marseille, the judicial branch of the local police, it also led 
to significant social mobilisation, as illustrated by the mass of information conveyed to 
the professional investigators and included in the procedural file. And yet, the study of 
this investigation reveals that the abduction tested the judicial and police authorities. It 
was a moment of crisis, a context which drew out an inquisitive community beyond the 
professional investigators, whose significance remains to be shown. To this end, we will 
begin by exposing the conditions which encouraged popular participation in the inquiry, 
before studying the forms of this participation. Finally, we will show that the communi-
ty of professional investigators was extended to the laypeople, and suggest what meaning 
ought to be ascribed to this. To do so, we will draw on studies which, since the 1990s, 
have renewed the social history of crime and justice by taking judicial personnel and po-
1 This research is partly based on documents related to the kidnapping of Claude Malmejac conserved in 
the Archives départementales des Bouches-du-Rhône, under the number 2U2 5746. These documents 
are divided in three files: Cézilly inquiry file, Malméjac inquiry file, and ‘false leads’ file.
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lice, their sociology, professional culture and relationships as the objects of study.2 We 
will also draw upon the contributions of cultural history, namely with regard to the emer-
gence of mass culture, narratives of crimes and investigations,3 and to progress in the hi-
story of the investigative method, considering its rhythms, its economy, its internal tensi-
ons as well as its diffusion and democratisation, the investigative method having become 
the preferred method for understanding of the social in the 19th century.4
I. Police, justice and the press in search of Claude 
Malméjac
If the search for young Malméjac provoked such a large popular mobilisation, it was fore-
most because the investigators requested it, in the absence of any clear leads on the night 
of the abduction on 28 November. Around 3pm, the kidnapper, an old woman dressed 
in black and walking with a cane, approached Claude Malméjac’s nurse, Georgette Perra-
chon, in the Parc Chanot. Some days earlier, this woman had entered the Malméjac’s 
apartment building at 185 avenue du Prado, in the suburbs, under the pretext of visiting 
an apartment for rent. She had crossed paths with the concierge, the nurse and the child. 
Hence when, on 28 November, she ran up to announce that Jean Malméjac, the father of 
the child, had been involved in a serious accident and had asked her to fetch the child as 
well as a doctor, the nurse did not question her. The two women hailed a taxi, which the 
kidnapper chose so that they could fit the child’s pram into it. The taxi made a first stop in 
front of the apartment of Doctor Crémieux, whom the nurse went to fetch alone, the old 
woman having offered to carry on the journey with the child. When Georgette arrived 
at the family apartment a quarter of an hour later with the doctor, only Mme Malméjac 
was there. Jean Malméjac, uninjured, was at the faculty. As early as 4pm, he informed the 
precinct captain, François Giorgi, of the events, who prepared a report within twenty mi-
nutes.5 Ten minutes later, the Sûreté were informed, who themselves alerted ‘every police 
station, gendarmerie and border control in post France’, whilst the judicial inquiry was 
entrusted to René Minnard, investigating judge.6 The priority was to find the kidnappers 
and the child, but the investigation faltered in the absence of obvious leads, with the nur-
se having quickly been exempted from suspicion. The investigation then took two direc-
tions. The French police and judicial authorities were alerted on the evening of the 28th 
by the Marseille police and on 29 and 30 November by the investigating judge, by means 
of rogatory commissions and very large delegations, ‘for the purposes of the search’. On 
the morning of 29 November, the judge ordered the General Department of judicial inve-
stigations to publish the descriptions of the kidnapper and the child in the criminal po-
2 Rousseaux, ‘Historiographie du crime’; Berlière, Denys, Kalifa and Milliot, Métiers de police; Farcy and 
Clère, Le juge d’instruction; Lopez, La guerre des polices.
3 Kalifa, L’encre et le sang, p. 289-292 ; Kalifa, La culture de masse.
4 Farcy, Kalifa and Luc, L’enquête judiciaire; Guignard, Juger la Folie; Malandain, L’introuvable complot.
5 Giorgi Statement, 28 November 1935, item n° 6.
6 Couplet Statement, 1 December 1935, item n° 301.
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lice bulletin. He called upon magistrates and police in Marseille, Nice, Aix, Avignon, Bé-
ziers, Toulon, Digne, Grasse, and Algiers. In Marseille he sought the cooperation of the 
local criminal investigation department as well as the 9th Mobile Police Brigade, who 
were specialized in the search for offenders with territorial jurisdiction extending to the 
entire South-East of France. At the same time, two calls for witnesses were issued, by the 
TSF (the radio) and then by the newspapers, with a view to seeking out the testimony of 
the taxi driver who drove the kidnapper and the child, and more broadly, any informa-
tion which might set the investigators on the right track. Le Petit Marseillais, which was 
the leading local daily newspaper in terms of circulation, ran the following statement: ‘In 
this regard, it would be helpful if passersby who caught sight of them would make them-
selves known to the police. The description of the old woman is the following: small, 
with a pointed chin, dressed in a long black coat with a black toque, with a slight limp 
and using a cane to walk’.7 The call for witnesses is the classic resort for investigators lak-
king any other leads.8 The inquiry, embarked upon in the dark, logically opened up to an 
enormous range.9
In these conditions, a singularly ‘disorganized, polyphonic, not to say cacophonous’ 
criminal investigation took place, from 28 November to 2 December.10 The taxi driver, 
Albert Tomassonne, answered the call for witnesses on the evening of the abduction. He 
claimed to have dropped off the kidnapper in front of n°5 Cours Pierre-Puget.11 The buil-
ding was searched without success. On 29 November, the investigation began to diffract. 
The judge asked the technical police in Marseille for a reconstruction of the abduction 
and a map of Parc Chanot. The Sûreté established a connection between the abduction 
and an armed robbery committed in September, on the basis of the ransom demands 
which the abductors addressed to the parents on 28 and 29 November. The victims were 
offered the restitution of their property in exchange for a sum of money, by means of a 
letter in identical writing. But the follow-on investigations did not lead to the identifica-
tion of the offender, who remained unknown.12 Since one of the ransom letters was left 
by the kidnappers in the Malméjac’s apartment building, the Sûreté posted two agents as 
sentries. On 1 December, they arrested Marcellin Barthélémy, a waiter in a café, and on 2 
December, Jean Boyatzopoulos, a mechanic, who both wanted to deliver written instruc-
tions to the Malméjacs by hand. Both were cleared of suspicion following hearings and 
investigations.13 Since leads were limited, the investigation to find the child and the kid-
nappers was driven by information which pointed towards the investigators.
7 Le Petit Marseillais, 29 November 1935.
8 Lopez, ‘Tout en police est affaire d’identification’, p. 214.
9 Malandain, ‘Ouverture et aporie’, p. 322-323.
10 Kalifa, ‘Enquête et “culture de l’enquête”’, p. 9.
11 Le Petit Marseillais, 29 November 1935.
12 Anonymous letters, items n°398 and 399, Couplet Statement, 1 December 1935, item n°301.
13 Couplet Statements, police reports n°5357, 1 December 1935, and n° 5402, 2 December 1935, ‘false leads’ 
file, unnumbered items.
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Information arrived in various forms: written, verbal, by telephone, by telegraph, 
hand-written and typed, and addressed to the police and to the Malméjacs, but also, de-
pending on the case, to the State prosecutor, to the investigating judge, to the central 
commissioner, to gendarmes and to district commissioners. Although the investigators 
in Marseille collected most of the information, some of it was transmitted to them from 
outside services.14 On 29 November, the information given to the investigating judge and 
to the Sûreté dictated the first searches. The witness account of a hairdresser led to the 
discovery of the pram left by the kidnapper at n°18 Cours Pierre-Puget, steps away from 
n°5 where she had been dropped off by the taxi driver.15 Following an anonymous tip-
off, received at his office, the judge went with his registrar to a nursing home to questi-
on Mme De Renzis, a potential suspect.16 The investigation carried on without success 
the following day. The Marseille police, for its part, organized searches in the southern 
districts of Endoume and Vallon-des-Auffes, on the basis of different corroborative wit-
ness statements.17 Significant resources were invested: plainclothes detectives, uniformed 
agents, and police dogs. The whereabouts of the child remained unknown. He was in fact 
being hidden in the western district of Saint-Julien.
From 30 November, the work of the investigators was split between the treatment of 
the incoming information and the following up of leads which seemed to be relevant. 
The follow-up investigation included a suspicious telegram sent from Nogent-sur-Mar-
ne, chloroform attacks in a Catholic educational establishment reported by sources in 
Lyon, the identification of a retired man who had tried on several occasions to seduce the 
nurse, the lead of a possible revenge plot in Algiers against the mother of the child, who 
came from there, and different suggestions as to the whereabouts of the child, including 
the islands of the Porquerolles and Sainte-Marguerite. A link was established between 
the abduction and an attempted child kidnapping involving another doctor, Doctor Cé-
zilly, the previous Saturday.18 A dozen such leads were investigated.
In Provence, the investigating judge deployed Mobile Police personnel in the field, lea-
ving the treatment of information, a more administrative task, to the Sûreté. The person-
nel organized themselves accordingly. Inspector Ernest Collomb, for example, was put 
in charge of receiving ‘the statements of people who presented themselves to our ser-
vice to give information on the matter of the kidnapping of young Claude’ by Commis-
sioner Couplet.19 It was Collomb who compiled ‘the summary of the statement of demoi-
selle Montagu’, which put the investigators on the trail of the kidnappers. It was given to 
him by the main inspector Jean Martini, who first listened to the statement and deemed 
14 ‘false leads’ file, 2U2 5746(2).
15 Couplet Statement, 30 November 1935, item n°291.
16 Judge Minnard’s statement, 29 November 1935, item n°308.
17 Le Petit Marseillais, 30 November 1935.
18 Marseille-Matin, 29 November 1935, Delegation of Judge Minnard to the central commissioner, 30 No-
vember 1935, item n°43.
19 Statement of Ernest Collomb, Couplet Statement, 4 December 1935, item n°304.
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it worthy of interest.20 Once it had been recorded by Inspector Collomb, the information 
was ‘immediately passed on to the Chief Inspector Desmoulins, in charge of gathering all 
statements and following them up”.21
Only one statement, that of Mlle Montagu, led to anything. But the stream of informa-
tion was considerable, according to the police and the newspapers. Commissioner Cou-
plet wrote on 2 December that “Information is coming in from all directions, from peop-
le acting in good faith, from anonymous sources, by telephone or by letter”.22 Marcel de 
Renzis, who was covering the case for Le Petit Marseillais, welcomed the fact that ‘spon-
taneous witness accounts to the investigators [abounded]’ from 29 November, ‘by the 
dozen’, the ‘description of the kidnapper published yesterday morning in the papers’ ha-
ving struck public opinion.23 The procedural file bears witness to this: a disparate bundle 
of statements, telegrams, letters, investigative acts, with 162 documents in the folder en-
titled ‘false leads’, considered as such after the kidnappers arrest and various checks and 
follow-ups. There are around 30 statements and 70 telegrams and letters, received bet-
ween the 29 November and the 2 December (others having been written, sent or recei-
ved after that date, 25 of which could not be dated). It is unusual to find such a large cor-
pus of this kind in procedural files. This documentation is not sufficient to attest that the 
investigators were confronted with a tidal wave of testimonials. It is likely that it is only 
a residue of the sum total of information received: the police services may have made an 
informal and infra-judicial pre-selection, or not taken into account the entirety of the in-
formation, possibly because they were overrun. A letter, sent by a court usher in Mar-
seille, Louis André, suggests as much. Convinced that he held important information, he 
first went to the 8th district police station. Unable to find the commissioner, he then tried 
to telephone the Sûreté, but ‘it was not possible to get through to them’. He then asked the 
‘police station orderly’ in the 8th district to telephone the Sûreté ‘as soon as possible’. But 
fearing that ‘in the wave of information’ from ‘that morning, my own would go unnoti-
ced’, he wrote a letter.24 The ‘false leads’ file is very disorganized. The letters are crumpled, 
some of them torn or partially cut up. Envelopes are often separated from their contents, 
and information received by post is mixed up with statements taken down in the offices 
of the Sûreté and with follow-up investigations ordered by the judge. This collection of 
items, though chaotic, sheds light on the forms of popular mobilisation, its social scale 
and its motivations.
II. Popular contributions to investigation, parallel 
inquiries
We will call ‘declarants’ those individuals who gave information to the investigation au-
thorities, whether in written form (letters) or verbally (statements). The corpus reveals a 
20 Statement of Jean Martini, Couplet Statement, 4 December 1935, item n°303.
21 Statement of Ernest Collomb, Couplet Statement, 4 December 1935, item n°304.
22 Couplet Statement, 2 December 1935, item n°307.
23 Le Petit Marseillais, 30 November 1935.
24 Letter from Louis André, 30 November 1935, ‘false leads’ file, item n°13.
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‘popular’ participation in the exercise of justice, inasmuch as the declarants came from 
different social environments and age groups. It is obviously difficult to precisely situate 
them all in the social hierarchy. To do so, we would need to know each one’s profession 
or status. Whilst this information is included in the statements taken down by the police, 
it is only mentioned spontaneously by 32 of the letter-writers. Alongside a woman who 
states that she has no profession, we can find the general secretary of the tennis club of 
the University of Marseille, two primary school teachers, an education inspector, an en-
gineering consultant, a postman, a retired master mariner, a retired member of the PTT 
(Post Office and Telecommunications Service), a dental surgeon, two streetcar employ-
ees, a court usher, a judge in the court of Uzès, two mechanics and a driver-mechanic. 
There is also a ‘builder’, though he does not say whether he is a boss or a worker. At first 
glance, the middle classes and the elites predominate. The Malméjac family, who lived in 
the suburbs (boulevard du Prado), took their holidays in Chamonix, and could gather 
together 50 000 francs in three days, lived in obvious comfort. The drama with which 
they were confronted clearly affected men and women who felt that they could identify 
with it. Nevertheless, we cannot reduce the mobilisation to a question of class. It is likely 
that workers were a minority amongst the witnesses because the abduction took place in 
the middle of the day in a bourgeois neighbourhood of Marseille, where there may have 
been few of them. Moreover, the letter-writers most often did not spontaneously menti-
on their professions. The mention of their professions must be interpreted as a choice in 
the presentation of themselves amongst others, for declarants who wanted to justify or 
legitimate their statements.25 In this corpus, 65 letters, more than half of the total, are an-
onymous or signed with a name, a first name or initials, so that the identification of the 
author is impossible. Some, such as the builder, state their profession rather than their 
name, even though it does not confer on them any particular credit, because their pro-
fession is what they identify themselves by above all.26 But most often, the profession is 
mentioned for its probative force, in order to impress upon the investigators, by the iden-
tification of the writer’s equal or superior social status. Others base themselves on the 
force of their expertise: this is the case of two astrologers and one clairvoyant, to which 
can be added by extension an occultist and fifteen amateur diviners, about whom it may 
be more appropriate to refer to by occupation rather than by profession. To this group 
can be added Gabriel Marck, a penitent ex-convict ‘who has been in more or less all of 
the important prisons’ and might be qualified, to use the parlance of the time, as a for-
mer professional offender. Having straightened himself out, and therefore being worthy 
of trust, he considers himself legitimate in inciting Commissioner Couplet to look for 
the kidnappers ‘not amongst the gangsters’ but rather ‘another professor or doctor who is 
jealous and capable of anything’.27 It is likely that many of the declarants, from working-
class backgrounds, did not state their profession because it did not make sense to in this 
context. On the other hand, they justified their words by their family status and the emo-
25 Dauphin, ‘Les correspondances’, p. 44.
26 Anonymous letter, 1 December 1935, ‘false leads’ file, item n°28.
27 Letter from Gabriel Marck, 2 December 1935, ‘false leads’ file, item n°48.
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tions which they felt with regard to the abduction of a small child. Several signatures are 
replaced with ‘a father’. We can also find ‘a very distraught woman and mother’, and ‘an 
old grandfather’.
The social diversity of the declarants, which can be inferred from these different pre-
sentations, is also visible in the material examination of the corpus. The use of letter 
paper, headed paper, or even good-quality white paper, the use of telegrams, the ma-
stery of codes of correspondence, such as the mentioning of the date and place of wri-
ting, the identity of the sender as well as the recipient, the conventional use of styles of 
address, indicate a habitual, professional or class practice of written correspondence. On 
the other hand, a number of tip-offs were written on schoolbook paper, postcards, some-
times reused, bits of used, torn or cut-up paper, suggesting a parsimonious use of the re-
source or an occasional, if not rare or recreational, use of the written form. The handwri-
ting is often clumsy, and the mastery of language approximative. The use of maxims also 
reveals working-class origins. Examples include a barely legible card put in the post by a 
certain Azoulay on 6 December 1935,28 and the letter from an ‘old grandfather’, who had 
suspicions about the ‘nurce’ and suggests that the central commissioner burn her feet 
to obtain a confession, since ‘to great ills, great remedies’. The text is written on a ledger 
sheet torn from a promotional book from the ‚Vache qui Rit‘ brand, on the back of which 
is the scribbling of a bill, perhaps written by a tradesman.29
An old grandfather, 2 December 1935, ‘false leads’ file, item n°35
28 Azoulay, 6 December 1935, ‘false leads’ file, unnumbered item.
29 An old grandfather, 2 December 1935, ‘false leads’ file, item n°35.
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The ‘false leads’ file bears witness to the fact that there is no prerequisite of educati-
on or familiarity with the written word to contribute to the investigation. It also brought 
together information from a broad social spectrum. The letters were mainly written by 
men, some old people, and even a young boy with clumsy handwriting, compelled to 
write to denounce a ‘Romanichelle’: ‘I am only an 11 year old kid and I can’t tell you any 
more than that’.30 Women are a minority amongst the writers: only 20 letters can be attri-
buted with certainty to women. But many factors may explain this. The kidnapping was 
a man’s business: the kidnapped child was male, his mother remained in the background 
and the only mediatized woman involved was the kidnapper. The investigators were all 
men, and was not the gender of the investigation also masculine? Finally, in families, 
men and women discussed the matter but it was the men, the heads of the family, who 
took it upon themselves to write.
In response to the call for witnesses, the information addressed to the investigators 
was first composed of witnesses making links between the description of the kidnap-
per and child and people they saw on the day of the abduction: old women dressed in 
black, with limps, walking with a cane with a rubber bottom (this detail was often men-
tioned), sometimes accompanied by a small child, were reported several times. Others 
reported women who were known to them and whose lives they considered to be disor-
ganized and crime-inducing, or with whom they had conflicts. A Parisian ‘father’ repor-
ted the widow of a ‘certain Doctor Gay who worked in Marseille on Boulevard Garibal-
di and who squandered the family fortune on gambling and vice. Supremely intelligent, 
she hated doctors most particularly and with age, I would not be surprised if she had re-
sorted to the worst mischief to get money and satisfy her vendetta’.31 These offers of leads 
must be distinguished from notices of women resembling the kidnapper. They show a 
greater freedom on behalf of the authors, in comparison to the investigators’ expectati-
ons. This is also the case for a number of letter writers who gave the investigators advice 
based on their personal interpretation of the facts and of the investigation, as described 
by the media. We know, by means of the newspapers alone, that information regarding 
the abduction, the kidnapper and the child was broadcast by the TSF. The newspapers’ 
coverage of the case also had the same aim, to begin with. But it also turned out that the 
latter proceeded to report on the progress of the inquiry, and, as early as the 1 December, 
on its stalling: ‘none of the leads followed have so far led to the child’s recovery’;32 ‘Search 
in vain! Nothing! Nothing! Such are the words that spring to our pens after a new and ex-
hausting day – the fourth. […] It must be said, alas, that the inquiry has stalled. It is sub-
merged in darkness instead of shedding any light’.33 We can therefore see that the temp-
tation would have been great, amongst the public, to comment on the investigation, to 
criticize it, or even to cast themselves as the investigators. On several occasions, the letter 
writers called into question the sincerity of the nurse, as well as that of her sister, who li-
30 Eleven year old child, undated, ‘false leads’ file, item n°34.
31 A father, 1 December 1395, ‘false leads’ file, item n°40.
32 Le Petit Marseillais, 1 December 1935.
33 Le Petit Marseillais, 2 December 1935.
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ved in Endoume, where searches were carried out on 29 November. The two young wo-
men were suspected of being accomplices in the abduction. Hence this anonymous letter 
from 2 December 1935: ‘This is from a sure and sincere friend. Closely monitor the si-
ster of the nurse Georgette Perrachon, who lives in the neighbourhood of Endoume. She 
is the key to unravelling the tragic kidnapping. Do not seek far, look around you. The-
re should be no question now of the woman in black’. Different letters called into questi-
on the description of the kidnapper which had been established by the authorities and 
broadcast by the press. It was not an old woman but a young woman, who did not limp. It 
might even be a man, dressed as a woman to ‘throw the search off track’.34 Some questio-
ned her origins: for some, she was a woman of the underworld, an accomplice of Apa-
ches or seemingly ‘living amongst prostitutes’, ‘in the cafés of the boulevard du Mont-
parnasse’, ‘nearly always accompanied by young people of ambiguous appearance’.35 But 
others thought that the guilty parties resided in the same neighbourhood as the Malmé-
jacs, that they were rival doctors, rich families without heirs, or former patients seeking 
revenge.
To these spectators of the criminal investigation must finally be added the improvised 
investigators and other amator police, such as Louis André, who physically carried out 
an investigation. In the rue Barthélémy, this witness saw a woman answering to the de-
scription of the kidnapper coming out of a furnished apartment. He decided to go in to 
‘ask the lodgers for some explanation’. This sparked a neighbourhood investigation: ‘I 
saw a woman on the first floor, then a man on the ground floor, who both told me that 
there was no old woman living in the building; I therefore went to the landlord, Mrs 
Estachon, 33 rue Bathélémy, who declared that she had no tenant fitting the descripti-
on which I communicated to her and could not explain the old lame woman’s presence 
in her building’.36 Another man said that he was witness to a discussion on the evening 
of the kidnapping, in front of n°45, between a small group of women, two of whom were 
‘holding a child between 18 months and 2 years old by the arm, wearing a white hat and 
walking with difficulty’. Having ‘read in the papers about young Claude’s kidnapping’, he 
‘thought that perhaps’ he was in the presence of the abductor. He therefore decided to 
take up watch. The next day, he explained to the commissioner, there was very good wea-
ther. It was the kind of weather ‘in which all the mothers take the opportunity to go out 
with their young ones to get some air and some sun’. But from ‘8 in the morning to 5 in 
the afternoon I did not see a single woman come out with a child from n°45 rue Ste Ba-
zile. It’s strange!’.37
Another category of field investigators included the clairvoyants, occultists and radies-
thesists, in other words, dowsers who tried to locate the child from a distance, often from 
the confines of their own homes, equipped with pendulums, photographs of the child 
34 A father, 1 December 1935, ‘false leads’ file, unnumbered item.
35 Vincentelli, 2 December 1935, ‘false leads’ file, unnumbered item ; Payot, 1 December 1935, ‘false leads’ 
file, unnumbered item.
36 Louis André, 30 November 1935, ‘false leads’ file, item n°13.
37 Anonymous, 1 December 1935, ‘false leads’ file, item n°1.
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cut out of newspapers, operational maps, Michelin maps, or postcards, some of them in 
their sleep. The involvement of clairvoyants and astrologers in cases of mysterious dis-
appearances was not uncommon at the time.38 The use of radiesthesia was, on the other 
hand, rather new. In the context of the development of the science of rays, defenders of 
the ancestral science of dowsing (traces of which can be found since ancient times) tried 
to distance it from occultism, and to establish its scientific nature.39 The new populari-
ty of the term ‘radiesthesia’ referred to the ‘sensitivity of rays’ emitted by all objects, li-
ving or otherwise, and which certain people were more receptive to than others, a recep-
tivity which could be enhanced by the use of rods and pendulums. In the mid-1930s, the 
debate raged between radiesthesists and rationalists, with the former defending the sci-
entific value of their art and the latter refuting it. The radiesthesists who set out the find 
young Claude Malméjac were in the thick of this public debate: some expressed them-
selves with a number of precautions whilst others deplored the fact that the fruitfulness 
of the practice was not better recognized, its efficiency having been proven, according to 
them, when the science was practiced by specialists. A defender of divining from Cha-
monix advised the investigators to seek out Father Mermet, ‘prince of dowsers’, who ‘of 
all the diviners, is the surest with his pendulum’.40 Radiesthesia had scientific trappings: 
it was based on the progress of the physics of rays, it produced labelled sketches, it called 
for objective procedures and protocols. Its practitioners were more educated, to judge by 
their mastery of the written word and by their social status (one of them, for example, 
was a retired teacher). The same year, the issue was raised in a review of its potential va-
lue in matters of justice.41 Might radiesthesia be added to the toolkit of the scientific po-
lice, who appeared at the time to be the most modern and the future of criminal investi-
gations? It offered new means of locating material goods, and missing persons. Since it 
had not yet been banned from the scientific field, it could still aspire to joining it, as was 
the case with hypnotism in Germany in the 1920s.42 Based on the identification of leads, 
the localisation of suspects or victims, their monitoring, or shadowing, the practice of di-
vining undeniably had points in common with the methods of the investigation. A let-
ter to Commissioner Couplet from a dowser, M. Gilbert-Lambert, honorary public tea-
cher, is a good example.43 Using his pendulum, he followed the trail of the kidnappers 
from the evening of 29 November. He discovered their hideaway, which he located with a 
blue cross on an old operational map included with the letter. He specified that the child 
was ‘accompanied by two men’, and had then been joined by a woman, and that they had 
spent the night there. The next day, one of the men left the hideaway around 8 o’clock and 
went to the north of the valley (also marked with a blue cross). There followed a number 
of considerations, and then this post-scriptum, written on the morning of Sunday the 1 
38 Kalifa, L’encre et le sang.
39 Bensaude-Vincent, ‘Des rayons contre raison’.
40 Anonymous, 1 December 1935, ‘false leads’ file, unnumbered item.
41 Revue Municipale, 1935.
42 Wolffram, ‘Crime, Clairvoyance’.
43 Gilbert-Lambert, 1 December 1935, ‘false leads’ file, item n°3.
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December: ‘I have just witnessed the movement of the whole gang bringing the child to-
wards the south by the sea’, as a result, in his view, of the revelations which had been prin-
ted in the newspapers. A man, he continued, left the group to go into town. ‘I was able, 
with the pendulum, to catch up with the man in town and I followed him into a house 
which I had already identified on Friday night’. From Barbentane, where he lived, this 
seasoned diviner had undertaken a shadowing operation in the manner of a detective or 
a policeman. He offered to continue if the police would send him a map of the town, and 
concluded: ‘I beg of you, Chief of Sûreté, do not listen to the bad press which refuses to 
believe in the resource of radiesthesia’.
With the exception of certain malicious accusations, the declarants were contributors 
to investigation who observed, asked questions, gathered data, followed deductions, and 
built up developed narratives. They shared a common culture of investigation and te-
stified to its democratisation.44 As one anonymous person wrote: ‘I only know what the 
newspapers have published about this case, but certain specifics of these publications 
have led me to make deductions’.45 For her part, Mme Malméjac’s sister-in-law declared 
having led her ‘own little personal investigation’.46 The collection of information in the 
procedural file shows a protean ‘judicial popular policing’ which brought grist to the pro-
fessional investigators’ mill. More than a sum of individual experiments, it is but a part of 
a greater inquisitive community which built up around the missing child and his parents, 
and which tended to subsume the community of professional investigators, in a context 
of a test to the criminal investigation and its actors.
III. Crisis and extension of inquisitive community
In the procedural file, the information and witness accounts which did not help to lead 
the investigation in the right direction were gathered under the title of ‘false leads’, and 
thereby disqualified, with the arrest and confession of the guilty parties enabling justice 
to take its course and establish the judicial truth. This shelving is a form of archive: it al-
lowed the investigators to keep a trace of the data without hindering the course of the 
inquiry. It also undoubtedly has a performative function: to affirm the power of a well-
ordered justice system. And yet, this ordering only took place after the facts. From 28 
November to 2 December, the priority given to the search for ‘young Claude’ meant that 
the investigation took on an unusual character.
In theory, criminal investigations are governed by rules and deployed within a frame-
work defined by the code of criminal investigations. They must be presented in written 
form. All of the items in the inquiry, and all of the acts of the investigating judge, must 
figure in the procedural file. An investigating judge directs the investigation, assisted by 
auxiliaries from the criminal police, if the inquiry is taking place in a town. Usually, the 
investigating judge officiates from his office in the courthouse and his auxiliaries carry 
44 Kalifa, ‘Enquête’.
45 Anonymous, 30 November 1935, ‘false leads’ file, item n°17.
46 Roche statement, 29 November 1935, item n°307.
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out complementary investigations at his request, following his instructions. The balan-
ce between these different actors is unstable, because their categorical aims, professional 
cultures and class membership often differ.47 This balance, along with the respect for pro-
ceedings, was tested over the course of the few days when investigators were focused on 
the search for Claude Malméjac, primarily because Judge Minnard kept the investigati-
on moving at a rapid pace. On 29 November, he formed a number of ‘very urgent’ dele-
gations and rogatory commissions and granted his auxiliaries maximum freedom of mo-
vement, their only instructions being ‘for the purposes of the search’. In these conditions, 
the Sûreté carried out autonomous searches in their own way, following the first witness 
accounts which they had received. This was why the service searched Endoume and the 
Vallon-des-Auffes, requisitioning uniformed police officers and police dogs. The press 
reported between 220 and 250 inspectors in the town and its surroundings.48 The next 
day, the same criminal police service received a delegation from the judge which soun-
ded like a call to order.
The investigating judge, concerned with the respect of the written procedure, asked 
Commissioner Couplet to give formal hearings to those witnesses who had verbally gui-
ded the activities of his service the previous day. He expressed surprise that Marseille-
Matin had mentioned the existence of a past attempted kidnapping which the police had 
known about, but which he did not. He also asked for hearings to be given to different in-
dividuals interviewed by the journalists as witnesses, who had not yet been heard in the 
context of the criminal investigation. Finally, on the subject of a lead ‘which the press is 
also talking about’, he wrote: ‘keep me informed […] so that nothing will be overlooked 
in the files of this criminal matter’. Concerned that justice may be found wanting, the in-
vestigating judge found himself adjusting the framework of the legal inquiry with regard 
to police and journalistic investigations.49 René Minnard also attempted to rein in the 
Sûreté service’s action which he deemed to be too autonomous and demonstrative. He 
therefore demanded that ‘all documents and convicting items which have been entrusted 
to you or may come to be found be addressed to [his] cabinet without delay, so that [he] 
might usefully direct the investigation which [he had] divided up for emergency reasons 
between the different services in the field in Marseille’. He therefore effectively chose to 
entrust the missions of fact-checking in the field to the Mobile Police, who were more 
discreet, leaving more bureaucratic operations to the Sûreté.
And yet, when the kidnappers were arrested on 2 December, the Sûreté had not fini-
shed hearing witnesses from the first few days under oath. The emergency nature of the 
search had to end before the conformity of the investigation could be restored. Moreo-
ver, it was the Sûreté who found the child, on the basis of a tip-off which was communi-
cated to them and which Commissioner Couplet took the initiative of checking with his 
agents, before addressing it ‘without delay’ to the courthouse. This was the service which 
was congratulated by Le Petit Marseillais in its pages on 3 December: the Sûreté therefore 
47 Farcy, ‘L’enquête pénale’; Lopez, ‘Magistrats, policiers et gendarmes’; Tanguy, ‘Le juge d’instruction’.
48 Paris-Soir and Le Journal, 1 December 1935.
49 Delegation of René Minnard to the central commissioner, 30 November 1935, item n°43.
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played a different role in this investigation than that assigned to it by the investigating 
judge. The search for the child therefore put a strain on the hierarchical relationship bet-
ween the judge and the criminal police in Marseille. It would appear that the search also 
contributed to eroding the limits which ordinarily held between the judge and his cabi-
net, policemen in the field, and between these professional investigators and the popula-
tion. The judge and his registrar went themselves to a retirement home on 29 November 
to check on a lead, thereby carrying out a task which would usually have fallen to the po-
lice services. Policemen were working on 29 November alongside the father of the child 
and different witnesses. Albert Tomassonne, the taxi driver, took part ‘in the search, sor-
ting through the unclear points of the witness accounts pertaining to the ‘old woman in 
black’’.50 The newspapers reported that Jean Malméjac, ‘the unhappy father of the unfor-
tunate child, professor at the Faculty of Medicine in Marseille, took part, along with the 
head of the Sûreté, M. Couplet, in an expedition to the neighbourhood of Endoume’.51 A 
photograph from 2 December shows him on a train taking notes on a notepad of the in-
formation provided by Doctor Cézilly, in the manner of a police inspector.52 Alongsi-
de the policemen, the father and the taxi driver, there were also the journalists. A pho-
tograph from Le Petit Marseillais shows Jean Malméjac surrounded by policemen and 
journalists. He is addressing them, they are taking notes: all of them seem to make up a 
large team of investigators. These stagings may have been for the purposes of the media. 
The figure of the investigating journalist is common to all of the articles.53 The staging 
of this group of investigators satisfied media logics. Nevertheless, it was based on a cer-
tain reality: journalists did become auxiliaries of the judge when they followed up leads 
or collected witness accounts which were then checked or made the objects of follow-up 
investigations in the framework of the inquiry. Added to the fact that Paris-Soir encou-
raged the stream of witness accounts and the policemen’s zeal by offering 40 000 francs 
to whoever could give conclusive information and 20 000 francs to the policemen who 
found young Claude, we can consider that the time dedicated to the search for the child 
expanded the perimeter of the investigation well beyond its ordinary institutional limits.
The magistrate and the Sûreté seem in part to have been dispossessed of their preemi-
nence, overrun by a larger inquisitive community with its roots in the population. This 
impression was reinforced by the presence of judicial and police counterparts amongst 
the lay-investigators, or alongside them. Amongst the ‘false leads’, for example, is the wit-
ness account of a secretary from the Marseille police, Paul Polidori, who like so many 
others saw, on 28 November, an old woman fitting the description of the kidnapper.54 
Another witness explained that he had begun an investigation with his district commis-
sioner, before pursuing it with his wife, in spite of its unfruitfulness.55 We can speak of a 
50 Le Petit Marseillais, 30 November 1935.
51 Le Journal, 30 November 1935.
52 Le Petit Marseillais, 2 December 1935.
53 Boucharenc, L’écrivain-reporter.
54 Statement of Paul Polidori, Couplet Statement, 2 December 1935, item n°80.
55 A father, ‘false leads’ file, 30 November 1935, item n°27.
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community because amongst both the police and the contributors, the collective nature 
is apparent. The case sparked conversations, debates and inquiries, with families, friends 
and neighbours. An anonymous source, for example, denounced a resident of the Long-
champ neighbourhood, adding that he had ‘friends in the neighbourhood who are ab-
solutely of the same opinion and like [him] noticed this woman’.56 But it is even clearer 
that the community was bound together by the media. The common point linking all of 
the contributors to the investigation was that they were following the case in the media. 
Many of them associated their statements with the reading of the newspapers. The court 
usher Louis André, for example, wrote that he was ‘intrigued’ by ‘the similarity’ between 
the woman he saw on rue Barthélémy and ‘the description that was given in Le Petit 
Marseillais’. A dowser from Fère-en-Thardenois (Aisne) boasted of having found ‘the ap-
proximative place where the old woman can be found’. He added: ‘based on the newspa-
per accounts, I could see that I was on the right track’.57 Madame Saurin, a teacher, wro-
te: ‘Having been moved by the account in the papers, I cannot resist the urge to share 
what I saw’.58
In the 1930s, newspapers dominated the media sphere, the expansion of which ac-
companied the growth of mass culture. The circulation of the biggest dailies reached two 
million copies, as was the case for Paris-Soir in the mid-1930s. The radio also grew con-
siderably.59 It was the media that broadcast the call for witnesses, before following the in-
vestigation, reporting on the work of the police, and then on the stalling of the inquiry. 
The radio broadcast statements from the Malméjacs to the kidnappers, the transcripts of 
which were reprinted in the papers. All of them described, with great pathos, the anguish 
of the parents, and Paris-Soir offered rewards: caught up in logics of revenue and com-
petition, the dailies competed ingeniously to occupy centre-stage in the media landsca-
pe and to hold their readers’ attention. The media was the pivot for a vast community of 
readers and listeners, united by the disappearance of Claude Malméjac. On 1 December, 
Le Petit Marseillais expressed this function of the press, likening it to ‘the conscience of 
thousands of good people who for the last two days have identified with the pain of the 
unfortunate parents and who would like to alleviate it’.60
This community has something to do with Benedict Anderson’s ‘imagined communi-
ty’, in spite of the reservations which the concept has garnered.61 Its members, unknown 
to each other, shared the same culture (of investigation) and the same aim: to find the 
child, and restore him to his distraught family. Its real existence is even more believable 
since the newspapers made it exist in their columns, by expressing the collective, if not 
unanimous, dimension of the popular mobilisation and compassion. Le Petit Marseil-
lais wrote on 30 November: ‘The story of the horrible kidnapping of a child was enough 
56 Anonymous, 30 November 1935, ‘false leads’ file, item n°6.
57 Villot, 5/12/1935, ‘false leads’ file, unnumbered item.
58 Letter from Mme Saurin, 29 November 1935, ‘false leads’ file, item n°20.
59 Charle, Le siècle de la presse, p. 265 ; Schor, Histoire de la société française, p. 212-213.
60 Le Petit Marseillais, 1 December 1935.
61 Anderson, Imagined Communities; Chivallon, ‘Retour sur la “communauté imaginée” d’Anderson’.
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to make Marseille’s big heart shake. The greatest emotion rocked our city yesterday, with 
everyone speaking of the terrible events. […] once the initial shock had passed, the who-
le city asked itself how it could lend its assistance to the unhappy mother whose heart 
had been broken. The unanimous pain of the city quickly transformed into an immen-
se desire to cooperate in the anxious search’. Jean Marèze, special envoy from Paris-Soir, 
wrote in his article published on 1 December: ‘It was enough to go to Marseille to under-
stand the extent of the sincerity and strength of emotion which has taken over the city 
since the mysterious kidnapping of young Claude Malméjac’. Further, ‘In Marseille, they 
speak of nothing else. In the streets, in the cafés, in the bars, the groups are forming, eve-
ryone gives their opinion. Gossipers intercept passers-by to see if there is any news’. On 
3 December, when the child was found and returned to his parents, Le Petit Marseillais 
printed that: ‘Passers-by unknown to each other asked each other: is it true, at least? Tho-
se who asked this question did not need to specify further. Everyone knew what they 
were talking about’. The article was accompanied by a photograph showing passers-by 
looking happy, learning of the good news from the ‘luminous panels of Cinéac – Le Pe-
tit Marseillais’.62
‘Some emotional faces of passers-by reading the news on the luminous panels of Cinéac – Le Petit Marseillais’, Le 
Petit Marseillais, 3/12/1935
The contributors to the enquiry could be considered as having been active members, 
spurred to speak by different motives. Some hoped to claim the reward offered by Pa-
ris-Soir. Other had to overcome the violent emotions sparked by the narratives in the 
press by speaking out. The licensed investigators, the judge and the police, were part of 
62 Le Petit Marseillais, 3 December 1935.
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this community, but they had a different relationship with the media, inasmuch as they 
were concerned with the media reputation of their institutions. The investigating judge, 
for example, read the press on the morning of 30 November and asked the Sûreté to re-
orient their action as a result. For its part, the Sûreté had journalists by its side the day it 
carried out field searches in Marseille, in order to be fairly treated in the columns the fol-
lowing day.
In the newspapers, the heart of Marseille beat to the rhythm of the investigation, but 
not that of France. The perimeter of the inquisitive community was not, however, limi-
ted to the city. To be sure, in order to follow the case from outside of Marseille, listeners 
and readers had to be interested in the fate of the Malméjacs. Maurice Duffosé, a diviner 
from Haute-Marne who offered his services to the Marseille police on 2 December, ex-
plained that he was responding late because since he ‘rarely read the daily newspapers’, 
he only learned of the case by reading ‘le Petit Parisien’ ‘by chance’.63 Interest in the case 
nevertheless extended beyond the local scale. 42 letters were posted from Marseille, but 
others came from the Paris and Lyon regions, the Alpine region, the departments of Var, 
Vaucluse, Drôme, Hérault, Aisne and even from Switzerland. This can be explained by 
the mediatisation of the case beyond Marseille, with declarants indicating various jour-
nals as references, including Excelsior, Paris-Soir, Paris Midi, le Petit Var and L’Eclaireur 
de l’Est (Reims). Incidentally, it was the publication of the photograph of the guilty par-
ties in the press which led to their identification: the mother and son were recognized by 
a private detective agency in Paris, the Office International de Recherches, who had been 
on their trail since a theft had been committed several years before in Rouen.64
If the field of the inquiry momentarily extended well beyond the criminal investigators 
and the police, it was because the kidnapping had a particularly strong social resonance. 
As during declarations of ceasefire or during political transition, a kind of lawlessness 
momentarily took over, although the scale was obviously not the same. The collective 
fervour which seized the investigators, journalists and public alike, can be explained by 
the particular quality of the victim and the previously unseen nature of the offense, in a 
context of strong collective sensitivity to child kidnappings. The villainous act targeted 
an unquestionably innocent victim, a small child, and struck at the heart of a father, a 
mother, and a whole family, arousing collective compassion which transcended social or 
political differences. Le Petit Marseillais made itself the echo of this sentiment: ‘In every 
household, from the most luxurious to the most humble, all thoughts went to the parents 
crying for their lost child’.65 Some weeks earlier, incidentally, the lifeless body of Nico-
le Marescot, four and half years old, had been found. She had been kidnapped and mur-
dered in Chaumont (department of Haute-Marne) on 19 April 1935. The searches follo-
wing her disappearance had sparked great mobilisations.66 When the disappearance of 
‘young Claude’ was announced, everybody therefore feared the worst. Because this ab-
63 Letter from Maurice Duffosé, 2 December 1935, ‘false leads’ file, unnumbered item.
64 Note from 3 December 1835, Cézilly inquiry, n°46.
65 Le Petit Marseillais, 3 December 1935.
66 Clément, L’affaire Socley.
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duction targeted a young boy, the motive of the kidnappers seemed mysterious. Howe-
ver, the newspapers quickly made a link to the Lindbergh case, whose victim was also a 
young boy, and as soon as the ransom demand was unveiled, the similarity appeared un-
questionable. The kidnapping of the Lindbergh baby garnered a lot of media attention in 
Europe in 1932.67 The similarities with the Malméjac case were interpreted as a new sign 
of the contamination of France by the vices of the United States. It was feared that the-
re was only a small step between kidnapping and the importation of gangsterism.68 In the 
France in the 1930s, weakened by the economic crisis, the crisis of the institutions and 
values, and by political disunity, such a crime could not fail to bring people together and 
the child’s recovery be a breath of fresh air: Le Journal and Détective both featured gang-
sters from Marseille condemning the kidnapping, themselves scandalised by such crimi-
nal methods.
The abduction of Claude Malméjac in Marseille in 1935 was a singular event. The act 
shocked its contemporaries on more than one count: the victim was a small child, the fa-
mily was attacked through him, the kidnappers seems to have brought a dreaded kind of 
North American criminality to France and therefore further evidence, if it was needed, 
of the disintegration of values. The linking of this abduction with the Marescot and Lind-
bergh affairs also contributed, at the time, to increasing its dramatic intensity. It was in 
this context that the investigators, lacking leads, appealed to the population to move the 
investigation forward, by means of the radio and the written press. The broadcasting of 
information in the media, followed by the coverage of the case, sparked a large popular 
mobilisation. Alongside eyewitness accounts, which met with the investigators’ expecta-
tions, there were also contributors who wished to be part of the cast of the investigation. 
They individually exercised a form of judicial popular policing. Yet the extraordinary na-
ture of the crime tested the institutional actors of the investigation, compromising their 
hierarchical structures and usual practices, to the extent that they seemed to melt into 
the wider inquisitive community, which collectively exercised judicial popular policing, 
the aim of which was to restore social order and consensus, in a France in the throes of 
disunity and crisis.
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Policing, Participation and People: some 
historical perspectives
Xavier Rousseaux
The focus of this book and of the conference from which it emerged relate to popular 
participation in social control and local policing. The project aims to reverse the traditio-
nal historiographical approach to policing from the eighteenth century onwards in We-
stern Europe. This traditional perspective underlines the increasing monopolisation of 
public order by central governments who took the initiative to professionalise the actors 
of social control, and gradually adopted the functions of public order for the benefit of 
public, local or centralised authorities. In contrast, an interpretation which focuses on a 
bottom-up approach, as in the concept of “popular participation”, highlights more com-
plex relationships between authorities who guarantee security, and residents seeking pu-
blic order. However, proponents of “popular participation” must avoid two pitfalls. First, 
they must avoid creating a radical opposition between elites and people uniformly sub-
ject to public order in the service of the elites. Second, they should avoid proposing an 
irenic vision making the local community the sole legitimate authors of public order 
working in the service of all. Both interpretations – either the conflictual reading of law 
enforcement officials like police officers or frontline judges as “watchdogs of capitalism” 
or servants of particular interests, as well as a consensual reading of the community – 
consider the people and power to be monolithic and eternal entities. The socio-histori-
cal approach defines public order as a space for debate, always unstable, split between the 
demands of divergent interest groups. Developing a socio-historical approach is there-
fore a question of rediscovering the dynamics behind the construction of public order 
as related to the balance between the demands of the population and the ideology of the 
authorities. We have also sought to uncover how control was shared between the groups 
constituting each community as power was delegated, captured or reinterpreted by the 
public authorities for their own benefit.
From the eighteenth century until the present day, the population has remained a ma-
jor actor in public order. The use of the generic term ‘population’ here should not obscu-
re in each field of observation the diversity of the components of each local population, 
nor the variety and heterogeneity of the groups to which it belongs. In this book, these 
range from a Milanese village in the eighteenth century, to a French provincial city in the 
nineteenth century or indeed the Catalan metropolis at the beginning of the twentieth 
century. On the other hand, concepts such as co-construction between actors, or “coope-
tition” between competitors, can reflect the mechanism of public order formation.1 Ho-
1 Brandenburger and Nalebuff, Co-opetition.
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wever, they do not define what this public order would be. It seems to us that the notion 
of a common order, based on concrete objectives and going beyond either class lines bet-
ween the elites, wealthy and the working classes, or the ideological differences between 
supporters of revolution and security, makes it possible to better understand how public 
order is constructed on a daily basis, building on a precarious balance of tensions bet-
ween individual behaviour and group interests.
As Emmanuel Berger and Antoine Renglet point out in their introduction, the relati-
onship between forms of popular participation and public institutions in policing can be 
described as follows in various ways.
The involvement of local representatives in choosing the actors for common order is 
a first element of popular participation. Before the eighteenth century, a multiplicity of 
power relations and actors was the rule in each territorial configuration, whether villa-
ge, urban space, or territorial principality. The studies gathered here call into question 
the simplified vision of the regular transition from an old regime of orders and hierar-
chies based on personal status moving to modern states based on a uniform public or-
der. For both the judiciary (in particular the small offices) which guarantees efficient so-
cial functioning (hygiene, commerce, night police, local justice), and also for the local 
actors of policing, popular participation interferes with the recruitment, retention or re-
newal of official actors. Driven by population growth, during the period 1750-1850 the-
re was a movement amongst central authorities in Europe driven by their desire to better 
control local orders. This led to tensions between the maintenance of traditional forms of 
local police. Recent work on the cities of the Ancien Régime (Naples, Madrid, Milan, Mi-
lan, Toulouse, Paris, Brussels) paints a more subtle landscape than the traditional view of 
an opposition between community control and new police and judicial institutions or-
ganised by the State. At this time, some new magistrates, such as the Alcades de barrios 
in Madrid, are challenging old practices, while others, such as the Neapolitan Capitani di 
Strada, are evolving with the establishment of new structures designated from above. On 
the one hand, workers and craftsmen rooted in their neighbourhoods impose their au-
thority by their ability to represent their peers through these small magistrates. On the 
other hand, central governments, whether by choice or because they are forced to, start to 
invest in the development of transmission belts with the working classes, especially in ci-
ties dominated by traditional elites (Marin, Antonielli). These approaches to negotiating 
public order sometimes run counter to the willingness of reformers to break complex re-
lationships between populations and local elites, in favour of a rationalized vision of the 
State’s public policy prerogatives.
Revolutionary movements, whether endogenous or exported, such as the French Re-
volution and the Napoleonic Empire, accentuate these tensions between a “centralizing” 
order and local populations. The sets of scales are becoming more important. Despite the 
willingness of the central authorities to create a uniform “public” order, the study of each 
local situation highlights the relative influence of each population in managing the lo-
cal order....
279
Xavier Rousseaux
Disorder is another laboratory for the study of concepts of order. Managing disorder 
is the concern of any local authority, and the support of sections of the population is es-
sential in the face of external or internal threats. Studies on national guards establish the 
principle of self-control in times of crisis, either locally or by central government. The 
different scenarios presented focus on traditional policing structures within which na-
tional “guards” are established. Such structures do come into existence spontaneously, 
and they display a clear connection with the structures of urban policing under the An-
cien Régime. The bourgeois guards of the former regime are the obvious symbol to lo-
cals of the community’s ability to take charge of the return to disturbed order, particu-
larly with regard to threats outside the community. For medieval cities enclosed within 
walls, urban militias, composed of the active part of the male population, are called up 
in the event of a threat outside the city limits (war, epidemic...). Nevertheless, the pro-
blem with these urban communities is that some of their members group together as re-
bels against urban authority.2 The disappearance of urban ramparts and the use of milita-
ry forces in the event of unrest reflect the gradual integration of local communities into 
larger political territories (principalities, kingdoms). This “relocation” of public order is 
particularly evident during revolutionary periods, marked by the strong politicization of 
traditional structures for the restoration of order. The “national” or “bourgeois” designa-
tion attached to active guards during revolutionary unrest highlights the ideology of the 
common good (national, patriotic, republican), or the supporting group (bourgeoisie, 
craftsmen, workers...) promoted by the institution. Public order is no longer just a pro-
blem for the local authorities, but becomes a problem of co-construction on the local and 
supra-local levels. Despite their apparent radical diversity, the two “Parisian” examples of 
the Revolutionary reports committee (Castellà i Pujols) and of the development of the 
high police of Napoleonic surveillance (Le Quang), demonstrate how much this “deter-
ritorialization” of public order is possible only through the participation of local groups, 
or thanks to individuals interested in reporting local disorders to the central govern-
ment. In the first case, revolutionary “policing” is thought of as a local community exten-
ded to the nation; civic denunciation is intended to be exercised in an act of transparen-
cy and separation of powers. In the second case, the threat and disorder are reduced to 
the individual level by the central power, in a confusion between police and justice, sup-
ported by discreet local interests. Civic denunciation becomes a secret and anonymous 
denunciation.3 The French model of Garde Nationale is the ultimate expression of bour-
geois participation in the local order. Nevertheless, as the example of the Cisalpine Repu-
blic shows, this model is changing into conquered territory (Dendena). Recruiting main-
ly volunteers from the urban working classes who are seduced by revolutionary change, 
the national guards are used to fight against robbery and smuggling on the margins of 
the Republic. Their military failure and their popular constitution as urban artisans will 
lead to their dissolution in favour of more endogenous forms. The same applies to deba-
2 Chiffoleau, Gauvard and Zorzi, Pratiques sociales et politiques judiciaires.
3 Gellately and Fitzpatrick, Accusatory Practices.
Policing, Participation and People: some historical perspectives
280
tes on local justice during revolutionary conquests, as shown by the example of the Du-
chy of Warsaw which was subject to French and Russian influence. Should local judges 
come from the population, through elections, or represent traditional urban or rural eli-
tes (Galedek)? Tensions between central power, intermediate elites and local populations 
can be found in the “modernization” of order and justice.
In the nineteenth century, in the French territories, the “national” guards were most 
often made up of liberal bourgeoisie whose interests were primarily the maintenance of 
their domination in the urban space and the protection of property. Depending on the 
local political configuration and whether it is during a time of crisis, these units bring to-
gether different strata of citizens, supporters of the Revolution, a moderate monarchy or 
a “sharing” republicanism as mentioned in the examples of Rennes and Lyon (Drober, 
Pareyre). In the southern European states, during the 1848 movements, local participati-
on in the “national guards” aimed at ensuring security and tax collection produced a dual 
movement of politicization of local citizens, and political appropriation by local com-
munities (Delpu). This function of expressing rivalries and local politicization partly ex-
plains the composition of the political parties that emerged in Europe in the second half 
of the nineteenth century and which built local democracy.
The abolition of national guards at the end of the nineteenth or beginning of the twen-
tieth century in France did not prevent the evolution of a myth of popular participation 
in policing. Following the 1870 German-French war, however, in a totally different con-
text, namely that of the modern war between national armies, the myth of the national 
or civic guard as being poorly armed, poorly uniformed, and undisciplined resurfaced in 
the mythology of “franc-tireurs”. Does this official vacuum of popular participation in lo-
cal order leave room for other forms of mobilization to defend collective interests? In the 
interbellum period, paramilitary groups, soviets of soldiers, corps-francs or workers mi-
litias, were to flourish, as an expression of popular power, in the context of the polariza-
tion of anti-democratic forces.
Another form of popular participation in the control of disorder highlighted in this 
book was the recruitment of self-proclaimed supplementary groups, most often based 
on forms of community associations, such as the Voraces lyonnais during the Canuts re-
volt, the Sicilian Squadri in rural areas or the Somatent in an industrialized metropo-
lis like Barcelona (Pareyre, Scaramuzza, Grafl). On the one hand, these two examples, 
among others, highlight the relationship between the different forms of control over pro-
duction tools (Lyon trades, Sicilian rural properties, or Barcelona factories) and the in-
terests of their owners. The training and police activity of these militias was often neces-
sary in times of unrest, but did not easily coexist with the public forces. They existed in 
areas undergoing profound transformation, the rural world emerging from local feu-
dalism, through the Garibaldian invasion, or the Mediterranean port cradle of extreme 
class struggles. Such militias are based on traditional or invented structures which were 
used to meet new needs. Moreover, these examples raise a question that is not very much 
addressed in this book, that of the cost of collective security and the interest of certain 
groups of the population in exerting control in a way beneficial to their interests, lea-
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ding them to manage or even create their own protection services (privatized security). 
This work can be linked to the current research on the emergence of private security in 
contemporary societies.4 It is again a question of breaking the image of private compe-
tition with official law enforcement agencies, and of formalizing the relationship bet-
ween public security and the needs of population groups (security of production tools, 
movement of goods, etc.) Not only does the formalization (uniform, disciplinary ethos, 
training) of private security agents require an adjustment of relations with official law 
enforcement agencies. It also introduces complex negotiations between special interests 
and the public interest, and redefinitions of private, community and public spaces; in 
short resulting in the monopoly of the public use of legitimate force.
Nevertheless, it remains true that the trend towards public control of community order 
is a major phenomenon in Western Europe between the eighteenth and twenty-first cen-
turies. The growing influence of the official forces of law and order, both in doctrine and 
in the field, leads to ever more complex requests addressed to them. A call for policing is 
another form of popular participation, whether it is focused on protecting the owners in 
rural areas or areas less controlled by the national state (with the evoked threat of robbe-
ry), or protecting the property of industrialists (threat of predation), small traders, and 
working-class districts (threat of lumpenproletariat). The increasing demands of the po-
pulation on the police marked the evolution of urban police in the nineteenth and twen-
tieth centuries, particularly in metropolitan areas or capital cities. Some groups criticize 
police laxity while others complain about their interventionism (Vaz). The popular press 
reinforces this binary image of either a lax or repressive police force, depending on the 
demands of local or national elites, and also on the “scandals” that allow criticism of the 
ruling power. Petitions and press are demonstrating these pressures from below to de-
mand protection for the different groups. In reverse, it seems important for the relevant 
authorities to control these new requests and integrate them into traditional forms of or-
der. The French case study highlights the fact that parliamentary democracy is wary of 
popular intervention, but it also incites the police, in particular the gendarmerie and ur-
ban police, to exert ever less violent coercion towards popular demonstrations (Lopez). 
The legitimacy of the police as representatives of the population depends on this mitiga-
tion of violence.
The experience of war adds an additional level of complexity for policing. The legiti-
macy acquired by official law enforcement agencies in most nineteenth century states 
becomes undermined by the new phenomenon of long-term military occupation. Thus 
the long wars of the twentieth century will see denunciations play a considerable role in 
conflicts of public order. Citizens are confronted with competition between the security 
forces of the occupying and occupied state. Both the first and second world wars lead to 
a conflict of legitimacy, which, in reverse, legitimizes practices of double games between 
public authorities (denunciation), the development of semi-official police forces, or ar-
med opposition against the occupier and its national collaborators. Reporting to the au-
thorities is a much more explosive exercise in occupied societies. While fear of enemy 
4 De Koster and Leloup, ‘Policer le port d’Anvers’; Leloup, ‘A Historical Perspective’.
Policing, Participation and People: some historical perspectives
282
spies manifests itself behind the front line (Ronan), it is much more devastating in occu-
pied countries where the categories of enemy and friend are blurred.5 Military operations 
promote the return of practices that predate the State’s control over public order, such as 
rural banditry or revenge killings, and also undermines the State’s monopoly and citi-
zens’ trust in it.6 To relegate itself, the state must rethink the relationship between citizen 
participation and public authority in policing.
A final place where people’s demands on the authorities converge is in the “horrible” 
rumours and crimes that generate popular emotions during threats perceived as unusu-
al. In 1750, the case of child abduction had stirred up the Parisian crowds.7 The emer-
gence of the “popular” press provides a permanent framework for the expression of an-
guish linked to predators targeting vulnerable individuals (children, isolated women, the 
elderly, etc.). Not only do journalists become investigators in the name of popular legiti-
macy, but official investigators also do not hesitate to use the press as a channel of com-
munication with the public. In major European cities the emergence of American-style 
“kidnappings” reflects on the one hand the fear of the moral disintegration of living com-
munities (neighbourhoods, parishes), and on the other hand, the atomization of social 
control and the individualization of popular demands. Child abduction is a profound re-
velation of the transformations of perceived threats in an individualized society, which is 
detached from the traditional collective protection of the community. The answer, skill-
fully staged or escaping the authorities, is the wave of individuals participating in the 
hunt for perverse criminals. However, this phenomenon introduces a disparity between 
cases which became media sensations, and those that remain in the shadows. The Mal-
méjac case is based on the investigators’ willingness to call witnesses while refusing to al-
low citizens to interfere with the investigation itself (Montel). This last case, in response 
to the growing concerns of cosmopolitan societies about attacks on their most vulnerab-
le members, children, highlights a blind spot in the research presented here, namely the 
participation of women in public order. Much of the uproar caused by child abduction 
cases in Europe since the 1990’s is characterized by the mobilization of women of all so-
cial levels and ages who are reactivating local networks of solidarity to form popular an-
ti-abduction protest marches and groups. As a result of these movements, there has been 
a global transformation of the police system, where the supposed priorities of the popu-
lation are integrated into police action plans.
The work begun by this book offers new perspectives on over two centuries of the re-
lationship between police, justice and the population. It confirms the paradox of the de-
mand for security. Insofar as conflict regulation emerges from the local context to the be-
nefit of state and national authorities as part of their claim to a monopoly on the use of 
physical coercion, police and courts must rebuild the legitimacy of their action. Such le-
gitimacy is based on the participation of populations who are gradually deprived of any 
5 Campion and Rousseaux, Policing New Risks.
6 Thiry, Le tribut des temps troubles; Leloup, Rousseaux, and Vrints, ‘Banditry in occupied and liberated 
Belgium’.
7 Farge and Revel, The Vanishing Children.
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direct intervention in public order and justice. In fact, whether they tacitly approve, col-
laborate in an auxiliary manner or in times of crisis or occupation, or replace disorga-
nized or powerless law enforcement agencies, the various components of the population 
have never stopped negotiating a shared public order with the authorities.
Bibliography
Adam M. Brandenburger and Barry J. Nalebuff, Co-opetition (New York: Doubleday 
Currency, 1996).
Pratiques sociales et politiques judiciaires dans les villes de l’Occident à la fin du Moyen 
Âge, ed. by Jacques Chiffoleau, Claude Gauvard and Zorzi Andrea (Rome: Ecole Fran-
çaise de Rome, 2007).
Accusatory Practices: Denunciation in Modern European History, 1789-1989, ed. by 
Robert Gellatelly and Sheila Fitzpatrick (Chicago: University Chicago Press, 1997).
Margo De Koster, and Pieter Leloup, ‘Policer le port d’Anvers: contrôles policiers publics 
et privés, entre complémentarité et rivalité, fin XIXe-début XXe siècle’, in Policer les mo-
bilités Europe-États-Unis, XVIIIe-XXIe siècle, ed. by Anne Conchon, Laurence Montel 
and Céline Regnard (Paris, Éditions de la Sorbonne: 2018)
Amandine Thiry, Le tribut des temps troubles, La justice face aux homicides attribués à 
la ‘résistance’ dans l’arrondissement de Mons (avril 1943-novembre 1944) (Louvain-la-
Neuve : Presses Universitaires de Louvain, 2016).
Policing New Risks in Modern Europe History, ed. by Jonas Campion and Xavier Rous-
seaux (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).
Pieter Leloup, ‘A Historical Perspective on Crime Control and Private Security: a Belgian 
Case Study’, Policing and Society, 29-5 (2019), 1-15.
Pieter Leloup, Xavier Rousseaux and Antoon Vrints, ‘Banditry in occupied and libera-
ted Belgium, 1914–21. Social practices and state reactions’, Social History, 39-1 (2014), 
83-105.
Arlette Farge and Jacques Revel, The Vanishing Children of Paris: Rumor and Politics be-
fore the French Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991).

List of authors
Livio Antonielli graduated from the University of Milan and the Scuola Normale Superi-
ore in Pisa. He has subsequently lectured in modern history and the history of political 
institutions at the Universities of Milan and Messina. His areas of expertise include the 
study of Italian institutions during the Napoleonic era, the police forces and forms of ter-
ritorial control between the 17th and 19th centuries, in particular in the state of Milan. 
He founded the Centre for studies on police history and territorial control (CEPOC), 
which published 32 volumes on these themes.  
Emmanuel Berger is professor of legal and social history at the Universidade Federal da 
Paraíba (Brazil). He was fellow at the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in 2017 
and at the Institute for Advanced study of Paris in 2013. His published works include 
(with Emilie Delivré, Martin Löhnig) “Popular Justice in Times of Transition” (2017); 
(with Clive Emsey) “Police and Public Order in France and England (1750-1850)”, 
Crime, History & Societies, 20/1 (2016); (with Emilie Delivré) “Popular justice in Eu-
rope” (2014); (with Heinz-Gerhard Haupt) “Popular Protest and Violence in 19 Century 
Europe”, European Review of History, 20/6 (2013); and “La justice pénale sous la Révo-
lution” (2008). 
Maria Betlem Castellà i Pujols is a postdoctoral researcher in History at the Department 
of Humanities of he Pompeu Fabra University (Barcelona, Spain). Her main research 
interests focus on the French revolutionary process and more specifically, the commit-
tees and the commissions of the French parliamentary assemblies, as well as the mainte-
nance of public order and the management of correspondence and petitions in the par-
liamentary sphere. She has published more than thirty academic papers and has given 
more than forty conferences in Europe, the United States and Japan. ORCID 0000-0001-
7837-721X.
Pierre-Marie Delpu holds a PhD in History and teaches at Aix-Marseille Université. He 
is a specialist of 19th century Southern Italian history. His last publications include:  “Le 
Royaume de Naples à l’heure française. Revisiter l’histoire du Decennio francese 1806-
1815”  (ed. with Igor Moullier and Mélanie Traversier, Presses du Septentrion, 2018), 
and “Un autre Risorgimento. La formation du monde libéral dans le Royaume des Deux-
Siciles 1815-1856” (Ecole française de Rome, 2019).
Francesco Dendena is a historian, specialist of political and cultural questions in the age 
of the French Revolution and Napoleonian Empire. His current research focuses on the 
editorial production and the book transfers between France and North Italy during the 
Republican Era. After five years as post-PhD and lecturer at University of Milan, he is 
currently member of the FNS project “Milan and Ticino (1796-1848). Shaping the Spati-
ality of a European Capital” and fellow at Swiss Institute of Rome.
Axel Dröber is currently researcher at the German Historical Institute of Paris where he 
held a fellowship between 2011 and 2013. He then conducted his PhD on the French Na-
tional Guard during the Restoration era and the July monarchy in France at the Univer-
sity of Freiburg im Breisgau.
Michał Gałędek is the Head of Chair of Legal History and Professor at the Faculty of Law 
and Administration of University of Gdańsk since 2019. His recent monograph (habilita-
tion) about concepts of the new administrative system for the Congress Poland was pu-
blished in Polish in 2017. His current research focuses on the Polish constitutionalism 
in 19th century and the development of Polish legal culture in 19th and 20th centuries.
Florian Grafl (Institute for European Ethnology and Cultural Analysis-Ludwigs-Maximi-
lians-University Munich) is part of the research group “Gewaltgemeinschaften” (Com-
munities of Violence) at Giessen University from 2009 to 2015 and wrote his PhD on 
collective violence in Barcelona during the interwar-period (1918-1936). Currently, he is 
working on the interdisciplinary research project “Sketches of Manners as Representati-
ons of Knowledge in Spanish America (1830-1860)”. His research is mainly focused on 
contemporary Spain, urban violence in Europe and the global history of science in the 
19th century.  
Jeanne-Laure Le Quang held a PhD in 2019 at the Institut d’Histoire moderne et contem-
poraine (Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne) about “Haute police et contrôle social 
sous le Consulat et le Premier Empire, 1799-1815”. Her publications include: “Exécuter la 
loi. 1789-1804” (with Virginie Martin, Alexandre Guermazi, 2018); “La commission sé-
natoriale de la liberté individuelle face aux mesures de haute police (1804-1814): loi inté-
grée, loi contournée ?”, Annales historiques de la Révolution française, 2018/4. 
Laurent Lopez holds a PhD in history from the Université of Paris IV-Sorbonne (2012). 
He is currently researcher and professor at the French National Military Archives (Ser-
vice Historique de la Défense, Vincennes). He is also an associate researcher of the CES-
DIP (CNRS). He is a lecturer at the National Gendarmerie’s internal preparatory class-
es and at the universities of Panthéon-Assas, Versailles-Saint Quentin-en-Yvelines, and 
Montpellier 3. For the past 20 years or so, he has been studying French and European law 
enforcement agencies. He published dozens of works on this topic.
Brigitte Marin is a Professor of Early Modern History (Aix-Marseille Université). She was 
Director of the Maison méditerranéenne des sciences de l’Homme (Aix-en-Provence, 
France) from 2009 to 2017. She is, since the 1st of September 2019, Director of the École 
française de Rome. Her research focuses on urban history in early modern Italy, grain 
provisioning and sanitary politics (especially in Naples), and the police reforms in 18th c. 
southern Europe.
Laurence Montel is a lecturer, member of Criham (EA 4270, University of Poitiers - 
France) and associated member of TELEMMe (UMR 7303, Aix-Marseille University - 
France). Her research focuses on history of contemporary crime and organized crime, 
underworld and urban imaginary, urban governance and corruption, from the study case 
of Marseille.
Matthias Pareyre is agrégé and graduated from the École Normale Supérieure of Lyon. He 
is currently assistant professor (A.T.E.R.) at Paris-Nanterre University and PhD student 
at the IRHiS laboratory (Lille University). Under Sylvie Aprile’s supervision, he is writ-
ing a PhD project on “Prendre le fusil pour défendre ou renverser les autorités: le rôle de 
la Garde nationale à Lyon et à Marseille dans les insurrections urbaines au XIXe siècle”. 
Antoine Renglet holds his PhD in history from the universities of Lille and Namur. His 
research field includes policing in European cities from the Enlightenment to the Napo-
leonic Era. After having been FNRS research fellow at the University of Louvain, he is 
currently postdoc of the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation at the Goethe University 
in Frankfurt/M. He also teaches history of crime and penal policies at the University of 
Namur. In 2020, he will publish at the University Press of Rennes: “Polices, villes et sécu-
rité sous la Révolution et l’Empire. L’ordre public urbain dans l’espace belge, 1780-1814”.
Ronan Richard held his PhD in 2004 from the Université de Rennes 2. He is currently 
associate researcher at the same University. He published “Hugo Ringer. Boulevard des 
Etrangers” (2018); “Internement et emprisonnement pendant la première guerre mon-
diale”, Bretagne 14-18 (2002/3); “Le sentiment national en Bretagne autour de la guer-
re”, Bretagne 14-18 (1998).
Xavier Rousseaux is Research Director at the National Funds for Scientific Research 
(FRS-FNRS), and professor at the Université catholique de Louvain, where he is director 
of the Centre for Law & Justice history. Working extensively on of the history of crime 
and justice, he is founder of www.Digithemis.be, hosting digital humanities resources for 
the history of justice. He co-edited the following books: (with Annie Hondeghem, Frédé-
ric Schoenaers), “Modernisation of the Criminal Justice Chain and the Judicial System” 
(2015); (with Jonas Campion), “Policing New Risks in Modern Europe History” (2016); 
(with Jean Trépanier), “Youth and Justice in Western States, 1815-1950” (2018).
Emilio Scaramuzza received his PhD in history from both University of Aix-Marseille 
and University of Milan. In December 2017, he discussed his doctoral dissertation, en-
titled “L’ordine nella libertà”. Territorial control, police and government policies in Gar-
ibaldinian Sicily (1860)”, in Aix-en-Provence. In May 2018, as a post-doctoral fellow at 
Università della Svizzera italiana, he joined the “Milan and Ticino (1796-1848)” project 
funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation. His research is focused on the Italian 
Risorgimento, in particular the Garibaldinian voluntarism during the Italian unification.
Maria João Vaz is currently assistant professor at the Department of History (ISCTE– In-
stituto Universitário de Lisboa) and researcher at the Centre for Research and Studies in 
Sociology (CIES-IUL). Her research fields are the social history of 19th and 20th centuries, 
the history of crime, social control and criminal justice, and the migration movements. 
Her most recent publication includes the book “Crime em Lisboa, 1850-1910” (Lisbon, 
Tinta da China, 2014).
©2019 Edition Rechtskultur
Edition Rechtskultur im Förderverein Europäische Rechtskultur e.V., Regensburg
www.edition-rechtskultur.de
Satz und Gestaltung: Carola Brand, Eva Lackner und Simon Naczinsky, Regensburg
ISBN: 978-3-96374-039-8
ISSN: 2568-4469
Aboservice: rechtskultur@gmail.com
